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
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CURIOSITIES OF WAR.



CURIOSITIES OF WAR

AND

MILITARY STUDIES:

Anecdotal, Descriptive, and Statistical.

"Every village has its hero, and every fireside has
its story."—RT. HON. B. DISRAELI.

BY THOMAS CARTER,

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE.

LONDON:

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P R E F A C E.

THE main object of the following pages has been to form a Manual of Amusement, Instruction, and Example; to illustrate, however imperfectly, the advantages to be derived from the practice of discipline and duty, and to show that there are CURIOSITIES IN WAR as in LITERATURE. Bright examples must ever act as incentives to noble deeds, and it is hoped that whilst this volume may prove interesting to the general public, the military reader may derive from it practical lessons for the formation of character.

T. C.

OCTOBER 1, 1859.




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TO
His Royal Highness
THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE,
K.G., K.P., G.C.B., AND G.C.M.G., ETC., ETC., ETC.,
GENERAL COMMANDING IN CHIEF,
THESE
CURIOSITIES OF WAR
And Military Studies,
ARE, WITH PERMISSION,
MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED,
BY HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS'S
VERY OBEDIENT,
HUMBLE SERVANT,
THOMAS CARTER.





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BATTLES ON SUNDAYS.

“ *Sundays* the pillars are
On which heav’n’s palace arched lies ;
The other days fill up the spare
And hollow room with vanities.”

GEORGE HERBERT.



CURIOSITIES OF WAR.

BATTLES ON SUNDAYS.

How remarkable is it to notice the numerous battles which have been fought on Sundays, particularly on Palm, Easter, and Whit Sundays. It is a stern necessity, that offers so sad a contrast to the prayer which then is ascending from ivied village church or stately city fane, to preserve us "from battle and murder, and from sudden death."

Colonel Monro, in his "Expedition," speaks of the battle of Ravenna, fought on Easter-day, 1512, between the French and Dutch and the Spaniards, in which "one shot of a double cannon did kill forty horsemen."

There are two instances of Sunday battles during the contest between the Houses of York and Lancaster.

Turn then the attention to four centuries since. Two hostile armies are on the eve of engaging—Edward of York is about to lead on his troops, while poor King Henry, almost desirous of shuffling off his

sovereignty, is envying the condition of the "homely swain :"—

"Gives not the hawthorn bush a sweeter shade
To shepherds, looking on their silly sheep,
Than doth a rich embroider'd canopy
To kings, that fear their subjects' treachery?"

The air is darkened by the snow, which, being blown in the faces of the Lancastrian host, has made their red rose *white*. Warwick has slain his horse, and has sworn to stand by Edward to the last gasp, and the latter soon gains the day. This victory was obtained at Towton, on *Palm Sunday*, the 29th of March, 1461; and the old chronicler has quaintly said, "this day was celebrated with lances instead of palms."

Ten years afterwards, and the two parties of York and Lancaster again appeal to arms. Barnet is the scene, and the day is *Easter Sunday*, 14th of April, 1471. Warwick, who had since earned the title of King-maker, fights against his former sovereign Edward, and has sent away his horse, that his soldiers may see he is resolved to share their fate. Deserted by his son-in-law, "false, fleeting, perjured Clarence," Warwick has fought his last fight, and, mortally wounded, is forced to exclaim :—

"Lo, now my glory smear'd in dust and blood !
My parks, my walks, my manors that I had,
Even now forsake me ; and of all my lands,
Is nothing left me, but my body's length !
Why, what is pomp, rule, reign, but earth and dust ?
And, live we how we can, yet die we must."

Edward is once more victorious; and, after his

success at Tewkesbury, on the 4th of May following, reigns without further opposition.

Two centuries later, and on Sunday, the 23rd of October, 1642, is to be fought one of the first battles between Charles and his Parliament. The very melancholy natural to the former has something indicative of his sad career; and even his presents appear typical, as witness his gift of a splendid cope to the Cathedral of Durham, which had embroidered on it David holding in his hand the head of Goliath. There is a curiosity of war, too, connected with this battle at Edge Hill, besides its being fought on a Sunday, for Cromwell is said to have viewed the contest from the church of Burton Dassett. Strange hiding-place for the future Protector!

In this battle Sir Gervase Scroop, fighting valiantly for the King, received twenty-six wounds, and was left on the ground amongst the dead. Next day his son Adrian obtained leave of the King to find and fetch away his father's corpse, and his hopes pretended no higher than a decent interment thereof. Such a search was thought in vain amongst so many naked bodies disguised with wounds, and where pale death had confounded all complexions together. However, having some general hint of the place where his father fell, he at last found the body, which had still some warmth within it; this heat was, with rubbing, within a few moments improved to motion, that motion within some hours into sense, and that sense within a day into speech; and in a few weeks he arrived to a perfect degree of recovery, living more than ten years after, a monument of his son's affection, filial care, and perseverance.

The conflict with the Covenanters at Loudon Hill was fought by Captain Graham, of Claverhouse, afterwards the celebrated Viscount Dundee, on Sunday, the 1st of June, 1679.

Forty-nine years later, and the cause of James II. sustains a defeat at Aghrim, in Ireland. This occurred in the evening of Sunday, the 12th of July, 1691.

It is singular to read the account of the battle of Ramillies, given at the time; for it is stated, that *being* Whit-Sunday, 12th of May, 1706, O.S., the Duke of Marlborough obtained a complete victory over the Elector of Bavaria and Marshal Villeroy at Ramillies, as if the day had anything to do therewith. His Grace had a narrow escape here, for Colonel Bingfield's head was carried off by a cannon-ball while holding the stirrup for the Duke to remount.

This incident recalls to mind the anecdote of the officer who kept bowing and taking off his hat to the Duke of Marlborough during some hotly contested battle, and was requested to waive ceremony. Whilst thus bowing, however, a cannon-ball passed over, and took off the head of one of the Duke's staff, when the officer is said to have remarked: "Your Grace perceives that one loses nothing by politeness."

The disastrous battle of Almanza was fought on Easter Sunday, the 25th of April, 1707. The Earl of Galway, a Frenchman, commanded the English army, and the Duke of Berwick, an Englishman, being the son of James II., by Marlborough's sister, was the leader of the French troops. This circumstance originated the witticism that the English had beaten the French, and not the French the English.

On Sunday, the 13th of November, 1715, was

fought the battle of Dumblaine, or Sheriffmuir. It was of this fight that Burns sang:—

“ But had you seen the philibegs,
And skyrin' tartan trews, man,
When in the teeth they dared our Whigs,
And covenant true blues, man;
In lines extended lang and large,
When bayonets opposed the targe,
And thousands hastened to the charge,
Wi' Highland wrath, they frae the sheath,
Drew blades o' death, till, out o' breath,
They fled like frightened doos, man.”

Both the Earl of Mar and the Duke of Argyle claimed the victory; but the Pretender reaped no advantage from it, the rebellion in his favour being shortly afterwards suppressed.

The “War of the Austrian Succession” offers an example in the battle of Val, or Laffeld, near Maestricht, fought on Sunday, the 2nd of July, 1747. In this battle the illustrious General Wolfe, then a major in the Thirty-third, now named the Duke of Wellington's Regiment, gave the earliest proofs of that military genius which afterwards won Quebec for the British crown, and paved the way for the conquest of Canada.

The Peninsular War is fruitful in Sunday fighting. The second battle in Portugal, that of Vimiera, was fought on Sunday, the 21st of August, 1808. The battle of Fuentes d'Onor was gained on Sunday, the 5th of May, 1811. On Sunday evening, the 19th of January, 1812, Lord Wellington issued the brief and determined order that “Ciudad Rodrigo must be carried by assault this evening, at seven o'clock.” The battle

of Orthes was fought on Sunday, the 27th of February, 1814, and that of Toulouse, the last general action of the Peninsular War, occurred on Easter Sunday, the 10th of April following. The battle of Waterloo was also decided on a Sunday, the date being the well known 18th of June, 1815.

The second Burmese war afforded two examples. On Easter Sunday, the 11th of April, 1852, the attack on the lines of defences at Rangoon took place. The second was the attack and capture of Pegu, on Sunday, the 21st of November, 1852, by the Anglo-Indian troops under Major-general Godwin.

In the victory of Inkermann is found another instance, for it was fought on Sunday, the 5th of November, 1854. This has been termed the "soldiers' battle," and Field-marshal Lord Raglan's despatch to his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, Minister at War, will ever be read with interest, giving, as it does, the wondrous details of that mighty and sanguinary contest, the second in which French and English emulated each other in deeds of daring against a force far superior as regards numbers :—

" Before Sevastopol, November 8, 1854.

" MY LORD DUKE,—I have the honour to report to your Grace that the army under my command, powerfully aided by the corps of observation of the French army, under the command of that distinguished officer, General Bosquet, effectually repulsed and defeated a most vigorous and determined attack of the enemy on our position overlooking the ruins of Inkermann, on the morning of the 5th instant.

" In my letter to your Grace of the 3rd, I informed

you that the enemy had considerably increased their force in the valley of the Tschernaya. The following day this augmentation was still further apparent, and large masses of troops had evidently arrived from the northward, and on two several occasions persons of distinguished rank were observed to have joined the Russian Camp.

"I have subsequently learnt that the 4th corps d'armée, conveyed in carriages of the country, and in the lightest possible order, had been brought from Moldavia, and were to be immediately followed by the 3rd corps.

"It was therefore to be expected that an extensive movement would not be long deferred.

"Accordingly, shortly before daylight, on the 5th, strong columns of the enemy came upon the advanced picquets covering the right of the position. These picquets behaved with admirable gallantry, defending the ground foot by foot against the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, until the 2nd Division, under Major-General Pennefather, with its field guns, which had immediately been got under arms, was placed in position.

"The Light Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir George Brown, was also brought to the front without loss of time; the 1st Brigade, under Major-General Codrington, occupying the long slopes to the left towards Sevastopol, and protecting our right battery, and guarding against attack on that side; and the 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Buller, forming on the left of the 2nd Division, with the 88th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jeffreys, thrown in advance.

"The Brigade of Guards, under His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge and Major-General Bentinck, proceeded likewise to the front, and took up most important ground to the extreme right on the alignment of the 2nd Division, but separated from it by a deep and precipitous ravine, and posting its guns with those of the 2nd Division.

"The 4th Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir George Cathcart, having been brought from their encampment, advanced to the front and right of the attack; the 1st Brigade, under Brigadier-General Goldie, proceeded to the left of the Inkermann Road; the 2nd Brigade, under Brigadier-General Torrens, to the right of it, and on the ridge overhanging the valley of the Tschernaya.

"The 3rd Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir Richard England, occupied in part the ground vacated by the 4th Division, and supported the Light Division by two regiments under Brigadier-General Sir John Campbell, while Brigadier-General Eyre held the command of the troops in the trenches.

"The morning was extremely dark, with a drizzling rain, rendering it almost impossible to discover anything beyond the flash and smoke of artillery and heavy musquetry fire.

"It, however, soon became evident that the enemy, under cover of a vast cloud of skirmishers, supported by dense columns of infantry, had advanced numerous batteries of large calibre to the high ground to the left and front of the 2nd Division, while powerful columns of infantry attacked with great vigour the Brigade of Guards.

"Additional batteries of heavy artillery were also

placed by the enemy on the slopes to our left; the guns in the field amounting in the whole to 90 pieces, independently however of the ship guns and those in the works of Sevastopol.


“Protected by a tremendous fire of shot, shell, and grape, the Russian columns advanced in great force, requiring every effort of gallantry on the part of our troops to resist them.

“At this time two battalions of French infantry, which had on the first notice been sent by General Bosquet, joined our right, and very materially contributed to the successful resistance to the attack, cheering with our men, and charging the enemy down the hill with great loss.

“About the same time a determined assault was made on our extreme left, and for a moment the enemy possessed themselves of four of our guns, three of which were retaken by the 88th, while the fourth was speedily recaptured by the 77th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Egerton.

“In the opposite direction the Brigade of Guards, under His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, was engaged in a severe conflict.

“The enemy, under the cover of thick brushwood, advanced in two heavy bodies, and assaulted with great determination a small redoubt which had been constructed for two guns but was not armed. The combat was most arduous, and the Brigade, after displaying the utmost steadiness and gallantry was obliged to retire before very superior numbers, until supported by a wing of the 20th Regiment of the 4th Division, when they again advanced and retook the redoubt.



"This ground was afterwards occupied in gallant style by French troops, and the Guards speedily reformed in rear of the right flank of the 2nd Division.

"In the meanwhile, Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir George Cathcart, with a few companies of the 68th Regiment, considering that he might make a strong impression by descending into the valley, and taking the enemy in flank, moved rapidly forward, but finding the heights above him in full occupation of the Russians, he suddenly discovered that he was entangled with a superior force, and while attempting to withdraw his men, he received a mortal wound, shortly previously to which Brigadier-General Torrens, when leading the 68th, was likewise severely wounded.

"Subsequently to this, the battle continued with unabated vigour and with no positive result, the enemy bringing upon our line not only the fire of all their field-batteries, but those in front of the works of the place, and the ship guns, till the afternoon, when the symptoms of giving way first became apparent, and shortly after, although the fire did not cease, the retreat became general, and heavy masses were observed retiring over the bridge of the Inkermann, and ascending the opposite heights, abandoning on the field of battle five or six thousand dead and wounded, multitudes of the latter having already been carried off by them. I never before witnessed such a spectacle as the field presented, but upon this I will not dwell.

"Having submitted to your Grace this imperfect description of this most severe battle, I have still two duties to discharge, the one most gratifying, the last most painful to my feelings.

“ I have the greatest satisfaction in drawing your Grace’s attention to the brilliant conduct of the allied troops. French and English vied with each other in displaying their gallantry and manifesting their zealous devotion to duty, notwithstanding that they had to contend against an infinitely superior force, and were exposed for many hours to a most galling fire.

“ It should be borne in mind that they have daily for several weeks undergone the most constant labour, and that many of them passed the previous night in the trenches.

“ I will not attempt to enter into the detail of the movements of the French troops, lest I should not state them correctly, but I am proud of the opportunity of bearing testimony to their valour and energetic services, and of paying a tribute of admiration to the distinguished conduct of their immediate Commander, General Bosquet, while it is in the highest degree pleasing to me to place upon record my deep sense of the valuable assistance I received from the Commander-in-Chief, General Canrobert, who was himself on the ground and in constant communication with me, and whose cordial co-operation on all occasions I cannot too highly extol.

“ Your Grace will recollect that he was wounded at the Alma. He was again wounded on the 5th, but I should hope that he will not long feel the effects of it.

“ I will, in a subsequent despatch, lay before your Grace the names of the officers whose services have been brought to my notice. I will not detain the mail for that purpose now, but I cannot delay to report the admirable behaviour of Lieutenant-General Sir

George Brown, who was unfortunately shot through the arm, but is doing well; of Lieutenant-General his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, who particularly distinguished himself; and of Major-General Pennefather, in command of the 2nd Division, which received the first attack, and gallantly maintained itself under the greatest difficulties throughout this protracted conflict; of Major-General Bentinck, who is severely wounded; Major-General Codrington, Brigadier-General Adams, and Brigadier-General Torrens, who are severely wounded; and Brigadier-General Buller, who is also wounded, but not so seriously.

“I must likewise express my obligations to Lieutenant-General Sir Richard England, for the excellent disposition he made of his Division, and the assistance he rendered to the left of the Light Division, where Brigadier-General Sir John Campbell was judiciously placed, and effectively supported Major-General Codrington; and I have great pleasure in stating that Brigadier-General Eyre was employed in the important duty of guarding the trenches from any assault from the town.

“Lieutenant-General Sir De Lacy Evans, who had been obliged by severe indisposition to go on board ship a few days previously, left his bed as soon as he received intelligence of the attack, and was promptly at his post, and though he did not feel well enough to take the command of the Division out of the hands of Major-General Pennefather, he did not fail to give him his best advice and assistance.

“It is deeply distressing to me to have to submit to your Grace the list of the killed, wounded, and missing on this memorable occasion. It is indeed

heavy, and very many valuable officers and men have been lost to Her Majesty's service.

"Among the killed your Grace will find the names of Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir G. Cathcart, Brigadier-General Strangways, and Brigadier-General Goldie.

"Of the services of the first it is almost unnecessary to speak. They are known throughout the British empire, and have within a short space of time been brought conspicuously before the country by his achievements at the Cape of Good Hope, whence he had only just returned when he was ordered to this army.

"By his death Her Majesty has been deprived of a most devoted servant, an officer of the highest merit, while I personally have to deplore the loss of an attached and faithful friend.

"Brigadier-General Strangways was known to have distinguished himself in early life, and in mature age throughout a long service, he maintained the same character.

"The mode in which he had conducted the command of the Artillery, since it was placed in his hands by the departure through illness of Major-General Cator, is entitled to my entire approbation, and was equally agreeable to those who were confided to his care.

"Brigadier-General Goldie was an officer of considerable promise, and gave great satisfaction to all under whom he has served.

"It is difficult to arrive at any positive conclusion as to the actual numbers brought into the field by the enemy. The configuration of the ground did not

admit of any great development of their force, the attack consisting of a system of repeated assaults in heavy masses of columns; but judging from the numbers that were seen in the plains after they had withdrawn in retreat, I am led to suppose that they could not have been less than sixty thousand men. Their loss was excessive, and it is calculated that they left on the field near five thousand dead, and that their casualties amount in the whole, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, to not less than 15,000.

"Your Grace will be surprised to learn that the number of British troops actually engaged little exceeded 8,000 men, whilst those of General Bosquet's division only amounted to 6,000, the remaining available French troops on the spot having been kept in reserve.

"I ought to mention, that while the enemy was attacking our right, they assailed the left of the French trenches, and actually got into two of their batteries; but they were quickly driven out in the most gallant manner with considerable loss, and hotly pursued to the very walls of Sevastopol.

"I have, etc.,

"His Grace the Duke of Newcastle,

"RAGLAN."

"Etc., etc., etc."

And to crown the whole, it was on Sunday, the 10th of May, 1857, that the terrible Indian mutiny broke out at Meerut.

SOLDIERS' LETTERS.



———“here are *letters* for you.”
HENRY IV., Part I.

SOLDIERS' LETTERS.

DURING the period that Prince Charles Edward attempted to recover for his father the throne of his ancestors, Sergeant Molloy, of the Sixth Foot, defended the small fort of Ruthven, and the following letter from the veteran, who had only a garrison of twelve men, is a curiosity of war. It was addressed to Lieutenant-General Sir John Cope, then commander-in-chief in Scotland.

“Ruthven Redoubt, 30th August, 1745.

“HON. GENERAL,—This goes to acquaint you that yesterday there appeared in the little town of Ruthven about three hundred of the enemy, and sent proposals to me to surrender this redoubt upon condition that I should have liberty to carry off bag and baggage. My answer was, ‘*I was too old a soldier to surrender a garrison of such strength without bloody noses.*’ They threatened hanging me and my men for refusal. I told them I would take my chance. This morning they attacked me about twelve o’clock (by my information) with about a hundred and fifty men; they attacked fore-gate and sally-port, and attempted to set sally-port on fire with some old barrels and other combustibles, which took place immediately, but the attempter lost his life by it. They drew off about half an hour after three. About two hours after they

sent word to me that two of their chiefs wanted to talk to me. I admitted and spoke to them from the parapet; they offered conditions, I refused; they desired liberty to carry off their dead men, I granted. There are two men since dead of their wounds in the town, and three more they took with them, as I am informed. They went off westward about eight o'clock this morning; they did the like march yesterday in the afternoon, but came back at night-fall. They took all the provisions the poor inhabitants had in the town, and Mrs. M'Pherson, the barrack-wife, and a merchant of the town, who spoke to me this moment, and who advised me to write to your honour, and told me there were above three thousand men, all lodged in the corn-fields west of the town, last night, and their grand camp is at Dalwhinnie. They have Cluny M'Pherson with them prisoner, as I have it by the same information. I lost one man, shot through the head by foolishly holding his head too high over the parapet. I expect another visit this night, I am informed, with their pateraroes, but I shall give them the warmest reception my weak party can afford. I shall hold out as long as possible. "I conclude, Honourable General, with great respect,

"Your most humble servant,

"J. MOLLOY, Sergt. 6th."

The defence was successful, as it deserved to be, for the despatch is as modest as it is truthful, and is unique in military history.

In the *Tatler*, No. 87, October 29th, 1709, is a characteristic epistle from Sergeant Hall of the bat-

talion of the Coldstream Guards, serving in Flanders, under the Duke of Marlborough, to his comrade Sergeant Cabe of the same corps. This may be considered as one of the first published communications of this nature; but modern times, and especially the late Russian war, have shown how interesting such letters are. "Voices from the Ranks" now form an interesting feature in military history.

"From the Camp before Mons, Sept. 26.

"COMRADE,—I received yours, and am glad yourself and wife are in good health, with all the rest of my friends. Our battalion suffered more than I could wish in the action. But who can withstand fate? Poor Richard Stevenson had his fate with a great many more. He was killed dead before we entered the trenches. We had above two hundred of our battalion killed and wounded. We lost ten sergeants, six are as followeth:—Jennings, Castles, Roach, Sherring, Meyrick, and my son Smith; the rest are not of your acquaintance. I have received a very bad shot in my head myself, but am in hopes, an't please God, I shall recover. I continue in the field, and lie in my colonel's quarters. Arthur is very well, but I can give you no account of Elms; he was in the hospital before I came into the field.

"I will not pretend to give you an account of the battle, knowing you have a better in the prints.

"Pray give my service to Mrs. Cook and her daughter; to Mr. Stoffet and his wife; and to Mr. Lyver and Thomas Hodsdon; and to Mr. Rogdell, and to all my friends and acquaintance in general, who do ask after me.

"My love to Mrs. Stevenson. I am sorry for the sending such ill news. Her husband was gathering a little money together to send to his wife, and put it into my hands. I have seven shillings and threepence, which I shall take care to send her.

"Wishing your wife a safe delivery, and both of you all happiness, rest

"Your assured friend and comrade,

"JOHN HALL."

"We had but an indifferent breakfast, but the Mounseers never had such a dinner in their lives.

"My kind love to my cousin Hinton and Mrs. Morgan, and to John Brown and his wife. I sent two shillings, and Stevenson sixpence, to drink with you at Mr. Cook's, but I have heard nothing from him.—It was by Mr. Edgar.

"Corporal Hartwell desires to be remembered to you, and desires you to inquire of Edgar what has become of his wife Pegg, and when you write, to send word in your letter what trade she drives.

"We have here very bad weather, which, I doubt not, will be a hindrance to the siege; but I am in hopes we shall be masters of the town in a little time, and then I believe we shall go to garrison."

The following letter, like the foregoing, is from a soldier in the Guards (the Scots Fusilier), descriptive of the Battle of Inkermann, and, with many others, was published in the newspapers:—

"We have had another general engagement, on the 5th of November. Well shall I remember that day. I thought never to forget the goodness of God

in bringing me off the ground safe, and without a scratch.

“And now I will endeavour to give you an account, as far as I am able, of the battle. But I must tell you that on the night preceding the battle it was very foggy, and the morning was misty. The Russians availed themselves of it. A strong force, about 40,000 men (we are informed), under the command of General Osten-Sacken, from Odessa, with numerous artillery, got possession of some heights, and when the mist cleared away opened fire, drove in the outlying pickets, and got possession of the hills overlooking the Second Division's tents. It was about a quarter past six A.M., when the firing commenced. I was just up, and saw the Second Division falling in. Some men were killed in front of their tents. We fell in anyhow. We had only six companies—two on picket; the Grenadier Guards five companies; and, I believe, the Coldstream Guards seven companies. The brigade of Highlanders are guarding Balaklava; the Second Division is encamped on our right. We went up, and a fearful sight it was in going through the Second Division's encampment. The shells were bursting over our heads, and the cannon-balls rolling through us, knocking down tents, and poor bāt-horses were knocked to pieces by them.

“We were, of course, all taken by surprise, finding the enemy being so near, and had gained possession of a redoubt; and the Duke of Cambridge, with only the Guards and two companies of the 46th, said, ‘You must drive them out of it.’ Well, then, they were only twenty yards from us, and we were firing

at each other. The pioneers and drummers, with the stretchers, were told to find the best shelter they could, and so I, myself, with our drum-major, were lying down behind a small bush, and we both expected every moment to be shot, the bullets actually passing within a few inches of our heads, and breaking off the branches over us as we lay there. Well, they succeeded in driving the Russians out of the place, and got them down the hill, when they were ordered to retire.

“ They retired, and the Russians came up with redoubled strength, and completely surrounded us. The Russians took possession of the redoubt. The Duke said, ‘ They must come out of it again.’ The Russians cheered, as also did the Guards. Things now looked desperate, as we had no support, except the Almighty, and He defended the right.

“ At it they went, and for half an hour things seemed to favour the enemy. We were all surrounded—no getting out. The Grenadier Guards nearly lost colours; they had only about forty men to defend them. We gave another cheer, and out of the redoubt they went again, and the Grenadier Guards managed to keep their colours. We drove them out at the point of the bayonet down the hill. The Guards were ordered to retire again, but would not, and, in fact, could not; if they had got down this steep hill, they could not have got back again well. The brave French came up to our assistance, and kept them at bay while we retired and got our ammunition completed; and then the brigade of Guards were formed into one regiment of six companies, and at it we went again; and by this time, plenty of assistance coming

to us, we managed to do them, but at a great loss to us. Officers behaved bravely. The Coldstreams had eight officers killed on the field; the Grenadiers, three officers. Only picture to yourself eleven officers being buried at one place and time! There was not a dry eye at the funeral. We had Colonel Walker wounded in three places. Colonel Blair died, and was buried to-day. He had only joined three weeks ago: he was shot in the breast. Our adjutant, Captain Drummond, Captain Gipps, Colonel F. Seymour, and Mr. Elkington, were all wounded. Colonel Ridley and Colonel Dalrymple left us to-day, sick. We have scarcely any officers now left. We had two sergeants, four corporals, and thirty-one privates killed on the field, and eleven have died since of their wounds."

Of a different stamp are the following, which, however strange they may appear, are genuine epistles, or extracts from them, sent to head-quarters. The names of the writers it would not be proper to give, and therefore they are omitted.

The writer of this epistle wishes to enlist into the army, but is objected to in consequence of his height.

"Having an ardent desire to be a soldier, the happy expedient occurred to me of addressing the 'fountain head,' simply stating facts. And when we are told that such men as Cæsar, and, more recently, Nelson and Napoleon were short men, it may be admitted that the mind is the standard of the man. I am aged twenty-four years, height 5 feet 5½ inches, a single man; and I beg leave to present your Grace

with copies of testimonials from officers of distinction, hoping it may please you to cause instructions to be conveyed to your humble applicant, and begging pardon for thus trespassing upon you.

"Allow me to add that (although somewhat egotistic) for rational intelligence and honesty of purpose I hold myself second to none.—I am, etc."

Another is wooed by the "tuneful nine," and thus addressed the late Commander-in-chief:—

"MY LORD DUKE,—I mean to take the liberty of writing these few lines before your Grace, flying under the protection of your wings, and trusting in your most charitable heart for to grant my request.

"May it please your Grace to reject me not, for the love of the Almighty God, to whom I pray to reward your soul in heaven.

"My Lord Duke, I shall convince you that I am a pt^e. soldier in the 99th depôt, at Chatham, a servant to her Majesty since the 29th of September, 1846; likewise that I was born of poor parents, who were unable to provide any means of education for me but what I scraped by over-hours and industry, till I grew thus eighteen years of age, and was compelled to quit their sight and seek my own fortune.

"I think I am possessed of honesty, docility, faithfulness, high hopes, bold spirit, and obedience towards my superiors. I partly know the Irish language, to which I was brought up, and am deficient of the English language, that is, of not being able of peaking [*qy.* speaking] it correctly. One of my past days, as I was guiding a horse in a solitary place, un-

expectedly I burst into a flow of poetry, which successfully came from my lips by no trouble. From thence I wrote during the following year, a lot of poems, some of which, it was given up, being the best composed in the same locality for the last forty years past. However I did no treason, but all for the amusement of the country.

"My Lord I mean to shoe a little proof of it in the following lines :—

Once from at home, as I did roam my fortune for to try,
All alone along the road, my courage forcing high ;
I said sweet home, both friends and foes, I bid you all good-bye.
From thence I started into Cork and joined the 99th.

This famous corps, which I adore, is brave and full of might,
With fire and sword, would fight the foe, and make their force
retire.

Supplied are those with Irish Poet for to compose in rhyme,
I pray to God his grace upon the flaming 99th.

"My Lord, to get an end to this rude letter, my request, and all that I want, is twelve months leave, for the mere purpose of learning both day and night, where I could accommodate myself according to my pay, at the end of which twelve months I might be fit for promotion in the protection of Her Majesty.

"Your most obedient Servant,

" ——— ——— "

Another correspondent closes his application in these glowing terms :—

"Your Petr. in closing his application humbly looks up to that kindest and best of Beings, Him who still covers y^r. Grace with the sweet shadow of His

wings, and he sincerely prays, that just as y^r. Pet^r. has heard his brave comrades in days of old cheer y^r. Grace upon the Field of Victory, that even so, after y^r. Grace has long enjoyed every earthly joy, he may from some sweet spot, yet once again listen in like manner to that cheer with which the Immortals above shall welcome y^r. Grace into the joy of y^r. Lord."

The next extract is from an old soldier, a parish schoolmaster:—

"I beg to state I am a sound Churchman and asking pardon for the liberty taken ever wishing and praying long life, prosperity, unity, peace, and concord to her most gracious Majesty, Prince Albert, and family, and to the most noble, most unequalled most brilliant, most victorious, words unspeakable, His Grace the Duke of Wellington, long life and good health, and his exit from his military career into that land of pure delight where saints immortal reign. To that King of kings and Lord of lords, who aided and protected your most noble person in all your victorious engagements while on earth; also the Master-General, the Army and Navy, Church and State, everlasting prosperity.

" — Pensioner,

" Parish Schoolmaster."

"Most Noble Duke, I now am thus situated that neither the roll of a drum can I hear nor yet the sound of a bugle."

Leaving then this worthy Pedagogue to *hear* his village students, the last selection is reached, the

writer of which evidently attempts the poetical, having a contempt for humble prose :—

“ December, 1849.

“ I have the
Honour to ask of you
To present my Compliments
To the Twelve Supremes.
For then crown'd again their
Golden harps they took harps
Ever tuned that Glittering By
Their sides like Quivers hang
And with Preamble sweet of
Charming Sylphony, they introduce
The sweet song, awaken raptures high.
No one exempt, no voice But well
Could join melodious part.
Such concord his in heaven !!
With every respect to Her Majesty
And the prince of Wales and all the
Royal Family.”

In these selections the orthography of the writers has been adhered to, and it is creditable to them that the spelling is, generally, so correct ; affording, in this respect, a favourable comparison with the examples published by the Civil Service Commissioners.



MARTIAL PRELATES.



“Or who should study to prefer a peace,
If holy churchmen take delight in brawls.”

HENRY VI., Part I.



MARTIAL PRELATES.

IN the seventh year of the reign of Richard II., the Bishop of Norwich, for divers military offences as a general officer, had to appear before Parliament, and was punished with the seizure of his temporalities and a heavy fine.

In the year 1688, the Princess Anne (afterwards Queen Anne), having fled from court, proceeded to join her husband, Prince George of Denmark, and when within a few miles from Oxford, she was met by Sir John Lanier with his regiment of horse, now the First Dragoon Guards, which formed part of the cavalcade on her public entry into that city, on the 15th of December. Immediately in front of her Royal Highness marched the Bishop of London, in a purple cloak, martial habit, pistols before him, and a drawn sword in his hand, riding at the head of a troop of gentlemen, who had inscribed on their standard the motto, "*Nolumus Leges Angliæ Mutari.*"

This reminds one of the celebrated fighting prelate Peter de Dreux, cousin-german to the King of France, and Bishop of Beauvais, who, being taken in arms by Richard Cœur de Lion, was imprisoned and fettered for personal injuries during his own captivity. Pope Celestine III. remonstrated in behalf of the prelate, to whom, in reply, the King sent the Bishop's helmet and armour to Rome, with these words from Genesis xxxvii. 32, "Know now whether it be thy son's coat or no." The Pope declined further inter-

cession; and replied, "That the coat the King had sent did not belong to a son of the Church but of the camp; and the prisoner, therefore, was at Richard's mercy."

Colonel Norris, who commanded the English and Scots in the service of the States of the United Provinces, whilst storming the walls of Malines, on the 9th of April 1580, slew a Spanish friar, arrayed in armour, in single combat. This officer, whose services were connected with the regiment now represented by the Third Foot, or the Buffs, was afterwards selected by Queen Elizabeth to place the maritime towns of England in a posture of defence to oppose the famed Spanish Armada, and was second in command of the army encamped at Tilbury. Doctor Fuller, in his "Worthies of England," says of him: "He was a most accomplished general, both for a *charge*, which is the *sword*, and a *retreat*, which is the *shield* of war. By the latter he purchased to himself immortal praise; when in France he brought off a small handful of English from a great armful of enemies, fighting as he retreated and retreating as he fought." His mother was Margaret, one of the daughters and heirs of John Lord Williams, of Tame, who was keeper of Queen Elizabeth when she was under restraint during her sister Mary's reign; so great was the attachment between Queen Elizabeth and the Lady Margaret, that on the receipt of the intelligence of the death of Sir John Norris, she addressed a kind but characteristic letter of condolence to his mother, whom she fondly designates as her "*own crow*." The mortal disease of Sir John Norris was brought on by anxiety whilst serving in Ireland, in 1597.

PERILS AT SEA.

"Wouldst thou"—so the helmsman answered—

"Learn the secret of the sea ?

Only those who brave its dangers

Comprehend its mystery !"

LONGFELLOW.

PERILS AT SEA.

NEVER is the discipline of regiments put to a severer trial than when a ship is on fire with troops on board. In the field, when the spirits of the men are cheered by the animating circumstances of the contest, honour being sure and death uncertain, it is natural to expect valour and good order; but, surrounded by the sea and devouring flames—dangers against which it seems almost hopeless to contend—with no mortal aid in sight, and passively to die is all that remains—it is such a scene as this that calls forth the manly resignation, the ready obedience, and the unfailing discipline—characteristics of a good soldier. These admirable qualities were displayed in the following instances, which cannot be too deeply impressed on the mind, as examples worthy of general imitation.

On Tuesday, the 1st of March, 1825, the "Kent," East Indiaman, with the right wing of the Thirty-first Regiment on board, took fire in the Bay of Biscay, and was totally destroyed; the accident occurred about ten o'clock A. M., towards the end of a violent gale of wind, when the ship was rolling heavily. One of the spirit-casks being adrift, an officer of the ship endeavoured to secure it with some billets of wood, but the ship making a heavy lurch, he unfortunately dropped the light, and letting go his hold of the cask

with a view to recover the lantern, it suddenly stove, and the spirits communicating with the lamp, the whole place was instantly in a blaze.

When there was no hope of saving the vessel, exertions were made to preserve the troops and crew. The noble example of the officers found a ready imitation in the men, and all showed the utmost order and firmness in this trying ordeal. The providential means of escape were afforded by the brig "Cambria," but it was not until three o'clock in the afternoon that Captain Cook succeeded in getting the first boat from the vessel. From that hour until eight in the evening, the boats were constantly employed in bringing the people to the "Cambria," and succeeded in saving 296 officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the Thirty-first Regiment, together with 46 women and 52 children belonging thereto, and 19 male and female private passengers, Captain Cobb and 139 of the crew, amounting in all to 553. Fifty-four men, one woman, and twenty-one children were lost, but the number would have been much greater had it not been for the excellent order observed. At two o'clock in the morning the "Kent" blew up, after being completely enveloped in flames for four hours previously. The crew of the ill-fated ship did not behave in the manner that is generally attributable to the British seaman, as they refused to return to the "Kent" for their shipmates after the first trip, and it was only by the coercive measures of Captain Cobb, who said he would not receive them on board unless they did so, that they reluctantly proceeded in their duty. Two hours after, the ship blew up, and a soldier's wife was delivered of a fine boy on board the "Cambria."

There were instances of men who tied the children of their brother soldiers on their backs, and leaping overboard swam with their burdens to the boats. Fourteen of the men who had remained on the wreck were rescued on the following morning by the "Caroline," and carried to Liverpool. In the Military Secretary's letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Fearon, commanding the Thirty-first Regiment, the thanks of his Royal Highness the Duke of York, Commander-in-chief, were expressed to him, for the example set by him and "for the persevering and gallant exertions which contributed so essentially to lessen the sad result of the catastrophe." The conduct of all was reported to his Majesty, who conferred on Lieutenant-Colonel Fearon the distinction of a Companion of the Bath.

Captain James Spence, one of the officers saved, afterwards commanded the regiment during the Sutlej campaign of 1845-46, being present at Moodkee, Ferozeshah, Aliwal, and Sobraon. He appears to have had a charmed life, having escaped in a most astonishing manner. Two horses were killed under him; he received balls through his cap and scabbard, and had his sword broken in his hand by grapeshot; at Sobraon, a Sikh, who was lying apparently dead in the trenches, jumped up when the Colonel's head was turned, and rushed at him to cut him down, which was only prevented by a private, who called the attention of the Colonel to his danger, and subsequently bayoneted the Sikh, the Colonel's sword having broken in the encounter.

The following highly interesting report of the shipwreck of the "Abercrombie Robinson" transport,

in Table Bay, on the 28th of August, 1842, and subsequent disembarkation of the troops, under the command of Captain Bertie Gordon, Ninety-first Regiment, was not forwarded when the event occurred, otherwise it would doubtless have appeared in General Orders; for his Grace the Duke of Wellington declared that he had "never read anything so satisfactory as this report," and expressed a wish that he "had received this statement at an earlier period after this misfortune occurred."

"The reserve battalion of the Ninety-first Regiment arrived in Table Bay, on the 25th of August, 1842, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay.

"On the 27th of August the command of the battalion, and of the detachments embarked on board the 'Abercrombie Robinson' transport, devolved on Captain Bertie Gordon, of the Ninety-first Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay and Major Ducat having landed on that day at Cape Town.

"The situation of the transport was considered a dangerous one from her size (being 1430 tons), and from the insufficient depth of water in which she had brought up. The port-captain, who boarded her on the evening of the 25th, advised the captain to take up another berth on the following day. This was impossible, for the wind blew strong into the bay from the quarter which is so much dreaded there, and had continued to increase in violence during the 26th, 27th, and 28th August.

"At eleven o'clock P.M., on the night of the 27th, it was blowing a strong gale, and the sea was rolling heavily into the bay. The ship was pitching much,

and she began to feel the ground ; but she rode by two anchors, and much cable had been veered out the night before.

“ Captain Gordon made such arrangements as he could, in warning the officers, the sergeant-major, and orderly non-commissioned officers to be in readiness.

“ From sunset on the 27th, the gale had continued to increase, until at length it blew a tremendous hurricane ; and at a little after three A.M., on the morning of the 28th, the starboard cable snapped in two ; the other cable parted in two or three minutes afterwards, and away went the ship before the storm, her hull striking, with heavy crashes, against the ground as she drove towards the beach, three miles distant, under her lee.

“ About this time the fury of the gale, which had never lessened, was rendered more terrible by one of the most awful storms of thunder and lightning that had ever been witnessed in Table Bay. While the force of the wind and sea was driving the ship into shoaler water, she rolled incessantly ; and heaved over so much with the back-set of the surf, that to the possibility of her going to pieces before daylight, was added the probability of settling down to windward, when the decks must have inevitably filled, and every one of the seven hundred souls on board must have perished.

“ While in this position, the heavy seas broke over her side and poured down the hatchways. The decks were opening in every direction, and the strong framework of the hull seemed compressed together, starting the beams from their places. The ship had been driven with her starboard-bow towards the beach,

exposing her stern to the sea, which rushed through the stern-ports and tore up the cabin floors of the orlop-deck.

"The thunder and lightning ceased towards morning, and the ship seemed to have worked a bed for herself in the sand, for the terrible rolling had greatly diminished, and there then arose the hope that all on board would get safe ashore.

"At day-break (about seven o'clock), it was just possible to distinguish some people on the beach opposite to the wreck. Owing to the fear of the masts, spars, and rigging falling, as well as to keep as much top-weight as possible off the ship's decks, the troops had been kept below but were now allowed to come on deck in small numbers.

"An attempt was made to send a rope ashore; and one of the best swimmers, a Krooman, volunteered the trial with a rope round his body; but the back-set of the surf was too much for him. A line tied to a spar never got beyond the ship's bows, and one fired from a cannon also failed. One of the cutters was then carefully lowered on the lee-side of the ship, and her crew succeeded in reaching the shore with a hauling line. Two large surf-boats were shortly afterwards conveyed in waggons to the place, where the ship was stranded, and the following orders were given by Captain Gordon for the disembarkation of the troops, viz.:—

"1st. The women and children to disembark (of these there were about seventy). 2nd. The sick to disembark after the women and children. 3rd. The disembarkation of the troops to take place by the companies of the Ninety-first drawing lots; the detach-

ments of the Twenty-seventh Regiment and of the Cape Mounted Riflemen taking the precedence. 4th. The men to fall in on the upper deck, fully armed and accoutred, carrying their knapsacks and great-coats. 5th. Each officer to be allowed to take a carpet-bag or small portmanteau.

“ The disembarkation of the women and children and of the sick occupied from half-past eight until ten o'clock A.M. The detachments of the Twenty-seventh Regiment and of the Cape Mounted Riflemen followed. That of the Ninety-first was arranged by the wings drawing lots, and then the companies of each wing.

“ At half-past ten A.M., one of the surf-boats, which had been employed up to this time in taking the people off the wreck, was required to assist in saving the lives of those on board the ‘ Waterloo ’ convict ship, which was in still more imminent peril, about a quarter of a mile from the ‘ Abercrombie Robinson.’

“ Having now but one boat to disembark four hundred and fifty men, and the wind and sea, which had subsided a little since daylight, beginning again to rise, together with the captain’s apprehension that she might go to pieces before sunset, which (however unfounded as was afterwards proved) powerfully influenced Captain Gordon’s arrangements; it became necessary to abandon the men’s knapsacks, as they not only filled a greater space in the surf-boats than could be spared, but took a long time to hand down the ship’s side. The knapsacks had been brought on deck, but were now, for these reasons, sent below again, and stowed away in the women’s standing-berths.

"The officers were likewise informed that they would not be allowed to take more than each could carry on his arm. The disembarkation of the six companies went on regularly, but slowly, from eleven A.M., until half-past three P.M., there being but one boat, which could only hold thirty men at a time. At half-past three P.M., the last boat-load left the ship's side. It contained those of the ship's officers and crew who had remained to the last; the sergeant-major of the reserve battalion Ninety-first; one or two non-commissioned officers who had requested permission to remain; Captain Gordon, Ninety-first Regiment; and Lieutenant Black, R.N., agent of transports. This officer had dined at Government-house the night before, but came on board the wreck with one of the first surf-boats that reached it, on the following morning.

"Nearly seven hundred souls completed their disembarkation after a night of great peril; and through a raging surf, without the occurrence of a single casualty. Among them were many women and children, and several sick men, of whom two were supposed to be dying.

"Although it had been deemed prudent to abandon the men's knapsacks and the officers' baggage, the reserve battalion of the Ninety-first Regiment went down the side of that shattered wreck, fully armed and accoutred, and, with the exception of their knapsacks, ready for instant service. It would be difficult to praise sufficiently the steady discipline of that young and newly-formed battalion, thus severely tested during nearly seventeen hours of danger; above eight of which were hours of darkness and imminent

peril. That discipline failed not, when the apparent hopelessness of our situation might have led to scenes of confusion and crime. The double guards and sentries, which had at first been posted over the wine and spirit-stores, were found unnecessary, and they were ultimately left to the ordinary protection of single sentries.

“Although the ship was straining in every timber, and the heavy seas were making a fair breach over us, the companies of that young battalion fell in on the weather-side of the wreck, as their lots were drawn, and waited for their turn to muster at the lee-gangway; and so perfect was their confidence, their patience, and their gallantry, that although another vessel was going to pieces within a quarter of a mile of us, and a crowd of soldiers, sailors, and convicts were perishing before their eyes; not a murmur arose from their ranks when Captain Gordon directed that the lot should not be applied to the detachments of the Twenty-seventh Regiment and Cape Mounted Riflemen, but that the Ninety-first should yield to them the precedence in disembarking from the wreck.”

“The officers of the Ninety-first Regiment who disembarked with the battalion, were Captains Gordon and Ward, Lieutenant Cahill, Ensigns McInroy and Lavers, and Assistant-Surgeon Stubbs. If from among the ranks of men who all behaved so well, it were allowable to particularize any, the names of Acting Sergeant-Major Murphy, Colour-Sergeant Phillips, Sergeant Murray, and Corporal Thomas Nugent, deserve this distinction. It was through the first that Captain Gordon communicated his orders, and carried them into execution. Every order he—

1

Sergeant-Major Murphy—received, was obeyed during the confusion of a wreck, with the exactness of a parade-ground. He never left the particular part of the ship where he had been stationed, during the darkness and terror of the night, although a wife and child seemed to claim a portion of his solicitude; and when he received permission to accompany them into the surf-boat, he petitioned to be allowed to remain with Captain Gordon to the last.

“The two sergeants were young lads, barely twenty-two years of age. They had married shortly before the battalion embarked at Kingstown, and their wives (quite girls) were clinging to them for support and comfort when the ship parted from her anchors. The guards were ordered to be doubled, and additional sergeants were posted to each. This brought Sergeants Phillips and Murray on duty. Without a murmur they left their wives and joined the guards of the lower deck. Their example of perfect obedience and discipline was eminently useful.

“And, if an officer’s name may be mentioned, the conduct of Assistant-Surgeon Stubbs well deserves notice. He was in wretched health; but on the first announcement of danger, he repaired to the sick-bay, and never left his charge until they were all safely landed.

“And, though last in this narrative, the beautiful calmness and resignation of the ‘soldiers’ wives ought to be ranked among the first of those ingredients of order which contributed to our safety. Confusion, terror, and despair, joined to the wildest shrieks, were fast spreading their dangerous influence from the

women's quarter, when Captain Gordon first descended among the people on the lower decks. A few words sufficed to quiet them, and from that moment their patience and submission never faltered.

"By half-past three P.M. the bilged and broken wreck was abandoned with all the stores and baggage—public and regimental—to the fast-increasing gale, and to the chances of the approaching night."

The following letter ordered that this narrative should be entered in the Record Book of the regiment. Captain Bertie Gordon received the appointment of Major of Brigade to the North-western District, and the Acting Sergeant-Major alluded to was made a Yeoman Warder of the Tower immediately on his discharge, with a pension.

"Horse Guards, 5th January, 1849.

"SIR,—I have had the honour to lay before the Commander-in-chief your letter of the 19th ultimo, with its enclosure from Major Bertie Gordon, at present in command of the first battalion of the Ninety-first Regiment, at Gosport.

"In reply to which I am directed to acquaint you, that his Grace has been pleased to desire that the whole of the report relating to the wreck of the 'Abercrombie Robinson' transport, off the Cape of Good Hope, in August, 1842, shall be minutely detailed, and entered in the Record Book of the Services of the Ninety-first Regiment, together with the opinion expressed by his Grace, in laying Major Gordon's report before her Majesty, of the admirable conduct of the officers and men under his command

upon the occasion alluded to, as well as that the situations to which Major Gordon and the Acting Sergeant-Major were appointed in consequence, may be specified in the record of the regiment.

“ I have, etc.

“ JOHN MACDONALD, Adjutant-General.

“ General Gordon, Colonel of the
Ninety-first Regiment.”

The Duke of Wellington ordered that the correspondence relative to the conduct of two companies of the Sixty-fourth Regiment, under the command of Captain Draper, when wrecked on their passage from Halifax, should be published to the army; and this shows how anxious his Grace was to hold up for imitation such instances of fortitude and discipline.

“ Horse Guards, 13th September, 1843.

“ SIR,—I have the honour herewith to transmit, by the Commander-in-chief's desire, copy of a correspondence which has taken place relative to the conduct of two companies of the Sixty-fourth Regiment, under the command of Captain Draper, lately wrecked on their passage from Halifax.

“ His Grace is desirous that you should communicate the contents of these documents, confidentially, to the commanding officers of regiments and dépôts serving under your orders, with a view to their making the same known to the troops, in order that Captain Draper's exemplary conduct upon the occasion alluded to may be appreciated as it deserves by every officer, non-commissioned officer, and soldier; and that the advantage of the maintenance of disci-

pline and subordination, under all the most trying circumstances, may be fully seen. "I have, etc.,

"JOHN MACDONALD, Adj't.-Gen."

"Portsmouth, 1st September, 1843.

"DEAR LORD FITZROY,—I hope I do not transgress when I call the attention of his Grace to the exemplary conduct of two companies of the Sixty-fourth Regiment, under the command of Captain Draper (1829), lately wrecked on their return from Halifax.

"The 'Alert,' a private ship, in which they embarked at Halifax, was fitted out with unusual haste; they struck soon after sailing, upon a reef, quite out of the proper course, about two o'clock A.M., and it was soon evident the vessel was sinking.

"The natural impulse of the men was to reach the deck, but the commander (who after the accident appears to have behaved very well) declared that the transfer of such a weight from below—above two hundred people—would cause the ship to labour so that she must founder; the officers explained this to the men, and remained with them below. The deck on which they stood soon partially blew up, and the water gradually gained the ankles and knees of the men; all remained steady; when the vessel beached.

"From the order maintained the party landed without the loss of a man, and immediately measures were taken to ensure life on the desolate spot they had reached—Goose Island—uninhabited.

"Sheds were erected from the spars and sails, provisions were recovered from the wreck, and much baggage, in an uninjured state, was saved.

"The party finally reached Halifax, after ten days' severe trial, without a sick man, or any flagrant breach of discipline.

"Captain Draper commanding, is a captain of 1829, and senior captain of the regiment.

"Having stated the case, I do not presume to add a recommendation, but submit it to the consideration of the Commander-in-chief.

"I have, etc.,

"HERCULES PAKENHAM, Major-Gen.

"Lieut.-Gen. Lord Fitzroy Somerset,
K.C.B."

A letter from the Military Secretary, Lord Fitzroy Somerset, in reply to the report from Sir Hercules Pakenham, completed the correspondence; in which the Duke's appreciation of the behaviour displayed by the troops, as already given, is reiterated.

Another officer of the Ninety-first had an opportunity of distinguishing himself on the occasion of the wreck of her Majesty's steamer "Birkenhead," which had been despatched with reinforcements for the troops engaged in the Kaffir war.

The scene of this terrible calamity was at Danger Point, not far from Simon's Bay, where the steamer, after a prosperous run of forty-eight days from Cork—which she left on the 7th of January, 1852—arrived on the 24th of February, and landed a portion of the reinforcements on board. She left on the following evening at seven o'clock, to proceed to Algoa Bay and the Buffalo River, with the rest of the troops destined for the war; and her commander, Captain Salmond, in his anxiety to make as quick a passage as possible,

kept to the shore so closely, that the steamer, during the night, got among the rocks which line the coast, and struck with a violent shock at two o'clock in the morning of the 26th of February, seven hours after she had steamed out of Simon's Bay. The speed at which she was going—eight and a half knots an hour—drove her with such force on the rocks, that within a few minutes after she struck she broke in two, and went down, carrying with her several of the persons on board.

The coolness and steady obedience to orders which the troops manifested on that awful and trying occasion present an instance of one of the noblest results of discipline. All the women and children were removed in time to secure their entire safety, and then the officers and men tried to save themselves in the boats, and by whatever means they could obtain.

The following report, addressed to the Commandant of Cape Town by Captain Wright, of the Ninety-first Regiment, one of the survivors, gives a graphic narrative of the disaster:—

“ Simon's Bay, March 1, 1852.

“ SIR,—It is with feelings of the deepest regret that I have to announce to you the loss of her Majesty's steamer 'Birkenhead,' which took place on a rock about two and a half or three miles off Point Danger, at two A.M., 26th February.

“ The sea was smooth at the time, and the vessel steaming at the rate of eight knots and a half an hour. She struck the rock, and it penetrated through her bottom just aft of the foremast. The rush of water was so great that there is no doubt that most of the

men in the lower troop-deck were drowned in their hammocks. The rest of the men and all the officers appeared on deck, when Lieut.-Col. Seton called all the officers about him, and impressed on them the necessity of preserving order and silence among the men. He directed me to take and have executed whatever orders the commander might give me. Sixty men were immediately put on to the chain-pumps on the lower afterdeck, and told off in three reliefs; sixty men were put on to the tackles of the paddle-box boats, and the remainder of the men were brought on to the poop, so as to ease the fore part of the ship. She was at this time rolling heavily. The commander ordered the horses to be pitched out of the port gangway, and the cutter to be got ready for the women and children, who had all been collected under the poop-awning. As soon as the horses were got over the side, the women and children were passed into the cutter, and under charge of Mr. Richards, master's-assistant, the boat then stood off about a hundred and fifty yards. Just after they were out of the ship the entire bow broke off at the foremast, the bowsprit going up in the air towards the fore-topmast, and the funnel went over the side, carrying away the starboard paddle-box and boat. The paddle-box boat capsized when being lowered. The large boat, in the centre of the ship, could not be got at.

"It was about twelve or fifteen minutes after she struck that the bow broke off. The men then all went up on the poop, and in about five minutes more the vessel broke in two, crosswise, just abaft the engine-room, and the stern part immediately filled and went down. A few men jumped off just before she did so,

but the greater number remained to the last, and so did every officer belonging to the troops. All the men I put on the tackles, I fear, were crushed when the funnel fell; and the men and officers below at the pumps could not, I think, have reached the deck before the vessel broke up and went down. The survivors clung, some to the rigging of the mainmast, part of which was out of the water, and others got hold of floating pieces of wood. I think there must have been about two hundred on the drift wood. I was on a large piece along with five others, and we picked up nine or ten more. The swell carried the wood in the direction of Point Danger. As soon as it got to the weeds and breakers, finding that it would not support all that were on it, I jumped off and swam on shore; and when the others, and also those that were on the other pieces of wood, reached the shore, we proceeded into the country, to try to find a habitation of any sort where we could obtain shelter. Many of the men were naked, and almost all without shoes. Owing to the country being covered with thick, thorny bushes, our progress was slow; but, after walking till about three p.m., having reached land about twelve, we came to where a waggon was outspanned, and the driver of it directed us to a small bay, where there is a hut of a fisherman. The bay is called Sandford's Cove. We arrived there about sunset; and, as the men had nothing to eat, I went on to a farm-house about eight or nine miles from the Cove, and sent back provisions for that day. The next morning I sent another day's provisions, and the men were removed up to a farm of Captain Smales', about twelve or fourteen miles up the country. Lieutenant

Girardot, of the Forty-third, and Cornet Bond, of the Twelfth Lancers, accompanied this party, which amounted to sixty-eight men, including eighteen sailors.

"I then went down to the coast, and during Friday, Saturday, and Sunday I examined the rocks for more than twenty miles, in the hope of finding some men who might have drifted in. I fortunately fell in with the crew of a whale boat, that is employed sealing on Dyer's Island; I got them to take the boat outside the seaweed, while I went along the shore. The seaweed on the coast is very thick, and of immense length, so that it would have caught most of the drift wood. Happily, the boat picked up two men, and I also found two. Although they were all much exhausted, two of them having been in the water thirty-eight hours, they were all right the next day except a few bruises. It was eighty-six hours on Sunday afternoon when I left the coast since the wreck had taken place; and as I had carefully examined every part of the rocks, and also sent the whale boat over to Dyer's Island, I can safely assert that when I left, there was not a living soul on the coast, of those that had been on board the ill-fated 'Birkenhead.'

"On Saturday I met Mr. Mackay, the Civil Commissioner of Caledon, and also Field-cornet Villiers. The former told me that he had ordered the men who had been at Captain Smales' to be clothed by him, he having a store at his farm. Forty soldiers received clothing there. Mr. Mackay, the field-cornet, and myself, accompanied by a party of men brought down by Mr. Villiers, went along the coast as far as the point that runs out to Dyer's Island, and all the bodies that were met with were interred. There were

not many, however, and I regret to say it could be easily accounted for. Five of the horses got to the shore, and were caught and brought to me. One belonged to myself, one to Mr. Bond, of the Twelfth Lancers, and the other three to Lieut.-Col. Seton, of the Seventy-fourth, Dr. Laing, and Lieutenant Booth, of the Seventy-third. I handed the horses over to Mr. Mackay, and he is to send them on to me here, so that they may be sold, and that I may account for the proceeds.

"On the 28th of February her Majesty's ship 'Rhadamanthus' was seen off Sandford's Cove; so I went down there, and found that Captain Bunce, the commander of the 'Castor' frigate, had landed and gone up to Captain Smales', to order the men down to the Cove, so as to embark in the steamer to be conveyed to Simon's Bay. On Sunday, when I was down on the coast, the field-cornet told me that at a part where he and his men had been a few bodies were washed up and buried; also a few boxes, which were broken in pieces and the contents strewed about the rocks. I then ceased to hope that any more were living, and came down to the Cove to join the other men. We arrived there about six P.M.

"The order and regularity that prevailed on board, from the time the ship struck till she totally disappeared, far exceeded anything that I thought could be effected by the best discipline; and it is the more to be wondered at, seeing that most of the soldiers had been but a short time in the service. Every one did as he was directed; and there was not a murmur or a cry among them until the vessel made her final plunge. I could not name any individual officer who did more

than another. All received their orders, and had them carried out, as if the men were embarking, instead of going to the bottom; there was only this difference, that I never saw any embarkation conducted with so little noise or confusion.

"I enclose a list of those embarked, distinguishing those saved. I think it is correct, except one man of the Ninety-first, whose name I cannot find out. The only means I had of ascertaining the names of the men of the different drafts, was by getting them from their comrades who are saved. You will see by the list inclosed, that the loss amounts to 9 officers and 349 men, besides those of the crew; the total number embarked being 15 officers and 476 men (one officer and 18 men were disembarked in Simon's Bay).

"I am happy to say that all the women and children were put safely on board a schooner that was about seven miles off when the steamer was wrecked. This vessel returned to the wreck about three p.m., and took off forty or fifty men that were clinging to the rigging, and then proceeded to Simon's Bay. One of the ship's boats, with the assistant-surgeon of the vessel and eight men, went off, and landed about fifteen miles from the wreck. Had the boat remained about the wreck, or returned after landing the assistant-surgeon on Point Danger—about which there was no difficulty—I am quite confident that nearly every man of the two hundred who were on the drift wood might have been saved, for they might have been picked up here and there, where they had got in among the weeds, and landed as soon as eight or nine were got into the boat. Where most of the drift wood stuck in the weeds the distance to the shore was not

more than four hundred yards, and as, by taking a somewhat serpentine course, I managed to swim in without getting foul of the rock, or being tumbled over by a breaker, there is no doubt the boat might have done so also.

"One fact I cannot omit mentioning. When the vessel was just about going down, the commander called out, "All those that can swim, jump overboard and make for the boats." Lieutenant Girardot and myself were standing on the stern part of the poop. We begged the men not to do as the commander said, as the boat with the women must be swamped. Not more than three made the attempt.

"On Sunday evening, at six P.M., all the men who were at Captain Smales', and the four I had with myself on the coast, were embarked in boats and taken on board the 'Rhadamanthus,' and we arrived in Simon's Bay, at three A.M., on Monday, the 1st of March. Eighteen of the men are bruised and burnt by the sun, and the commodore has ordered them into the naval hospital. The rest are all right, and seventy require to be clothed. I need scarcely say that everything belonging to the men was lost.

"I have, etc.,

"EDWARD W. C. WRIGHT,

"Captain, Ninety-first Regiment.

"Lieut.-Col. Ingilby, R.A., Commandant of
Cape Town.

"P.S.—I must not omit to mention the extreme kindness and attention shown by Captain Smales to the men at his house; and by Captain Ramsden, of the 'Lioness' schooner, and his wife, to those taken on board his vessel.

E. W. C. W."

From other accounts it would appear that considerable numbers perished in the water from the attacks of the sharks, which surrounded the wreck in shoals.

The Duke of Wellington signified his appreciation of Captain Wright's services in the "Birkenhead,"* in a letter, dated Horse Guards, 13th April, 1852, from which the following are extracts:—

"It was impossible for the Commander-in-chief, however, not to observe with admiration the conduct of the troops under such painful circumstances; and I am to express his full and entire approbation of the subsequent exertions of Captain Wright, and the surviving officers, in procuring relief for those more fortunate individuals who reached the shore, and in subsequently endeavouring to discover any others who might have been thrown on the beach.

"In contemplating the appalling extent of this misfortune, as detailed in Captain Wright's excellent report, and which has cast a gloom over the whole

* A graceful tribute has just been paid by the Queen to the memory of the officers and crew who perished on board the "Birkenhead" troop-ship. Her Majesty, desirous of recording her admiration of the heroic constancy and unbroken discipline shown on board that vessel, has caused to be placed on the colonnade at Chelsea Hospital a tablet in commemoration of that event. A tablet has also been erected, by command of Her Majesty, to the memory of Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby Moore, who perished on board the "Europa," when that vessel was burnt at sea, on the 31st of May, 1854, about two hundred miles from Plymouth, with the head-quarters and a detachment of the 6th Dragoons on board, affording a noble example of courage and discipline in the discharge of duty. In both instances the names of the officers and men who perished are recorded on brass plates, adjoining the tablets.

community, it is consolatory to the Commander-in-chief to find, that the obedience and discipline of the troops were maintained to the last; and that, with a devotion which was truly admirable, no one thought of providing for his own safety until that of the helpless women and children was secured.

“ I have, etc.,

“ G. BROWN, Adjutant-General.

“ Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. George Cathcart,
Cape of Good Hope.”

Fire on board must obviously be an additional alarm, and commencing with that calamity, so the illustrations close with instances of a similar character.

The loss of the “ Sarah Sands ” is fully detailed in the accompanying General Order, which conveyed his Royal Highness’s approbation of the conduct of the troops on board, offering another example of the fortitude and manly conduct of British soldiers :—

“ GENERAL ORDER.

“ Horse Guards, 27th February, 1858.

“ His Royal Highness the General Commanding-in-chief has great gratification in making known to the army, the substance of a report received from Major-General Breton, commanding the troops at the Mauritius, recording the remarkable gallantry and resolution displayed by the officers and soldiers of the Fifty-fourth Regiment, on board the ship ‘ Sarah Sands,’ on the 11th November, 1857, under circumstances of a most trying nature, namely, when that

vessel took fire at sea, having at the time a large quantity of ammunition on board.

"It is under such emergency that presence of mind, high courage, and coolness—qualities which are the attributes of British soldiers—are conspicuous, and are rendered particularly so, when attended by the maintenance of that discipline which was evidently observed on the occasion.

"Major-General Breton states in his report, that the first consideration acted upon was to throw the powder overboard, a most hazardous and dangerous duty, which was effected (with the exception of a very trifling portion of it) by volunteers, at the risk of their being suffocated by the smoke below.

"The boats were got ready—the women and children placed in them—and the greatest degree of emulation evinced by the officers and men in the performance of all that could be required of them.

"For the lengthened period of sixteen or eighteen hours the ship was in extreme peril, until the fire was subdued, and the hold cleared of water, which was thrown in for the purpose of extinguishing it, or which had rushed in through the opening in the stern, caused by the explosion of the last of the powder.

"The following non-commissioned officers and privates are specially named by Major Brett (upon whom the command devolved) as having particularly distinguished themselves on the occasion :—

"Sergeant Henry Robinson.

„ Thomas Page.

„ James Doyle.

„ James Houston,—

(*Instructor of musketry.*)

Private William Warren.
„ John Doyle.
„ James Hopkins.
„ James Fitzpatrick.
„ George Dodd.
„ James Gallagher.
„ William Wiles.
„ Andrew Walsh.
„ Thomas Holland.
„ Francis Glenney.
„ George Lamb.
„ James Carmichael.

Lance-Corporal John Westby.

Private Philip Folland.
„ James Buckingham.
„ Robert Denton.
„ Bartholomew Canavon.

Lance-Corporal John Stevenson.

Private Michael Byrnes.

Lance-Corporal John McCullum.

Private Stewart Hall.

“The colours of the Regiment appear to have been saved by Private William Wiles, Fifty-fourth Regiment, and Richard Richmond, one of the quartermasters of the ship, at the hazard of their lives.

“Major Brett exerted himself to the uttermost, and is entitled to high praise for his conduct throughout. He reports of the officers generally that their conduct was admirable, and gives great credit to Captain Gillum, Lieutenant and Adjutant Houston, and Lieutenant Hughes.

“By extraordinary exertions the ship was saved from destruction, and enabled to reach Port Louis.

"His Royal Highness is pleased to observe, that the behaviour of the Fifty-fourth Regiment during the course of this distressing occurrence, was most praiseworthy, and by its result must render manifest to all the advantages of subordination and strict obedience to orders, under the most alarming and dangerous circumstances in which soldiers can be placed.

"By order of his Royal Highness,
"The General Commanding-in-chief,
"G. A. WETHERALL,
"Adjutant-General."

Another instance recently occurred of fire at sea, namely, the burning of the "Eastern Monarch" at Spithead, on the 2nd of June, 1859, which vessel was conveying invalids home from India. Brevet Lieut.-Colonel Allan's report is as follows:—

"Portsmouth, June 3rd, 1859.

"SIR,—I have the honour to report to you, for the information of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief, that the ship 'Eastern Monarch,' on board of which were embarked the detachments of invalids from Bengal, under my command, was this morning totally destroyed by fire, which fire can only be attributed to a spontaneous combustion of saltpetre.*

"In consequence of a scarcity of provisions the ship put into Spithead about one o'clock. A little after two A.M., when everybody was in bed, a heavy explosion took place under the after portion of the

* The Court of Inquiry found that the fire was not caused by spontaneous combustion, but from the carelessness of the steward.

troop deck, blowing up that part of both decks immediately above it, destroying the whole of the cuddy, which it filled with a suffocating volume of smoke.

"The troops were immediately ordered to parade—the pumps were manned—the fire-hose brought to bear, and every other step that I considered necessary and feasible taken to subdue the fire, which broke out in fierce flames almost immediately after.

"Seeing there was no chance of saving the ship, I, in conjunction with Captain Morriss, the commander of the vessel, at once took steps to save life. The boats were loosed, and the ladies, women, and children, as far as possible, passed down into them. The rapidity with which the flames spread, forced us very shortly to the fore-castle. A number of man-of-war's boats assembled beneath the bows, and every effort was made to get the men into them. In this, I am happy to state, I was completely successful, owing very much to the very gallant and able assistance I received from two ballast lighters, as well as from the excellent conduct of the men themselves. This frightful scene was enacted in less than one hour of the night.

"I regret to state that one man, one woman, and five children have perished; the former by drowning, the latter by the explosion. Several have received very severe contusions and injuries, from which a few may probably die.

"It now only remains for me to beg you to bring to the notice of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-chief, the very excellent behaviour of the troops, and the great assistance I received from every individual officer under my command; so cool, collected, and energetic were they *all*, that I feel it is only due to them

to bring their names respectively before his Royal Highness.

"They are Captain Molesworth, Twenty-seventh Regiment (my second in command); Captain Ussher, Eighty-seventh Regiment; Captain Munnings, Twenty-fourth Regiment; Captain Stopford, Fifty-second Regiment; Lieutenant the Hon. G. Clive, Fifty-second Regiment; Lieutenant Gresson, Twenty-seventh Regiment; Quartermaster Nevell, Seventieth Regiment; and Assistant-Surgeon Kidd, Twenty-seventh Regiment; this latter officer, the moment the fire broke out, got his sick on to the fore-castle and they were all passed out.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Muter, of the Sixtieth Rifles, a private passenger, rendered me the greatest assistance, as did Lieutenant Wish, of the Bombay Artillery; and I am deeply indebted to Captain Morriss and the whole of his *officers* for their spirited exertions and gallant conduct on this very trying occasion. Everything has been totally destroyed, no person landing with anything but what they rose from their beds in.

"I have, etc.

"ANDREW TRINBULL ALLAN,

"Lieut.-Col. 81st Regt.

"Commanding Detachments Bengal Invalids.

"Major-Gen. Hon. Sir J. Y. Scarlett, K.C.B.,
etc., etc., Portsmouth."

This report drew forth the following communication from head-quarters.

"Horse Guards, 13th June, 1859.

"SIR,—Having had the honour to lay before the General Commanding-in-chief your letter of the 3rd instant (addressed to the Quartermaster-General),

with its enclosure from Lieutenant-Colonel Allan, of the Eighty-first Regiment, reporting the destruction, by fire, at Spithead, on the morning of the 3rd instant, of the ship 'Eastern Monarch,' having on board a detachment of invalids from Bengal; I have it in command to request that you will be pleased to convey to Lieutenant-Colonel Allan the gratification felt by his Royal Highness at the exemplary conduct of himself and of the officers and men under his command on that trying occasion.

"To their discipline and coolness in danger may be attributed the preservation of the lives of those on board, and it is impossible to give too much praise to such examples of soldierlike resolution and steadiness.

"You will be pleased to furnish a copy of this letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Allan, and to publish the subject of it in your district orders.

"I have, etc.,

"G. A. WETHERALL, Adjt.-Gen.

"Major-Gen. the Hon. Sir J. Y. Scarlett, K.C.B.,

"Commanding South-western District,

"Portsmouth."

The *Times* devoted the accompanying eloquent article on the subject, in which is forcibly illustrated the lesson that has been attempted in these selections; its perusal must ever serve to stimulate all (if such urging be necessary) never to forfeit the noble character acquired by the military in similar hours of trial. It appeared in the edition published on Monday, June 6th, 1859:—


"The burning of the 'Eastern Monarch' at Spithead, on the morning of Thursday last, will add yet

another chapter to the naval history of our country. What English seamen can do in action we know; but, heroic as their achievements have been when called upon to maintain their country's honour amid the deadly turmoil of a naval engagement, it is not, perhaps, even then that they display the full extent of their patient courage. The sea has mischances in store which are more trying to human fortitude than the crashing of the shot or the glance of the cutlass. Worse than any weapon wielded by human arm—worse than any missile propelled by human skill, is the deadly animosity of the great sea itself; worse again than this is it when fire and water are struggling for the mastery, and men stand by, all but helpless, the victims of this or that element which may conquer in the strife.

“Of all forms of destruction to which human beings are exposed that of a fire at sea is the worst. The torture is prolonged, the resistance all but hopeless, the alternative of death by fire or death by water more dreadful than if no choice were offered. The escape is from death to death, but still the choice is allowed. Within the last few years it has been our painful duty to lay many stories of this kind before our readers, and now another must be added to the list. Fortunately the ‘Eastern Monarch’ had completed her voyage to the British shores, and had anchored temporarily at Spithead when the calamity occurred. If it was to be, the misfortune could scarcely have happened at a better spot, for at Spithead prompt and effective assistance was forthcoming. All the assistance the British Navy could have rendered *to the burning ship* would, however, have been but of

little avail but for the high discipline, the ready obedience, the fortitude and self-control of the crew and passengers, and the clear head and firm will of the commander. The bulk of the passengers were invalid soldiers returning from the North-western provinces of India. Poor fellows! They met with but an unpleasant welcome on their arrival at home. They seem to have behaved as British soldiers always do behave on such emergencies—with as much coolness as though they had been on the parade-ground, with as much courage as though they had been in action on the field. Had they been a herd of emigrants or ordinary landmen, there can be no doubt that an awful loss of life must have been the result. But here were three or four hundred men accustomed to obey orders, to act together, to do whatever they were told, or to do nothing, if they were directed to stand still.

“On reading the account of the burning of the ‘Eastern Monarch’ it is impossible not to be struck with various points of similarity between it and the dismal tale of the ‘Birkenhead.’ The ‘Birkenhead’ story was the more awful one of the two, because the sufferers were so far removed from human help. We cannot, however, doubt that the men who did so well on Thursday morning last would have met a more terrible fate with equal courage. With death staring them in the face they rivalled the fortitude, the humanity, the discipline of their predecessors; why doubt, if the ship’s planks had sunk beneath their feet, while the sharks were playing round them waiting for their food, that they too would have been true to the end?



“The ‘Eastern Monarch’ was a splendid ship, perhaps the foremost amongst the sailing ships which pass between the British Islands and the Indian shores. She had sailed from Kurrachee on the 22nd of February last, bringing home, as we have already stated, between three and four hundred invalid troops. She had touched at St. Helena, but the run between that island and the English coast had been prolonged, in consequence, at first, of light baffling breezes, and, finally, of the east wind, with which we have been so long afflicted at home. The result was, that the ship ran short of provisions, and Captain Morriss resolved on anchoring at Spithead on his way up Channel to obtain some meat and vegetables. Well was it that he did so, for the accident, according to all human presumption, would equally have happened had he held on his course. It would then have been the story of the ‘Amazon’ over again—it may well be in a more appalling form. At 1.30 A.M. on Thursday last the ship brought up at Spithead, and the crew were employed, under the direction of the chief mate, in furling the sails. They were yet engaged in their task when a violent explosion was heard in the after part of the ship. The skylights on the poop were blown out, and the poop ladders were carried away. In a moment the whole decks were filled with a choking vapour, and then the flames burst out, running like wildfire along the decks. Ladies rushed on deck shrieking in their night-dresses. The officers on board sprang up as best they could. The troops leaped from their hammocks, and scarcely escaped death even then, so rapid was the progress of the *flames*. For a moment, and but for a moment, all was

confusion, and 'God have mercy on our souls!' Order, however, was soon restored, so powerful were the instincts and habits of discipline, even at such a time. The troops, under the orders of their officers, gathered on the fore part of the burning ship, and never, as we are told, were men more self-possessed, more ready in obedience, more cheerful in the presence of impending death. The crew did their work quite as well. As soon as it became clear that it was impossible to arrest the progress of the flames the four boats belonging to the ship were lowered down, and the women and children were passed over the sides and placed in safety. There was not room for all of them. Presently two men-of-war's boats came alongside and the remainder of the women and children were passed down. Then, and not till then, the men began to look out for themselves, and in half an hour's time every one who could be found was got out of the ship. There must have been in all about five hundred human beings on board. The loss of life amounts to one woman and five children, who were killed or suffocated by the first explosion; one soldier, who died from exhaustion after he was brought to shore, and one child. These facts taken together are eloquent enough, and spare us all necessity of descanting further on the zeal and courage of the gallant men concerned in this calamity. Captain Morriss had scarcely left the ship when the flaming masts went by the board. The hull continued burning until mid-day, and last night some charred timbers were all that remained of the 'Eastern Monarch.' The tradition of the gallantry of her crew and of the invalid soldiers on board will not pass away, and be forgotten."

The following General Order conveyed the Queen's thanks to the troops on board the 'Eastern Monarch':—

“GENERAL ORDER.

“Horse Guards, 9th July, 1859.

“The General Commanding-in-chief has received from the Secretary of State for War, a report from the Board of Trade of the investigation held to inquire into the cause of the destruction by fire of the troop ship 'Eastern Monarch,' and having submitted the same to the Queen, has much gratification in announcing to the officers and men who were on board that ship, and to the whole army, her Majesty's approbation of the discipline and good order displayed by them under such trying circumstances. The officers and men were principally invalids from India, and belonged to various regiments; but all behaved as British soldiers are wont to do in such perilous situations, and exhibited a gratifying proof of the good discipline and manly spirit of the army generally.

“Throughout the eventful career of a soldier, there is no position in which he can be placed where fortitude, courage, and obedience can be more essential, or more conspicuous, than upon such occasions as shipwreck or fire at sea. The display of those qualities, in the instance now adverted to, is most creditable, and does honour to Lieutenant-Colonel Allan of the Eighty-first Regiment, in command, and to all the officers and soldiers who shared in that dreadful calamity.

“By command of his Royal Highness,

“The General Commanding-in-chief,

“G. A. WETHERALL,

“Adjutant-General.”

MUTINY ACT AND ARTICLES OF WAR.



"Partly, to satisfy my opinion, and partly, for the satisfaction, look you, of my mind, as touching the direction of the military discipline ; that is the point."

HENRY V.

MUTINY ACT AND ARTICLES OF WAR.

THE following extracts are from the "Articles and Rules for the better Government of his Majestie's Forces by Land, during this present War. M.DC,LXXIII :"—

"DUTIES TO ALMIGHTY GOD.

Art. I.

"All Officers and Souldiers (not having just impediment) shall diligently frequent Divine Service and Sermon, on Sundays and other Days, especially Festivals, or Days set apart for Publick Fasting and Humiliation, in such Places as shall be appointed for the Regiment wherein they serve. And for those, who either wilfully or negligently absent themselves from Divine Service or Sermon, or else, being present, do behave themselves indecently or irreverently during the same; if they be Officers, they shall be severely reprehended at a Court-Martial; but if Souldiers, they shall for every such first Offence, forfeit each man Twelve pence, to be deducted out of his next Pay; and for the second Offence, shall forfeit Twelve Pence, and be laid in Irons for Twelve Hours. And for every like Offence afterwards, shall suffer and pay in like manner.

"Art. IV.

"If any Officer or Souldier shall presume to blas-

pHEME the Holy and undivided Trinity, or the Persons of God the Father, God the Son, or God the Holy Ghost; or shall presume to speak against any known Article of the Christian Faith, he shall have his Tongue bored through with a red hot Iron."

This punishment is mentioned in the war ordinances of the Earl of Northumberland, in the reign of Charles I., and continued in force to the period of James II.

The red hot iron has passed away, but the offence for which it was formerly inflicted is still punishable, as will be seen by the accompanying extracts from the "Rules and Articles for the better Government of all her Majesty's Forces" of the present year; and for improper behaviour at Divine Service, a forfeit of twelve pence is still in force:—

"DIVINE WORSHIP.

"Art. 35.

"ANY Officer or Soldier who shall speak against any known Article of the Christian Faith shall be delivered over to the Civil Magistrate, to be proceeded against according to Law."

"Art. 36.

"ANY Officer or Soldier who, not having just Impediment, shall not regularly attend Divine Service and Sermon in the Place appointed for the assembling of the Corps to which he belongs; or who shall wilfully absent himself; or who, being present, shall behave indecently or irreverently; or who shall use any unlawful Oath or Execration; shall, if an Officer, be brought before a *General Court-martial*, and, on being convicted

thereof, be publicly and severely reprimanded ;—and if a Soldier, shall be brought before a *Regimental*, or other Court-martial, and, on being convicted thereof, shall for the First Offence, forfeit Twelve pence, to be deducted out of his next Pay ; and for the Second Offence, not only forfeit Twelve pence, but be placed in Confinement for Twelve Hours ;—and for every further like Offence shall suffer and pay in like Manner ; and the Money so forfeited shall be applied to the Use of the sick Soldiers of the Troop or Company to which the Offender belongs.”

The origin of the Mutiny Act is attributed to the circumstance of the present First Foot, or Royals, having refused to embark for the Netherlands, in 1689. This regiment had been a great favourite with James II., in consequence of its antiquity, valour, and good conduct, and having preserved its loyalty to the last, did not expect to be well received by William III.; besides which the order was considered premature, as the national assembly of Scotland had not declared for the new sovereign. This made the officers and soldiers imagine that they were not bound to obey the commands issued, and under this impression, several of them, after seizing the money appointed for their pay, marched towards Scotland with four pieces of cannon. They were overtaken in Lincolnshire, and about twenty officers and five hundred men, who had previously been convinced of their error, laid down their arms and submitted themselves to the king's clemency. William III. is stated to have admired the devotedness of the corps to his predecessor, when he was forsaken by almost every one, not excepting his own children, and, after dismissing

three or four officers, pardoned the remainder of the regiment.

The first regular Mutiny Bill was passed on the 3rd of April, 1689, and is now annually renewed, by Parliament.

WOMAN IN BATTLE.



"I tell thee, proud Templar, that not in thy fiercest battles
hast thou displayed more of thy vaunted courage, than has been
shown by a woman when called upon to suffer by affection or
duty."

IVANHOE.

WOMAN IN BATTLE.

IN the *Gentleman's Magazine* for July, 1739, page 383, is the following entry amongst the list of deaths for that year:—"7th July—*Christiana Davis*, who several years served with great Valour as a Dragoon in the *Inniskilling* Regiment, but receiving a Wound in the Battle of *Aghrim* was discovered. She was afterwards in *Flanders*, and was very useful in a Battle or Siege to supply the Soldiers with Water and other Necessaries, even to the Mouth of a Cannon. For her gallant Behaviour, she obtained the late King's Letter for an allowance of 1s. per Day out of *Chelsea College* during Life. She was interred, as she desired, in the Pensioners' Burying Ground, and three grand Volleys fir'd over her Grave."

This statement, extraordinary as it is, does not correctly give the services of this remarkable woman, for she was not wounded at *Aghrim*, neither was she in the *Inniskilling* Regiment, now the 6th Dragoons, but in the 2nd Dragoons or Scots Greys. The father was wounded in the above battle, which accounts for the mistake. Her adventures were published, and may now be considered a scarce work; there is a copy in the British Museum, to which reference has been made in preparing this notice.

The Title Page of which the following is a copy, is sufficient, of itself, to excite attention, and although some portions of the book are coarse, the adventures are highly interesting and bear every impress of truth:—

THE
LIFE AND ADVENTURES
OF
MRS. CHRISTIAN DAVIES,
THE
BRITISH AMAZON,
COMMONLY CALLED
MOTHER ROSS;

Who served as a Foot-Soldier and Dragoon, in several Campaigns, under King *William* and the late Duke of *Marlborough*; containing Variety of Transactions both serious and diverting:

Wherein she gave surprising Proofs of Courage, Strength, and Dexterity in handling all Sorts of Weapons, rarely to be met with in the contrary Sex;

For which, besides being otherwise rewarded, she was made a Pensioner of *Chelsea* College by Queen *Anne*, where her Husband now is a Serjeant, and she continued to her Death.

The whole taken from her own Mouth, and known to be true by Many Noblemen, Generals, and other Officers, &c. mentioned in her Life, and still living, who served in those Wars at the same Time, and were Witnesses of her uncommon Martial Bravery.

THE SECOND EDITION.

To which is added,

An APPENDIX, containing several remarkable Passages, omitted in the former Impression.

LONDON,

Printed for R. MONTAGU. M,DCC,XLI.

The book is illustrated with a frontispiece showing her in the uniform of a dragoon and also as a sutler.

"She was born in *Dublin*, in the year 1667, of Parents whose Probity acquired them that Respect from their Acquaintance, which they had no Claim to from their Birth!"

Her father was a maltster and brewer; she became active and strong in all the labours of industry.

To use her own words:—"While my Father bore arms for King *James*, the neighbouring Papists, in time of divine Service, came to, and blocked up the Church Door of *Leslip*, with Butchers' Blocks and other Lumber. My mother was then in the Church; I was at home, but hearing the Noise, and fearing my Mother might receive some Hurt, I snatched up a Spit, and thus armed, sallied forth to force my Way, and come to her Assistance; but being resisted by a Serjeant, I thrust my Spit thro' the Calf of his Leg, removed the Things which had blocked up the Door, and called to my Mother, bidding her come away, for Dinner was ready."

Although a pardon had been obtained for her father having appeared in arms, and levied men for King *James*, yet all his effects were seized by the Government.

Her aunt's business, that of a public-house, was left to her, and she married a Richard Welsh, who remained there in the same capacity as when her relative was living. It appears that she made the first overtures through a female friend. He proved a tender, careful, and obliging husband; but taking a bottle with a schoolfellow, he was persuaded to go on board a vessel with recruits, and have a bowl of punch

in the captain's cabin. The result may be easily anticipated; the wind sprang up fair, and he reached Helvoet Sluys before he had recovered from the effects of his intemperance. He enlisted into Lord Orrery's regiment of foot, now the First Royals. His wife determined to leave her children and go to Flanders in search of her husband. Her eldest child she left with her mother, and the one born after her husband's departure with a nurse; her second son was dead. Cutting off her hair, she dressed herself in a suit of her husband's clothes; and reaching the "Golden Last," where Ensign Herbert Laurence was beating up for recruits, she enlisted under the name of Christopher Welsh, in the regiment commanded by the Marquis de Pisare. Shortly afterwards, our heroine joined the grand army, and was present at the battle of Landen, in which she was wounded a little above the ankle. In her own words: "When I heard the Cannon play, and the small Shot rattle about me, which, at first, threw me into a sort of Panick, having not been used to such rough Music." This wound incapacitated her from service for two months; shortly after she was taken prisoner with others by the French, and endeavours were made to secure the captives for the service of France. Here she was met by her first cousin Captain Cavanaugh, a French officer, but was not recognized. After nine days' imprisonment she was exchanged, and returned to the army; here she gained the affections of a burgher's daughter, which led to a duel with a rival lover, a sergeant of the same regiment who had insulted the lady in question, and was wounded; for this she was imprisoned, the sergeant's wounds being considered mortal. The

father of the young lady obtained the release of our heroine, her arrears of pay, and her discharge. She escaped from this love affair because she was sensible that the father would not bestow his daughter's hand on a poor foot soldier, and at the same time remarked to the young lady, that although "no more than a common sentinel," she had as much honour "as a general," and purposed to gain a commission by bravery.

She afterwards entered Lord John Hay's regiment of dragoons, now the Second Scots Greys, and served during the siege of Namur (1695). An odd adventure subsequently befell her, for a child was laid to her charge, as being the father, and refusing to expose the perjury of the mother, she defrayed the expense of the infant, who did not live above a month. After the peace of Ryswick, the regiment was reduced, and she returned to Ireland, but none of her friends recognized her, as she was so much altered by the fatigues she had undergone; this suited her purpose, for the nurse's charge for her youngest child was more than she could pay. War again breaking out, she enlisted in her old corps of dragoons, commanded by Lord John Hay, and was engaged at Nimeguen. At the siege of Venloo, her horse was wounded by treading on a scythe left by the frightened peasants. At Liege she obtained as booty a large silver chalice, and some other pieces of plate, which she disposed of to a Dutch Jew for a third part of their value. In the second attack at Schellenberg she received a ball in the hip, which could never be afterwards extracted; her sex narrowly escaped detection while in hospital. After the battle of Blenheim, she was detached to

guard the prisoners, and met with her husband, who was embracing a Dutchwoman. She made herself known to her husband, who was serving in Ockley's Regiment, and the recognition may be more easily imagined than depicted; his faults were all overlooked, but she resolved to pass as his brother until the termination of the war, and left him after giving him a piece of gold. The "pretty dragoon," for so she was called, subsequently gained the affections of a young Dutch girl. At Ramillies she escaped unhurt through the hottest of the battle; but when the French were defeated, an unlucky shell from a steeple, on which before the battle, they had planted some mortars and cannon, which played all the time of the engagement, struck the back part of her head and fractured her skull. She was trepanned, and did not recover in less than ten weeks. Although she suffered much, yet the discovery of her sex was a greater grief to her. The surprising news spread far and near, and Lord John Hay declared she should want for nothing. Brigadier Preston made her a present of a handsome silk gown, and the officers all contributed what was necessary to furnish her with proper costume, and she was dismissed the service with a handsome compliment. His lordship hoped she would not continue her cruelty to her husband, now she could no longer pass under a disguise. There was a new marriage, all the officers being invited to the solemnity; the old practice of throwing the stocking not being forgotten, and a kiss being given to the bride by all on taking leave.

At the siege of Ath she took a piece out of a soldier's hand, and killed one of the enemy; a

musket shot from the town, at the same time, split her under lip, bent one of her teeth into her mouth, and knocked her down. She adds, "Both this Shot and mine, with which I killed the Soldier, were so exactly at a Time, that none could distinguish whether I fell by the recoiling of the Piece, or the Enemy's Ball. My Husband and some of his Comrades, ran to take me up, and seeing the blood imagined I was shot through the head, but I convinced them to the contrary, by spitting the Ball and Tooth into my Hand." While in Ghent, the Dutchwoman, to whom allusion has been made, took lodgings opposite, and inveigled our heroine's husband to an alehouse; Mrs. Welsh struck her with a case knife, and cut her nose off close to the face; her husband, by order of the colonel, was confined and reprimanded, but his wife obtained his liberty. She was useful to the army as a sutler, and in obtaining information. Whilst at Courtray she won a race with her mare, on which she carried provisions, with Captain Montgomery, of the Grenadiers, in Lord Orkney's regiment, who ridiculed her habit and her poor animal. To quote once more from her book: "I offer'd to run her against his Horse for a Pistole, and we would both ride. Brigadier *Godfrey*, who was by, laid another Pistole on my Side. We both went to the place chosen to run upon, and starting at the beat of Drum, placed to give the Signal, he suffer'd me to keep pace with him for some time, but finding he was going to leave me, I made a furious Push at him, flung Man and Horse into a Ditch, and thus won the Race! The Brigadier laugh'd heartily at my Stratagem, the Captain was half angry, but I got a couple of pistoles; for the Brigadier gave

me that he had won, and did not much concern myself, nor should I have given myself any Trouble had he been irritated, for I may safely say, I had as little Fear about me as any Man in the Army."

She always followed her husband, and at the siege of Ghent, when he was one of the forlorn hope, Colonel Hamilton stopped her ; but subsequently she finds him and takes a bottle of brandy, which was of comfort to him.

Many other adventures are related in this singular work, which the Reverend G. R. Gleig, M.A., Chaplain General to the Forces, has worked up into an amusing tale in his delightful "Traditions of Chelsea Hospital." Her husband was killed at the battle of Malplaquet, and she found his body being stripped by a stranger, who at her approach retired. Whilst she was deploring her loss, Captain Ross came by, and attempted to console her ; this compassion gained for her the *soubriquet* of *Mother Ross*. She threw her husband's body across the mare, dug a grave, and buried it, and would have thrown herself in had she not been prevented. Her dog used to lie constantly on his master's grave, but on her approach would run to the rear of the regiment, where her partner used to be while living. Her grief was powerful, but she married Hugh Jones, a grenadier, about eleven weeks afterwards. At the siege of St. Venant, her second husband was wounded, and she covered him with her clothes, which she stripped off to her stays, whilst his comrades carried him to the trench ; of this wound he died in about ten weeks. After the peace she presented a petition to Queen Anne, who said it would be her care to provide for her.

and if she was delivered of a boy, she would give him a commission as soon as born. The child proved to be a girl, much to the mother's vexation. Her Majesty ordered fifty pounds to defray expenses to be given her. Her third husband was a soldier named Davies, who had served in the First Regiment of Foot Guards, and at the time of his marriage was in the Welsh Fusiliers. The Queen had ordered a shilling a day subsistence for life, for Mrs. Davies, which the Lord Treasurer Oxford reduced to fivepence, and Mr. Craigs obtained the King's order for receiving one shilling as originally intended. She afterwards lived in the Willow Walk, "Tuttle" Fields, Westminster, and made farthing pies, and sold strong liquors; this enabled her to purchase her husband's discharge, but the money was thrown away, as two days after his arrival in town, being in liquor, he enlisted in the Guards. She marched in the funeral procession of the Duke of Marlborough, as she says, "with a heavy heart and streaming eyes." Her husband ultimately became an inmate of Chelsea College.

Long before her death she was afflicted with a complication of distempers, as dropsy, scurvy, etc., and at length her husband being taken ill, she would sit up with him at nights, by which she contracted a cold that threw her into a continual fever, of which she died in four days, on the 7th of July, 1739, and was interred, with military honours, in the burying ground belonging to Chelsea Hospital.

A similar instance of a female soldier is recorded on a tombstone in the parish church of St. Nicholas, Brighton, as is shown by the following singular in-

scription ; she is stated to have served in the Fifth Foot, but this regiment was not in the battle mentioned, and it is possible that the Third Foot was the corps in question, the figures being somewhat similar, and might therefore be mistaken by the tombstone cutter :—

In Memory of
PHŒBE HESSEL,
who was born at Stepney in the year 1713.
She served for many years
as a private Soldier in the 5th Regiment of foot
in different parts of Europe,
and in the year 1745 fought under the command
of the Duke of Cumberland,
at the Battle of Fontenoy,
where she received a Bayonet wound in her Arm.
Her long life, which commenced in the time of
Queen Anne,
extended to the reign of
George IV.,
by whose munificence she received comfort
and support in her latter Years.
She died at Brighton, where she long resided,
December 12th, 1821, Aged 108 years.

George IV. allowed this aged veteran a pension of half-a-guinea a week, which she enjoyed for many years.

There is another instance in Queen Anne's time of a female passing herself off as a soldier, for it appears by the embarkation return of the Twentieth Foot, preserved among the Harleian Manuscripts at

the British Museum, that one of the soldiers of Captain St. Clair's company proved to be a female. The return is dated 1st July, 1702, at which time the regiment embarked as part of the force which proceeded on the expedition against Cadiz.

In 1759, during the operations of the English to reduce Guadaloupe, the natives and planters were incited by M. Dutriel, the French Governor, to resistance; and Madame Ducharmey armed her servants and negroes, leading them in person, like Thalestris of old, to attack the British camp. The conquest of the whole island was, however, effected in the beginning of May of the above year.

The following particulars relating to the conduct of a soldier's wife at the attack on the post of New Vigie, in the island of St. Vincent, in June, 1796, are related by Major-General Stewart, in his narrative of the services of the Royal Highlanders:—"I directed her husband, who was in my company, to remain behind in charge of the men's knapsacks, which they had thrown off to be light for the advance up the hill. He obeyed his orders; but his wife, believing, I suppose, that she was not included in these injunctions, pushed forward in the assault. When the enemy had been driven from the third redoubt, I was standing giving some directions to the men, and preparing to push on to the fourth and last redoubt, when I found myself tapped on the shoulder; and, on turning round, I saw my Amazonian friend standing with her clothes tucked up to the knees, and seizing my arm, 'Well done, my Highland lads,' she exclaimed, 'see how the brigands scamper, like so many deer! Come,' added she, 'let us drive them from yonder hill.'

On inquiry I found she had been in the hottest fire, cheering and animating the men; and when the action was over, she was as active as any of the surgeons in assisting the wounded."

The heroine of Saragossa is a celebrated instance of woman in battle; and Sir David Wilkie's picture has perpetuated her memory. Her gallant deed is thus recorded:—

At the siege of Saragossa, in the year 1809, Augustina Saragossa, about twenty-two years of age, a handsome woman of the lower class of people, whilst carrying refreshments to the gates, arrived at the battery of the Portillo at the very moment when the French fire had absolutely destroyed every person that was stationed in it. The citizens and soldiers for the moment hesitated to reman the guns; Augustina rushed forward over the wounded and the slain, snatched a match from the hand of a dead artilleryman, and fired off a twenty-six pounder; then jumping upon the gun, made a solemn vow never to quit it alive during the siege; and having stimulated her fellow-citizens, by this daring intrepidity, to fresh exertions, they instantly rushed into the battery, and again opened a tremendous fire on the enemy. For her heroism on this occasion, she afterwards received the surname of "Saragossa," a pension from the government and the daily pay of an artilleryman.

Sir John Carr, in his "Tour through Spain," relates the following interesting account of the heroine of Saragossa:—"Augustina appeared to be about twenty-three. She was neatly dressed in the black mantilla. Her complexion was a light olive, her countenance soft and pleasing, and her manners,

which were perfectly feminine, were easy and engaging. Upon the sleeve of one of her arms she wore three embroidered badges of distinction, commemorative of three distinguished acts of intrepidity. General Doyle told me she never talked of her own brilliant exploits, but always spoke with animation of those she saw displayed by others in those memorable sieges. The day before I was introduced to this extraordinary female, she had been entertained at a dinner given by Admiral Purvis on board his flagship. The particulars I received from an officer who was present. As she received a pension from government, and also the pay of an artilleryman, the Admiral considered her as a military character, and, much to his credit, received her with the honour of that profession. Upon her reaching the deck, the marines were drawn up, and manœuvred before her. She appeared quite at home, regarding them with a steady eye, and spoke in terms of admiration of their neatness and soldier-like appearance. Upon examining the guns, she observed of one of them as other women would speak of a cap, 'My gun,' alluding to one with which she had effected considerable havoc among the French at Saragossa, 'was not so nice and clean as this.' She was drinking her coffee when the evening gun was fired; its discharge seemed to electrify her with delight; she sprang out of the cabin upon the deck, and attentively listened to the reverberation of its sound. In the evening she joined in the dance with the rest of the company, and displayed a good ear for music, and considerable natural gracefulness. The sailors, as it may be supposed, were uncommonly pleased with her. Some were heard to

say, with an hearty oath, 'I hope they will do something for her; she ought to have plenty of prize money; she is of the right sort.' She occasionally wears the dress of the service into which she entered, the artillery, but modestly preserves the petticoat. One evening, as she was walking alone in this habit, in one of the streets of Cadiz, with her sabre by her side, a man, attracted by her beauty, followed her a considerable way; upon which, offended at his impertinence, she turned round, and, drawing her sabre, with great calmness, but determination, told him, that if he followed her another step, she would cut him down. The gay, but not gallant, Lothario fled as fast as his legs would carry him."

What a charming incident is that of the orphan girl, described by Sir William Napier in his account of the battle of Busaco, on the 27th of September, 1810:—"Meanwhile an affecting incident, contrasting strongly with the savage character of the preceding events, added to the interest of the day. A poor orphan Portuguese girl, about seventeen years of age, and very handsome, was seen coming down the mountain, and driving an ass loaded with all her property, through the midst of the French army. She had abandoned her dwelling in obedience to the proclamation, and now passed over the field of battle with a childish simplicity, totally unconscious of her perilous situation, and scarcely understanding which were the hostile and which the friendly troops, for no man on either side was so brutal as to molest her."

Another instance of woman's devotion and contempt of danger occurred during the defence of Matagorda, a small fort about two miles from Cadiz,

which, though frequently cannonaded, had been held fifty-five days. On the 21st of April, 1810, the Spanish seventy-four, and the armed flotilla which had been moored to assist in the defence, from a shower of heated shot, were compelled to take shelter under the works of Cadiz. The fire of forty-eight guns and mortars were then concentrated on this small fort, and its slight parapet, as it were, vanished. The troops fell fast; for thirty hours this continued, when General Graham sent boats to bring off the survivors, his intended diversion having proved impracticable. "Here," says Sir William Napier, "I must record an action of which it is difficult to say whether it was most feminine or heroic. A sergeant's wife, named Retson, was in a casemate with the wounded men, when a very young drummer was ordered to fetch water from the well of the fort. Seeing the child hesitate, she snatched the vessel from his hand, braved the terrible cannonade herself, and, although a shot cut the bucket-cord from her hand, she recovered it, and fulfilled her mission." An interesting account of this noble-minded woman is contained in a small volume, entitled "Sketches of a Soldier's Life in Ireland," by the author of "The Eventful Life of a Soldier." A detailed account of the heroine of Matagorda was inserted in the *Glasgow Chronicle*, and this was transferred to the columns of the *Times* for the 19th of August, 1843, from which the following particulars are extracted:—"When the French were besieging Cadiz, during April, 1810, great importance was attached by them to the reduction of fort Matagorda, as it commanded a point on which they could have erected batteries with considerable effect. Accord-

just about two o'clock in the morning of the 21st of June, thirty pieces of cannon were opened on the fort, which was not above 100 yards square. Our heroine's husband, who was a sergeant in the gallant 42nd Highland, which formed part of the garrison, was at his post, but she was sleeping in a hut in the battery with her child of four years of age in her arms. A tremendous thundering boom sent a twenty-four-pound shot right through the hut, taking effect on the woman at the head of the bed, but leaving the startled heroine uninjured. Amidst the dreadful sounds and indistinct sights of carnage, the mother bore the terrified child to a bomb-proof for safety, and returning to the hut, she carried away all her own and her husband's linen, which she tore up and applied as bandages to the wounded, nobly assisting the surgeon, while the only other two women in the fort were lying in hysterics. A cry for water arose, and a drum-boy was ordered to procure some from the well, which was in the centre of the battery. The little fellow hesitated, and stood dangling the bucket in his hand. 'Why don't you go for water?' exclaimed the surgeon. 'The poor thing's frightened,' interrupted Mrs. Retson, 'an nae wonder; gie me the bucket, my man, an I'll gang mysel.' Seizing the bucket from the trembling hand of the boy, our intrepid heroine, stumbling on the bodies of the dead, amidst the roars of artillery and the groans of the wounded, hurried on to the well. The instant that she had lowered the bucket, a shot cut the rope! Nothing daunted, however, with the assistance of a seaman she recovered the vessel, and had the rope spliced, and bearing the precious liquid to the parched lips of the wounded,

she received the hearty 'God bless and preserve you!' from those who were able to speak, and the not less grateful expression of the eye from those who were fast retreating beyond the range of time. Fearlessly she exposed herself, mixing wine and water for the exhausted soldiers, and inspiring new life and vigour into all around by her astonishing display of female heroism. During the hottest of the fire, and when it was almost impossible to remove from the parapets without being struck, Mrs. Retson, young in years, and blooming in health and beauty, refused to leave her husband, or remove from the spot where she was of such admirable service. When it was found necessary to repair one of the embrasures, she alone, with perfect composure, entered, and, in the face of the enemy, remained till she had completed all that could be done. The cannonade was again renewed on the following day, but with dismantled towers, failing ammunition, and the half of their number killed and disabled, the British found it impossible to return the fire with equal vigour. A lull took place. A strong storming-party of the French appeared. All the guns that the British could bring to bear upon them were three; but these were charged to the very muzzle with loose powder, grape, and ball-cartridge. The French party advanced (if they got under the range of the guns the fort was theirs), but our brave fellows stood marshalled and ready to fight to the last. Seizing a boarding-pike, and taking up her position alongside of her husband, our heroine calmly awaited the result. The column moved nearer and nearer, not a sound was heard in the fort, the guns are pointing, the threatening force has now reached within

nearly two hundred yards of the fort; a half-second more, 'Fire!' Shrieks ascend with the cannons' roar, and deep groans mock the distance by reaching the ears of the British troops, ~~are~~ with one prolonged shout they proclaim their deliverance. With half their number struck down by the well-directed fire, the French retired in the utmost consternation and confusion; but the fort of Matagorda was found so much demolished as to be untenable, and the same day the troops, accompanied by Mrs. Retson, were removed by the boats of the fleet, and the fort was blown up."

Mrs. Retson's name was again brought to public notice under these circumstances. In the year 1843, a gentleman of the name of Conan having been taken to the hospital at Glasgow, was attended by Mrs. Retson, as nurse. On his recovery he brought her case under the notice of the public, with the view of raising a subscription in her behalf. The appeal met with a generous response, and nearly £200 having been raised, the money was invested in a life annuity.

At the Battle of Salamanca, on the 22nd July, 1812, the eloquent historian of the Peninsular War, Lieut-Gen. Sir W. Napier, K.C.B., thus records the devotion of an English lady:—

"Such were the soldiers, and the devotion of a woman was not wanting to the illustration of this great day.

"The wife of Colonel Dalbiac, an English lady of a gentle disposition, and possessing a very delicate frame, had braved the dangers, and endured the privations of two campaigns, with the patient fortitude

which belongs only to her sex; and, in this battle, forgetful of every thing but that strong affection which had so long supported her, she rode deep amidst the enemy's fire, trembling, yet irresistibly impelled forwards by feelings more imperious than horror, more piercing than the fear of death."

It was in this battle that the Duke of Wellington is stated to have been struck in the thigh by a spent musket-ball, which passed through his holster.

Lady de Lancy, a sister of Captain Basil Hall, carefully attended her dying husband, Sir William de Lancy, in a peasant's cottage at Waterloo, for seven or eight days after the battle, in which he had been severely wounded, and, in fact, was at first returned as killed. In "Recollections, by Samuel Rogers," the following account is given by the Duke:—"De Lancy was with me when he was struck. We were on a point of land that overlooked the plain, and I had just been warned off by some soldiers (but as I saw well from it, and as two divisions were engaging below, I had said, 'Never mind'), when a ball came leaping along *en ricochet*, as it is called, and striking him on the back, sent him many yards over the head of his horse. He fell on his face, and bounded upward and fell again.

"All the staff dismounted, and ran to him; and when I came up he said, 'Pray tell them to leave me, and let me die in peace.'

"I had him conveyed into the rear; and two days afterwards, when, on my return from Brussels, I saw him in a barn, he spoke with such strength that I said (for I had reported him among the killed), 'Why, De Lancy, you will have the advantage of Sir Condy in

Castle Rackrent; you will know what your friends said of you after you were dead.' 'I hope I shall,' he replied. Poor fellow! We had known each other ever since we were boys. But I had no time to be sorry; I went on with the army, and never saw him again."

The Russian war is not devoid of such instances, which being so well known their repetition is unnecessary; but there is one example which it would be ingratitude to omit, for it was left to the nineteenth century to exemplify woman's true sphere of duty in the battle-field;—this was shown by Florence Nightingale and her devoted sisterhood, and it is gratifying to remember the assistance rendered by the *Times* newspaper, in opening a subscription to aid this generous lady in her efforts to alleviate the sufferings of the sick and wounded. Whilst the army boasted of the bravest of the brave, the kindly sympathy and attention of woman were not wanting. Love was united to heroism, and should the time ever call for a repetition of such self-sacrifice, the example thus afforded will produce similar efforts, which seem to blend the chivalry of a past age with the practical duties of the present. Her task performed, she returned home, only anxious to escape observation, and to seek retirement. Her experience had eminently fitted her for the glorious mission she had undertaken, and her knowledge of hospital duties rendered her equal to the great emergency. To quote a soldier's words, showing the fascination she exercised over all under her care: "She would speak to one and to another, and nod and smile to a many more; but she couldn't do it to all, as you know, for we lay there by hun-

dreds; but we could kiss her shadow as it fell, and lay our heads on the pillow again, content."

Britain has welcomed home with open hand
Her gallant soldiers to their native land;
But *one* alone the Nation's thanks did shun,
Though Europe rings with all that she hath done.
For when will "shadow on the wall" e'er fail
To picture forth fair Florence Nightingale!
Her deeds are blazon'd on the scroll of Fame,
And England well may prize her deathless name.

Punch, in the accompanying stanzas, has happily eulogized the Dorcas of the Crimea:—

A NIGHTINGALE IN THE CAMP.

THE men before Sebastopol! a more heroic host
There never stood, in hardship and in peril, at their post.
The foremost of those warriors 'twere a famous thing to be!
And there the first among them goes, if thou hast eyes to see.

'Tis not the good LORD RAGLAN, nor yet the great OMAR,
No, nor the fierce PELISSIER, though thunderbolts of war.
Behold the soldier who in worth excels above the rest;
That English maiden yonder is our bravest and our best.

Brave men, so called, are plentiful; the most of men are brave.
So, truly, are the most of dogs, who reck not of a grave:
Their valour's not self-sacrifice, but simple want of heed;
But courage, in a woman's heart, is bravery indeed.

And there is Mercy's Amazon, within whose little breast
Burns the great spirit that has dared the fever and the pest.
And she has grappled with grim Death, that maid so bold and
meek:

There is the mark of battle fresh upon her pallid cheek.

That gallant, gentle lady the Camp would fain review ;
Throughout the Chief escorts her with such honour as is due.
How many a prayer attends on her, how many a blessing greets
How many a glad and grateful eye among that host she meets

Now goes she to look forth upon the Enemy's stronghold.
Oh, damsel, when its story shall in aftertimes be told,
When not a stone of that thieves' den shall rest upon a stone,
No name shall with its memory live longer than thine own.

Among the world's great women thou has made thy glorious
mark ;

Men will hereafter mention make of thee with JOAN OF ARC :
And fathers, who relate the MAID OF SARAGOSSA's tale,
Will tell their little children, too, of FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE.

MILITARY EPITAPHS.



“ Sure, if I reprehend anything in this world, it is the use of my oracular tongue, and a nice derangement of *epitaphs*.”

MRS. MALAPROP.

MILITARY EPITAPHS.

On a grave-stone in Longnor churchyard, Staffordshire, is this inscription:—

“In memory of WILLIAM BILLINGE, who was born in a corn-field, in Fairfield, in the year 1679. At the age of twenty he enlisted into his Majesty’s service, under Sir G. Rooke; and was at the taking of the fortress of Gibraltar, in 1704. He afterwards came under the Duke of Marlborough, at the memorable battle of Ramillies, fought on the 23rd of May, 1706, when he was wounded by a musket-shot in the thigh. He afterwards returned to his native country, and with manly courage defended his sovereign’s rights in the rebellions of 1715 and 1745. He died within 150 yards of the place where he was born, and was interred on the 30th of January, 1791, aged 112.”

“Billeted by death, he quarter’d here remains;
When the last trumpet sounds, he’ll rise and march again.”

In the graveyard of Chelsea Hospital is the following remarkable inscription, which is inserted in the popular work, by the Reverend G. R. Gleig, M.A., Chaplain-General to the Forces, entitled “Chelsea Hospital and its Traditions.”

“Here rests WILLIAM HISLAND,
Who merited well a pension
If long service be a merit,
Having served upwards of the days of man.
Ancient but not superannuated,
Engaged in a series of wars,

Civil as well as foreign ;
 Yet not maimed or worn out by neither.
 His complexion was florid and fresh,
 His health hale and hearty ;
 His memory exact and ready ;
 In stature he excelled the military size ;
 In strength surpassed the prime of youth ;
 And what made his age still more patriarchal,
 When above one hundred years old,
 He took unto him a wife.
 Read, fellow soldiers, and reflect
 That there is a spiritual warfare
 As well as a warfare temporal.

Born VI of August 1620, }
 Died VII of Feb: 1732, } Aged 112."

The Reverend author adds, "I have made many anxious inquiries about this veteran, but it grieves me to be compelled to acknowledge, that they have produced no satisfactory results. All that is known of his history stands recorded on his tombstone ; and as I have given the scroll at length, my reader must be content to weave out of it for himself, whatever tissue of striking or romantic events his fertile imagination may represent as most appropriate."

On a neat marble tablet, in Kidderminster church, is the following inscription :—

"Sacred to the memory of JOHN TAYLOR, late a sergeant in the 4th (or Queen's own) dragoons, who departed this life at Elvas, in Portugal, on the 14th of November, 1809, at the early age of twenty-seven. He fell a sacrifice (among hundreds) to the sickness *which visited the army of Lieutenant-General Lord Wellington, after the retreat from Talavera, in the*

Spanish dominions. This humble monument was erected by his captain, as a small tribute of respect for one to whom he was much attached, and who was a most excellent non-commissioned officer, and an honest, sober, upright man."

"No further seek his merits to disclose,
Or draw his frailties from their dread abode,
(There they alike in trembling hope repose)
The bosom of his Father and his God."

This will be recognized as the concluding verse of Gray's "Elegy written in a Country Churchyard."

The following curious epitaph is copied from a tombstone at Coventry to the memory of Arthur Manley, who served in the Queen's Royal Regiment of Horse, now Second Dragoon Guards, upwards of fifty-six years:—

"Here lieth the body of ARTHUR MANLEY, late quartermaster in the Queen's Royal Regiment of Horse, who served the crown of Great Britain upwards of fifty-six years, from the 15th of July, 1685, to the 24th of August, 1741. He died June 7th, 1746, aged 78.

"The Israelites in desert wandered but two score;
But I have wandered two score sixteen and more.
In dusty campaigns, restless days and nights,
In bloody battles oftentimes did I fight;
In Ireland, Flanders, France, and Spain:
At last, here lies my poor mortal remains.

"I served in the Foot ten years, and in the above Regiment of Horse upwards of forty-six years."

In St. Matthew's churchyard, Ipswich, is the following monumental inscription to the memory of *Sergeant Duncan*, Seventh Light Dragoons:—

"JOSEPH DUNCAN, Sergeant, died 25th May, 1804, aged 28 years. This stone is erected by the officers and non-commissioned officers, to perpetuate the memory of a worthy man.

"Reader, in time prepare to follow me,
As my route was, so thine will surely be;
The mandate of my God I did obey,
Kings and dragoons when called must march away."

A very remarkable epitaph is the following, which is copied from a tombstone in Winchester churchyard:—

"In memory of THOMAS THATCHER, a Grenadier in the 2nd Regiment of the Hants Militia, who died of a violent fever, contracted by drinking cold small Beer when Hot.

"Here sleeps in peace a British Grenadier,
Who caught his death by drinking cold small Beer.
Soldiers be wise from his untimely fall,
And when ye're hot drink strong or none at all."

The original stone having fallen into decay, a new one was erected with this addition:—

"An honest soldier never is forgot,
Whether he dies by Musket or by Pot."

The date is 1761.

The following epitaph, to the memory of an officer of the 16th Light Dragoons, is copied from a tombstone in Guildford churchyard:—

"When death the fatal route did bring
His Soul did march away,
Encamped with Christ our Heavenly King
Till the great Judgment Day.
When the awful Trumpet sounds
To call the Saints to Heaven,
Among the blest may he be found
And all his Sins forgiven."

DEFENCE OF THE COLOURS.



" Prosper our *colours* in this dangerous fight!"
HENRY VI., PART I.

• **ANALYTICAL** (qualitative and quantitative) **chemistry**

• **APPLIED** (industrial) **chemistry**

• **ORGANIC** **chemistry** (study of carbon compounds)
• **INORGANIC** **chemistry** (study of non-carbon compounds)

DEFENCE OF THE COLOURS.

At the battle of Dettingen, on the 27th of June, 1743, Private Thomas Brown, a native of Kirkleatham, in Yorkshire, preserved one of the standards of his regiment, the 3rd Light Dragoons, in the following surprising manner:—Upon the cornet's receiving a wound in the wrist, and dropping the standard, Brown endeavoured to dismount to pick it up, but, whilst so doing, lost two fingers of his bridle-hand by a sabre cut, his horse at the same time running away with him to the rear of the French lines. Whilst endeavouring to regain his regiment, he saw the standard, which had been captured by overwhelming numbers, being conveyed by a gendarme to the rear. He immediately attacked and killed this man, caught the standard as it fell, and fixing it between his leg and the saddle, cut his way back, receiving seven wounds in the head, face, and body; three balls passed through his hat. In about six weeks he recovered from his wounds, and was promoted to the post of a private gentleman in the Life Guards, as a reward for his gallant deed; these appointments were, at that period, generally obtained by purchase.

Although the results of the battle of Dettingen were not equal to those attending the victory gained over the French by Edward the Third at Cressy, on the 26th of August, 1346, yet there are parallel circum-

stances in these battles. At Cressy King Edward III. and his son, Edward the Black Prince, were present; whilst at Dettingen King George II. was accompanied by his son, the Duke of Cumberland. It was the *début* of both of the young princes in the tented field, and the chivalrous bearing of the Black Prince, particularly his behaviour to his prisoners, is imitated by the Duke of Cumberland, who refused to have his wound attended to, until the surgeons had examined that of a French officer, the Count de Fenelon, who had been taken prisoner and conveyed to the Duke's tent. "Begin," said his Royal Highness, "with the wound of the French officer; he is more dangerously hurt than I am, and stands more in need of assistance."

Cornet Richardson, of Ligonier's Horse, now the present 7th Dragoon Guards, who carried one of the standards at the battle of Dettingen, was surrounded, and, refusing to surrender, he received upwards of thirty sabre cuts and shots on his body and through his clothes; the standard and standard-lance were also much damaged, but he succeeded in preserving the standard. The standards of the regiment were so damaged in this battle that they were unfit for use, and when new ones were received from England, each cornet was presented with that he had carried during the action, as a testimony of the good conduct displayed therein.

In the action at Rousbeck, in the Netherlands, on the 18th of May, 1794, Private Michael Maneely, of the 8th Royal Irish Hussars, received several wounds while defending a standard, of which he had gained possession. His horse was killed under him, and,

though faint from loss of blood, he managed to carry off the standard and buried it in the ground, but was shortly taken prisoner.

Ensign Walsh, of the 3rd Foot, in the accounts of the time, was reported to have prevented the colour of the regiment from being taken at the battle of Albuera, on the 16th of May, 1811, by tearing, when the staff of the colour was broken by a cannon-ball, the colour off and concealing it in his bosom. This statement misled the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he moved a vote of thanks to the Army, on the 7th of June following, for its gallantry in this sanguinary battle, in the following words:—

“In the charge which the brigade of Colonel Colborne had sustained from the Polish cavalry, the three regiments of which it was composed undoubtedly lost their colours. The colours of one of them were afterwards recovered—the standard being retaken from the enemy, and the other preserved for his corps, in an exemplary manner, by the gallant officer who had the charge of it. The colours of the other two regiments were undoubtedly in possession of the enemy, and would, in all probability, be made the ground of a claim of triumph. But, whilst upon this topic, he trusted the house would excuse him for adverting to the very gallant and heroic conduct of the two officers who bore the colours of the Buffs, which had been preserved. One of them was surrounded by the enemy, and, when asked to give his colours, answered, not but with his life!—and his life was the instant forfeit of his refusal. (A call for his name.) The name of this heroic individual was Ensign Thomas. The standard thus taken was after-

wards recovered from the enemy. The manner in which the other standard was preserved was marked by circumstances equally meritorious and honourable to the individual who preserved it, and equally entitled to the applause and admiration of his country. Ensign Walsh was the officer he alluded to. This gallant individual, having the staff of the colour broken by a cannon-ball, which also severely wounded himself, fell upon the field of battle, and, more anxious about his precious charge than for himself, contrived to separate the flag from the remnants of the staff and secured it in his bosom, from which he afterwards produced it when his wounds were dressed after the battle. (Hear, hear!) He was rejoiced to name these heroic individuals, and to give all the splendour to their reputation which the mention of their deed in that house was calculated to confer."

The honour, however, was due to Lieutenant Latham, who preserved the regimental colour from falling into the enemy's hands in the following gallant manner:—While the Buffs were engaged with the French infantry, they were attacked in the rear by a large force of French and Polish cavalry. Ensign Thomas, who carried the second, or regimental colour, was called upon to surrender; but he replied that could only be with his life. He fell, mortally wounded, a victim to his bravery, and the colour was captured. The first, or the king's colour, was carried by Ensign Walsh; the sergeants who protected it had fallen in its defence, and Ensign Walsh was pursued by several Polish Lancers. Lieutenant Latham saw the danger of this colour being borne in triumph from the field by the enemy; his soul was alive to the honour of

his corps, and he ran forward to protect the colour. Ensign Walsh was surrounded, wounded, and taken prisoner; but Lieutenant Latham arrived at the spot in time to seize the colour, and he defended it with heroic gallantry. Environed by a crowd of assailants, each emulous of the honour of capturing the colour, and his body bleeding from wounds, Lieutenant Latham clung with energetic tenacity to his precious charge, defended himself with his sword, and refused to yield. A French hussar, seizing the flag-staff, and rising in his stirrups, aimed at the head of the gallant Latham a blow which failed in cutting him down, but which sadly mutilated him, severing one side of the face and nose. Although thus severely wounded, his resolute spirit did not shrink, but he sternly and vigorously continued to struggle with the French horsemen, and, as they endeavoured to drag the colour from him, he exclaimed, "I will surrender it only with my life." A second sabre stroke severed his left arm and hand, in which he held the staff, from his body. He then dropped his sword, and, seizing the staff with his right hand, continued to struggle with his opponents until he was thrown down, trampled upon, and pierced with lances; but the number of his adversaries impeded their efforts to destroy him, and at that moment the British cavalry came up and the French troopers fled. Lieutenant Latham, although desperately wounded, was so intent on preserving the colour, that he exerted the little strength he had left to remove it from the staff and to conceal it under him. The Fusilier Brigade advanced, and, by a gallant effort, changed the fortune of the day. Sergeant Gough, of the first battalion Seventh Royal

Fusiliers, found the colour under Lieutenant Latham, who lay apparently dead. The colour was restored to the Buffs, and the sergeant was rewarded with a commission. Sergeant Gough, of the Seventh Royal Fusiliers, was recommended for a commission in consequence of his gallant conduct, and was appointed to an ensigncy in the Second West India Regiment, on the 14th November, 1811. After lying some time on the ground in a state of insensibility, Lieutenant Latham revived and crawled towards the river, where he was found endeavouring to quench his thirst. He was removed to the convent, his wounds dressed, the stump of his arm amputated, and he ultimately recovered. Ensign Walsh escaped from the enemy soon after he was made prisoner. He recovered of his wounds, and, joining his regiment, made known the circumstance of the colour having been preserved by Lieutenant Latham. The officers of the Buffs, with a readiness which reflected great honour on the corps, subscribed one hundred guineas for the purchase of a gold medal, on which the preservation of the colour by Lieutenant Latham was represented in high relief, with the motto, "I will surrender it only with my life." Application was made to His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, by General Leigh, Colonel of the Third Foot, or the Buffs, for the royal authority for Lieutenant Latham to receive and wear the medal, which was granted, in a letter dated Horse Guards, 4th January, 1813.

The conduct of Lieutenant Latham having thus been made known to the Duke of York, His Royal Highness evinced that eagerness to bring merit to the notice of the Crown for which he was distin-

guished, and Lieutenant Latham was rewarded, on the 11th of February, 1813, with a commission of captain in the Canadian Fencible Infantry, from which he exchanged, on the 13th of May following, to the Third Foot. The medal was presented to Captain Latham, at Reading, on the 12th of August, 1813.

In 1815, when the second battalion of the Buffs was stationed at Brighton, Captain Latham was presented by his colonel to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, afterwards King George IV., who was ever ready to appreciate and reward valour with an enthusiastic warmth which occasioned him to be much beloved. When Captain Latham's conduct was explained to the Prince Regent, His Royal Highness expressed, in strong terms, his admiration of that gallant achievement, and added that the mutilation of Captain Latham's face admitted of alleviation, and if he should feel disposed to avail himself of the aid of a celebrated surgeon, Mr. Carpue, who had succeeded, by an improved operation, in repairing mutilations of the face to an astonishing extent, His Royal Highness would feel happy in being permitted to pay the expense of the operation and cure. Captain Latham assented to this kind proposition, and the operation was performed by Mr. Carpue, assisted by Assistant-Surgeon John Morrison, M.D., of the Buffs.

Captain Latham received, by authority of the royal warrant, a pension of one hundred pounds a year, in consequence of the loss of his left arm, and a further annual pension of seventy pounds on account of his other severe wounds. He continued to serve in the Third Regiment until the 20th April, 1820,

when he was permitted to exchange to the half-pay, receiving the regulated difference. So general was the belief in the preservation of the colour by Ensign Walsh, that the following stanzas were written by W. T. Fitzgerald, commemorative of the incident:—

“BATTLE OF ALBUERA.

“Nor shall the youths of humble lot,
Brave Walsh and Thomas, be forgot;
In life and death to honour just,
Neither resigned his sacred trust.

“When all his comrades fell around,
The gallant ensign kept his ground.
‘Your standard yield!’ the Frenchman cried;
Brave Thomas answered ‘No!’ and died.

“Walsh, when he felt the hostile dart,
Preserved the colours next his heart,
And, as he sunk, by wounds oppress’d,
Still held them closer to his breast.

“Such bright examples should be told
Of hearts of more than mortal mould.
The young in rank and martial station,
They form the bulwark of the nation.”

This same battle of Albuera furnishes, as may be imagined, other instances of defending the colours.

Ensign James Jackson carried the regimental colour of the 57th at the battle of Albuera. Soon after the action commenced, the officer with the king’s colour was severely wounded, and the colour fell to the ground, when Ensign Jackson immediately directed one of the sergeants to pick it up, and he took it from him, giving the regimental colour to the sergeant, which he retained until an officer was brought to take charge of it.

The 57th marched into action 580 bayonets, and at ten o'clock were hotly engaged; by two p.m. 22 officers and 430 men were killed and wounded.

The king's colour, which Ensign Jackson carried, received thirty balls through it, and two others broke the pole and carried away the top. Nine balls passed through his clothes, of which four wounded—one through the body.

During the greatest part of the battle the hostile lines were less than one hundred yards from each other.

Brevet-Major James Jackson was placed on retired full pay as captain, 57th Regiment, on the 25th June, 1841, and was promoted to the brevet rank of Lieutenant-Colonel on the 28th November, 1854. He is still living.

At the battle of Salamanca, on the 22nd of July, 1812, a ball struck the pole of the king's colour, cutting it nearly in two, and taking the epaulette off the shoulder of Lieutenant D'Arcy, of the Eighty-eighth Connaught Rangers, who carried it, and who escaped without injury.

In this battle the officers and sergeants with the colours of the Sixty-first fell under the enemy's fire, when they were seized by privates William Crawford and Nicholas Coulson, who carried them to the top of the hill. Crawford was immediately promoted to be sergeant, and the same rank was offered to Coulson, who replied that he was over-rewarded already by the cheers and thanks of his comrades, and the approbation of his officers. Sergeant Crawford fell a sacrifice to his gallantry in a subsequent encounter. Lieutenants Wolfe and Armstrong took charge of the

colours, and the regiment continued its advance; and when darkness put an end to the conflict, the British were victorious at every part of the field.

Lieutenant Edward Ring, of the Fifty-fifth regiment, then a youth, when he found there were no means of escape, saved the regimental colour, which he carried the whole time, at Bergen-op-Zoom, on the 9th of March, 1814, by tearing off the colour and concealing it in his bosom. This officer was subsequently chief of police in Ireland, and died from the effects of a gun-shot wound in the head, which he received whilst defending his father's house, in 1823, from the attack of a band of armed rioters, who were defeated, for which he, together with the rest of the family, received the thanks of the then Lord-Lieutenant, the Marquis of Wellesley, the Commander-in-Chief, together with addresses from the noblemen and gentlemen of the county of Cork.

Many other examples of devotedness to the colours might be instanced, but they would necessarily partake of the same heroism as the foregoing acts, which not being so generally known, and to correct imperfect statements, have been here inserted. In this respect, as in others, recent events in the Crimea and India have shown that British officers and soldiers have not degenerated, to which fact the deeds performed by the recipients of the Victoria Cross bear ample testimony.

INFLUENCE OF WEATHER IN BATTLES.

“ King Henry.—How bloodily the sun begins to peer
Above yon busky hill! The day looks pale
At his distemperature:

Prince Henry. The southern wind
Doth play the trumpet to his purposes ;
And, by his hollow whistling in the leaves,
Foretells a tempest, and a blustering day.

King Henry.—Then with the losers let it sympathize ;
For nothing can seem foul to those that win.”
HENRY IV., *Part 1.*

INFLUENCE OF WEATHER IN BATTLES.

At the battle of Cressy, according to Froissart, "there fell a great rain and eclipse, with a terrible thunder; and before the rain there came flying over both battles a great number of crows, for fear of the tempest coming. Then anon the air began to wax clear, and the sun to shine fair and bright, the which was right in the Frenchmen's eyes and on the Englishmen's backs." The rain is said to have rendered the bow-strings of the Genoese archers useless, but the English, having kept their bows in cases, were not affected by the weather.

In the surprise at Cromdale, during the night of the 30th April, 1690, the weather influenced the escape of the Highlanders, for Sir Thomas Livingstone had laid his plans so well that the Highlanders had only time to escape without clothes; the naked men, after making across the plain, gained the hill, when a thick mist enveloped the heights, and hid them from the pursuing cavalry. Major-Generals Buchan and Cannon were surprised equally with their men, and the one escaped with his shirt and night-cap only, and the other minus coat, hat, and sword.

The defeat at Falkirk Moor on the 17th of January, 1746, was attributed to a violent storm of rain and wind the whole time of the action, which beat so in the face of the British, that they could not see before them; spoiled the ammunition in the act of loading;

rendered their arms almost useless, and made the ground so slippery and heavy, that the artillery could not be brought up.

At the memorable battle of Plassey, on the 23rd June, 1757, a heavy shower of rain damaged the enemy's powder to such an extent that his fire slackened, but the ammunition of the British remained serviceable.

The influence of weather played an important part in Napoleon's expedition to Russia, and materially contributed to its failure.

In the "Narrative of the Campaigns of the Twenty-eighth Regiment," Lieutenant-Colonel Cadell speaking of the actions in the Pyrenees, on the 7th July, 1813, shows the influence of the weather in battles:—"After a most fatiguing march we reached the top, where we were delighted to find Lord Wellington and his staff, amongst whom we recognized an old friend of the regiment, Colonel May, of the artillery (now Sir John May). Under his lordship's directions, the enemy were driven from several positions; but in the afternoon, a dense fog, so frequent in those lofty regions, coming on, completely put a stop to further operations for that day, it being impossible for the different corps to communicate with each other. We were therefore obliged to remain all night in the different situations in which the fog had caught us. In the course of the night we could plainly hear the French talking under us; his lordship was on the mountain, and shared the fatigues, privations, and anxiety of that memorable night. The morning of the 28th broke upon us beautifully clear, and showed the enemy in strong force under us. After

a little preparation, we moved down upon them, and in a short time, Sir Rowland, with his division, had the honour of first driving the French out of Spain."

At Waterloo, as is well known, the heavy rain during the night of the 17th of June, 1815, prevented greater slaughter, as the shots seldom rose after they had once touched the ground, and never bounded along like when the ground is dry; the shells also frequently buried themselves, and when they exploded, produced no other effect than throwing up fountains of mud.

The retreat of the Austrians after the battle of Solferino, was protected by a tremendous storm, which lasted more than an hour. This storm is described by an officer as having burst over the field when the fight was at its thickest; and under cover of the darkness and rain, the Austrians made their last but unavailing burst, and then gradually retreated. This remarkable episode of the weather is alluded to in the accompanying extract from the account published in the *Moniteur* :—

"As for the fourth corps (General Niel's), it advanced step by step, always gaining ground. There was a moment, about four o'clock in the afternoon, when in order to support their retreat the Austrians made a final effort to effect a lodgment between the fourth and second corps. A fierce conflict ensued; the infantry and artillery took part in it, and the cavalry in several charges finished by deciding the success of this great day. That was the last act of the battle; the Austrians began their retreat along their whole line. This retreat was favoured by a fearful storm that lasted more than an hour; the thunder,

hail, wind, and lastly a frightful deluge of rain, produced such an effect, that nothing could any longer be distinguished on the field of battle.

“When the weather cleared up, the enemy had disappeared, and in the distance we could see the direction taken by his retreating columns. The Emperor of Austria, who was lodging at Cavriana, in the very place where the Emperor set up later his headquarters, left the field of battle about four o'clock, and withdrew, on the side of Goito. From the heights of Cavriana the strong column of dust could be seen that was raised by the steps of his escort.”

ORIGIN OF THE
PRESENT INFANTRY REGIMENTS
OF THE LINE.



“Nothing could stop that astonishing *infantry*!”—NAPIER

INFANTRY REGIMENTS OF THE LINE,
AND THEIR NUMERICAL TITLES.

THE rank of the several regiments of the British army was first regulated by a Board of General Officers assembled in the Netherlands, by command of King William III., on the 10th of June, 1694.

Another Board of General Officers was assembled by order of Queen Anne, in 1713, to decide on the rank and precedence of regiments raised subsequently to 1694.

A third Board was assembled, by command of King George I., in 1715, for the same purpose.

These Boards recommended that English regiments raised in England, should take rank from the dates of their formation; and that English, Scots, and Irish regiments, raised for the service of a foreign power, should take rank from the dates of their being placed on the English establishment.

The *Numerical Titles* of regiments, as fixed on the principle laid down in the reports of the Boards of General Officers, above alluded to, were confirmed by the warrant issued by authority of King George II., dated 1st of July, 1751, and also by the warrant of King George III., dated 19th of December, 1768, previously to which periods regi-

ments were generally designated by the names of their colonels.

The principle on which the Numerical Titles of regiments were fixed, having been thus established by Royal authority, the regiments of infantry which had been formed by King Charles II., on his restoration to the throne in 1660, and those which had been subsequently raised in the reigns of King James II. and of William III., were numbered, according to the dates of being placed on the English establishment, from the First, or Royal regiment, to the Twenty-seventh regiment. The First to the Twenty-fourth regiments have now a second battalion each, which were added during 1857 and 1858.

The regiments of infantry, which had been added to the army in the reign of Queen Anne from the year 1702, and retained on the establishment after the peace of Utrecht in 1713, commenced with the Twenty-eighth, and ended with the Thirty-ninth regiment.

The Fortieth regiment was formed in the year 1717. from independent companies in North America and the West Indies ; the command was conferred on Colonel Richard Philips.

The Forty-first regiment was formed from invalids in 1719, and the command was conferred on Colonel Edmund Fielding.

The other regiments of infantry, raised by King George I. on the augmentation of the army in the year 1715, were disbanded in 1718, after the monarchy in the line of the House of Brunswick had been established, and the peace of the kingdom restored.

The Forty-second Highland regiment was formed in the reign of King George II., from independent companies in Scotland, in the year 1739. It was originally termed "The Black Watch," and was placed on the establishment on the 25th of October, 1739. The command was conferred on Colonel James Earl of Crawford. The corps which had been formed, in 1737, by Colonel James Oglethorpe, for service in Georgia and South Carolina, was disbanded in 1749. It had not been ranked in the number of established regiments of infantry, although in the *Gentleman's Magazine* for 1745 it is placed as Forty-second, according to the date of formation, making Crawford's Highlanders the Forty-third regiment. The numerical system of distinction had, at this period, scarcely come into use, the regiments being generally designated by the names of their colonels.

The Forty-third regiment was raised for service in America, in the year 1740, by Colonel Andrew Spotswood, and afterwards commanded by Colonel W. Gooch. It was disbanded in 1743.

Ten regiments of Marines were raised in 1739 and 1740, and were numbered from the Forty-fourth to the Fifty-third regiments; but they were disbanded in November, 1748.

Seven regiments were raised and added to the establishment of the army in January, 1741; and in consequence of the disbandment of Colonel Spotswood's, afterwards Gooch's, American Provincials, and also of the ten regiments of Marines, the numerical titles of six of these regiments were changed, after the peace of 1748, as specified in the following list, viz.:—

54th Regt., com. by Col. Thomas Fowke,	became the 43rd Regt.
55th " " James Long,	" 44th Regt.
56th " " D. Houghton,	" 45th Regt.
57th " " James Price,	" 46th Regt.
58th " " J. Mordaunt,	" 47th Regt.
59th " " J. Cholmondeley,	" 48th Regt.
60th " " H. De Grangue,	disbanded in 1748.

The Forty-ninth regiment was formed in the year 1743, of two companies of one of the regiments raised in the reign of Queen Anne, which had remained at Jamaica, and of six other companies formed in that colony. The command was given to Colonel Edward Trelawny, then Governor of Jamaica. It was retained on the establishment after the peace of 1748, and numbered the Forty-ninth regiment.

On the recommencement of hostilities in 1755, fifty companies of Marines were raised, under the direction and control of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. These companies were formed into three divisions, at the principal naval stations, Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham. A fourth division was formed at Woolwich by Order in Council dated the 15th of August, 1805. The Corps of Marines having been raised in 1755, and since that period retained on the establishment, as a branch of the permanent national force of navy, army, and marines, have been authorized to rank, when acting with infantry of the line, next to the Forty-ninth regiment, as directed by His Majesty King George IV., in the following general order, dated

" Horse Guards, 30th March, 1820.

" In reference to the Regulations regarding Precedence of Regiments (as contained in page 10 of the

General Regulations and Orders of the Army), His Majesty has been graciously pleased to command that the Royal Marines, when acting with the Troops of the Line, shall take their station next to the Forty-ninth regiment.

“By command of
“H. R. H. the Commander-in-Chief,
“HENRY TORRENS, Adjutant-General.”

In the year 1745 two regiments were raised for service in North America, by Colonel William Shirley and Colonel Sir William Pepperell. In 1754 they were numbered the Fiftieth and Fifty-first Regiments.

In December, 1755, eleven regiments were raised and added to the establishment of the army; and in consequence of the disbandment of Colonel Shirley's and Sir William Pepperell's regiments in 1757, the eleven regiments, above alluded to, were ranked two numbers higher in the list of regiments of infantry, as shown in the following list, viz.:—

52nd Regt., com. by Col. Jas. Abercromby, became the 50th Regt.	
53rd „ „ Robt. Napier, „ 51st Regt.	
54th „ „ H. Lambton, „ 52nd Regt.	
55th „ „ W. Whitmore, „ 53rd Regt.	
56th „ „ John Campbell „ 54th Regt.	
57th „ „ G. Perry „ 55th Regt.	
58th „ „ Lord C. Manners „ 56th Regt.	
59th „ „ John Arabin „ 57th Regt.	
60th „ „ Robt. Anstruther „ 58th Regt.	
61st „ „ Charles Montagu „ 59th Regt.	
62nd Royal American, } of four battalions } Col. the Earl of Loudon 60th Regt.	

The third and fourth battalions of the Sixtieth were disbanded in 1763; other third and fourth bat-

talions were subsequently raised, which were also disbanded in 1783; a third and fourth battalion were placed on the establishment of the army in 1795, and the fifth and sixth battalions in 1797; and the seventh and eighth battalions in August and November, 1813. Five battalions of the Sixtieth regiment were disbanded, as follows:—Fourth battalion, on the 24th August, 1819; Fifth battalion, on the 24th July, 1818; Sixth battalion, on the 9th February, 1818; Seventh battalion, on the 24th June, 1817; Eighth battalion, on the 30th May, 1816. Upon the reduction of the first battalion in April, 1819, it was ordered that the second should be numbered the first, and the third the second battalion. The Sixtieth has again four battalions, the third battalion having been formed in May, 1855, and the fourth battalion having been added in 1857.

In April, 1758, the second battalions of the fifteen regiments undermentioned, were formed into distinct regiments and numbered as shown in the following list, viz.:—

The Second Batt. of the 3rd Foot was constituted the 61st Regt.

"	"	4th Foot	"	"	62nd Regt.
"	"	8th Foot	"	"	63rd Regt.
"	"	11th Foot	"	"	64th Regt.
"	"	12th Foot	"	"	65th Regt.
"	"	19th Foot	"	"	66th Regt.
"	"	20th Foot	"	"	67th Regt.
"	"	23rd Foot	"	"	68th Regt.
"	"	24th Foot	"	"	69th Regt.
"	"	31st Foot	"	"	70th Regt.
"	"	32nd Foot	"	"	71st Regt.
"	"	33rd Foot	"	"	72nd Regt.
"	"	34th Foot	"	"	73rd Regt.
"	"	36th Foot	"	"	74th Regt.
"	"	37th Foot	"	"	75th Regt.

After the peace of Fontainebleau, in 1763, reductions were made in the regular army, and the number of regiments of infantry was decreased from one hundred and nineteen to seventy. The above Seventy-first, Seventy-second, Seventy-third, Seventy-fourth, and Seventy-fifth regiments were consequently disbanded in that year.

The number of regiments of infantry continued at seventy, until the commencement of the American War, in 1775, and the renewal of hostilities with France and Spain, in 1779, when it was increased to one hundred and five regiments, exclusive of eleven unnumbered regiments and thirty-six independent companies of invalids.

After the General Peace in 1782, the number of regiments of infantry was again fixed at seventy, except a few regiments in India, which were reduced on being withdrawn from that country. The Hundredth was one of the regiments thus circumstanced.

In consequence of an increase of possessions in India, and of additional troops being necessary for the suppression of certain native powers, additional corps were raised and embarked for the East Indies in 1779, and in subsequent years.

The present Seventy-first regiment was raised in December, 1777, and embarked for India in 1779. Its number was changed from 73rd to 71st regiment in 1786.

The present Seventy-second regiment was raised in December, 1777, and embarked for India in 1781. Its number was changed from 78th to 72nd regiment in 1786.

The Seventy-third regiment was raised as the

second battalion of the 42nd regiment in 1777, and embarked for India in 1781. It was formed into a distinct regiment, and numbered the 73rd in 1786.

The 74th (Highland), 75th (Highland), 76th, and 77th regiments were raised for service in India, in October, 1787, and embarked for India in 1788.

The 78th (Highland), 79th (Highland), 80th, 81st, 82nd, 83rd, 84th, 85th, 86th, 87th, 88th, 89th, 90th, and 91st (Highland) regiments were raised in 1793, immediately after the commencement of the war with France. In 1795, regiments were numbered as high as the 135th regiment, besides various unnumbered corps.

The 92nd (Highland) regiment (originally the 100th) was raised and placed on the establishment of the army on the 3rd of May, 1796.

The 91st, 92nd, 93rd, 94th, 95th, 96th, 97th, and 99th regiments, which were raised in 1793, were shortly afterwards disbanded, so that in the year 1798, the 98th became the 91st, and the 100th was numbered the 92nd regiment. The numbered regiments in 1799 ended with the 92nd Highlanders.

The present 93rd (Highland) regiment was placed on the establishment on the 25th of August, 1800.

The Scots Brigade was numbered the Ninety-fourth Regiment on the 25th December, 1802. This corps had been formed in the year 1568, for service in Holland against the oppression of Spain. Being a British corps, its services were demanded from the United Provinces by King James II. on the rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth in 1685, after the suppression of which it returned to Holland. It again embarked for England with the Prince of Orange at

the revolution in 1688. It remained in Great Britain until the Protestant cause had been established, and it re-embarked for Flanders in 1691, and served in the campaigns of King William III. It remained in the service of Holland until 1793, when it was decided by King George III., upon the application of the British officers remaining in it, to require the corps to return to Great Britain. It was taken on the British establishment on the 5th July, 1793. It then consisted of three battalions; in 1795 it was reduced to two battalions, and embarked for Gibraltar. In 1796 it was formed into one battalion, and embarked for the Cape of Good Hope; it embarked in 1798 for the East Indies, from whence it returned to England in 1808. It embarked for Cadiz and Lisbon, and served in the Peninsular War, from January, 1810 to July, 1814. It was disbanded at Belfast on the 24th December, 1818.

The Rifle Corps, commanded by Colonel Coote Manningham, was formed and added to the establishment of the army on the 25th August, 1800. On the 25th December, 1802, it was directed to be numbered the 95th Regiment, but was taken out of the list of numbered regiments of infantry on the 6th February, 1816, and directed to be styled the Rifle Brigade. It then consisted of three battalions, which were distributed at the following stations, viz. :—

- 1st Battalion.—6 Companies with the Army of Occupation in France, and 4 Companies at Shorncliffe.
- 2nd Battalion.—6 Companies with the Army of Occupation in France, and 4 Companies at Shorncliffe.
- 3rd Battalion.—10 Companies at Dover. This Battalion embarked for Ireland in March, 1816. It was disbanded at Birr on the 24th of November, 1818.

A third battalion was again added to the Rifle Brigade in May 1855, and a fourth battalion in 1857.

The present 94th, 95th, 96th, 97th, 98th, and 99th regiments were added to the establishment of the army in the early part of the year 1824, in consequence of the increased number of the colonial possessions of the British empire.

The present 100th Regiment was raised in Canada during the early part of 1858, from which country it arrived in England in July of that year. The foregoing remarks show that it is not the first regiment so designated. The present 92nd commenced its career as the 100th regiment. Even in the beginning of the nineteenth century there was a regiment numbered the 100th, which was raised in Ireland in 1804-5, by Frederick John Falkiner, Esq., and was placed upon the establishment of the army from the 25th March, 1805, and was numbered the 100th Regiment of Foot. After serving in Canada from 1805 until 1818, it was disbanded at Chatham as the 99th, the change of numerical title taking place in 1816, in consequence of the 95th Regiment being made the Rifle Brigade, and ceasing to be numbered amongst the regiments of the line. The 100th Regiment, disbanded in 1818, was numbered the 102nd Regiment in 1808, and was brought home from New South Wales, being then styled the New South Wales Corps. It served in Bermuda and Nova Scotia, and on the 6th February, 1816, when the 95th became the Rifle Brigade, was numbered the 100th Regiment: it was disbanded at Chatham, in March, 1818.

HONEY-STEALING AND PIG- KILLING.

"Thrusting poor Bees out of their nives,
Seizing both *honey*, wax, and lives."

JOHN DAY.

"———Now, I pray you,
Hear the *pig's* counsel."

SOUTHEY.

HONEY-STEALING AND PIG-KILLING.

THE soldiers during the Peninsular War appear to have had a *penchant* for honey, as more than one general order was issued by the Duke of Wellington, to prevent the bee-hives from being plundered.

The following is a specimen:—

“Jaraicejo, 16th August, 1809.

“G. O. 1.—The soldiers are again positively prohibited to plunder bee-hives; any man found with a bee-hive in his possession will be punished.”

It was during this war that the unmilitary practice of pig-shooting caused two men to suffer the penalty of death, in addition to the two dragoons accidentally shot. The Duke's views are shown in the accompanying orders.

“Aldehuela de la Boveda, 16th November, 1812.

“G. O. 1.—The Commander of the Forces requests the General Officers commanding divisions will take measures to prevent the shameful and unmilitary practice of soldiers shooting pigs in the woods, so close to the camp and to the columns of march, as that two dragoons were shot last night; and the Commander of the Forces was induced to believe this day on the march, that the flank patrols were skirmishing with the enemy.”

“2.—He desires that notice may be given to the

soldiers, that he has this day ordered two men to be hanged who were caught in the fact of shooting pigs; and he now orders that the Assistant Provosts may attend their divisions on the march, and that they will do their duty, as well as in respect to this as other offences."

A far different kind of pig-killing is narrated in the following singular incident, which is stated to have occurred during the war of American independence in the year 1779. At that period a division of the British army was encamped on the banks of a river, and in a position so favoured by nature, that it was difficult for any military art to surprise it. War in America was rather a species of hunting than a regular campaign. "If you fight with art," said Washington to his soldiers, "you are sure to be defeated. Acquire discipline enough for retreat, and the uniformity of combined attack, and your country will prove the best of engineers." So true was the maxim of the American general, that the English soldiers had to contend with little else. The Americans had incorporated the Indians into their ranks, and had made them useful in a species of war to which their habits of life had peculiarly fitted them. They sallied out of their impenetrable forests and jungles, and with their arrows and tomahawks, committed daily waste upon the British army—surprising their sentinels, cutting off their stragglers; and even, when the alarm was given, and pursuit commenced, they fled with a swiftness that the speed of cavalry could not overtake, into the rocks and fastnesses, whither it was dangerous to follow them.

In order to limit as far as possible this species of war, in which there was so much loss and so little honour, it was the custom with every regiment to extend its out-posts to a great distance beyond the encampment; to station sentinels some miles in the woods, and keep a constant guard round the main body.

A regiment of foot was at this time stationed upon the confines of a boundless savannah. As its particular office was to guard every avenue of approach to the main body, the sentinels, whose posts penetrated into the woods, were supplied from the ranks, and the service of this regiment was thus more hazardous than any other. Its loss was likewise great. The sentinels were perpetually surprised upon their posts by the Indians, and were borne off their stations without communicating any alarm, or being heard of after.

Not a trace was left of the manner in which they had been conveyed away, except that, upon one or two occasions, a few drops of blood had appeared upon the leaves which covered the ground. Many imputed this unaccountable disappearance to treachery, and suggested as an unanswerable argument, that the men thus surprised, might at least have fired their muskets, and communicated the alarm to the contiguous post. Others, who could not be brought to consider it as treachery, were content to receive it as a mystery which time would unravel.

One morning, the sentinels having been stationed as usual over-night, the guard went at sunrise to relieve a post which extended a considerable distance into the wood. The sentinel was gone! The surprise was great; but the circumstance had occurred before.

They left another man and departed, wishing him better luck. "You need not be afraid," said the man with warmth, "I shall not desert."

The relief-company returned to the guard-house. The sentinels were replaced every four hours, and at the appointed time, the guard again marched to relieve the post. To their inexpressible astonishment, the man was gone! They searched round the spot, but no traces could be found of his disappearance. It was necessary that the station, from a stronger motive than ever, should not remain unoccupied; they were compelled to leave another man, and returned to the guard-house. The superstition of the soldiers was awakened, and terror ran through the regiment. The colonel being apprised of the occurrence, signified his intention to accompany the guard when they relieved the sentinel they had left. At the appointed time, they all marched together; and again, to their unutterable wonder, they found the post vacant, and the man gone.

Under these circumstances, the colonel hesitated whether he should station a whole company on the spot, or whether he should again submit the post to a single sentinel. The cause of these repeated disappearances of men, whose courage and honesty were never suspected, must be discovered; and it seemed not likely that this discovery could be obtained by persisting in the old method. Three brave men were now lost to the regiment, and to assign the post to a fourth, seemed nothing less than giving him up to destruction. The poor fellow whose turn it was to take the station, though a man in other respects of incomparable resolution, trembled from head to foot.

"I must do my duty," said he to the officer, "I know that; but I should like to lose my life with more credit."

"I will leave no man," said the colonel, "against his will."

A man immediately stepped from the ranks, and desired to take the post. Every mouth commended his resolution. "I will not be taken alive," said he, "and you shall hear of me on the least alarm. At all events, I will fire my piece if I hear the least noise. If a crow chatters, or a leaf falls, you shall hear my musket. You may be alarmed when nothing is the matter: but you must take that chance as the condition of the discovery."

The colonel applauded his courage, and told him he would be right to fire upon the least noise which was ambiguous. His comrades shook hands with him, and left him with a melancholy foreboding. The company marched back, and waited the event in the guard-house.

An hour had elapsed, and every ear was upon the rack for the discharge of the musket, when, upon a sudden, the report was heard. The guard immediately marched, accompanied, as before, by the colonel, and some of the most experienced officers of the regiment. As they approached the post, they saw the man advancing towards them dragging another man on the ground by the hair of his head. When they came up to him, it appeared to be an Indian whom he had shot. An explanation was immediately required.

"I told your honour," said the man, "that I should fire if I heard the least noise. The resolution I had taken has saved my life. I had not been long on my

post, when I heard a rustling at some short distance ; I looked, and saw an American hog, such as are common in the woods, crawling along the ground, and seemingly looking for nuts under the trees and among the leaves. As these animals are so very common, I ceased to consider it for some minutes ; but being on the constant alarm and expectation of attack, and scarcely knowing what was to be considered a real cause of apprehension, I kept my eyes vigilantly fixed upon it, and marked its progress among the trees ; still there was no need to give the alarm, and my thoughts were directed to danger from another quarter. It struck me, however, as somewhat singular, to see this animal making, by a circuitous passage, for a thick coppice immediately behind my post. I therefore kept my eye more constantly fixed upon it, and as it was now within a few yards of the coppice, hesitated whether I should not fire. My comrades, thought I, will laugh at me for alarming them by shooting a pig : I had almost resolved to let it alone, when just as it approached the thicket, I thought I observed it give an unusual spring. I no longer hesitated : I took my aim ; discharged my piece ; and the animal was instantly stretched before me with a groan which I conceived to be that of a human creature. I went up to it, and judge my astonishment, when I found that I had killed an Indian ! He had enveloped himself with the skin of one of these wild hogs so artfully and completely, his hands and feet were so entirely concealed in it, and his gait and appearance were so exactly correspondent to that of the animal's, that, imperfectly as they were always seen through the trees and jungles, the disguise could not be penetrated at a dis-

tance, and scarcely discovered upon the nearest approach. He was armed with a dagger and a tomahawk."

Such was the substance of this man's relation. The cause of the disappearance of the other sentinels was now apparent. The Indians, sheltered in this disguise, secreted themselves in the coppice, watched the moment when they should throw it off; burst upon the sentinels without previous alarm, and too quick to give them an opportunity to discharge their pieces, either stabbed or scalped them, and bore their bodies away, which they concealed at some distance among the leaves. The Americans, it seems, gave them rewards for every scalp of an enemy which they brought.

The following is the last of the stringent general after orders (alluded to at page 139) which the Duke of Wellington found it necessary to issue for the protection of bee-hives.

"Badajoz, 12th September, 1809.

"G. A. O.—The fourth division having again in three instances plundered bee-hives, notwithstanding the orders of the 7th instant, the regiments of that division are forthwith, upon the receipt of this order, to be turned out and placed under arms, and they are not to quit their arms till one hour after sunset, when they are to be sent to their huts, and sentries placed round the camp to prevent all men from straggling; and they are to be put under arms again to-morrow morning, at an hour before sunrise, and to stand by their arms till an hour after sunset, and to stand so on day after day, till the soldiers shall have been discovered who have been guilty of these outrages, which

it is repeated cannot be committed without the knowledge of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the regiments. When the regiments shall be under arms, men must be sent on fatigue for water, for their provisions to cook, etc., under charge of officers and non-commissioned officers, in proportion to the strength of the parties, who must be brought back to the lines as soon as the work required for them shall have been performed.

“Colonel Kemmis will report whether the orders of the 4th instant, requiring that the rolls should be called in the fourth division every hour, have been obeyed. This order is not intended to apply to the Eleventh Regiment.”

REMARKABLE WOUNDS AND
“HAIRBREADTH ’SCAPES.”



“What, art thou hurt?”

ROMEO AND JULIET.



REMARKABLE WOUNDS AND "HAIR- BREADTH 'SCAPES."

By D'Auvergne's Campaigns in Flanders, 1693, it appears that at the battle of Landen, King William III. had some narrow escapes, for it is stated—

"The king narrowly missed three musquet shots, one through his periwig, which made him deaf for a while; another through the sleeve of his coat, which did no harm; the third carried off the knot of his scarf, and left a small contusion on his side."

King Charles XII., after signalizing himself in a famous battle, received no wound, but in the evening, as he was changing his dress, found a ball lodged in his black cravat.

Lieutenant-General Carpenter and the division under General Stanhope were taken prisoners by the French and Spanish forces at Brihuega, in the mountains of Castile, on the 7th December, 1710; on this occasion he was wounded by a musket ball, which, having broken part of his jaw, lodged itself under the root of his tongue, where it remained several months before it could be extracted, during which period his life was in danger, and the pain, it is needless to add, was great. He was ancestor to the Earls of Tyrconnel, and died Baron Carpenter of Killaghy, in the county of Kilkenny, on the 10th of February, 1732,

aged seventy-five, having survived his remarkable wound twenty-one years.

Captain Murray of the 42nd Regiment was wounded at Martinique, in 1762, by a musket ball, which entered his left side, under the lower rib, passed up through the left lobe of the lungs (as was ascertained after his death), crossed his chest, and, mounting up to his right shoulder, lodged under the scapula. His case being considered desperate, the only object of the surgeons was to make his situation as easy as possible for the few hours they supposed he had to live; but, to the great surprise of all, he was on his legs in a few weeks, and, before he reached England, was quite recovered, or, at least, his health and appetite were restored. He was never afterwards, however, able to lie down; and during the thirty-two years of his subsequent life, he slept in an upright posture, supported in his bed by pillows. He died in 1794, a Lieut.-General, Colonel of the Seventy-second regiment, and representative in Parliament for the county of Perth.

The following example, which occurred during the night of the 17th of September, 1781, is recorded in the "History of the Siege of Gibraltar," by Colonel John Drinkwater, and shows that whilst there's life there's hope. The incident is thus related, and has reference to the present Seventy-first, then numbered Seventy-Third, regiment:—"A shell, during the above attack, fell in an embrasure opposite the King's lines, bomb-proof, killed one of the Seventy-third, and wounded another of the same corps. The case of the latter was singular, and will serve to enforce the maxim, that, even in the most dangerous cases, we should never despair of

a recovery whilst life remains. This unfortunate man was knocked down by the wind of the shell, which, instantly bursting, killed his companion, and mangled him in a most dreadful manner. His head was terribly fractured, his left arm broken in two places, one of his legs shattered, the skin and muscles torn off part of his right hand, the middle finger broken to pieces, and his whole body most severely bruised, and marked with gunpowder. He presented so horrid an object to the surgeons, that they had not the smallest hopes of saving his life, and were at a loss what part to attend to first. He was that evening trepanned, a few days afterwards his leg was amputated, and other wounds and fractures dressed. Being possessed of a most excellent constitution, Nature performed wonders in his favour, and in eleven weeks the cure was completely effected. His name was Donald Ross, and he long continued to enjoy his Sovereign's bounty, in a pension of ninepence a-day for life."

William Masters, Esq., who died in March, 1799, was a colonel under the old Duke of Cumberland, and in one of the engagements was shot through the lungs by a musket ball, which entirely cured him of a violent asthma. The Duke used to say, when any of his officers laboured under that disorder, that they must get shot through the lungs, like Masters.

Samuel Evans, a private in the grenadier company of the Second Foot, was carried off amongst the wounded at Corunna. He arrived in England, and died in the military hospital at Plymouth, on the 30th of January, 1809. On a *post mortem* examination being made, it was discovered that he had been shot through the heart, and yet had survived sixteen days.

His heart is preserved in the museum of the above hospital.

At the battle of Salamanca, on the 22nd of July, 1812, a round shot, probably fired at the colours of the Eleventh Foot, took the heads off the two sergeants posted between the colours, and of a black man who beat the cymbals in the band, and who was in rear of them, without injuring either of the officers carrying the colours. Ensign Scott, one of the officers, was, however, afterwards killed.

Mr. Larpent had a narrow escape at St. Fé, in December, 1813, from being shot through the head by a dragoon, as he was writing. The ball went between his pen and his nose, and where his head had been two seconds before; one cheek was splattered by the door splinters, and the other by the wall-plaster where the ball struck. This gentleman was attached to the head-quarters of Lord Wellington, as Judge Advocate-General, during the Peninsular war, from 1812 to its close, and his private journal was edited by Sir George Larpent, Bart., and published in 1853. His personal intercourse with the Duke, and the *on dits* he records, make the work very interesting, as will be seen by the extracts introduced in these pages.

It is remarkable that the Duke of Wellington passed through so many battles unhurt; he had a narrow escape at Orthez. In Larpent's Journal, speaking of this battle, it is remarked that "it was curious that Lord Wellington and General Alava were close together when struck, and both on the hip, but on different sides, and neither seriously injured, as the surgeon told me who dressed them. Lord Wellington's was a bad bruise, and skin was broken. I

fear his riding so much since has rather made it of more consequence, but hope the two days' halt here will put him in the right way again, as all our prospects here would vanish with that man."

"I walked down to the bridge with Lord Wellington yesterday (6th March, 1814), and found him limp a little, and he said he was in rather more pain than usual, but it was nothing. At dinner yesterday, he said he was laughing at General Alava having had a knock, and telling him it was all nonsense, and that he was not hurt, when he received this blow, and a worse one, in the same place himself. Alava said it was to punish him for laughing at him."

In "Recollections, by Samuel Rogers," recently published, there is a remark of Wellington's in allusion to the above circumstance:—

"The elastic woven corslet would answer well over the cuirass. It saved me, I think, at Orthez, where I was hit on the hip. I was never struck but on that occasion, and then I was not wounded. I was on horseback again the same day."

According to popular belief, the Duke of Wellington also had an escape at Salamanca, as mentioned at page 97.

Surgeon De Lisle, of the Fourteenth Foot, has recorded the following remarkable circumstance during the operations against Sevastopol:—On the morning of July 24th, 1855, private Francis O'Brien, a lad of eighteen, was brought from the trenches with a wound from a musket ball in the right temple. It entered about two inches above the orbit, passed downwards, and drove out a large portion of the supra-orbital ridge, which appeared to be imbedded in the upper

eyelid, and was cut down upon by the medical officer in the trenches, in mistake for the ball, which it certainly very much resembled. As no ball could be found, it was supposed to have passed out at the opening of entrance.

The finger, when passed into the wound, could feel the pulsation of the brain; yet, from that day to the present, no symptom of cerebral disturbance has appeared, unless it be that, since his convalescence, the muscles of the face work convulsively when he feels faint and weak from remaining too long in the erect posture. About a month after admission, the detached portion of the bone above the orbit was removed from the eyelid, though with considerable difficulty, and on the following morning the ball fell from the wound, much to the poor lad's horror, who thought his eye had dropped out.

Both wounds have now been healed, but he is unable to raise the right eyelid; the eye is perfect, but apparently without power of vision, though sensible to the stimulus of light; for, on turning the wounded side to the light, the left pupil contracts. His general health is good.

One of the most singular wounds, perhaps, ever received and not to cause immediate death, is the following; the account is extracted from the report of the Medical Board on the officer in question:—

“Lieutenant French, of the Thirty-eighth Regiment, received a gunshot wound on the 18th June, 1855, before Sevastopol, in the upper portion of the left shoulder, which penetrated the chest, and resulted in a most copious suppuration from the left side, with compression of the left lung, and *removal of the heart*

from the left to the right side. The left arm is powerless, and his general health very delicate, the suppuration from the left lung, though considerably diminished, not having yet subsided." He died on the 9th of December, 1857.

Major Sir Thomas Troubridge, Bart., of the Seventh Royal Fusileers, now Colonel and Deputy Adjutant-General to the Forces (clothing, etc.), while commanding in a battery at the battle of Inkermann, was desperately wounded by a forty-two-pound shot, and the following operations had to be performed :— The left foot was removed by Syme's operation, and the right leg amputated below the knee. He was placed under chloroform twice for the operations, a few minutes elapsing before giving it the second time. Both feet were much injured, the bones of the left foot being completely smashed, with great destruction of the soft parts, insomuch that the flap had to be formed from the cushion of the heel. This gallant officer now walks well, aided by a stick, and strangers would scarcely know that he had been so severely wounded. Lieutenant (now Captain) Owens, of the Thirty-third regiment, who was standing close by Sir Thomas, had the calf of his leg carried off by the same shot, and has suffered severely ever since, the wound never having healed.

Sir Charles Napier's life is one justifying Lord Byron's remark that truth is stranger than fiction. In infancy he was snatched, when at the last stage of starvation, from a vile nurse; when a young boy, attempting a dangerous leap, he tore the flesh from his leg in a frightful manner; a few years later he fractured the other leg. At the battle of Corunna,

he received five terrible wounds, and, but for the aid of a generous French drummer, would there have been killed; he was made a prisoner, and his fate being long unknown, he was mourned for as dead by his family. In the battle of Busaco, a bullet struck his face, and lodged behind the ear, splintering the articulation of the jawbone; yet with this dreadful hurt, he made his way, under a fierce sun, to Lisbon, more than one hundred miles! Returning from France, after the battle of Waterloo, the ship sunk off Flushing, and he only saved himself by swimming to a pile, on which he clung until a boat carried him off, half drowned, for the pile was too large to climb up; he had caught it during the recession of a wave, and was overwhelmed by each recurring surge. He escaped cholera, and a second shipwreck off the Indus, and marvellously recovering from the stroke of a rocket at Kurrachee, was again firm on horseback, and conducted a dangerous war to a glorious termination.

On the 13th September, 1842, whilst in Scinde, he was observing the practice of a rocket-train, when one of the fiery missiles burst, rocket and shell together, and tore the calf of his right leg open to the bone; but neither the bone itself nor the great artery was injured, and the wound was instantly stitched. This account is gathered from the History of the Conquest of Scinde, by his brother, Lieutenant-General Sir William Napier, the author of the "Peninsular War."

This list might be extended, but it is conceived that sufficient is here narrated to form a remarkable page in the "Curiosities of War."

VARIETIES.



HORATIO.—O, day and night, but this is wondrous strange!

HAMLET.

VARIETIES.

ANIMALS IN WAR.

HOMER has not disdained to sing of "The Battle of the Frogs and Mice," and the following incident makes the latter, to some extent, an historical character. It occurred during the lengthened contest known in history as "the war of the Spanish succession," which commenced in May, 1702, and was terminated by the Treaty of Utrecht, in April, 1713. Towards the termination of the war the siege of Aire was undertaken. A gallant defence was made; but in vain, for the remark applied by Justin to the successes of Alexander the Great—"Alexander cum nullo hostium unquam congressus est, quem non vicerit: nullam urbem obsedit, quam non expugnaverit"—is equally true of Marlborough, "who never fought a battle which he did not win, nor besieged a town which he did not take." This Aire was a small but strong town of the French Netherlands, on the river Lys, and the surrounding marshes were considered to render the place almost impregnable. After several breaches had been made, and great loss sustained on both sides, the garrison surrendered on the 9th of November, 1710. Whilst the siege was being prosecuted, provisions became very scarce, and the soldiers were indebted to the labours of mice, which had accumulated hoards of corn. Strange as

the circumstance may appear, it is recorded by General Stearne, in his manuscript journal; and Captain Parker, of the Royal Regiment of Foot in Ireland, now the Eighteenth (Royal Irish) Regiment, also relates the event as follows:—"While we lay at this siege provisions happened to fall short, for a party from Ypres had destroyed our boats, laden with provisions and stores, as they were coming to us up the Lys. The country about Aire, indeed, is noted for its great produce of all sorts of grain; but the enemy had removed it out of our reach. However, we met with a considerable supply by means which, I fear, will scarcely be believed by any but those that saw it; but fact it is, that the soldiers found concealments under ground which the mice had laid up for their winter store, and that in such abundance that it was a great relief to us towards the end of the siege. These hoards were from four to six feet under ground, and in many of them our men found some pecks of corn." The work from which this extract is taken is entitled "Memoirs of the most Remarkable Transactions from the year 1683 to 1718, in Ireland and Flanders, by Captain Robert Parker, late of the Royal Regiment of Foot in Ireland, who was an eye-witness to most of them."

The mouse does not always thus act the part of a provident commissariat, for during the "Seven Years' War," memorable for the battle of Minden, and the popular Marquis of Granby, whose visage has furnished a sign for many a place of entertainment, independent of that at Dorking, described in *Pickwick*,* the fol-

* On the opposite side of the road, was a large sign-board on a high post, representing the head and shoulders of a gentle-

lowing announcement appeared in the *London Gazette* of the 17th November, 1761 :—

“The French have demanded from the country of Eischsfeld and Hohenstein four hundred cats; one hundred had been already delivered to them. The motive for the demand is, that the mice eat up their magazines.”

After this, who shall cast a doubt on Whittington, whose feline favourite must indeed have been a veritable tortoiseshell ?

Elephants have been used in war by the moderns as well as the ancients; they were employed by Tippoo Saib, and were armed with prodigious chains, with which, when wounded before Seringapatam in 1799, they killed several of their friends.

In Hyder Ali's attack at Perambaukum, on the 6th of September, 1780, of the troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie, these sagacious animals played an important part, as shown in the following graphic description of the conflict by Captain Innes Munro, of the Seventy-third (now Seventy-first) Regiment, in his “Narrative of the Military Operations on the Coromandel Coast, from 1780 to 1784” :—

“Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie could but make a feeble resistance against so superior a force; but his little band yet gallantly supported a very unequal fire, until their whole ammunition had either been

man with an apoplectic countenance, in a red coat, with deep blue facings, and a touch of the same blue over his three-cornered hat for a sky. Over that again were a pair of flags; beneath the last button of his coat were a couple of cannon; and the whole formed an expressive and undoubted likeness of the Marquis of Granby, of glorious memory.”—PICKWICK.

blown up or expended, which of course silenced the British artillery. Hyder's guns upon this drew nearer and nearer at every discharge, while each shot was attended with certain and deadly effect. Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie's detachment seeing their artillery silenced and remaining inactive while exposed to certain destruction, very naturally became dismayed; which the enemy no sooner perceived than they made a movement for a general charge and advanced on all quarters to a close attack. At this dangerous and trying juncture, sufficient to damp the spirits of the most intrepid, all the camp-followers rushed in confusion through the ranks of every battalion, and in an instant threw the whole into disorder. The black troops, finding themselves in this calamitous situation, relinquished every hope of success; and, notwithstanding the extraordinary exertions of their European officers, were no more to be rallied. But such of the Europeans as had fallen into disorder by this irregularity, quickly united again in compact order, headed by their gallant commander, who was at this time much wounded; and, being joined by all the Sepoy officers, planted themselves upon a rising bank of sand in their vicinity, where they valiantly resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity.

“History cannot produce an instance, for fortitude, cool intrepidity, and desperate resolution, to equal the exploits of this heroic band. In numbers, now reduced to five hundred, they were opposed by no less than one hundred thousand enraged barbarians, who seldom grant quarter. The mind, in the contemplation of such a scene, and such a situation as theirs was, is filled at once with admiration, with astonishment, with

horror, and with awe. To behold formidable and impenetrable bodies of horse, of infantry, and of artillery, advancing from all quarters, flashing savage fury, levelling the numberless instruments of slaughter, and darting destruction around, was a scene to appal even something more than the strongest human resolution; but it was beheld by this little band with the most undaunted and immoveable firmness. Distinct bodies of horse came on successively to the charge, with strong parties of infantry placed in the intervals, whose fire was discharged in showers; but the deliberate and well levelled platoons of the British musketry had such powerful effect as to repulse several different attacks. Like the swelling waves of the ocean, however, when agitated by a storm, fresh columns incessantly poured in upon them with redoubled fury, which at length brought so many to the ground, and weakened their fire so considerably, that they were unable longer to withstand the dreadful and tremendous shock; and the field soon presented a picture of the most inhuman cruelties and unexampled carnage.

“The last and awful struggle was marked by the clashing of arms and shields, the snorting and kicking of horses, the snapping of spears, the glistening of bloody swords, oaths, and imprecations; concluding with the groans and cries of bruised and mutilated men, wounded horses tumbling to the ground upon expiring soldiers, *and the hideous roaring of elephants, stalking to and fro, and wielding their dreadful chains alike amongst friends and foes.*”

The following anecdote relating to elephants is recorded, which, if true, is a singular instance of sagacity. It is said the late Tippoo Saib possessed

an elephant, which had been badly wounded in several engagements with the English. In one of these battles an English surgeon was made prisoner of war. As the art of surgery was imperfectly known in the dominions of Tippoo, this was thought an invaluable capture. This surgeon was employed, and liberally paid for his services. Tippoo at length told his captive that his favourite elephant was badly wounded, and that he must attend to the recovery of this formidable patient. The English surgeon remonstrated against the peril of this practice ; but the reply of the monarch was short and conclusive—his head should answer for the neglect of his majesty's command. Tippoo attended the first three or four visits of the surgeon to the four-footed patient, and while the ball was extracting spoke to the beast in a tone of command. The elephant obeyed his master, and amidst the groans excited by the pain of the operation, while the tears were streaming from his eyes, offered no symptoms of resistance, or of annoyance. After his wounds had received two or three dressings, and the anguish of the pain had abated, the elephant, with the other patients, would visit the surgeon in his tent, and wait for the assistance of the medical hand with all the gravity of an intelligent being.

At the battle of Laswarree, gained by General Lake, on the 1st November, 1803, Brigadier-General Thomas Pakenham Vandeleur, Lieutenant-Colonel of the Eighth Hussars, whilst in the act of drawing his sword, and taking his place at the head of his regiment, was shot through the heart by a French artilleryman, and fell off his favourite black charger. This *was* a celebrated race-horse, of a jet-black colour, and

long after the death of his gallant rider, the noble animal kept his place with the regiment. He subsequently became the property of Cornet Burrowes, and was taken great care of until the regiment quitted India, when he was shot in order to prevent his falling into unworthy hands.

In D'Auvergne's "History of the Campaign in Flanders, in 1691," it appears by the following extract that the artillery were drawn by white oxen, for he says, "The Landgrave of Hesse joined the Confederate army with his forces in this camp, attended with a proportionable train of artillery, all drawn with white oxen, which made a fine show upon a march." The camp alluded to was at Gemblours.

During the dreadful retreat to Corunna the wife of Sergeant Monday, orderly-room clerk of the Twenty-eighth Regiment, actually carried a lap-dog in a basket over her arm, and brought it safe home to England.

At the battle of Waterloo, some of the horses, as they lay on the ground, having recovered from the first agony of their wounds, commenced eating the grass about them, thus surrounding themselves with a circle of bare ground, the limited extent of which showed their weakness; others were noticed quietly grazing in the middle of the field, between the two hostile lines, their riders having been shot off their backs. Whenever a charge of cavalry passed near them, the horses would form themselves in the rear of their mounted companions, and, without riders, gallop with the rest, neither stopping or flinching when the encounter took place.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cadell relates the following incident, which occurred in November, 1812:—"While

we were on the march, about four miles from Alba, Lieutenant Irwin, of the grenadiers, had a singular opportunity of displaying his strength and intrepidity. An over-driven bullock got among the ranks of the regiment, and knocked the men about very unceremoniously, when Lieutenant Irwin rushed forward, and boldly seizing the animal by the horns, actually threw him over upon his back into a deep cut in the road, where he was instantly killed, and cut up by the hungry soldiers; nor was he then done with, for we left a party to cut up the hide into sandals for some of the men who had lost their shoes."

During the battle of Talavera, and at the time the enemy's guns were playing on the left of the British line with great effect, a solitary hare was started on the plain and valley, on the left of the height, by a shell bursting accidentally near the cover of the affrighted animal; and being discovered by the divisions on the height and in the valley, a halloo was set up by the men, much to the annoyance of the general officers, who, however, could not prevent them enjoying the chase in fancy, until the timid creature, unable to extricate itself (the artillery playing from every direction in which it attempted to retreat), was shot by one of the soldiers.

It is a curious fact that during the siege of Silistria, hares were to be found in the adjoining vineyards. The Chasseurs killed one not three hundred yards from the bastion, where the briskest firing was kept up. The storks, also, never left their nests, and built on houses which were riddled with shot and splinters.

It appears by the "Recollections of Samuel Rogers,"

recently published, that the Duke of Wellington rode Copenhagen, at Waterloo, from four in the morning until twelve at night, and that when he dismounted, the horse threw up his heels at him as he went off. "If he fed," the Duke adds, "it was on the standing corn, as I sat in the saddle. He was a chestnut horse, and I rode him hundreds of miles in Spain, and at the battle of Toulouse." He died, blind with age (28 years old), in 1835, at Strathfieldsaye, where he lies buried within a ring fence.

When the three troops of the First Dragoon Guards were reviewed by King William IV., at Brighton, on the 17th January, 1834, accompanied by Queen Adelaide, his Majesty presented to the regiment a cream-coloured horse in exchange for the only remaining Waterloo horse in the corps.

It will be recollected that at the battle of Magenta a dog belonging to a lieutenant of the Foreign Legion was mortally wounded almost at the same instant as his owner; the faithful animal had sufficient strength to crawl to his late master's side, and expired on his body. This affecting episode formed an interesting pictorial record in the *Illustrated London News* of Saturday, July 30th, 1859.

FORMATION OF GRENADEER COMPANIES.

Charles II. having resolved to introduce into the English army the practice of using hand-grenades in the field, a warrant was issued on the 13th of April, 1678, for a company of one hundred men to be raised and added to the Holland regiment, under the command of Captain John Bristoe, and to be armed with hand-grenades, and styled Grenadiers. A similar

addition was made to several other corps. The grenadiers carried fusils, bayonets, hatchets, and swords; and each man had a large pouch for his hand-grenades. The uniform of the grenadier was different from that of the musketeer and pikeman; the two latter wearing a round hat with broad brim, turned up on one side, and the former a fur cap with high crown; the grenadiers also wore fur cravats, called in the orders of that period "crevatts of fox tails."

This introduction of grenadiers into the army is thus noticed by Evelyn:—"1678; now were brought into service a new sort of soldiers called *grenadiers*, who were dextrous at flinging hand-grenades, every one having a pouch full; they wore furr'd caps with coped crownes like Janizaries, which made them look very fierce, and some had hoods hanging down behind. Their clothing being likewise pybald, yellow, and red."

CURIOUS MODES OF RECRUITING.

When Queen Elizabeth resolved to assist Henry IV. of France in raising the siege of Calais, besieged in 1596 by the Spaniards, under Cardinal Albert, Archduke of Austria, she commanded some levies to be raised in England for this service; and the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of London having received a message from the Court to raise one thousand men immediately for the relief of Calais, proceeded on Easter Sunday, 1596, to the several churches, with their constables, fastened the doors, and selected from the congregation the number of men required, who were immediately equipped and sent to Dover.

An Act was passed during the early part of Queen

Anne's reign (4 Anne, cap. 10), authorizing justices of the peace to apprehend such idle persons as had no apparent means of subsistence, and deliver them to the military on paying them the levy-money allowed for passing recruits.

This remarkable Act was revived by 30 George II., cap. 8.

The following is extracted from *Lloyd's Evening Post*, published in 1759, and shows how crime could be condoned by entering the army:—

“Norwich, Aug. 4.—On Tuesday last was committed to the Castle by R. Browne, Esq., John Ludkins, otherwise Adkins, being charged on the oath of Elizabeth the wife of William Williams, victualler, at Weybourne, in Norfolk, with robbing her of 30*s.* in her dwelling-house. He was committed a few weeks since to the city gaol, for defrauding Mr. Thursby, joiner, of goods to the value of about £10, but made his escape out of prison; he was afterwards retaken, and on producing the goods, prosecution was stopt against him, on condition he enlisted for a soldier, which he accordingly did, under Captain Lacy in the 56th regiment of foot, commanded by Lord Charles Manners, and afterwards deserted.”

BESTOWAL OF A MEDAL BY THE POPE ON BRITISH TROOPS.

Shortly after the taking of Bastia, in Corsica, in May, 1794, a portion of the Twelfth Lancers proceeded to Italy, and landed at Civita Vecchia, where the conduct of the officers and men was such as to gain the notice of Pope Pius VI., who ordered gold medals for the officers, as will be seen from the accom-

panying letter from his Secretary of State, Cardinal de Zelada:—

“From the Vatican, May 30th, 1794.

“The marked consideration which the Holy Father has always entertained, and never will cease to entertain, for the generous and illustrious English nation, induces him not to neglect the opportunity of giving a proof of it, which is now afforded by the stay of a British regiment at Civita Vecchia. As his Holiness cannot but applaud the regular and praiseworthy conduct of the troops in question, he has determined to evince his entire satisfaction by presenting a gold medal to each of the officers, including General Sir James Steuart, Bart., and Colonel Erskine, though absent; and since these medals, twelve in number, are not, at the present moment, in readiness, nor can be provided before the departure of the regiment from Civita Vecchia, the Holy Father will be careful that they shall be sent, as soon as possible, to Sir John Cox Hipplesly, who will be pleased to transmit them to the respective officers, making them acquainted, at the same time, with the feelings by which his Holiness is animated, and with the lively desire which he entertains of manifesting on all occasions his unalterable regard, whether it be towards the nation in general, or towards every individual Englishman. In thus making known to Sir John Cox Hipplesly, member of the British Parliament, the dispositions of the Supreme Pontiff, the Cardinal de Zelada, Secretary of State, begs leave to add an offer of his own services and the assurances of his distinguished esteem.”

General Sir James Steuart and Colonel Erskine

before mentioned were the colonel and lieutenant-colonel of the regiment. Some of the officers proceeded to Rome, and were introduced to the Pope, who received them very graciously, and taking a helmet into his hand, expressed a hope "that Heaven would enable the cause of truth and religion to triumph over injustice and infidelity," and he then placed it on Captain Browne's head.

SENT TO COVENTRY.

The phrase being "sent to Coventry" is said to derive its origin from a circumstance which happened to a regiment that was quartered in the town of Coventry, where the officers were extremely ill-received by the inhabitants, or rather, denied all sort of intercourse with them. Hence, to be "sent to Coventry" signifies, to be excluded from all social communications with others, or, more properly, with those who before were intimate.

THIRTEENTH FOOT FORMED INTO CAVALRY.

During the campaign in Spain, in 1706, under the celebrated but eccentric Earl of Peterborough,* the following extraordinary and unprecedented change of

* Lady Hervey's description of Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough and Monmouth, at Bath, in 1725, affords a strange contrast to the heroism displayed by him in Spain:—"Lord Peterborough is here, and has been so some time, though by his dress one would believe he had not designed to make any stay; for he wears boots all day, and, as I hear, must do so, having brought no shoes with him. It is a comical sight to see him with his blue ribbon and star, and a cabbage under each arm or a chicken in his hand, which, after he himself has purchased at market, he carries home for his dinner."

the greater portion of a regiment of infantry into cavalry occurred. His lordship had been much pleased with the conduct of the present Thirteenth Foot, and he determined to form them into a regiment of dragoons. Dr. Freind thus relates the circumstance in his account of the "Campaign in Valencia":—

"No surprise, I believe, was equal to that of the officers and soldiers of Colonel Pearce's regiment, who had orders to march from Vinaros to a place called Oropeso, four leagues from Castillon de la Plana: at this place, by ten in the morning, they were met by the Earl of Peterborough, on a plain just bordering on the town. His lordship, having made a review, was complimenting the regiment, and wishing he had horses and accoutrements, to try whether a corps of so good a character would maintain the like reputation upon such a change. They, no doubt, concurred very heartily with his lordship in his wishes, little expecting the execution of them in a moment; but his lordship having ordered his secretary to give the commissions already prepared, the officers at last believed the general in earnest; when, turning to the edge of a hill, they saw eight bodies of horses, drawn up separately, and found them already accoutred. Among these there were three good horses for each captain, two for each lieutenant, and one for each cornet. My lord left to the field-officers the choice of their troops, the other captains drew lots, and immediately they all mounted and marched to the quarters appointed for them."

The regiment, in its new capacity, did good service, and evinced signal gallantry at the disastrous battle of Almanza, which is included amongst those fought on *Sundays*. This corps of dragoons was disbanded after

the Peace of Utrecht, in 1713; but the officers and men who were not formed into dragoons, and had returned home in 1706, met with such success in recruiting, that the regiment in less than two years was fit for service, and is now distinguished as the Thirteenth, or Prince Albert's Light Infantry.

ESTABLISHMENT AND PAY OF INFANTRY IN 1686.

The following statement shows the numbers and rates of pay of a regiment of infantry in the year 1686:—

STAFF.		Pay per Day.		
		£	s.	d.
1 Colonel, <i>as Colonel</i>	.	0	12	0
1 Lieut-Colonel, <i>as Lieut-Colonel</i>	.	0	7	0
1 Major, <i>as Major</i>	.	0	5	0
1 Chaplain	.	0	6	8
1 Chirurgeon, <i>ivs.</i>	1 Mate, <i>iis. vid.</i>	0	6	6
1 Adjutant	.	0	4	0
1 Quarter-Master and Marshal	.	0	4	0
Total for Staff		2	5	2
THE COLONEL'S COMPANY.				
The Colonel as Captain	.	0	8	0
1 Lieutenant	.	0	4	0
1 Ensign	.	0	3	0
2 Sergeants <i>xviii.</i> each	.	0	3	0
3 Corporals, <i>is.</i> each	.	0	3	0
1 Drummer	.	0	1	0
50 Private Soldiers, at <i>viii.</i> each	.	1	13	4
Total for one Company		2	15	4
Nine Companies more		24	18	0
Total		29	18	6
Per Annum, £10,922 12s. 6d.				

NAPOLEON AND THE TWENTIETH REGIMENT.

Whilst the Twentieth Regiment was serving at St. Helena, Napoleon delivered "Coxe's Life of Marlborough" to Surgeon Archibald Arnott, of the Twentieth, in order to the work being presented to the officers of the corps. Sir Hudson Lowe objected to the volumes being received by the regiment unless the imperial title was torn out. The officers would not consent to such a mutilation, and on the books being sent to England for the opinion of His Royal Highness the Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief, they were returned in their original condition, with the remark that such a gift from Napoleon Bonaparte to a British regiment was most gratifying to him, and that the safe detention of Napoleon Bonaparte was a sufficient testimony that the regiment had done its duty, and the presentation of the books was a satisfactory and flattering acknowledgment that a delicate and difficult duty had been performed in a generous and gentlemanly spirit.

The books, with the imperial title, are now in the library of the Twentieth Regiment in India.

These particulars appeared in the *Times* of 9th September, 1853, signed "Minden," in reference to the review of Sir Hudson Lowe's life.

Additional information has been obtained from officers who have belonged to the Twentieth, by which it appears that the following circumstance led to the presentation of the work:—Dr. Arnott, the surgeon of the Regiment, a most excellent man, was called in during the last illness of Napoleon. He remained in constant attendance until his death,

and on one occasion, when urging him to take some medicine, he said, "You must, sire." Napoleon immediately replied, "Ah, doctor, that is the way I suppose you deal with the sick men in the hospital. You should be kind to them, for there are not better soldiers in the world than the British infantry; and now that I am on the subject, I will make a present to your regiment, and I don't think I can send a more acceptable one than the life of one of your greatest generals." He then directed a servant to bring from the library the Life of Marlborough which had been given to him by Lord Robert Spencer, and, handing it to Dr. Arnott, he said "he hoped the officers of the Twentieth would receive and place the books in their library as a present from him."

The objection was, indeed, frivolous, for it consisted only of the words "L'Empereur Napoleon," written on the title-page, but not, it is believed, in Napoleon's handwriting.

Twelve grenadiers of the Twentieth Regiment were selected to bear his remains to the place of interment at St. Helena.

A DIFFICULT SURNAME.

Colonel Hepburn, who commanded the regiment now known as the First Royals, and was for some time in the service of France, had his name changed from Hepburn to Hebron, and Père Daniel, the French historian, gives the following singular reason for it:—"On l'appelloit en France 'le Chevalier d'Hebron,' son nom d'Hepburn étant difficile à prononcer." Thus the difficulty of pronouncing his name caused it to be changed. Colonel Sir John Hepburn was

shot in the neck at the siege of Saverne, in Alsace, in June, 1636, of which wound he died. He was on the point of being advanced to the dignity of a marshal of France, when his death occurred.

SINGULAR DESCRIPTION OF A DESERTER FROM THE
TWENTY-SECOND REGIMENT OF FOOT.

(*From the "London Gazette," of July, 1689.*)

"Run away, out of Captain Soames' company, in his Grace the Duke of Norfolk's regiment of infantry, quartered at Newport, in Shropshire, Roger Curtis, a barber-surgeon, a little man, with short black hair, a little curled; round visage, fresh-coloured, in a light-coloured cloth coat, with gold and silver buttons, and the loops stitched with gold and silver, red plush breeches, and white hat; he lived formerly at Downham Market, in Norfolk. Whoever will give notice to Francis Baker, the agent to the said regiment, in Hatton Garden, so that he may be secured, shall have two guineas reward."

ACTION AT GORDE.

The almost forgotten victory on the plains of Gorde, on the 16th of September, 1813, is here adverted to, on account of the Seventy-third Foot being the only British battalion in the action. The accompanying statement of operations is extracted from the "Annual Register," vol. lxxxvii., page 280:—"After landing at Stralsund, and assisting in completing the works of that town, Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, with the Seventy-third, was detached into the interior of the country, to feel for the enemy, and also to get into

communication with Lieutenant-General Count Wallmoden, which dangerous service he successfully effected, though he had, with great care and caution, to creep with his small force between the large *corps d'armée* of Davoust and other French generals at that time stationed in Pomerania, Mecklenburg, and Hanover. Having joined Count Wallmoden, the Seventy-third contributed greatly to the victory that general gained over the French on the plains of Gorde, in Hanover, where Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, at the head of his battalion, declining any aid, and at the moment when the German Hussars had been routed, charged up a steep hill, took a battery of French artillery, and unfurling the British colours, at once spread terror amongst that gallant enemy which feared no others; a panic struck them, and they fled."

SUSPENDED ANIMATION.

The following instance of suspended animation, in the case of Sergeant Bubb, of the Twenty-eighth Regiment, is, perhaps, one of the most remarkable in the annals of the Humane Society. Mr. W. H. Crowfoot, surgeon, of Beccles, was called professionally to Kessingland, on Tuesday, 17th December, 1805, and met by accident a cart containing (as he was told) the dead body of a soldier. The history of the supposed deceased man was briefly this: — That on the preceding day, about eleven o'clock, after suffering shipwreck, with part of the Twenty-eighth regiment of Foot, he sank in a state of insensibility upon the deck of the ship, where he remained during the night, and was said to have perished during the inclemency of the weather. He was brought on shore between eleven and twelve

o'clock the next day, and was left on the beach for more than an hour, under a conviction that he was, as represented by the bystanders, dead. Mr. C. desired to examine the body, and perceiving some remaining warmth about the heart, he resolved to use his endeavours to restore the man. To the astonishment of those present, he very fortunately succeeded, after three hours' unwearied application in the means usually employed on such occasions.

USING UP THE ENEMY'S SHOT.

A singular circumstance occurred during the Peninsular War, which was no less than the collecting of the French shot in the vicinity of the British camp. The incident is thus related in a letter written, on the day following the escape of the French garrison of Almeida, by the Duke of Wellington to Viscount Beresford :—

“ Villa Formosa, 11th May, 1811.

“ You will hardly believe that we were obliged to pick up the French shot in our camp to make up ammunition for Arentschild's guns, his reserve having been left behind at Saragossa.”

This practice was resumed at the siege of Sevastopol, for it appears by a General Order, dated 24th October, 1854, that—

“ The Commander-in-Chief is pleased to authorize the payment of fourpence for each small shot, and sixpence for each large shot which may be brought into the camp of Lieutenant-Colonel Gambier, Royal Artillery, near the light division, by any soldier or seaman.”

A further General Order was published on the 4th November, 1854, which stated that—

“General Order, No. 1, of 24th October, authorizing payment for shot delivered at the Camp of the Siege Train, is cancelled.”

Suwarrow, the celebrated Russian general, is reported to have made the following use of the enemy's bullets, when after an obstinate defence, he had taken a town in the Crimea, during the storming of which, the greatest instances of courage had been shown by the troops. In a magazine were found several thousands of musket-balls, all of which the general had soon after rudely struck with the name of the city; and in commemoration of the event, presented one to each of his brave followers, placing them as trophies on the breasts they had been destined to pierce.

CLOTHING IN 1685.

In the year 1685, when the Tenth Regiment was raised, it wore blue coats, and was the only corps of infantry thus clothed. The coats were lined with red, and the men had red waistcoats, breeches, and stockings; round hats with broad brims—the brim being turned up on one side and ornamented with red ribbons; the arms were muskets and pikes; the pikemen were distinguished by wearing red worsted sashes. The other corps had red coats, which colour was generally worn by English soldiers from the time of Queen Elizabeth; several of Cromwell's regiments were clad in blue, and King Charles II. clothed the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards in blue, which colour it has since retained. A regiment of marines, raised in his reign, had a yellow uniform. Shortly

after the revolution in 1688, the Tenth were clothed in red like the rest of the infantry.

ESPRIT DE CORPS.

Private Thomas Stevenson, of Ligonier's Horse, now Seventh Dragoon Guards, having had his horse shot under him shortly after the commencement of the battle of Fontenoy, on the 11th May, 1745, did not rejoin his regiment until the evening of the following day. The *esprit de corps* was shown in this manner, for so proud were the men of being styled a "Ligonier," that they would not permit him to remain within the lines. A court-martial was demanded by the man, before which he produced Lieutenant Izard, of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, who deposed that, "on the morning of the day of action, the prisoner addressed him, acquainted him with the death of his (the prisoner's) horse, and requested permission to carry a firelock in the grenadier company under him. The prisoner's request was granted; he behaved throughout the day with uncommon intrepidity, and was one of the nine grenadiers which he (the evidence) brought out of the action." Stevenson was at once restored to his troop with honour. His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland promoted him on the following day to a lieutenantancy in the Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

SIEGE OF BOUCHAIN.

At the siege of Bouchain, situated on the Scheldt, which was taken in September, 1711, the communication between the enemy's camp and the town was established through a morass, where the water was somewhat deep, and covered with willows and rushes.

It was constructed on a narrow footway that ran through the middle of it, and a parapet, carried on with fascines from tree to tree the whole distance, protected by three redoubts. The Duke of Marlborough being resolved to obtain possession of these, ordered out 400 grenadiers, who marched up to the middle, and some to the neck, in water. They reached the parapet, and drove the enemy from their posts, though exposed to the cannon, both of the town and the entrenchments.

The above is related by Lieutenant-Colonel Blackader, of the Twenty-sixth Cameronians, and Lediard, in his "Life of Marlborough," relates that "an ensign of Ingoldsby's regiment (now Eighteenth Foot) who was at the head of fifteen grenadiers, being very short of stature, and seeing, when they had advanced into the water, that he must either drown or give up his share of the enterprise and return, chose rather to get upon the shoulders of one of his grenadiers, and when they came to the parapet, he was one of the first to leap into the enemy's works." The ensign's name was Somercourt.

SUGAR USED FOR EARTHWORKS.

A surprising statement is made by the Rev. George Robert Gleig, M.A., Chaplain-General to the Forces, in his work entitled "The Campaigns of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans in 1814—15," by which it appears that in the operations before New Orleans, sugar was used instead of earth. To use the author's own words:—"In the erection of these batteries, a circumstance occurred worthy of notice on account of its singularity. I have already stated that

the whole of this district was covered with the stubble of sugar-cane; and I might have added that every storehouse and barn attached to the different mansions scattered over it was filled with barrels of sugar. *In throwing up these works, the sugar was used instead of earth.* Rolling the hogsheads towards the front, they were placed upright in the parapets of the batteries; and it was computed that sugar to the amount of many thousand pounds sterling was thus disposed of."

SUPPOSED ORIGIN OF SASHES.

Sashes are believed to have been invented for the ease of wounded officers, by means of which (in case any of them were so badly wounded as to render them incapable of remaining at their posts) they might be carried off with the assistance of two men. They are now reduced to a very small size, and of course unfit for the original purpose.

SIXTY-NINTH REGIMENT WITH NELSON.

The Sixty-ninth Regiment served as Marines, and was present at the battle off Cape St. Vincent, on the 14th February, 1797, which gained a peerage for Sir John Jervis. Nelson disobeyed the signal to tack in succession, and ordered his ship to be wore, which brought him into action with the "Santissima Trinidad," 136, the "San Joseph," 112, the "Salvador del Mundo," 112, the "St. Nicolas," 80, the "San Isidro," 74, another 74, and another first-rate. Troubridge, in the "Culloden," immediately joined, and most nobly supported him. According to Southey's "Life of Nelson," Captain Berry, who had lately

been Nelson's first-lieutenant, was the first man who leaped into the enemy's main-chains. Miller, when in the very act of going, was ordered by Nelson to remain. Berry was supported from the spritsail-yard, which¹ locked in the "St. Nicolas's" main rigging. A soldier of the Sixty-ninth broke the upper quarter gallery-window, and jumped in, followed by the commodore himself, and by others, as fast as possible. The cabin doors were fastened, and the Spanish officers fired their pistols at them through the window : the doors were soon forced, and the Spanish brigadier fell while retreating to the quarter-deck. Nelson pushed on, and found Berry in possession of the poop, and the Spanish ensign hauling down. He passed on to the fore-castle, where he met two or three Spanish officers, and received their swords. The English were now in full possession of every part of the ship ; and a fire of pistols and musketry opened upon them from the admiral's stern gallery of the "San Joseph." Nelson having placed sentinels at the different ladders, and ordered Captain Miller to send more men into the prize, gave orders for boarding that ship from the "San Nicolas." It was done in an instant, he himself leading the way, and exclaiming, "Westminster Abbey, or victory !" Berry assisted him into the main-chains ; and at that moment a Spanish officer looked over the quarter-deck rail, and said they surrendered. It was not long before he was on the quarter-deck, where the Spanish captain presented to him his sword, and told him the admiral was below, dying of his wounds. There, on the quarter-deck of an enemy's first-rate, he received the swords of the officers ; giving them, as they were delivered, to Wil-

liam Fearney, one of his old "Agamemnon's," who, with the utmost coolness, put them under his arm.

LAST OF THE QUEUES.

"Horse Guards, 20th July, 1808.

"General Order* :—The Commander-in-Chief directs it to be notified that, in consequence of the state of preparation for immediate service in which the whole army is at the present moment to be held, His Majesty has been graciously pleased to dispense with the use of *queues* until further orders.

"His Royal Highness desires the commanding officers of regiments will take care that the men's hair is cut close in their necks in the neatest and most uniform manner, and that their heads are kept perfectly clean by combing, brushing, and frequently washing them. For the latter essential purpose it is His Majesty's pleasure that a small sponge shall hereafter be added to each man's regimental necessaries.

"By order of His Royal Highness the

"Commander-in-Chief,

"HARRY CALVERT, Adjutant-General."

The mode in which this order was carried into effect is thus related in the—

* It is well known in the army what attention is paid to anything published in this manner, of which the following anecdote may be an instance :—During the year 1777, two soldiers went twice in one day to hear some celebrated preachers whose doctrines were diametrically opposed to each other. "Well, Tom," said one, "which of them do you think is right; for you see how differently they preach?" "Why," replies the other, "I shall not believe either until it comes out in general orders."

“Narrative of the Campaigns of the Twenty-eighth Regiment since their return from Egypt in 1802, by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Cadell, Unattached, late Major of that Corps.”

“On the 24th of July, a general order arrived from the Horse Guards, which, droll as it may appear, gave universal delight; it was to cut off the men’s *queues*.

“A signal was immediately made for all hair-cutters to repair to head-quarters.

“As soon as they had finished on board the head-quarter ship, the adjutant, Lieutenant Russell, proceeded with them and a pattern man, to the other troop-ships. The tails were kept till all were docked, when, by a signal, the whole were hove overboard, with three cheers.”

The regiment was on board ship at Spithead, on its return home from Gottenburg, and shortly afterwards proceeded to Portugal.

CURIOUS TRAIT IN LORD HILL.

In the “Life of Lord Hill,” by the Rev. Edwin Sydney, A.M., it appears that the sensibility of that gallant general was such as to faint, in his boyhood, at the sight of blood when one of his schoolfellows had cut his finger. After one of his achievements in the war, this fact was brought to his recollection by a lady, with the remark that she wondered how he could have acted with such coolness and vigour in the midst of the dreadful scenes of carnage surrounding him. “I have still,” he replied, “the same feelings; but in the excitement of battle all individual sensation is lost sight of.”

After he had entered upon his military duties he could not witness a prize-fight from the windows of his lodging without fainting.

His delicate health prevented his joining in the athletic exercises of his more robust companions; but his little garden and his numerous pet animals testified his systematic care and attention, by their succeeding better than those of his schoolfellows.

WOLFE'S FAVOURITE POEM.

The following anecdote of this celebrated general, deserves well to be remembered. The late Professor Robinson, of Edinburgh, at that time a midshipman in the royal navy, happened to be on duty in the boat in which General Wolfe went to visit some of his posts the night before the decisive battle of Quebec. The evening was fine, and the scene, considering the work they were engaged in, and the morning to which they were looking forward, was sufficiently impressive. As they rowed along, the general, with much feeling, repeated nearly the whole of Gray's *Elegy* (which had recently appeared and was yet but little known) to an officer who sat with him at the stern of the boat, adding, as he concluded, that "he would prefer being the author of that poem to the glory of beating the French to-morrow." To-morrow came, and the life of this illustrious soldier was gloriously terminated, amidst the tears of his friends and the shouts of his victorious army.

There is a good anecdote preserved of this officer, for it is said that when George II. proposed giving the command of the expedition against Quebec to General Wolfe, great objections were raised by the

ministry, and one of them, in particular, begged His Majesty to consider that the man was actually mad. "Mad, is he?" said the King; "well, if he be, I wish he would bite some of my other generals."

A VETERAN VOLUNTEER.

When the threatened French invasion was expected in 1803, a general order was issued from the Horse Guards, dated 2nd December of that year, commanding that (in case of a landing being effected in any part of the kingdom) all officers below the rank of general officers, and not attached to any particular regiment, should report themselves, in person, to the general officer commanding the district in which they might be resident; and all general officers not employed on the staff were requested to transmit their addresses immediately to the Adjutant-General. The veteran General Reid, Colonel of the Eighty-eighth, or Connaught Rangers, although in his eighty-second year, forthwith obeyed the summons, and forwarded his address in the following characteristic letter:—

"London, 6th December, 1803.

"SIR,—In obedience to the orders of His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, expressed in the *London Gazette* of Saturday last, for all General Officers not employed on the Staff to report to you their address, I have the honour to inform you, that I am to be found at No. 7, Woodstock Street, near Oxford Street; that I am an old man, in the 82nd year of my age, and have become very deaf and infirm, but I am still ready, if my services be ac-

cepted, to use my feeble arm in defence of my King and Country, having had the good fortune on former occasions to have been repeatedly successful in action against our perfidious enemies, on whom, I thank God, I never turned my back.

“ I have, etc.,

“ JOHN REID, General,

“ Colonel of the 88th Regt.

“ The Adjutant-General.”

FREDERICK THE GREAT.

Frederick the Great having been told, in the way of remonstrance, by one of his generals, that he had seen many campaigns, replied, “ So has the jackass that carries my pack.” The bare fact of having been on service, or present at many engagements, does not, in itself, make a good officer.

A YOUTHFUL HERO.

Voltaire has related a most striking incident which occurred at the battle of Dettingen, on the 27th of June, 1743, the last action in which a British sovereign was present; it is that of the Count of Boufflers, aged ten years and a-half, who had his leg shattered by a cannon-ball : the little fellow received the wound, saw his leg amputated, and died with equal undauntedness; such courage, allied to youth, is said to have drawn forth tears from all present.

PRESENCE OF MIND.

While stationed at Jersey, a soldier of the Thirty-first Regiment displayed the following example of

courage and presence of mind:—On the 4th of June, 1804, a salute had been fired in honour of the anniversary of the birthday of King George III. The bombardier, whose duty it was to deposit the slow match in the magazine on the Town Hill, at St. Heliers, after the performance of the ceremony, neglected to observe whether it was extinguished; it unfortunately was still alight, and set fire to the building; there were within the place three hundred and twenty-five barrels of powder, and from its central situation, an explosion would have destroyed the greater portion of the town. Private William Pentenny, of the Thirty-first Regiment, assisted by two inhabitants of Jersey, broke open the magazine, when another moment's delay would probably have been too late, the fire having nearly reached the spot where the powder was deposited, when he entered. With infinite coolness and decision he carried the nearest barrels away in his arms, and continued so to act until the whole stock was removed out of danger. This important service was highly appreciated. The Patriotic Fund at Lloyd's awarded Private William Pentenny a pension of £20 a-year, whilst the States of Jersey conferred an additional £12 upon this deserving soldier, and presented to him a gold medal, struck on purpose to commemorate the achievement, which he was permitted to wear. The Governor, Major-General the Honourable William Stewart, ordered a ring of silver lace to be worn round his arm as a further distinction.

WELLINGTON AND NAPOLEON.

In "Recollections, by Samuel Rogers," under the

head, "Duke of Wellington," it is stated, "Bonaparte I never saw; though, during the battle [Waterloo], we were once, I understand, within a quarter of a mile of each other. I regret it much; for he was a most extraordinary man."

MARQUIS OF HASTINGS.

The Marquis of Hastings, son of the Earl of Moira, who served with the Duke of York, in Holland, and was afterwards Master-General of the Ordnance and Governor-General of India, from 1812 to 1822, also Governor of Malta, died in November, 1825, on board the "Revenge," in Baia Bay; he left a letter, in which, amongst other requests, he directed that his right hand might be amputated, and preserved until the death of the Marchioness, when it was to be placed in the coffin and buried with her. This singular request was carried out, as desired.

LEGAL AND MILITARY DUTIES.

It appears by a letter from William Blathwayt, Secretary at War, dated Whitehall, 24th of January, 1703, to Colonel John Livesay, Twelfth Foot, at Jamaica, that the Duke of Marlborough, at the solicitation of Sir Salathiel Lovell, Recorder of the City of London, approved of his son, Captain Lovell, of Livesay's Regiment, who had studied the law, to continue his practice in Jamaica, "so far as may be consistent with the service of the regiment, and his duty as captain."

Legal and military duties are also combined in the following recent instance, the report of which appeared in the *Daily News* of Friday, May 27th, 1859:—

"Court of Exchequer, 26th May, 1859.—THE TOGA AND THE SWORD. A case having been mentioned, in which Mr. Slade, Q.C., was leading counsel, the Lord Chief Baron said—Mr. Slade, who is a Lieutenant-Colonel of the Yeomanry, is 'retained' at head-quarters in his discharge of his military duties (laughter), and he has begged that time may be given him, after the campaign is over, to come here and resume his toga. (Laughter.) His application is granted."

SOBRIQUETS OF REGIMENTS.

Previously to the issue of the royal warrant of 1751, which directed the Number to be painted, or embroidered, on each colour of every regiment, it had been the practice to designate regiments by the names of their Colonels, adding, in some instances, the colour of their Facings, particularly when two regiments were commanded by colonels of the same name:—for example, the Nineteenth were commonly called the "Green Howards" between 1738 and 1748, in order to distinguish them from the Third Regiment, or Buffs, of which General Thomas Howard was the colonel during that period.

The facings and breeches of the Third Foot, or the Buffs, and the Thirty-first Regiment were of the same colour, and the following tradition has been preserved in the latter corps, in reference to the battle of Dettingen, when King George II. mistook it for the Third Foot, and called out "Bravo, Buffs," with a view of animating the men to further gallantry; when reminded that it was the Thirty-first, and not the Old Buffs, his Majesty then rejoined, "Bravo, Young

Bufs;" this sobriquet has been since retained. The Twenty-eighth Regiment has been named the "Slashers;" the Fiftieth the "Dirty Half-hundred;" the Fifty-seventh the "Die-hards;" and the Fifty-sixth the "Pompadours;"—*cum multis aliis*.

EXAMPLE OF BREVITY.

General Sir Robert Boyd was remarkable for the brevity of his despatches. Whilst governor of Gibraltar, he is said to have written an order to his agent, Mr. Browne, in England, for his own private stores, in three words, like Cæsar's—" *Veni, vidi, vici* "—namely, "Browne, beef, Boyd." The reply which accompanied the stores was equally laconic—"Boyd, beef, Browne."

PRISONERS TO THE BURMESE.

When Dr. Sandford and Lieutenant Bennett, of the Royals, were captured during the first Burmese war of 1825-26, preparations were made to crucify them; but, after an hour's suspense, they were eventually forwarded in chains to the capital, a distance of 300 miles. On reaching Ava they were thrown into a loathsome dungeon, crowded with criminals and deserters, where the Doctor remained five, and Lieutenant Bennett ten days, with nothing but a little rice to support them, and even this was occasionally omitted. After being released from gaol they were kept separate. The Doctor was a prisoner at large in the house of Mr. Price, an American missionary and the king's interpreter, and Lieutenant Bennett was placed under charge of a Burmese constable, and was in chains in a lonely situation during the troubled and fearful

state of Ava. From the vindictive and sanguinary disposition of some of the Burmese ministers and chiefs, the lives of the prisoners were in constant jeopardy, particularly during the moments of excitement produced by disastrous intelligence from the army. The prisoners had also to dread that, through the influence and fury of the queen and priests, they should be sacrificed as a propitiatory offering to the Burmese gods. On the nearer approach of the British army, the Doctor and Lieutenant Bennett were frequently consulted on European modes of concluding treaties of peace; and the Burmese acknowledged they could not reconcile to their minds the idea that a victorious army, with nothing to impede its progress, should halt within a day or two's march of the capital and terminate the war on conditions; this was not Burman custom. To use their own simile, they could not believe the cat with the mouse in her claws would refrain from demolishing it, and therefore they concluded the pecuniary demand of the English general was merely a ruse to obtain as much precious metal as possible, and afterwards as much territory would be retained as was deemed convenient. To raise their opinion of British faith, the Doctor engaged to convey a letter to the British camp, and to return of his own accord, and his re-appearance astonished the Burmese ministers and the whole population of Ava.

Lieutenant (afterwards Major) Bennett wrote an interesting narrative of the various scenes and incidents he met with—all of a novel and singular nature, and exhibiting traits and peculiarities of the Burman character, which his situation as a prisoner of war

could alone develop. This narrative was published in the first and second volumes of the "United Service Journal."

EIGHTY-SIXTH REGIMENT.

A division of the Eighty-sixth Regiment, on marching through Tipperary, in 1823, halted at the village of Middleton: in the evening the commanding officer observed the soldiers assembled round a tomb in the burial ground, with their caps off; on inquiring the cause, a soldier of the grenadiers replied, "Your honour, we are come up to see our old captain." On joining the group, he observed the tomb of his old and respected comrade, Lieut.-Colonel Lanphier, and the following words, which had been scratched by the soldiers beneath the inscription of the tomb-stone:—"A BRAVE SOLDIER!" "Please, your honour," the soldier continued, "the boys of the company would like to fire three rounds over the grave, and would be glad to pay for the powder, if your honour will let them fire." On the following morning the grenadier company, which the deceased had gallantly commanded for a number of years, paid the last tribute of respect to their late captain's remains, which was duly appreciated by his surviving relatives, and also by the villagers. Lieut.-Colonel Lanphier entered the army as ensign in the Tenth Foot, in 1798, and was promoted to be lieutenant in the Eighty-sixth Regiment in 1800, to be captain in 1806, to the rank of Brevet-Major in 1810, and of Brevet Lieut.-Colonel in 1819; he retired from the service by the sale of his commission on the 30th of January, 1823, being then the *senior* captain of the Eighty-sixth Regiment.

BADAJOZ AND THE PIPER OF THE SEVENTY-FOURTH.

At the siege of Badajoz, in March, 1812, when the final attack was made on the night of the 6th of April, amongst the foremost in the escalade was John McLauchlan, the piper of the Seventy-fourth, who, the instant he mounted the castle wall, began playing the regimental quick-step, "The Campbells are Coming," at the head of the advance along the ramparts, as coolly as if on a common parade, until his music was stopped by a shot through the bag of the pipes; he was afterwards seen seated on a gun carriage, quietly repairing the damage, perfectly unconcerned about the shot flying around, and presently recommenced his animating tune. The poor piper was afterwards cut in two by a cannon-shot at the battle of Vittoria, in the following year, whilst playing in rear of the colours.

CAPTURE OF THE FIRST EAGLE.

The first French eagle taken during the Peninsular War, was that captured by Sergeant Patrick Masterson, of the Eighty-seventh Royal Irish Fusiliers, at the battle of Barrosa, on the 5th of March, 1811. It belonged to the Eighth French Light Infantry. The sergeant was promoted to an ensigncy in the Royal York Light Infantry Volunteers for this deed, and was subsequently removed to his old regiment, the Eighty-seventh Fusiliers.

MILITARY COINCIDENCES.

Alexander the Great, when traversing the deserts of Africa, and suffering, in common with his army,

excessive thirst, on a soldier presenting him with some water in a casque, he threw it away in the presence of the troops;—the lesson of temperance conveyed in this action was greater than giving it to his soldiers to drink.

This brings to remembrance the memorable anecdote of the illustrious Sidney.

Sir Philip Sidney, at the battle of Zutphen, displayed the most undaunted courage. He had two horses killed under him; and whilst mounting a third, was wounded by a musket-shot out of the trenches, which broke the bone of his thigh. He returned about a mile and a-half on horseback to the camp; and being faint with the loss of blood, and parched with thirst, he called for drink. It was presently brought him; but as he was putting the vessel to his mouth, a poor wounded soldier, who happened to be carried by him at that instant, looked up to it with wishful eyes. The gallant and generous Sidney took the bottle from his mouth, just when he was going to drink, and delivered it to the soldier, saying, "Thy necessity is yet greater than mine."

Similar self-denial is exemplified in the following interesting circumstance, which is recorded by Lieut. General Sir William Napier, in his history of the conquest of Scinde, respecting the march into the desert in pursuit of Meer Shere Mahomet:—

"On one of those long marches, which were almost continual, the Twenty-fifth Sepoys, being nearly maddened by thirst and heat, saw one of their water-carriers approaching with full skins of water. They rushed towards him in crowds, tearing away the skins and struggling together, with loud cries of Water!

Water! At that moment, some half-dozen straggling soldiers of the Twenty-second came up, apparently exhausted, and asked for some. At once the generous Indians withheld their hands from the skins, forgot their own sufferings, and gave the fainting Europeans to drink; then they all moved on, the Sepoys carrying the Twenty-second men's muskets for them, patting them on the shoulders, and encouraging them to hold out. It was in vain; they did so for a short time, but soon fell. It was then discovered that these noble fellows were all wounded, some deeply, but thinking there was to be another fight, they had concealed their hurts, and forced nature to sustain the loss of blood, the pain of wounds, the burning sun, the long marches, and the sandy desert, that their last moments might be given to their country on another field of battle!"

Names of men of the Twenty-second regiment who concealed their wounds, received in the Battle of Hyderabad, and marched with their regiment the next day, thinking another battle was at hand:—

Sergeant Haney, John Durr, John Muldowney, Robert Young, Henry Lines, Patrick Gill, James Andrews, Thomas Middleton, James Mulvey, and Silvester Day.

When James II. commanded that his proclamation of toleration should be read from the pulpit, only two hundred clergymen obeyed. Seven bishops joined in a respectful petition against the order of the Sovereign, who declared them guilty of a seditious libel, and sent the petitioners to the Tower. They were tried in Westminster Hall, in June, 1688, and acquitted, to the great joy of the country.

A similar instance to this is found in the six

Portsmouth captains. They belonged to the Eighth Foot, and sent a memorial to the Duke of Berwick against receiving Roman Catholic recruits into the regiment. Their names were—Lieutenant-Colonel the Honble. John Beaumont, Captains Simon Packe, Thomas Orme, John Port, William Cook, and the Honble. Thomas Paston, and on the 10th of September, 1688, they were tried by a general court-martial at Windsor. On being found guilty of violating the fifteenth article of the King's Regulations, they were sentenced to be dismissed the service. The public looked upon them as champions of their civil and religious rights, and their portraits were engraved and circulated. Ballads were likewise composed in their honour. An engraving was made in 1688, which was headed "The Portsmouth Captains," and to which was appended the motto, *Pro Latria, Patria, Atria*. The Revolution shortly afterwards occurred, and Lieutenant-Colonel Beaumont received from the new Sovereign the colonelcy of the regiment. Fortunately, now more tolerant times have arrived, and soldiers, whatever their religious persuasion, vie with each other in their attempts to excel in gallantry.

At the battle of Malplaquet, on the 11th of September, 1709, the Royal Regiment of Ireland in the British service (the present Eighteenth Royal Irish) encountered the Royal Regiment of Ireland in the pay of the King of France. A parallel case occurred during the Peninsular War. At the dashing affair of Arroyo dos Molinos, on the 28th of October, 1811, the brass drums and the drum-major's staff of a battalion of the French Thirty-fourth were captured by

the second battalion of the British Thirty-fourth Regiment, and are still used by the latter corps. The whole of the men of the French Thirty-fourth were also taken prisoners by the brigade of which the British Thirty-fourth formed part. In the "Recollections in the Peninsula" it is recorded that "several of the French officers, as they tendered their swords, embraced the officers of the English Thirty-fourth, saying, 'Ah, Messieurs, nous sommes des frères, nous sommes du trente-quatrième régiment tous deux. Vous êtes des braves. Les Anglois se battent toujours avec loyauté, et traitent bien leurs prisonniers.' 'Ah, Messieurs, la fortune de la guerre est bien capricieuse.'" The Thirty-fourth received the Royal authority to bear the words "Arroyo dos Molinos" on the regimental colour, for their behaviour on this occasion. Sergeant Moses Simpson, the individual who actually took the staff from the drum-major of the French Thirty-fourth Regiment, afterwards filled the situation of barrack-sergeant at Northampton, and has been presented by the officers of the Thirty-fourth with a handsome medal, in commemoration of his gallant conduct.

It is a singular circumstance that the Twelfth Foot and the Hanoverian Regiment of Hardenberg fought side by side at the battle of Minden, on the 1st of August, 1759, and they were the only two entire regiments employed in the memorable sortie from Gibraltar, as will be perceived by the subjoined Evening Garrison Order, dated] 26th November, 1781:—

"COUNTERSIGN, STEADY.—All the grenadiers and light infantry in the garrison, and all the men of the

Twelfth and Hardenberg's Regiments, with the officers and non-commissioned officers on duty, to be immediately relieved and join their regiments, to form a detachment, consisting of the Twelfth and Hardenberg's regiments complete; the grenadiers and light infantry of all the other regiments; one captain, three lieutenants, ten non-commissioned officers, and a hundred artillery; three engineers, seven officers, ten non-commissioned officers, overseers, with a hundred and sixty workmen from the line, and forty workmen from the artificer corps; each man to have thirty-six rounds of ammunition, with a good flint in his piece, and another in his pocket; the whole to be commanded by Brigadier-General Roas, and to assemble on the red sands, at twelve o'clock this night, to make a *sortie* upon the enemy's batteries. The Thirty-ninth and Fifty-eighth Regiments to parade at the same hour, on the grand parade, under the command of Brigadier-General Picton, to sustain the *sortie* if necessary."

Another singular coincidence has been recorded as having occurred at the battle of Vittoria, in 1813, which is stated to have been fought nearly on the same spot with one in which a victory was obtained by the English, that restored a legitimate sovereign to the throne of Spain. Within sight of the enemy's position on the 21st of June, and only a few miles higher up the same stream (the Zadora), stands the village of Navarrette, where, on the 3rd day of April, 1367, Edward the Black Prince totally defeated Henry the Bastard, and, in consequence, seated Don Pedro on the throne of Castile. Joseph Bonaparte's escape on horseback is also strikingly illustrated by a similar act, related in Froissart's account of the above; for

n it we are told that Henry, perceiving his army defeated, without hopes of recovery, called for his horse, mounted it, and galloped off among the crowd of fugitives. This misstatement has been oftentimes repeated, but Lieutenant-General Sir William Napier has set the matter at rest in the following extract from the "History of the Peninsular War:"—The hill thus carried was called the Englishmen's Hill, not, as some recent writers have supposed, in commemoration of a victory gained by the Black Prince, but because of a disaster which there befell a part of his army. His battle was fought between Navarrette and Najera, many leagues from Vittoria, and beyond the Ebro; but on this hill the two gallant knights, Sir Thomas and Sir William Felton, took post with two hundred companions, and being surrounded by Don Tello with six thousand, all died or were taken after a long, desperate, and heroic resistance."

A skirmish happened near Penalva, on the 15th August, 1708, in which both parties claimed the victory, but King Philip retired, and King Charles partook of the dinner prepared for his competitor. A like incident occurred during the French operations in Italy, when the Emperor Napoleon III. partook of the repast which had been prepared at Solferino for Francis Joseph of Austria, realizing the truth of Madame de Sevigné's remark, that "it is not always the same man who warms the oven and who bakes the bread."

EXAMPLES OF LOYALTY.

During the civil wars, General Ireton proposed to the Earl of Derby the repossession of his estates in Eng-

land, on condition of his surrendering the Isle of Man to the Parliament. The earl treated this proposal with extreme contempt, and made the following reply :—

“ I received your letter, and with scorn I return you this answer. I cannot but wonder whence you should gather any hopes from me that I should, like you, prove treacherous to my sovereign ; since you cannot be insensible to my former actings in his late Majesty’s service, from which principle of loyalty I have in no way departed.

“ I scorn your proffers ; I disdain your favours ; I abhor your treasons ; and am so far from delivering this island to your advantage, that I will keep it, to the utmost of my power, to your destruction.

“ Take this final answer, and forbear any further solicitations ; for if you trouble me with any more messages upon this occasion, I will burn the paper and hang the bearer.

“ This is the immutable resolution, and shall be the undoubted practice, of him who accounts it his chiefest glory to be,

“ His Majesty’s most loyal and
“ obedient servant,

“ DERBY.”

Equally loyal was the reply of the defender of Minorca in 1781, Lieutenant-General the Honourable James Murray, who was offered a large sum of money by the King of Spain, through the Duke of Crillon, commanding the combined French and Spanish forces, to induce him to betray his trust, which was rejected with indignation in the following letter :—

“ Fort St. Philip, October 16th, 1781.

“ SIR,—When your brave ancestor was desired by

his sovereign to assassinate the Duc de Guise, he returned the answer which you should have done, when the King of Spain charged you to assassinate the character of a man whose birth is as illustrious as your own, or that of the Duc de Guise. I can have no further communication with you but in arms. If you have any humanity, you may send clothing to your unfortunate prisoners in my possession ; leave it at a distance, because I will admit of no contact for the future but such as is hostile in the most inveterate degree.

“ I am, etc.,

“ To the Duc de Crillon. “ JAMES MURRAY.”

Unfortunately, the brave garrison had to surrender in February, 1782, after displaying great heroism, and suffering from scurvy, a putrid fever, and dysentery ; when there was not a sufficient number of men able to bear arms for one relief of the ordinary guards, and not one hundred men free from disease.

Lieutenant-General the Honourable James Murray stated in his despatch, “ I flatter myself that all Europe will agree that the brave garrison showed uncommon heroism, and that thirst for glory which has ever distinguished the troops of my royal master. . . . Such was the uncommon spirit of the King’s soldiers, that they concealed their diseases and inability rather than go into the hospital ; several men died on guard, after having stood sentry ; their fate was not discovered until called upon for the relief, when it came to their turn to mount sentry again. . . . Perhaps a more noble, nor a more tragical scene was ever exhibited than that of the march of the garrison of St. Philip, through the Spanish and French lines. It consisted of no more than six hundred decrepid soldiers ; two

hundred seamen, one hundred and twenty royal artillery, twenty Corsicans, and twenty-five Greeks, etc. Such was the distressing appearance of our men, that many of the Spanish and French soldiers are said to have shed tears."

The Duke of Crillon, in the articles of capitulation stated, "No troops ever gave greater proofs of heroism than this poor worn-out garrison of St. Philip's Castle, who have defended themselves almost to the last man." Beatson, the historian of these wars, states, "The zeal, bravery, and constancy, displayed by all the corps composing the garrison of St. Philip, under an accumulation of misfortunes, may have been equalled, but never exceeded."

FIRST ACTION OF THE FIFTEENTH HUSSARS.

The first British regiment of light dragoons formed for permanent service is the present Fifteenth Hussars, and it was raised by Colonel George Augustus Elliott, afterwards the celebrated defender of Gibraltar. Many journeymen tailors and clothiers had come to London, in 1759, to petition Parliament against certain grievances; but becoming ambitious to appear in the uniform of this new corps, which was highly popular, they joined, and soon completed the establishment of the regiment, then known as Elliott's Light Horse. In the action near Emsdorf, on the 16th of July, 1760, Major Erskine directed the men to place oak branches in their helmets,* and to display a firmness in the approaching engagement corresponding to the charac-

* At the battle of the Boyne, on the 1st of July, 1690, the Irish were distinguished by pieces of white paper in their hats.

ter of that tree. A general expression of assent was the answer, and the soldiers evinced, individually and collectively, the qualities of heroes in this their first action; and five hundred of the enemy, having been separated from the main body, laid down their arms, and surrendered at discretion. Having secured these, the pursuit was continued, and the remainder, being overtaken, beat a parley, and surrendered prisoners of war. The total number of prisoners amounted to 2,659 officers and men. Sixteen stand of colours were captured by this regiment in Germany, during the Seven Years' War, from 1757 to 1763.

SINGULAR SENTENCE OF A COURT-MARTIAL.

The following remarkable circumstance occurred during the war with America :—" Lieutenant-Colonel Walcott, of the Fifth Regiment of Foot, while encamped near Boston, was so unfortunate, in a hasty and intemperate moment, to be moved to strike a subaltern (Ensign Patrick) under his command; and, notwithstanding the latter had challenged him, the lieutenant-colonel was brought to a court-martial, of which Brigadier-General Pigot was president, for the offence; when the Court, after due consideration, suspended him from pay and allowances for six months, and was further pleased to order that Ensign Patrick should draw his hand across the face of the lieutenant-colonel before the whole garrison, in return for the insult he had received."

OFFICERS VERSUS LADIES' DRESSES.

The following curious order was issued in 1764, to the troops forming the garrison of Dublin :—

"Dublin, 31st January, 1764.

"Lieutenant-General Fowkes recommends to the officers of the garrison that they would not play at the Castle whilst on duty; and that the officers of the Horse Guards will avoid mixing with the ladies in the drawing-room, on account of the inconveniency of spurs to the ladies' hooped petticoats.

"(Signed) D. GRANT, Captain 52nd Regt.

"For the Major of Brigade."

MILITARY AND BRITISH CULTIVATORS OF TOBACCO.

The first service that devolved upon the Fourth Horse, now Third Dragoon Guards, was to enforce obedience to an Act of Parliament, which prohibited the cultivation of tobacco. The demand for this article, together with its high price, caused several landowners to cultivate it on their farms, especially at Winchcombe and the adjacent villages. This was in 1685, and when the troop, which had been quartered a short time at Winchcombe for the above purpose, left that place, it appears by the War Office Records that the following paragraph was in the order for the march of the men:—"Our further will and pleasure is, that you cause parties to be sent, once at least in every week, to our town of Winchcombe, and places adjacent, who are hereby ordered to destroy all plants, seeds, and leaves of tobacco, which they shall, upon the strictest search, find planted or growing contrary to the Act of Parliament."

ACT OF SELF-DEVOTION.

During the war with America, in 1781, Corporal O'Lavery, of the Seventeenth Light Dragoons, was

sent with the bearer of a despatch to Lord Rawdon. On their way they were attacked and both severely wounded. The bearer died on the road, and the corporal, taking the paper, rode on until he fell from loss of blood; in order to conceal the important secret contained in the despatch should he be taken by the enemy, he thrust the paper into his wound, which, although not mortal in itself, proved so by this act. When found, on the following day, sufficient life was left for him to point to the fatal depository of the secret. He was a native of the county of Down, where a monument there records his fame, and the gratitude of his commander, Lord Rawdon.

THIRTY-FIRST REGIMENT.

While the Thirty-first were stationed at Pensacola, in 1765, the regiment suffered so severely from yellow fever, that sufficient men could not be found to carry their comrades to the grave. The men who attended the funerals of their brother soldiers in the morning, when the regiment was strong enough to preserve some ceremony, were, in several instances, consigned to the tomb in the evening. It is recorded that, at one period of its illness, only a corporal and six privates could be mustered as fit for duty. When the regiment arrived at Gravesend in July, 1797, it mustered only eighty-five non-commissioned officers and men.

It was a brigade of the grenadiers of this and other regiments that His Royal Highness the Duke of Kent (father of the Queen) commanded in the capture of Martinique, St. Lucia, and Guadaloupe, in 1794. During the attack on the former island, both his

aides-de-camp, Captain the late General Sir Frederick Wetherall, whose son is the present Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant (afterwards Major-General) Vesey, were severely wounded, close to His Royal Highness. When the Prince was ordered to storm Morné Tartisson and Fort Royal, on the 17th March, 1794, he placed himself at the head of his brigade of grenadiers, and thus addressed them:—"Grenadiers! this is St. Patrick's Day; the English will do their duty in compliment to the Irish, and the Irish in compliment to the Saint! Forward, Grenadiers!" This important capture was annually commemorated by an anniversary dinner at the United Service Club on each succeeding St. Patrick's Day.

A CHRISTIAN'S TOMBSTONE IN A MAHOMEDAN
CEMETERY.

With what strange feelings must the troops employed in the first expedition to Afghanistan, in 1838-39, have read the following inscription on a tombstone in a Mahomedan burying-ground at Cabool, dated as far back as the time of Aurungzebe:—"Here lyeth the body of John Hicks, son of Thomas and Edith Hicks, who departed this life the eleventh of October, 1666."

SIR THOMAS PICTON AND THE DUKE OF
MARLBOROUGH.

In the *Times* of Thursday, May 5th, 1859, appeared the following letter relating to the remains of the late Sir Thomas Picton:—

"To the Editor of the Times.

"SIR,—In the vaults of our burying-ground on the Bayswater-road may be seen the thick chest or oak

box, in which lie the remains of Sir Thomas Picton, as they were packed up in the village of Waterloo and sent to England. It seems obvious that the body was only to have found a temporary resting-place in these vaults, as the character of the receptacle is rather that of a rude packing-case than a suitable coffin.

"These vaults are just closed by order of the Privy Council, and in a few days the brickwork, which is entirely to close in the coffins, will be commenced. Are there no old companions in arms of General Picton who would be glad to do for him what the medical profession did lately for John Hunter? It would be easy to apply to the Secretary of State for an order to have these remains removed, or, if it be thought that the bodies of our great heroes are the property of the nation, surely if a representation were made to the Government they would not be unwilling to transfer so illustrious a warrior to some more distinguished mausoleum.—Your obedient servant,

"W. BREWER.

"21, George Street, Hanover Square, May 4."

The result of this appeal was that the remains of this gallant general were removed on the 8th of June, 1859, to St. Paul's, and the following account of the ceremony appeared in the *Morning Post* of Thursday, June 9th:—

"Yesterday morning, according to arrangement, the remains of the late Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Picton were removed from the cemetery belonging to the parish of St. George, Hanover Square, to St. Paul's Cathedral.

“The coffin was placed on a gun-carriage, drawn by eight horses. It was covered with a rich silk Genoa velvet pall with richly emblazoned armorial bearings of the late general, and with the union-jack. The procession was under the direction of the Royal Artillery. The first carriage contained Mr. J. Picton, the Hon. Colonel Vereker, Colonel Bagot, and General Wood. The second contained the Rev. Henry Howarth, rector of St. George’s, Hanover Square, Mr. Stanley, and Dr. Brewer. In the third were Mr. Cooper, Mr. Westerton, and Mr. Treherne. Then followed the carriages of Lord Strafford, the Right Hon. Mr. Estcourt, the Home Secretary, Lord Gough, General Sir F. Stovin, Sir John Burgoyne, Sir Hew Ross, Sir Robert Gardiner, and Sir James Coleman.

“Amongst the others who appeared as mourners was the Rev. Dr. Macnab, of Canada, representing his uncle, Captain Alexander Macnab, of the Thirtieth Regiment of Foot, who was aide-de-camp to General Picton, and who fell at the battle of Waterloo.

“The procession moved slowly through the principal streets to St. Paul’s Cathedral. When the body reached St. Paul’s Cathedral, some time was taken up in removing the ponderous mass from the gun-carriage, and bearing it up the steps on the south side into the cathedral. It was there met by the Very Rev. the Dean Milman, Archdeacon Hale, the Rev. W. Murray, and several other prebendaries and minor canons, who preceded the body to the crypt, where a vault had been constructed not far from the tomb of Wellington, the illustrious chief of the noble hero. At that moment the organ began to play the ‘Dead March in Saul.’ Followed by the old comrades of the illus-

trious general, the body was conveyed, in the most solemn silence, to the tomb, where it was received and lowered into the grave in the presence of Colonel Vereker, Mr. J. Picton, and a large number of private mourners. This having been done, the body was covered up and the cavalcade reformed."

The remains of the illustrious Duke of Marlborough did not continue in their first resting-place. The Chaplain-General, the Rev. G. R. Gleig, M.A., in his "British Military Commanders," observes:—"His body, after undergoing the process of embalming, and lying in state at Marlborough House, was conveyed in a sort of triumphal car to Westminster Abbey, long lines of carriages following, and all the parade of troops, heralds, and mourners preceding and surrounding the senseless clay. * * * And the cavalcade was received by the light of blazing torches at the door of the abbey by all the dignitaries and ministers of the church, in full canonicals. Yet was the solemn ceremony performed for no other purpose than to render due honours to the remains of England's most illustrious commander. The body was not permitted for any length of time to rest where, amid such splendour, it had been entombed; but, being removed to the chapel at Blenheim, it was finally deposited in a mausoleum erected by Rysbrack, under the superintendence of the duchess." In the *London Magazine* for 1744 it was stated—"On the 30th October, 1744, the remains of the late Duke of Marlborough, having been taken out of a vault in Henry VII.'s chapel, were carried out of town to be interred at Blenheim; and the next day the corpse of the late Duchess was carried to the same place."

THIRTY-NINTH FOOT AND PLASSEY.

This corps has the motto *Primus in Indis*, having been the first King's regiment employed in India, for which country it embarked from Ireland in the beginning of 1754, and was therefore the first British regiment that ever doubled the Cape of Good Hope. Only a portion of it shared in the memorable battle of Plassey, two hundred and fifty of the Thirty-ninth having been embarked from Madras for the presidency of Bengal in October, 1756. The armament consisted of nine hundred Europeans and fifteen hundred Sepoys. In the action, fought near Calcutta, on the 5th February, 1757, one of the enemy's rockets struck the cartouch-box of a Sepoy, set fire to the charges, which exploded, and communicated the mischief to several others; this threw the division into confusion, but fortunately none of the enemy were at hand to profit by this accidental circumstance; and Captain Eyre Coote, of the Thirty-ninth (afterwards the celebrated Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote, K.B.), who marched at the head of the grenadiers, in the rear of the Sepoys, rallied them, and restored the line of march. A desperate contest ensued, during which, Ensign Martin Yorke, of the Thirty-ninth, with a platoon of the regiment, rescued one of the field-pieces which was on the point of being captured. The Nabob Surajee Dowlah lost twenty-two officers of distinction, six hundred men, four elephants, five hundred horses, some camels, and several bullocks. On the 9th of February a treaty was concluded between the Nabob and the East India Company, which terminated hostilities for a

time. It was, however, soon perceived that the Nabob was only temporizing; and Lieutenant-Colonel Clive then determined to place Meer Jaffier, one of the distinguished chieftains of Bengal, on the musnud or government seat, and of deposing the Nabob Surajee Dowlah—the former having engaged, in the event of his being elevated to the viceroyship, to assist in driving the French from Bengal. This led to the battle of Plassey, but the co-operation of Meer Jaffier appeared problematical, which made Clive hesitate as to crossing into the island of Cossimbuzar, and at all risks, attack the Nabob. A council of war was summoned, and, singular enough, Lieutenant-Colonel Clive declared for remaining at Cutwah. Eight other officers were of the same opinion, and only seven voted for immediate action. Amongst the latter was Captain Coote, and after some consideration, Clive resolved to act on the former's opinion, and the minority.

One of the most remarkable victories was the result; the battle of Plassey was fought on the 23rd of June, 1757, and the victory gained was the foundation of British dominion in India. A handsome silver-mounted drum-major's cane (still in possession of the regiment) was presented to the Thirty-ninth by the Nabob of Arcot, with the following device and inscription thereon:—Device: an elephant, with motto "*Primus in Indis*," Plassey, 1757. Inscription: "Nabob of Bengal overturned by the Thirty-ninth Regiment, and the Company's troops, 5th February, 1757." This, in course of time, was confounded with the battle of Plassey, but the former was the action fought near Calcutta. While this portion of the Thirty-ninth was thus engaged in Bengal, the remain-

der, at Madras, was not unemployed; having shared in the unsuccessful attack on Nellore, on the 5th May, 1757, in the relief of Trichinopoly, and in the operations against Wandewash. The regiment returned to Ireland in the beginning of 1759.

AMENITIES OF WARFARE.

When the troops under the Earl of Essex succeeded in capturing Cadiz in 1596, the glory of the achievement was only surpassed by the fact that it was considered a distinguishing feature of the virtue of the English army that three thousand Spanish ladies and merchants' wives were permitted to retire therefrom without being molested.

Conrade III., who was elected emperor in 1738, besieged Weinsberg, a small town belonging to the Duke of Wurtemberg. The duke, who opposed the election, was, with his wife, in the town, and sustained the siege with such heroic bravery, that the emperor resolved to fire it and put its defenders to the sword; but he allowed the women to quit it, and carry with them whatever they thought most precious. The duchess, profiting by the offer, took her husband on her shoulders, and all the married women, following her example of affection, left Weinsberg in conjugal triumph.

In the recently-discovered Marlborough letters and despatches, edited by the late General Sir George Murray, is the following letter to Mr. R. Graham, Provincial of the English Dominicans at Aix-la-Chapelle, affording another example of amenities in war:—

“Camp at Tongres, 18th May, 1706.

“SIR,—I have received your letter of the 14th

instant, and send you herewith the *sauvegarde* you desire for the English convent of Bornhem, as a mark of the regard I shall be always ready to show, not only to my countrymen, but in a particular manner to all such others for whose unfortunate circumstances the piety of well-disposed persons may have designed quiet and peaceable retirements.

“I am, etc., M.”

The following illustration of politeness at the battle of Fontenoy has been handed down by Voltaire:—
“In the meantime the English advanced, and the line composed of the French and Swiss Guards and of Courten, having upon their right the regiment of Aubeterre and a battalion of the king’s, advanced also to meet them. The regiment of English Guards was at the distance of fifty paces. Campbell’s and the Royal Scotch were the first; Mr. Campbell was the Lieutenant-General. The English officers saluted the French by taking off their hats. The Count de Chabanes and the Duc de Biron advanced forward and returned the compliment. Lord Charles Hay, Commander of the English Guards, cried out, ‘Gentlemen of the French Guards, give fire.’ The Count D’Antroche, then lieutenant of grenadiers, made answer with a loud voice, ‘Gentlemen, we never fire first, fire you first.’ Then the captain said to his men in English, ‘Fire.’ The consequence of this singular instance of politeness was, that nineteen officers of the French Guards and eleven of the Swiss were wounded in this discharge.”

The following incident occurred during a pause in the second day’s fight at Talavera, on the 28th of July,

1809, when both armies went to the banks of the small stream, a tributary of the Tagus, for water, which flowed through a part of the battle-ground. The men approached each other and conversed like old acquaintances, even exchanging their canteens and wine-flasks. In the words of the author of "The Bivouac" (the Rev. W. H. Maxwell, Prebendary of Balla):—"All asperity of feeling seemed forgotten. To a stranger they would have appeared more like an allied force, than men hot from a ferocious conflict, and only gathering strength and energy to recommence it anew. But a still nobler rivalry for the time existed; the interval was employed in carrying off the wounded, who lay intermixed upon the hard-contested field; and, to the honour of both be it told, that each endeavoured to extricate the common sufferers, and remove their unfortunate friends and enemies, without distinction. Suddenly the bugles sounded, the drums beat to arms; many of the rival soldiery shook hands and parted with expressions of mutual esteem, and in ten minutes after they were again at the bayonet's point."

The Eighty-sixth Regiment erected a handsome monument near St. Denis, in the Island of Bourbon, where Lieutenant John Graham Munro, of that corps, fell, with the following inscription:—"Lieut. John Graham Munro fell near this spot on the 8th of July, 1810, while charging the enemy at the head of His Britannic Majesty's Eighty-sixth Grenadiers. The officers of the regiment have erected this monument as a mark of their respect for his memory." This monument having, some years back, suffered by a hurricane, the French officers stationed on the

island (to their honour be it known) had it put in a thorough state of repair at their own expense.

It will never be forgotten by the British nation that Marshal Soult, with the chivalrous feeling of a true soldier, erected a monument over the grave of Sir John Moore, at Corunna.

When the Ninety-second Highlanders arrived at Fuentes d'Onor, in May, 1811, they were greatly distressed from want of provisions, and on this circumstance being made known to the Brigade of Foot Guards, they volunteered giving up a ration of biscuit, then in their haversacks, which was received with three hearty cheers by the Gordon Highlanders.

Whilst the British were in position on the banks of the Nive, in November, 1813, the French used to meet the English officers at a narrow part of the river, and chat over the campaign. One of the latter, in order to convince them of the reverses of Napoleon in Germany, rolled a stone up in the *Star* newspaper, and endeavoured to throw it across the stream. The stone, unfortunately, went through it, which made it fall into the water. The French officer thereupon remarked, in pretty fair English, "Your good news is very soon damped."

In the private journal of F. S. Larpent, Esq., Judge Advocate-General of the British forces in the Peninsula, is the following entry bearing on this subject:—"August 14th, 1814.—Lezaca.—Our sentries and the French are within one hundred yards of each other, and are relieved regularly without the least molestation on either side. This is the true thing. Unless an attack is to be made, what is gained by killing a poor sentry?"

DISPOSAL OF TREASURE.

The following incident is recorded in the "Narratives of the Campaigns of the Twenty-eighth Regiment, since their return from Egypt, in 1802," by Lieut.-Colonel Charles Cadell, unattached, late Major of that corps :—

" On the morning of the 5th (January, 1809), the reserve left Nogales. We were detained at a bridge a little way on the road, covering the engineers, who were endeavouring to destroy it, but they did not succeed. The Twenty-eighth Regiment was now the rear-guard of the reserve, and the flank companies, with a company of the Ninety-fifth, formed the rear-guard of the regiment. The whole distance was a continued skirmish. About noon we came up with two cars laden with dollars ; but the bullocks that drew them being completely exhausted, it was impossible to save the treasure. Under these circumstances, Sir John Moore decided that the whole should be thrown down the mountain, most judiciously considering, that if the casks were broken, the men would make a rush for the money, which would have caused great confusion, and might have cost the lives of many. The rear-guard, therefore, was halted ; Lieutenant Bennet, of the light company, Twenty-eighth Regiment, was placed over the money, with strict orders from Sir John Moore to shoot the first person who attempted to touch it. It was then rolled over the precipice ; the casks were soon broken by the rugged rocks, and the dollars falling out, rolled over the height—a sparkling cascade of silver. The French advanced guard coming up shortly after to the spot, were detained for a time picking

up the few dollars that had been scattered on the road."

NO QUARTER.

The following General Order was issued by His Royal Highness the Duke of York, on the National Convention sending instructions to their troops in Flanders that no quarter should be given to the English or Hanoverians. The sentiments did equal honour to himself and to his country; it must, at the same time, be added, that the brave men who composed the French army received the order from their government with the contempt it deserved :—

"G. O., JUNE 7TH, 1794.—His Royal Highness the Duke of York thinks it incumbent on him to announce to the British and Hanoverian troops under his command, that the National Convention of France, pursuing that gradation of crimes and horrors, which has distinguished the periods of its government as the most calamitous of any that has yet occurred in the history of the world, has just passed a decree that soldiers shall give no quarter to the 'British or Hanoverian troops.' His Royal Highness anticipates the indignation and horror which has naturally arisen in the minds of the brave troops whom he addresses, upon receiving this information. His Royal Highness desires, however, to remind them, that mercy to the vanquished is the brightest gem in a soldier's character; and exhorts them not to suffer their resentment to lead them to any precipitate act of cruelty on their part, which may sully the reputation they have acquired in the world. His Royal Highness believes that it would be difficult for brave men to conceive

that any set of men, who are themselves exempt from sharing in the dangers of war, should be so base and cowardly as to seek to aggravate the calamities of it upon the unfortunate people who are subject to their orders.

“It was indeed reserved for the present times to produce to the world the proof of the possibility of the existence of such atrocity and infamy. The pretence for issuing this decree, even if founded in truth, would justify it only to minds similar to those of the members of the National Convention. It is, in fact, too absurd to be noticed, and still less to be refuted. The French must themselves see through the flimsy artifice of an intended assassination, by which Robespierre has succeeded in procuring that military guard, which has at once established him the successor of the unfortunate Louis, by whatever name he may choose to dignify his future reign. In all the wars which, from the earliest times, have existed between the English and the French nations, they have been accustomed to consider each other in the light of generous as well as brave enemies, while the Hanoverians, for a century the allies of the former, have shared in this reciprocal esteem. Humanity and kindness have at all times taken place the instant that opposition ceased; and the same cloak has been frequently seen covering those who were wounded, and enemies, whilst indiscriminately conveying them to the hospitals of the conquerors.

“The British and Hanoverian armies will not believe that the French nation, even under their present infatuation, can so far forget their characters as soldiers, as to pay any attention to a decree, as inju-

rious to themselves as it is disgraceful to the persons who passed it. On this confidence His Royal Highness trusts that the soldiers of both nations will confine their sentiments of resentment and abhorrence to the National Convention alone; persuaded that they will be joined in them by every Frenchman who possesses one spark of honour, or one principle of a soldier: and His Royal Highness is confident that it will only be on finding, contrary to every expectation, that the French army has relinquished every title to the fair character of soldiers and of men, by submitting to, and obeying so atrocious an order, that the brave troops under his command will think themselves justified, and indeed under the necessity of adopting a species of warfare, for which they will stand acquitted to their own conscience, to their country, and the world: in such an event the French army alone will be answerable for the tenfold vengeance which will fall upon themselves, their wives, and their children, and their unfortunate country, already groaning under every calamity which the accumulated crimes of unprincipled ambition and avarice can heap upon their devoted victims."

THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON AND RETURNS.

F. S. Larpent, Esq., the Judge Advocate-General of the British forces in the Peninsula, records this characteristic anecdote; the incident occurred in January, 1814: "Lord Wellington at dinner, on Sunday, directed some jokes at Major D——, who makes out the returns, because he wanted to make a grand total of wounded, etc., after the late five days' fighting. He laughed and said, all might go wrong from this

innovation, but he was determined he would have no more grand totals, until he got another Vittoria without more loss; that the loss was always great enough, in all conscience, without displaying it in this ostentatious manner, and that he would not have every drummer and every officer, etc., killed or wounded in the five days, all added up in one grand total; but that, at least, the croakers should have the trouble themselves of adding up all the different losses, and making it out for themselves."

FÊTE AT CIUDAD RODRIGO.

The Duke of Wellington having been desired to invest Lieut.-General the Hon. Galbraith Lowry Cole with the Order of the Bath in a suitable manner, and as he had never done anything at Ciudad Rodrigo, of which place he had been created duke, he resolved to give a grand *fête* there in the midst of the ruins. This grand dinner, ball, and supper, came off on the 13th March, 1818; to which the heads of departments, generals, public authorities, Spaniards and English, were asked to dinner, to the amount of sixty-five. In the evening, ladies about forty, and the men about a hundred and fifty, came to the ball and supper. The dinner and supper were half cooked at Frenada, and carried over in military waggons and on mules. Mr. Larpent, the Judge Advocate-General, says, in his journal, that the whole went off very well, except that it was excessively cold, as a few balls, during the siege, had knocked in several yards of the roof of the ball-room, and it was a hard frost at the time. The house where the entertainment was given was the best in the town, only it had suffered a little during the siege; all de-

fects were nearly concealed, and one hole in the floor had a man near it to see that no one got a leg in, and a mat was over the hole. One Spanish officer was seen with a turkey's leg sticking out of his pocket. Mr. Larpent accounts for this by remarking that probably a turkey had not been seen there for months, and these were all brought from thirty to forty miles down the Douro, near Lamego. All passed off well, and only a few silver spoons, and knives and forks, with one plate, were reported missing.

BARRACK LIBRARIES.

The British soldier now forms no inconsiderable unit of the "reading public." For some years past, an annual grant has been made by parliament for the purchase of books, chessmen, draughts, dominoes, etc., for the troops; and the consequence is, that a regularly appointed library now exists at almost every barrack-station.

The mental *pabulum* collected by the literary commissariat consists of upwards of 110,000 volumes, affording healthy nourishment to something like 17,000 readers,* who show their appreciation of these libraries by the readiness with which they subscribe their monthly pennies for the privilege of using them.

It appears by Colonel Lefroy's interesting Report on Army Schools that the viands most to the taste of soldiers, are those which are lightest and most easy of digestion, as served up by Miss Austin, Mrs. Bray, Miss

* In the United Kingdom alone. The records from foreign stations appear incomplete.

Edgeworth, Miss Porter, Miss Ferrier, and by Cooper, Bulwer Lytton, Dickens, Fielding, James, Lever, Lover, Marryatt, and Peter Parley. The "Penny Magazine," and the "Regimental Records," are also great favourites; but poetry, travels, and professional works, are side-dishes but little sought after,—while books of reference, biographies, natural histories, and religious works are real "*pièces de résistance*," seldom tasted.

The munificence of royalty is not less marked than the liberality of parliament in this matter.

During the war in the Crimea a consignment of 2112 volumes was sent out by the Queen to Sir William Codrington, who was desired to make arrangements for their free and unrestricted circulation throughout the army. As a proof of the estimation in which this mark of their sovereign's solicitude was held by the troops, it may be mentioned that when the books thus entrusted to the honourable keeping of her soldiers were sent back to England, not more than two were missing, though all bore traces of *active service*, and several had been entirely worn out by the *siege operations* to which they had been exposed.

After the return of the army these books were carefully examined and repaired, and their deficiencies made good, and they now form two separate establishments—the "Victoria Soldiers' Libraries"—at Aldershot and Dublin, where, doubtless, they will continue to be long and peacefully enjoyed as heir-looms by the successors of those for whose solace and amusement, while engaged in the varied scenes and sufferings of war, they were originally provided by a *beneficent mistress*.

NAMES OF BATTLES ON THE STANDARDS AND COLOURS.

The Lion of Nassau, with the motto "*Virtutis Namurcensis Præmium*," conferred on the Eighteenth (Royal Irish) Regiment, for its distinguished conduct at the siege of Namur, in King William III.'s reign, is one of the most ancient honorary distinctions granted to a corps for a service of this nature. Next to this is the word MINDEN, which is the first name of a battle allowed to be inscribed on the colours, otherwise the victories of the illustrious Marlborough might have been thus emblazoned. Had such been the custom the following British regiments engaged at the battle of Blenheim, on the 13th of August, 1704, and since retained on the establishment of the army, would have displayed that word on their colours. Their ancient and present designations are given :—

FIVE REGIMENTS OF HORSE.

Designation of the Regiment in 1704.	Present Designation.
Lumley's	1st, or King's Dragoon Guards.
Wood's	3rd Dragoon Guards.
Cadogan's	5th Dragoon Guards.
Wyndham's	6th Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers)
Schomberg's	7th Dragoon Guards.

TWO REGIMENTS OF DRAGOONS.

Lord John Hay's	2nd (Royal North British) Dragoons (Scots Greys).
Ross's	5th (Royal Irish) Light Dragoons (Lancers).

FOURTEEN BATTALIONS OF INFANTRY.

Battalion of Foot Guards .	Grenadier Guards.
Lord Orkney's (two battns.)	1st, or the Royal Regiment.
Prince George of Denmark's	3rd Foot, or the Buffs.
Webb's	8th, or the King's Regiment.
Lord North and Grey . .	10th Foot.
Howe's	15th Foot.
Earl of Derby's	16th Foot.
Hamilton's	18th (Royal Irish) Regiment.
Rowe's	21st, Royal N. British Fusiliers.
Ingoldsby's	23rd, Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
Marlborough's	24th Regiment.
Fergusson's	26th (Cameronians).
Meredith's	37th Regiment.

The following names of battles, etc., have been authorised to the regiments specified:—

AFGHANISTAN—4, 16 Lt. Dr.; 2, 13, 17 Foot.

ALBUHERA—3 Dr. Gds.; 4 Lt. Dr.; 3, 7, 23, 28, 29, 31, 34, 39, 48, 57, 60, 66 Foot.

ALI WAL—16 Lancers; 31, 50, 53 Foot.

ALMA—4 Lt. Dr.; 8, 11 Hussars; 13 Lt. Dr.; 17 Lancers; Gren. Gds., Coldst. and Sco. Fu. Gds.; 1, 4, 7, 19, 20, 21, 23, 28, 30, 33, 38, 41, 42, 44, 47, 49, 50, 55, 63, 68, 77, 79, 88, 93, 95 Foot; Rifle Brigade.

ALMARAZ—50, 71, 92 Foot.

ARABIA—65 Foot.

ARROYO-DOS-MOLINOS—34 Foot.

ASSAYE—74, 78 Foot.

AVA—1, 13, 38, 41, 44, 45, 47, 54, 87, 89 Foot.

BADAJOS—4, 5, 7, 23, 27, 30, 38, 40, 43, 44, 45, 48, 52, 60, 74, 77, 83, 88 Foot; Rifle Brigade.

BALAKLAVA—4, 5 Dr. Gds.; 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 17 Dragoons; 93 Foot.

BARROSA—Gren., Coldst., Sco. Fu. Gds.; 28, 67, 87 Foot; Rifle Brigade.

BHUTPORE—11, 16, Lt. Dr.; 14, 59 Foot.

- BLADENSBURG—4, 21, 44, 85 Foot.
 BOURBON—69, 86 Foot.
 BUSACO—1, 5, 9, 38, 43, 45, 52, 74, 83, 88 Foot; Rifle Brigade.
 BUSHIRE—64 Foot.
 CABOOL (1842)—3 Dr.; 9, 13, 31, 40, 41 Foot.
 CANDAHAR—40, 41 Foot.
 CAPE OF GOOD HOPE—24, 59, 71, 72, 83, 93 Foot; Cape Mounted Riflemen.
 CHILLIANWALLAH—3, 9, 14 Lt. Dr.; 24, 29, 61 Foot.
 CHINA—18, 26, 49, 55, 98 Foot; R. Art.
 CIUDAD RODRIGO—5, 43, 45, 52, 60, 74, 77, 83, 88 Foot; Rifle Brigade.
 COPENHAGEN—49 Foot; Rifle Brigade.
 CORUNNA—Gren. Gds.; 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 14, 20, 23, 26, 28, 32, 36, 38, 42, 43, 50, 51, 52, 59, 71, 81, 91, 92 Foot; Rifle Brigade.
 DETROIT—41 Foot.
 DOMINICA—46 Foot; 1 West India Regt.
 DOURO—14 Dr.; 3, 48, 66 Foot.
 EGMONT-OP-ZEE—15 Lt. Dr.; 1, 20, 25, 49, 63, 79, 92 Foot.
 EGYPT—11, 12 Lt. Dr.; Coldst., Sco. Fu. Gds.; 1, 2, 8, 10, 13, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 40 (Flank Cos.), 42, 44, 50, 54, 58, 61, 79, 80, 86, 88, 89, 90, 92 Foot.
 EMSDORF—15 Lt. Dr.
 FEROZESHAH—3 Lt. Dr.; 9, 29, 31, 50, 62, 80 Foot.
 FUENTES D'ONOR—14, 16 Lt. Dr.; 24, 42, 43, 45, 52, 60, 71, 74, 79, 83, 85, 88, 92 Foot; Rifle Brigade.
 GHUZNEE—4, 16 Lt. Dr.; 2, 13, 17, 40, 41 Foot.
 GIBRALTAR—12, 39, 56, 58 Foot; Royal Marines.
 GOOJERAT—3, 9, 14 Lt. Dr.; 10, 24, 29, 32, 53, 60, 61 Foot.
 GUADALOUPE—15, 63, 90 Foot; 1 West India Regt.
 HINDOOSTAN—8 Lt. Dr.; 17, 36, 52, 71, 72, 76 Foot.
 HYDERABAD—22 Foot.
 INDIA—12, 14, 65, 67, 69, 75, 84, 86 Foot.
 INKERMAN—4 Lt. Dr.; 8, 11 Hussars; 13 Lt. Dr.; 17 Lancers; Gren. Gds., Coldst., and Sco. Fu. Gds.; 1, 4, 7, 19, 20, 21, 23, 28, 30, 33, 38, 41, 44, 47, 49, 50, 55, 57, 63, 68, 77, 88, 95 Foot; Rifle Brigade.

- JAVA**—14, 59, 69, 78, 89 Foot.
JELLALABAD—13 Foot.
KHELAT—2, 17 Foot.
KOOSH-AB—64, 78 Foot.
LEIPSIQ—R. Art. (Rocket Troop).
LESWABEEE—8 Lt. Dr.
LINCELLES—Gren., Coldst., Sec. Fu. Gds.
LUCKNOW—32 Foot.
MAHARAJPORE—16 Dr.; 39, 40 Foot.
MAIDA—20, 27, 35, 58, 61 (Flank Cos.), 78, 81 Foot.
MANDORA—90, 92 Foot.
MANGALORE—73 Foot.
MAHEIDPORE—1 Foot.
MARABOUT—54 Foot.
MARTINIQUE—7, 8, 13, 15, 23, 25 (Flank Cos.), 60, 63, 90 Foot;
 1 West India Regt.
MEEANEE—22 Foot.
MIAMI—41 Foot.
MINDEN—12, 20, 23, 25, 37, 51 Foot.
MONTE VIDEO—38, 40, 87 Foot; Rifle Brigade.
MOODKEE—3 Lt. Dr.; 9, 31, 50, 80 Foot.
MOOLTAN—10, 32, 60 Foot.
MORO—56 Foot,
NAGPORE—1 Foot.
NIAGARA—1, 6, 8, 41, 82, 89 Foot.
NIEUFORT—53 Foot.
NIVE—16 Lt. Dr.; 1, 3, 4, 9, 11, 28, 31, 32, 34, 36, 38, 39, 42,
 43, 50, 52, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 71, 76, 79, 84, 85, 91, 92
 Foot; Rifle Brigade.
NIVELLE—2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 36, 39, 40,
 42, 43, 45, 48, 51, 52, 53, 57, 58, 60, 61, 66, 68, 74, 79, 82,
 83, 87, 88, 91 Foot; Rifle Brigade.
ORTHEES—14 Lt. Dr.; 5, 6, 7, 11, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34,
 36, 39, 40, 42, 45, 48, 50, 51, 52, 58, 60, 61, 66, 68, 71, 74,
 82, 83, 87, 88, 91, 92 Foot; Rifle Brigade.
PRGU—18, 51, 80 Foot.
PERSIA—14 Lt. Dr.; 64, 78 Foot.
PLASSEY—39 Foot.

- PENINSULA—1, 2 Life Gds. ; R. Horse Gds. ; 3, 4, 5 Dr. Gds. ;
 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 Drns. ; Gren., Coldst.,
 Sco. Fu. Gds. ; 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 20, 23, 24, 27,
 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47,
 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 67, 68, 71, 74,
 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 91, 92 Foot ; Rifle
 Brigade.
- PUNJAUB—3, 9, 14 Lt. Dr. ; 10, 24, 29, 32, 53, 60 61, 98 Foot.
- PUNNIAR—9 Dr. ; 3, 50 Foot.
- PYRENEES—2, 3, 6, 7, 11, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 36, 39,
 40, 42, 45, 48, 50, 51, 53, 57, 58, 60, 61, 66, 68, 71, 74, 79,
 82, 91, 92 Foot.
- QUEENSTOWN—41, 49 Foot.
- RESHIRE—64 Foot.
- ROLEIA—5, 6, 9, 29, 32, 36, 38, 40, 45, 60, 71, 82, 91 Foot ;
 Rifle Brigade.
- ST. LUCIA—1, 27, 53, 64 Foot.
- ST. SEBASTIAN—1, 4, 9, 38, 47, 59 Foot.
- SAHAGUN—15 Lt. Dr.
- SALAMANCA—5 Dr. Gds. ; 3, 4, 11, 14, 16 Lt. Dr. ; 1, 2, 4, 5, 7,
 9, 11, 23, 24, 27, 30, 32, 36, 38, 40, 43, 44, 45, 48, 51, 52,
 53, 58, 60, 61, 68, 74, 79, 83, 88 Foot ; Rifle Brigade.
- SCINDE—22 Foot.
- SERINGAPATAM—12, 33, 73, 74, 75, 77 Foot.
- SEVASTOPOL—1, 4, 5, 6 Dr. Gds. ; 1, 2, 4, 6 Dr. ; 8, 10, 11,
 Hussars ; 12 Lancers ; 13 Lt. Dr. ; 17 Lancers ; Gren.
 Gds., Coldst., Sco. Fu. Gds. ; 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 13, 14, 17, 18,
 19, 20, 21, 23, 28, 30, 31, 33, 34, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47,
 48, 49, 50, 55, 56, 57, 62, 63, 68, 71, 72, 77, 79, 82, 88, 89,
 90, 93, 95, 97 Foot ; Rifle Brigade.
- SOBRAON—3 Lt. Dr. ; 9, 16 Lancers ; 9, 10, 29, 31, 50, 53, 62,
 80 Foot.
- SURINAM—64 Foot.
- TALAVERA—3 Dr. Gds. ; 4, 14, 16 Lt. Dr. ; Coldst., Sco. Fu.
 Gds. ; 3, 7, 24, 29, 31, 40, 45, 48, 53, 60, 61, 66, 83, 87,
 88 Foot.
- TARIFA—47, 87 Foot.
- TOULOUSE—5 Dr. Gds. ; 3, 4 Lt. Dr. ; 2, 5, 7, 11, 20, 23, 27,

36, 40, 42, 43, 45, 48, 52, 53, 60, 61, 74, 79, 83, 87, 88, 91
Foot; Rifle Brigade.

TOURNAY—14, 37, 53 Foot.

VILLIERS-EN-BOUCHÉ—15 Lt. Dr.

VIMIERA—2, 5, 6, 9, 20, 29, 32, 36, 38, 40, 43, 45, 50, 52, 60,
71, 82, 91 Foot; Rifle Brigade.

VITTORIA—3, 5 Dr. Gds.; 3, 4, 14, 15, 16 Lt. Dr.; 1, 2, 4, 5, 6,
7, 9, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 31, 34, 38, 39, 40, 43, 45, 47, 48,
50, 51, 52, 53, 57, 58, 59, 60, 66, 68, 71, 74, 82, 83, 87, 88,
92 Foot; Rifle Brigade.

WATERLOO—1, 2 Life Gds.; R. Horse Gds.; 1 Dr. Gds.; 1, 2,
6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16 Lt. Dr.; Gren. Gds., Coldst.
Gds., Sco. Fu. Gds.; 1, 4, 14, 23, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 40, 42,
44, 51, 52, 69, 71, 73, 79, 92 Foot; Rifle Brigade; Royal
Artillery.

WILHELMSTAHL—5 Foot.

Several regiments of militia having volunteered their services for the garrisons of the Mediterranean during the siege of Sevastopol, thereby liberated Regiments of the Line to proceed to the Crimea, which essentially contributed to the success of the army in that quarter;—the Queen accordingly authorised the following corps, whose services were accepted, to bear the word “MEDITERRANEAN” on their colours, viz.:—Royal Berkshire; East Kent; 1st Royal Lancashire; 3rd Royal Lancashire; 3rd, Royal Westminster, Middlesex; Northampton; Oxford; 1st, King’s Own, Stafford; Royal Wiltshire; 2nd West York.

Since January, 1859, Regiments of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons have been ordered to carry only a single standard or guidon. Light Dragoons, Hussars, and Lancers do not carry either.

Regiments which have no standard or colours bear *their distinctions* on the cap or helmet-plates. Rifle

Regiments wear them on their breast-plates and cap-plates. The English regiments of foot had formerly a colour to each company. In the War-Office Records is a warrant of King James II., dated 21st August, 1686, authorising the payment of £206 5s. 6d. for ten colours for the Queen's Regiment of Foot. They were afterwards formed into three divisions, on the same principle as the Continental armies, viz., two wings of musqueteers, and a centre division of pikemen. Each division had a stand of colours, that it might act separately. The Swedish Infantry were formed in this manner by Gustavus Adolphus, and the example was copied by Marshals de Turenne and Montecuculi. This mode of formation was, however, changed during the reign of Queen Anne, when the general adoption of bayonets took place, and the division of pikemen being discontinued, the third colour became unnecessary, and was consequently laid aside.

The Queen's Royals after the year 1688 had three stand of colours, in common with other regiments; it happened, however, that this third colour was retained in possession by the corps until 1750, probably from the long absence of the regiment on foreign service, it having embarked in 1730 for Gibraltar, where it remained until 1749.

A belief had thus been induced that the Queen's Royal Regiment had been permitted, as a distinction, to carry three colours, as appears by a letter from General Robert Donkin, who entered the regiment as an ensign in 1747, and served in it until 1759. He states:—"On our marching over Island Bridge into Dublin city in 1750, the third colour was, by order of General Fowke (then colonel of the regiment),

taken out of my hand, furled, and never flew since. The men grumbled exceedingly. I felt myself hurt at being deprived of an honour no other corps then enjoyed."

With a view of establishing uniformity throughout the army in the colours, clothing, and appointments of the several regiments, a warrant, dated 1st July, 1751, was issued by King George II., for regulating the clothing, standards, colours, etc., of regiments of cavalry and infantry. By this warrant it is directed that—

"The King's or first colour of every regiment is to be the Great Union throughout ;"—and that, "The second colour is to be the colour of the facing of the regiment, with the Union in the upper canton."

At this period the facing of the Queen's Royal Regiment was sea-green, which was the original facing of the corps.

It is further directed, in the same warrant, under the head of "Devices and Badges of the Royal Regiments and of the sixth old Corps," as follows :—

"Second Regiment, or, The Queen's Royal Regiment. In the centre of each colour, the Queen's cypher on a red ground, within the garter, and crown over it: in the three corners of the second colour, the lamb, being the ancient badge of the regiment."

A subsequent warrant was issued on the 19th December, 1768, by command of His Majesty King George III., prescribing "Regulations for the colours, clothing, etc., of the Marching Regiments of Foot." This warrant contains the same directions as that of 1751, regarding "the first and second colours of regiments," and "the devices and badges of the royal regiments

and of the six old corps." The facing of the Queen's Royal Regiment was, at this period, changed from green to blue.

Neither of the Royal warrants above-mentioned contain any authority for the Queen's Royal Regiment bearing a third colour.

The foregoing statement shows, therefore, that although the third colour so long remained in possession of the Queen's Royal Regiment after being laid aside by other corps, it had been erroneously considered that this regiment had a peculiar privilege of carrying three stand of colours.*

To correct this error, and to maintain uniformity throughout the army, King William IV. directed that no regiment should, under any circumstances whatever, display a third colour, and the following letter,

* The Seventy-fourth (Highland) Regiment received a third colour for its gallantry at the battle of Assaye, which was conferred by order of the Governor-General of India. In consequence of the inconvenience occasioned by taking a third officer from his duty to carry this honorary colour, it was decided, on the 31st of August, 1830, that it should be discontinued in the field, and carried only at reviews, inspections, and on gala days. A similar distinction was also conferred on the Nineteenth Dragoons (afterwards disbanded), and on the Seventy-eighth Regiment, likewise present at the battle of Assaye, on the 23rd of September, 1803. It was recently proposed that a bronze truncheon, not exceeding five feet six inches in length, to be carried in the centre of the Sirmoor battalion by an extra Jemadar should be sanctioned, in lieu of a third colour which had been awarded to it for distinguished conduct in the field in India; but the proposition of a third colour, or a truncheon to be carried as a colour, was negatived as contrary to the established usage of the service. The truncheon was, however, permitted to be carried by the bugle-major at the head of the corps.

dated 14th August, 1835, was addressed, by His Majesty's special command, to Lieutenant-General the Right Honourable Sir James Kempt, G.C.B., as colonel of the Second, or Queen's Royal Regiment, by the Adjutant-General of the Forces, dated Horse Guards, 14th August, 1835 :—

"SIR,—By desire of the General Commanding-in-Chief, I have the honour to make the following communication to you, for your information and guidance, viz.,

"The Fifth Foot having, at Malta, preferred a claim to the distinction of bearing a third stand of colours, Major-General Sir Frederick Ponsonby referred the case for Lord Hill's consideration, and his lordship immediately submitted it to the King.

"His Majesty at once disallowed this claim, and, at the same time, inquired whether a similar claim had been made and admitted in the case of any other regiment.

"Lord Hill mentioned the case of the Queen's Royal, and fully explained the grounds upon which the distinction of a third stand of colours had, so recently, been conferred upon that corps; when His Majesty was pleased to decide, that no regiment in His Majesty's service should be permitted to display a third colour, under any circumstances whatsoever; and to command that His Majesty's said decision should be notified to you.

"The King, however, expressed to Lord Hill, His Majesty's earnest hope that you, and the Queen's Royal collectively, would regard this decision, not as a mark of His Majesty's forgetfulness of the uniformly high character of the regiment, but solely as a

proof of His Majesty's determination to establish uniformity in this (as in every other) respect throughout the army.

"His Majesty was graciously pleased to observe, that it was impossible for him to render more manifest the high estimation in which he held the character of the Queen's Royal, than by transferring an officer of your reputation to the colonelcy of it, from that of one of the most gallant and distinguished regiments in the service, viz., the 40th.

"The King was further pleased to observe, that if it were wished upon your part, and upon the part of the Queen's Royal, that the third colour should be retained and preserved, His Majesty would not insist upon its being actually withdrawn; but, in making that observation, His Majesty expressly ordered, that on no account should the third colour ever be displayed in the ranks of the regiment.

"Lastly, His Majesty was pleased to command, that this letter should be entered in the Regimental Record, as well as in the Standing Orders of the Queen's Royal.

"I have, etc.,

"JOHN MACDONALD, A.G."

"South Street, 19th August, 1835.

"SIR,—I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 14th instant, signifying to me, by desire of the General Commanding-in-Chief, that His Majesty has been pleased to decide, that no regiment in His Majesty's service shall be permitted to display a third colour under any circumstances whatsoever; and that,

consequently, the third colour now in possession of the Queen's Royal shall not, from henceforth, be displayed in the ranks of the regiment.

"I will, without delay, transmit a copy of your communication to the officer commanding the Queen's Royal in India, for his information and guidance, with orders to enter the same in the Regimental Record, as well as in the Standing Orders of the corps, in obedience to His Majesty's commands; and I am persuaded, that the officers and men of the Queen's Royal, although thereby deprived of a distinction which the regiment has for some time enjoyed, will, nevertheless, feel as I do, highly gratified, by the very gracious terms in which His Majesty has been pleased to direct his decision upon the subject to be communicated to me.

"I have, etc.,

"JAMES KEMPT.

"To the Adjutant-General."

N.B. In a printed description of the colours of every regiment, published in 1684, no mention is made of the Queen's Regiment having the privilege of carrying an additional colour.

The following is an extract from D'Auvergne's "History of the Campaign in Flanders in 1693," relating to the battle of LANDEN:—

"'Tis certain that we have taken from them (the French) nineteen colours and thirty-seven standards, which, considering the proportion of forces, is more than they gained from us, particularly as to the number of colours; for besides, that the French had double our number of foot, their battalions never

have but three colours at the most in each; our Brandenburg and Hanover Foot have as many colours as there are companies in every battalion, insomuch that some battalions have a dozen; and, therefore, it is more for us in proportion to have taken nineteen colours from them, than if they had taken fifty from us."

INFANTS IN THE INFANTRY.

In the letters and despatches of the Duke of Marlborough, which were unexpectedly discovered at Blenheim a few years since, when that mansion was undergoing repairs, and which were edited by the late General Sir George Murray, the practice of giving commissions, in Queen Anne's time, to *children*, is thus adverted to:—The duke's letter is to the Earl of Cardigan (vol. 3, page 653), in reference to the son of the late Major-General Brudenell, recommended for a company in the regiment; *but he was only five years old*. Marlborough refused "as contrary to the rules the queen has prescribed for herself in that matter, besides that the inquiry parliament is making of the officers absent from their commands in Spain, makes it yet the more difficult."

This is not an isolated instance, as the accompanying extract of another letter from the Duke of Marlborough to Mr. Walpole shows:—

"Camp at Helchin, 31st August, 1708.

"I own I have been some time under obligations to my Lord Portmore for his son, who is now twelve years of age; and though I am by no means for encouraging *children* in the service, yet, his lordship

having been many years at the head of that regiment, I intend to do myself the honour to write two words to the prince upon the present vacancy."

The Duke of Marlborough addressed a letter from the camp at Fretain, on the 7th September, 1708, to His Royal Highness the Prince of Denmark on this occasion.

THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH AND THE LONDON
GAZETTE.

The letters and despatches discovered at Blenheim, before adverted to, throw a curious light on the news published in the *London Gazette*. Mr. Cardonnel thus writes to Mr. Lewis:—

"I must leave it to you to pick out of my letters from time to time a paragraph of my lord duke's motions for the *Gazette*; but you must take care nothing be put in that may give the least offence to Prince Louis, since he is like to be with us or near us the whole campaign.

"I am, etc.,

"A. DE CARDONNEL."

Marlborough did not always take this preparation of news quietly, for in the postscript of a letter to Mr. Secretary Hedges, dated "Camp at Tirlemont, 7th September, 1705," he says, "I think myself very unjustly used by the *Gazette* of the 20th August." This has reference to omissions made in the *London Gazette* of a portion of the official bulletin of the 19th of that month, sent home by his grace.

A curious insight into Marlborough's character is

shown in *this* extract of a letter to Mr. Dawson (vol. 3, page 258) :—

“St. James’s, 16th December, 1706.

“I should not be averse to what you propose in relation to the county of Derry, and therefore, when your leisure will permit, would be glad to explain that matter further to me ; but it must be with that precaution *that none know I am any way concerned, otherwise it is to be feared the purchase would be raised considerably.*”

INTRODUCTION OF BAYONETS INTO THE ARMY.

The first allusion to bayonets in the English army is contained in the following extract from a warrant bearing date 2nd of April, 1672 :—

“CHARLES R.—Our will and pleasure is, that a Regiment of Dragoones which we have established and ordered to be raised, in twelve Troopes of fourscore in each besides officers, who are to be under the command of Our most deare and most entirely beloved Cousin, Prince Rupert, shall be armed out of Our stoares remaining within our Office of the Ordinance, as followeth ; that is to say, three corporalls, two sergeants, the gentlemen at armes, and twelve souldiers of each of the said twelve Troopes, are to have and carry each of them one halbard, and one case of pistolls with holsters ; and the rest of the souldiers of the several Troopes aforesaid are to have and to carry each of them one matchlocke musquet, with a collar of bandaliero, and also to have and to carry one bayonet or great knife. That each lieutenant have and carry one partizan, and that two drums be delivered out for each Troope of the said Regiment.”

Partizans are alluded to in the accompanying letter from the Duke of Marlborough, dated from St. James's, 10th March, 1707, to Lieutenant-General Ingoldsby:—"Colonel Lalo is acquainted that his officers must conform themselves to other regiments and use *pertuisans* as those of the regiment of Welsh Fusiliers." This letter also forms part of the collection of Marlborough's despatches. Colonel Sampson de Lalo was colonel of the Twenty-first Royal North British Fusiliers, and displayed great gallantry at the battle of Malplaquet, where he was mortally wounded. He was a protestant French gentleman, and was forced to quit France on account of religious persecution.

Bayonets at first were daggers which the soldiers, after they had exhausted their ammunition, fitted to the bore of their muskets. The use of them fastened to the muzzle of the firelocks was also a French improvement, adopted about 1690.

At length the bayonet was fastened with a socket, which enabled the muzzle to be left clear for firing, as the following anecdote from "Grose's Military Antiquities" shows:—"In one of the campaigns of King William III. in Flanders, in an engagement, the name of which my informant has forgotten, there were three French regiments whose bayonets were made to fix after the present fashion; one of them advanced against the Twenty-fifth Regiment with fixed bayonets. Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, who commanded it, ordered his men to screw their bayonets into their muzzles to receive them; but to his great surprise, when they came within a proper distance, the French threw in a heavy fire, which for a

moment staggered his people, who by no means expected such a greeting, not conscious how it was possible to fire with fixed bayonets. They nevertheless recovered themselves, charged, and drove the enemy out of the line."

"IT IS BETTER TO LEAVE THE WELL ALONE."

The celebrated Governor (General Elliott, afterwards Lord Heathfield) of Gibraltar, during the siege of that fortress, was surprised to see certain of the soldiers constantly intoxicated, although the sale of spirituous liquors was strictly prohibited. It was at length remarked, that the men were desirous to obtain water from one particular well in the medical garden, and considering that there must be a reason for the preference, it was resolved to examine it, when the water was found to be strongly impregnated with rum. This circumstance was accounted for by the fact that the governor had received a quantity of rum, and for its greater security, and to keep it from the knowledge of the soldiers, it was buried near the above well, close to which a shell had exploded; this, tearing up the earth, and bursting the casks, caused the spirit to flow into the adjoining well.

Another amusing anecdote of a well has been preserved:—During the Peninsular war, certain officers at the mess-table were observed to decline the soup with marked significancy, which made the general at the head of the table anxious to ascertain the cause; whereupon it was mentioned, that a French soldier had been discovered, that morning, in the well from which the water had been obtained, in a state of decomposition. This did not damp the general's appetite, for it is

said, that he immediately asked for another basin of soup, at the same time remarking, that "it would have been better if the whole French army had been in it."

BALLOONS IN WARFARE.

Balloons are said to have been used at the battle of Liege, at the commencement of the French Revolution. Experienced engineers ascended in a balloon, and reported on the position and movements of the Austrian army. Continual notice was afforded of whatever transpired in the Austrian camp, the number of their artillery, and their motions, by notes thrown down amongst the French troops, and attacks were consequently made against the enemy's most assailable points.

These machines were employed by the French at the battle of Fleurus, during the siege of Mentz, and subsequently at that of Ehrenbreitzen. The balloon, in all these instances, proved serviceable; and especially at the latter place, the height of the fortress rendering it impossible to reconnoitre the internal portions in any other manner.

Paper and pencils of different colours were provided for the engineers who ascended, and the signs being previously decided on, the paper, when marked, was fastened to an arrow-like rod, loaded at one end and pointed in order to fix itself upright in the ground. To the other end was attached a small silk flag, and being dropped in the ground within reach of the French, the desired information was communicated.

A paragraph lately appeared in the French papers,

headed, "New Method of making Reconnoissances in War." People laughed as they read on, for it was stated that M. Godard, after making an ascension in a balloon to survey the Austrian positions, had returned to the camp and reported that he had "seen nothing." It is now admitted that the "new method" was a failure so far as the first experiments went; but M. Godard lately made a sudden appearance in Paris, and it is reported that he has gone back to the army with fresh apparatus, which it is expected will succeed. Such is the correspondent's account, and it appears that valuable information was thus obtained.

MILTON NEARLY ADJUTANT-GENERAL.


It appears, by Dr. Johnson's "Lives of the most eminent English Poets," that Milton was reported to have been designed for adjutant-general. The extract is as follows:—"Philips, evidently impatient of viewing him in this state of degradation, tells us that it was not long continued; and, to raise his character again, has a mind to invest him with military splendour. 'He is much mistaken,' he says, 'if there was not about this time a design of making him an adjutant-general in Sir William Waller's army. But the new modelling of the army proved an obstruction to the design.'"

FIFTY-SECOND LIGHT INFANTRY.

The late General Martin Hunter states in his MS. Journal, which is quoted in the "History of the Fifty-second Light Infantry," now in course of publication under the superintendence of a Board, consisting of the Duke of Richmond, Lieutenant-Generals Sir John Bell

and Sir J. F. Love, Major-Gen. Monins, and other distinguished officers, to which Captain Moorsom is the honorary secretary, that "During the winter (1775), plays were acted at Boston twice a-week, by the officers and some ladies. A farce, called the 'Blockade of Boston,' written by General Burgoyne, was acted. The enemy knew the night it was to be performed, and made an attack on the mill at Charlestown at the very hour the farce began; they fired some shots, and surprised and carried off a sergeant's guard. We immediately turned out and manned the works, and a shot being fired by one of our advanced sentries, a firing commenced at the redoubt, which could not be stopped for some time. An orderly sergeant standing outside the playhouse door, who heard the firing, immediately running into the playhouse, got upon the stage, crying out, 'Turn out! turn out! they're hard at it, hammer and tongs.' The whole audience, supposing the sergeant was acting a part in the farce, loudly applauded, and there was such a noise he could not, for some time, make himself heard. When the applause was over he again cried out, 'What are ye all about? If ye won't believe me, ye need only go to the door, and there ye'll hear and see both.' If the enemy intended to stop the farce, they certainly succeeded, as the officers immediately left the playhouse and joined their regiments."

Lieutenant-General Burgoyne is now remembered as a dramatist by his ballad opera of "The Lord of the Manor," which is occasionally represented. He was also the author of a comedy entitled "The Heiress."



THE VICTORIA CROSS.



“Worth! What is a ribbon worth to a soldier?

Worth! Everything! Glory is priceless!”

THE LADY OF LYONS.

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THE VICTORIA CROSS.

It was not until 1856 that an order was established to which all ranks of the army might aspire. This new distinction of valour appropriately bears the name of the "Victoria Cross," and its value is heightened by the fact of the Queen having, on more than one occasion, personally conferred the decoration. As the Right Honourable Benjamin Disraeli happily observed on the occasion of proposing thanks to the Army and Navy for their services in the Crimea, "Every village has its hero, and every fireside has its story."

The following is a copy of the instrument instituting the decoration of the "Victoria Cross," and the accompanying deeds for which it has been bestowed naturally rank as "Curiosities of War."

VICTORIA, by the grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Queen, Defender of the Faith, etc.,

To all to whom these presents shall come, greeting :

Whereas we, taking into our royal consideration that there exists no means of adequately rewarding the individual gallant services either of Officers of the lower grades in our Naval and Military Service, or of Warrant and Petty Officers, Seamen and Marines in our Navy, and Non-commissioned Officers and Soldiers in our Army ; and whereas the Third Class of our Most Honorable Order of the Bath is limited, except in very rare cases, to the higher ranks of both Services, and the granting of medals, both in our Navy and Army, is only awarded for long service or

meritorious conduct, rather than for bravery in action or distinction before an enemy, such cases alone excepted where a general medal is granted for a particular action or campaign, or a clasp added to the medal for some special engagement, in both of which cases all share equally in the boon, and those who by their valour have particularly signalized themselves remain undistinguished from their comrades; now, for the purpose of attaining an end so desirable as that of rewarding individual instances of merit and valour, we have instituted and created, and by these presents, for us, our heirs and successors, institute and create a new Naval and Military Decoration, which we are desirous should be highly prized and eagerly sought after by the Officers and Men of our Naval and Military Services, and are graciously pleased to make, ordain, and establish the following rules and ordinances for the government of the same, which shall from henceforth be inviolably observed and kept:

Firstly. It is ordained, that the distinction shall be styled and designated "The Victoria Cross," and shall consist of a Maltese Cross of Bronze, with our Royal Crest in the centre, and underneath which an escroll bearing this inscription "For Valour."

Secondly. It is ordained, that the Cross shall be suspended from the left breast, by a blue riband for the Navy, and by a red riband for the Army.

Thirdly. It is ordained, that the names of those upon whom we may be pleased to confer the Decoration shall be published in the London Gazette, and a registry thereof kept in the office of our Secretary of State for War.

Fourthly. It is ordained, that any one who, after having received the Cross, shall again perform an act of bravery, which if he had not received such Cross would have entitled him to it, such further act shall be recorded, by a Bar attached to the riband by which the Cross is suspended, and for every additional act of bravery an additional Bar may be added.

Fifthly. It is ordained, that the Cross shall only be awarded to those Officers or Men who have served us in the presence of the enemy, and shall have then performed some signal act of valour, or devotion to their country.

Sixthly. It is ordained, with a view to place all persons on a perfectly equal footing in relation to eligibility for the Decoration,

that neither rank, nor long service, nor wounds, nor any other circumstance or condition whatsoever, save the merit of conspicuous bravery, shall be held to establish a sufficient claim to the honour.

Seventhly. It is ordained, that the Decoration may be conferred on the spot where the act to be rewarded by the grant of such Decoration has been performed, under the following circumstances :—

I. When the Fleet or Army, in which such act has been performed, is under the eye and command of an Admiral or General Officer commanding the Forces.

II. Where the naval or military force is under the eye and command of an Admiral or Commodore commanding a squadron or detached naval force, or of a General commanding a corps, or division, or brigade on a distinct and detached service, when such Admiral, Commodore, or General Officer shall have the power of conferring the Decoration on the spot, subject to confirmation by us.

Eighthly. It is ordained, where such act shall not have been performed in sight of a Commanding Officer as aforesaid, then the claimant for the honour shall prove the act to the satisfaction of the Captain or Officer commanding his ship, or to the Officer commanding the regiment to which the claimant belongs, and such Captain or such commanding Officer shall report the same through the usual channel to the Admiral or Commodore commanding the force employed on the service, or to the Officer commanding the forces in the field, who shall call for such description and attestation of the act as he may think requisite, and on approval shall recommend the grant of the Decoration.

Ninthly. It is ordained, that every person selected for the Cross under rule seven shall be publicly decorated before the naval or military force or body to which he belongs, and with which the act of bravery for which he is to be rewarded shall have been performed, and his name shall be recorded in a General Order, together with the cause of his especial distinction.

Tenthly. It is ordained, that every person selected under rule eight shall receive his Decoration as soon as possible, and his name shall likewise appear in a General Order as above required, such General Order to be issued by the naval or military commander of the forces employed on the service.

Eleventhly. It is ordained, that the General Orders above referred to shall from time to time be transmitted to our Secretary of State for War, to be laid before us, and shall be by him registered.

Twelfthly. It is ordained, that as cases may arise not falling within the rules above specified, or in which a claim, though well founded, may not have been established on the spot, we will, on the joint submission of our Secretary of State for War and of our Commander-in-Chief of our Army, or on that of our Lord High Admiral or Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty in the case of the Navy, confer the Decoration, but never without conclusive proof of the performance of the act of bravery for which the claim is made.

Thirteenthly. It is ordained, that in the event of a gallant and daring act having been performed by a squadron, ship's company, a detached body of seamen and marines, not under fifty in number, or by a brigade, regiment, troop or company, in which the Admiral, General, or other Officer commanding such forces may deem that all are equally brave and distinguished, and that no special selection can be made by them; then in such case the Admiral, General, or other Officer commanding may direct, that for any such body of seamen or marines, or for every troop or company of soldiers, one officer shall be selected by the officers engaged for the Decoration; and in like manner one petty officer or non-commissioned officer shall be selected by the petty officers and non-commissioned officers engaged; and two seamen or private soldiers or marines shall be selected by the seamen or private soldiers or marines engaged respectively for the Decoration; and the names of those selected shall be transmitted by the senior Officer in command of the naval force, brigade, regiment, troop or company, to the Admiral or General Officer commanding, who shall in due manner confer the Decoration as if the acts were done under his own eye.

Fourteenthly. It is ordained, that every warrant officer, petty officer, seaman or marine, or non-commissioned officer or soldier who shall have received the Cross shall, from the date of the act by which the Decoration has been gained, be entitled to a Special Pension of Ten Pounds a-year, and each additional Bar conferred under Rule Four on such warrant or petty officers, or non-com-

missioned officers or men, shall carry with it an additional Pension of Five Pounds per annum.

Fifteenthly. In order to make such additional provision as shall effectually preserve pure this most honorable distinction, it is ordained, that if any person on whom such distinction shall be conferred be convicted of treason, cowardice, felony, or of any infamous crime, or if he be accused of any such offence and doth not after a reasonable time surrender himself to be tried for the same, his name shall forthwith be erased from the registry of individuals upon whom the said Decoration shall have been conferred by an especial Warrant under our Royal Sign Manual, and the Pension conferred under Rule Fourteen shall cease and determine from the date of such Warrant. It is hereby further declared that we, our heirs and successors, shall be the sole judges of the circumstance demanding such expulsion; moreover, we shall at all times have power to restore such persons as may at any time have been expelled, both to the enjoyment of the Decoration and Pension.

Given at our Court at Buckingham Palace, this 29th day of January, in the 19th year of our reign, and in the year of our Lord 1856.

By Her Majesty's Command,

To our Principal Secretary
of State for War.

PANMURE.

RECIPIENTS OF THE VICTORIA CROSS, ARRANGED ACCORDING TO REGIMENTS.

Second Dragoon Guards.

Lieutenant (now Captain) ROBERT BLAIR.—Date of act of bravery, 28th September, 1857.—A most gallant feat [was here performed by Lieutenant Blair, who was ordered to take a party of one sergeant and twelve men, and bring in a deserted ammunition waggon. As his party approached, a body of fifty or sixty of the enemy's horse came down upon him from a village, where they had remained unobserved; without a moment's hesitation he formed up his men; and, regardless of the odds, gallantly led them on, dashing through the rebels. He made good his retreat without

losing a man, leaving nine of them dead on the field. Of these he killed four himself; but, to my regret, after having run a native officer through the body with his sword, he was severely wounded, the joint of his shoulder being nearly severed.—Despatch from Major-General James Hope Grant, K.C.B., dated 10th January, 1858.

Second Dragoons.

Sergeant-Major (No. 774) JOHN GRIEVE.—Saved the life of an officer in the Heavy Cavalry Charge at Balaklava, who was surrounded by Russian Cavalry, by his gallant conduct in riding up to his rescue and cutting off the head of one Russian, disabling and dispersing the others.

Sergeant HENRY RAMAGE.—Date of act of bravery, 26th October, 1854.—For having at the Battle of Balaklava galloped out to the assistance of Private M'Pherson of the same regiment, on perceiving him surrounded by seven Russians, when by his gallantry he dispersed the enemy and saved his comrade's life.—For having on the same day, when the Heavy Brigade was rallying and the enemy retiring, finding his horse would not leave the ranks, dismounted, and brought in a prisoner from the Russian lines.—Also for having dismounted on the same day, when the Heavy Brigade was covering the retreat of the Light Cavalry, and lifted from his horse Private Gardiner, who was disabled from a severe fracture of the leg by a round shot. Sergeant Ramage then carried him to the rear from under a very heavy cross fire, thereby saving his life, the spot where he must inevitably have fallen having been immediately afterwards covered by the Russian Cavalry.

Fourth Light Dragoons.

Private (No. 635) SAMUEL PARKES.—In the charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade at Balaklava, Trumpet-Major Crawford's horse fell, and dismounted him, and he lost his sword; he was attacked by two Cossacks, when Private Samuel Parkes (whose horse had been shot) saved his life, by placing himself between them and the Trumpet-Major, and drove them away by his sword. In attempting to follow the Light Cavalry Brigade in the retreat, they were attacked by six Russians, whom Parkes kept at bay, and retired slowly, fighting, and defending the Trumpet-Major for some time, until deprived of his sword by a shot.

THE VICTORIA CROSS.

Sixth Dragoons.

Surgeon JAMES MOUAT, C.B., late of Sixth Dragoons, now Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals.—Date of act of bravery, 26th October, 1854.—For having voluntarily proceeded to the assistance of Lieutenant-Colonel Morris, C.B., 17th Lancers, who was lying dangerously wounded in an exposed situation after the retreat of the Light Cavalry at the battle of Balaklava, and having dressed that officer's wounds in presence of and under a heavy fire from the enemy. Thus, by stopping a serious hemorrhage, he assisted in saving that officer's life.

Seventh Hussars.

MEMORANDUM.—Cornet WILLIAM GEORGE HAWTREY BANKS, 7th Hussars, upon whom the Commander-in-Chief in India has reported that the decoration of the Victoria Cross has been provisionally conferred for conspicuous gallantry, in thrice charging a body of infuriated fanatics, who had rushed on the guns employed in shelling a small mud fort in the vicinity of Moosa-Bagh, Lucknow, on the 19th of March, 1858—of the wounds received on which occasion he subsequently died—would have been recommended to her Majesty for confirmation in that distinction had he survived.

Eighth Hussars.

Captain (now Brevet Major) CLEMENT WALKER HENEGE,—No. 1584, Sergeant JOSEPH WARD,—No. 1298, Farrier GEORGE HOLLIS—and No. 861, Private JOHN PEARSON.—Date of act of bravery, 17th June, 1858.—Selected for the Victoria Cross by their companions in the gallant charge made by a squadron of the regiment at Gwalior, on the 17th of June, 1858, when, supported by a division of the Bombay Horse Artillery and Her Majesty's Ninety-fifth Regiment, they routed the enemy, who were advancing against Brigadier Smith's position, charged through the rebel camp into two batteries, capturing and bringing into their camp two of the enemy's guns, under a heavy and converging fire from the fort and town.—Field Force Orders by Major-General Sir Hugh Henry Rose, G.C.B., commanding Central India Field Force, dated Camp, Gwalior, 28th June, 1858.

Ninth Light Dragoons (Lancers.)

Lieutenant ALFRED STOWELL JONES (now Captain 18th

Hussars).—Date of act of bravery, 8th June, 1857.—The cavalry charged the rebels and rode through them. Lieutenant Jones, of the 9th Lancers, with his squadron, captured one of their guns, killing the drivers, and, with Lieutenant-Colonel Yule's assistance, turned it upon a village occupied by the rebels, who were quickly dislodged. This was a well-conceived act, gallantly executed.—Despatch from Major-General James Hope Grant, K.C.B., dated 10th January, 1858.

Lance-Corporal W. GOAT.—Date of act of bravery, 6th March, 1858.—For conspicuous gallantry at Lucknow, on the 6th March, 1858, in having dismounted in the presence of a number of the enemy, and taken up the body of Major Smyth, 2nd Dragoon Guards, which he attempted to bring off the field, and after being obliged to relinquish it, being surrounded by the enemy's cavalry, he went a second time under a heavy fire to recover the body.—Despatch from Major-General Sir James Hope Grant K.C.B., dated 8th April, 1858.

Troop Sergeant-Major SPENCE.—Date of act of bravery, 17th January, 1858.—For conspicuous gallantry on the 17th of January, 1858, at Shumsabad, in going to the assistance of Private Kidd, who had been wounded, and his horse disabled, and bringing him out from a large number of rebels.—Despatch from Major-General Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B., dated 8th April, 1858.

Troop Sergeant-Major RUSHE.—Date of act of bravery, 19th March, 1858.—For conspicuous bravery, near Lucknow, on the 19th March, 1858, in having in company with one other private of the troop, attacked eight of the enemy, who had posted themselves in a nullah, and killed three of them.—Despatch from Major-General Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B., dated 8th April, 1858.

Privates THOMAS HANCOCK and JOHN PURCELL.—The guns, I am happy to say, were saved; but a waggon of Major Scott's battery was blown up. I must not fail to mention the excellent conduct of a Sowar of the 4th Irregular Cavalry and two men of the 9th Lancers, Privates Thomas Hancock and John Purcell, who, when my horse was shot down, remained by me throughout. One of these men and the Sowar offered me their horses, and I was dragged out by the Sowar's horse. Private Hancock was severely

wounded, and Private Purcell's horse was killed under him. The Sowar's name is Roopur Khan.—Extract of a letter from Brigadier J. H. Grant, C.B., Commanding Cavalry Brigade of the Field Force, to the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General of Division. Dated, Camp, Delhi, 22nd June, 1857.

Private J. R. ROBERTS.—Date of act of bravery, 28th September, 1857.—For conspicuous gallantry at Bolundshahur, on the 28th September, 1857, in bringing a comrade, mortally wounded, through a street under a heavy musketry fire, in which service he was himself wounded.—Despatch from Major-General Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B., dated 8th April, 1858.

Lance-Corporal R. KELLS.—Date of act of bravery, 28th September, 1857.—For conspicuous bravery at Bolundshahur, on the 28th September, 1857, in defending against a number of the enemy, his commanding officer, Captain Drysdale, who was lying in a street with his collar-bone broken, his horse having been disabled by a shot, and remaining with him until out of danger.—Despatch from Major-General Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B., dated 8th April, 1858.

Private P. DONOHUE.—Date of act of bravery, 28th September, 1857.—For having, at Bolundshahur, on the 28th of September, 1857, gone to the support of Lieutenant Blair, who had been severely wounded, and with a few other men brought that officer in safety through a large body of the enemy's cavalry.—Despatch from Major-General Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B., dated 8th April, 1858.

Private J. FREEMAN.—Date of act of bravery, 10th October, 1857.—For conspicuous gallantry on the 10th of October, 1857, at Agra, in having gone to the assistance of Lieutenant Jones, who had been shot, killing the leader of the enemy's cavalry, and defending Lieutenant Jones against several of the enemy.—Despatch from Major-General Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B., dated 8th April, 1858.

Private R. NEWELL.—Date of act of bravery, 19th March, 1858.—For conspicuous gallantry at Lucknow, on the 19th of March, 1858, in going to the assistance of a comrade whose horse had fallen on bad ground, and bringing him away, under a heavy fire of musketry from a large body of the enemy.—Despatch from Major-General Sir Jas. Hope Grant, K.C.B., dated 8th April, 1858.

Eleventh Hussars.

Lieutenant ALEXANDER ROBERT DUNN (retired 12th January, 1855).—For having in the Light Cavalry Charge, on the 25th October, 1854, saved the life of Sergeant-Major Bently, 11th Hussars, by cutting down two or three Russian Lancers who were attacking him from the rear, and afterwards cutting down a Russian Hussar who was attacking Private Levett, 11th Hussars.

Thirteenth Light Dragoons.

Sergeant JOSEPH MALONE.—Date of act of bravery, 25th October, 1854.—For having stopped under a very heavy fire to take charge of Captain Webb, 17th Lancers, until others arrived to assist him in removing that officer, who was, as it afterwards proved, mortally wounded. Sergeant Malone performed this act of bravery while returning on foot from the charge at the Battle of Balaklava, in which his horse had been shot.

Fourteenth Light Dragoons.

Lieutenant JAMES LEITH (now Brevet Major, and of the 2nd Dragoons).—Date of act of bravery, 1st April, 1858.—For conspicuous bravery at Betwah, on the 1st of April, 1858, in having charged alone, and rescued Captain Need, of the same regiment, when surrounded by a large number of rebel infantry.—Despatch from Major-General Sir Hugh Henry Rose, G.C.B., dated 28th April, 1858.

Seventeenth Lancers.

Sergeant-Major CHARLES WOODEN.—Date of act of bravery, 26th October, 1854.—For having, after the retreat of the Light Cavalry, at the Battle of Balaklava, been instrumental, together with Dr. James Mouat, C.B., in saving the life of Lieutenant-Colonel Morris, C.B., of the 17th Lancers, by proceeding, under a heavy fire, to his assistance, when he was lying very dangerously wounded in an exposed situation.

Quartermaster-Sergeant JOHN FARRALL.—Date of act of bravery, 25th October, 1854.—For having remained, amidst a shower of shot and shell, with Captain Webb, who was severely wounded, and whom he and Sergeant-Major Berryman had carried as far as the pain of his wounds would allow, until a stretcher was

procured, when he assisted the Sergeant-Major and a Private of the 13th Light Dragoons (Malone) to carry that officer off the field. This took place on the 25th October, 1854, after the charge at the Battle of Balaklava, in which Farrell's horse was killed under him.

Troop Sergeant-Major JOHN BERRYMAN.—Served with his regiment the whole of the war, was present at the Battle of the Alma, and also engaged in the pursuit at Mackenzie's Farm, where he succeeded in capturing three Russian prisoners, when they were within reach of their own guns. Was present and charged at the Battle of Balaklava, where, his horse being shot under him, he stopped on the field with a wounded officer (Captain Webb) amidst a shower of shot and shell, although repeatedly told by that officer to consult his own safety, and leave him, but he refused to do so, and on Sergeant John Farrell coming by, with his assistance carried Captain Webb out of range of the guns. He has also a clasp for Inkermann.

Royal Artillery.

Captain and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel (now Colonel and Aide-de-Camp to the Queen) COLLINGWOOD DICKSON, C.B.—Date of act of bravery, 17th October, 1854.—For having, on the 17th October, 1854, when the batteries of the right attack had run short of powder, displayed the greatest coolness and contempt of danger in directing the unloading of several waggons of the field battery which were brought up to the trenches to supply the want, and having personally assisted in carrying the powder barrels under a severe fire from the enemy.

Brevet Lieut.-Colonel MATTHEW CHARLES DIXON.—On the 17th April, 1855, about two p.m., when the battery he commanded was blown up by a shell from the enemy, which burst in the magazine, destroyed the parapets, killed and wounded ten men, disabled five guns, and covered a sixth with earth; for most gallantly re-opening fire with the remaining gun before the enemy had ceased cheering from their parapets (on which they had mounted), and fighting it until sunset, despite the heavy concentrated fire of the enemy's batteries, and the ruined state of his own.

Captain (now Brevet-Major) FREDERICK MILLER.—Date of act

of bravery, 5th November, 1854.—For having at the Battle of Inkermann personally attacked three Russians, and, with the gunners of his division of the battery, prevented the Russians from doing mischief to the guns which they had surrounded. Part of a regiment of English Infantry had previously retired through the battery in front of this body of Russians.

Captain (now Brevet Lieut.-Colonel) FRANCIS CORNWALLIS MAUDE, C.B.—This officer steadily and cheerily pushed on with his men, and bore down the desperate opposition of the enemy though with the loss of one-third of his artillerymen. Sir James Outram adds, that this attack appeared to him to indicate no reckless or foolhardy daring, but the calm heroism of a true soldier, who fully appreciates the difficulties and dangers of the task he has undertaken ; and that, but for Captain Maude's nerve and coolness on this trying occasion, the army could not have advanced.—Extract from Field Force Orders of the late Major-General Havelock, dated 17th October, 1857.

Captain (now Brevet-Major) GRONOW DAVIS.—Date of act of bravery, 8th September, 1855.—For great coolness and gallantry in the attack on the Redan, 8th September, 1855, on which occasion he commanded the spiking party, and after which he saved the life of Lieutenant Sanders, 30th Foot, by jumping over the parapet of a sap, and proceeding twice some distance across the open under a "murderous" fire to assist in conveying that officer, whose leg was broken, and who was otherwise severely wounded, under cover ; and repeated this act in the conveyance of other wounded soldiers from the same exposed position.

Lieutenant CHRISTOPHER CHARLES TRESDALE, C.B. (now Brevet Major and Aide-de-Camp to the Inspector General of Royal Artillery, Major-General John Bloomfield).—Date of act of bravery, 29th September, 1855.—For gallant conduct in having, while acting as aide-de-camp to Major-General Sir William Fenwick Williams, Bt., K.C.B., at Kars, volunteered to take command of the force engaged in the defence of the most advanced part of the works, the key of the position, against the attack of the Russian army ; when, by throwing himself into the midst of the enemy, who had penetrated into the above redoubt, he encouraged the garrison to make an attack so vigorous as to drive out the Russians *therefrom*, and prevent its capture ; also for having, during the

hottest part of the action, when the enemy's fire had driven the Turkish artillerymen from their guns, rallied the latter, and by his intrepid example induced them to return to their post; and further, after having led the final charge which completed the victory of the day, for having, at the greatest personal risk, saved from the fury of the Turks a considerable number of the disabled among the enemy, who were lying wounded outside the works,—an action witnessed and acknowledged gratefully before the Russian staff by General Mouravieff.

Sergeant-Major ANDREW HENRY (afterwards Captain Land Transport Corps, and since retired on half-pay).—For defending the guns of his battery against overwhelming numbers of the enemy at the Battle of Inkermann, and continuing to do so until he had received twelve bayonet wounds. He was at the time Sergeant-Major of G Battery, 2nd Division.

Sergeant DANIEL CAMBRIDGE.—Date of act of bravery, 8th September, 1855.—For having volunteered for the spiking party at the assault on the Redan, 8th September, 1855, and continuing therewith after being severely wounded, and for having, in the after part of the same day, gone out in front of the advanced trench under a heavy fire to bring in a wounded man, in performing which service he was himself severely wounded a second time.

Sergeant GEORGE SYMONS (now Lieutenant Military Train).—Date of act of bravery, 6th June, 1855.—For conspicuous gallantry on the 6th June, 1855, in having volunteered to unmask the embrasures of a five-gun battery in the advanced right attack, and when so employed, under a terrific fire which the enemy commenced immediately on the opening of the first embrasure, and increased on the unmasking of each additional one, in having overcome the great difficulty of uncovering the last by boldly mounting the parapet and throwing down the sand bags, when a shell from the enemy burst and wounded him severely.

Gunner and Driver THOMAS ARTHUR, when in charge of the magazine in one of the left advanced batteries of the right attack on the 7th June, 1855, when the Quarries were taken, he, of his own accord, carried barrels of infantry ammunition for the 7th Fusiliers several times during the evening across the open. Volunteered for, and formed one of the spiking party of artillery at the assault on the Redan on the 18th June, 1855.

Royal Engineers.

Second Captain (now Brevet-Major) HOWARD CRAUFURD ELPHINSTONE.—Date of act of bravery, 18th June, 1855.—For fearless conduct in having, on the night after the unsuccessful attack on the Redan, volunteered to command a party of volunteers who proceeded to search for and bring back the scaling ladders left behind after the repulse; and while successfully performing this task of rescuing trophies from the Russians, Captain Elphinstone conducted a persevering search close to the enemy for wounded men, twenty of whom he rescued and brought back to the trenches.

Lieutenant (now Captain) GERALD GRAHAM.—Determined gallantry at the head of a ladder party, at the assault of the Redan, on the 18th June, 1855. Devoted heroism in sallying out of the trenches on numerous occasions, and bringing in wounded officers and men.

Lieutenant (now Captain and Brevet Lieut.-Col.) W. O. LENNOX.—Cool and gallant conduct in establishing a lodgment in Tryon's Rifle Pit, and assisting to repel the assaults of the enemy. This brilliant operation drew forth a special order from General Canrobert.

Colour-Sergeant HENRY M'DONALD.—Date of act of bravery, 19th April, 1855.—For gallant conduct when engaged in effecting a lodgment in the enemy's rifle pits in front of the left advance of the right attack on Sevastopol, and for subsequent valour when, by the engineer officers being disabled from wounds, the command devolved upon him, and he determinately persisted in carrying on the sap, notwithstanding the repeated attacks of the enemy.

Colour-Sergeant PETER LEITCH.—Date of act of bravery, 18th June, 1855.—For conspicuous gallantry in the assault on the Redan, when, after approaching it with leading ladders, he formed a caponnière across the ditch, as well as a ramp, by fearlessly tearing down gabions from the parapet, and placing and filling them until he was disabled from wounds.

Corporal (No. 997) JOHN ROSS.—Distinguished conduct on the 21st July, 1855, in connecting the 4th parallel right attack with an old Russian rifle pit in front. Extremely creditable conduct on the 23rd August, 1855, in charge of the advance from the 5th parallel right attack on the Redan, in placing and filling twenty-

five gabions under a very heavy fire, whilst annoyed by the presence of light balls. Intrepid and devoted conduct in creeping to the Redan in the night of the 8th September, 1855, and reporting its evacuation, on which its occupation by the English took place.

Corporal (No. 1078) WILLIAM J. LENDRIM.—Intrepidity—getting on the top of a magazine, and extinguishing sand-bags which were burning, and making good the breach under fire, on the 11th April, 1855. For courage and praiseworthy example in superintending 150 French Chasseurs, on the 14th February 1855, in building No. 9 Battery, left attack, and replacing the whole of the capsized gabions under a heavy fire. Was one of four volunteers for destroying the farthest rifle pit on the 20th April.

Sapper (No. 854) JOHN PERIE.—Conspicuous valour in leading the sailors with the ladders to the storming of the Redan, on the 18th June, 1855. He was invaluable on that day. Devoted conduct in rescuing a wounded man from the open, although he himself had just previously been wounded by a bullet in the side.

Military Train.

Private MICHAEL MURPHY, Farrier.—Date of act of bravery, 15th of April, 1858.—For daring gallantry on the 15th of April, 1858, when engaged in the pursuit of Koor Singh's army from Azimghur, in having rescued Lieutenant Hamilton, Adjutant of the 3rd Sikh Cavalry, who was wounded, dismounted, and surrounded by the enemy. Farrier Murphy cut down several men, and, although himself severely wounded, he never left Lieutenant Hamilton's side until support arrived.

Grenadier Guards.

Captain and Lieut.-Colonel Hon. H. HUGH MANNERS PERCY (now Colonel and Aide-de-Camp to the Queen).—Date of act of bravery, 5th November, 1854.—At a moment when the Guards were at some distance from the Sand-bag Battery, at the Battle of Inkermann, Colonel Percy charged singly into the battery, followed immediately by the Guards; the embrasures of the battery, as also the parapet, were held by the Russians, who kept up a most severe fire of musketry. At the Battle of Inkermann Colonel Percy found himself, with many men of various regiments who had charged too far, nearly surrounded by the Russians, and without ammuni-

tion. Colonel Percy, by his knowledge of the ground, though wounded, extricated these men, and passing under a heavy fire from the Russians then in the Sand-bag Battery, brought them safe to where ammunition was to be obtained, thereby saving some fifty men and enabling them to renew the combat. He received the approval of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge for this action on the spot. Colonel Percy was engaged with and put *hors-de-combat* a Russian soldier.

Brevet-Major (now Lieut.-Colonel) Sir CHARLES RUSSELL, Bart., offered to dislodge a party of Russians from the Sand-bag Battery, if any one would follow him; Sergeant Norman, Privates Anthony Palmer and Bailey (who was killed) volunteered the first. The attack succeeded.

Sergeant (No. 5872) ALFRED ABLETT (3rd Battalion).—On the 2nd September, 1855, seeing a shell fall in the centre of a number of ammunition cases and powder, he instantly seized and threw it outside the trench; it burst as it touched the ground.

Private (No. 3571) ANTHONY PALMER (3rd Battalion).—Present when the charge was made in defence of the colours, and also charged singly upon the enemy, as witnessed by Sir C. Russell; is said to have saved Sir C. Russell's life.

Coldstream Guards.

Brevet-Major GERALD LITTLEHALES GOODLAKE.—For distinguished gallantry whilst in command of the sharpshooters furnished by the Coldstream Guards, on the 28th October, 1854, on the occasion of "the powerful sortie on the 2nd Division," when he held the Windmill Ravine, below the Picquet House, against a much larger force of the enemy. The party of sharpshooters then under his command killed thirty-eight (one an officer), and took three prisoners of the enemy (of the latter, one an officer), Major Goodlake being the sole officer in command. Also, for distinguished gallantry on the occasion of the surprise of a picquet of the enemy, in November, at the bottom of the Windmill Ravine, by the sharpshooters under his sole leading and command, when the knapsacks and rifles of the enemy's party fell into his hands.

Private (No. 3968) WILLIAM STANLOCK.—For having volunteered, when employed as one of the sharpshooters in October, 1854, for reconnoitring purposes, to crawl up within six yards of

a Russian sentry, and so enabled the officer in command to effect a surprise; Private Stanlock having been warned beforehand of the imminent risk which he would run in the adventure.

Private (No. 4787) **GEORGE STRONG**.—For having, when on duty in the trenches in the month of September, 1855, removed a live shell from the place where it had fallen.

Scots Fusilier Guards.

Brevet-Major (now Lieut.-Colonel) **ROBERT JAMES LINDSAY**.—When the formation of the line of the regiment was disordered at Alma, Captain Lindsay stood firm with the colours, and by his example and energy greatly tended to restore order. At Inkermann, in a most trying moment, he, with a few men, charged a party of Russians, driving them back, and running one through the body himself.

Sergeant **JOHN KNOX** (now Captain in the 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade).—When serving as a Sergeant in the Scots Fusilier Guards, was conspicuous for his exertions in reforming the ranks of the Guards at the Battle of the Alma. Subsequently, when in the Rifle Brigade, he volunteered for the ladder-party in the attack on the Redan, on the 18th of June, and (in the words of Captain Blackett, under whose command he was) behaved admirably, remaining on the field until twice wounded.

Sergeant (No. 3234) **M'KECHNIE**.—When the formation of the regiment was disordered at Alma, for having behaved gallantly, and rallied the men round the colours.

Private (No. 3363) **WILLIAM REYNOLDS**.—When the formation of the line was disordered at Alma, for having behaved in a conspicuous manner in rallying the men round the colours.

Sergeant **JAMES CRAIG** (now Lieutenant and Adjutant 2nd Battalion 10th Foot).—Date of act of bravery, 6th September, 1855.—For having volunteered, and personally collected other volunteers, to go out under a heavy fire of grape and small arms, on the night of the 6th September, 1855, when in the right advanced sap in front of the Redan, to look for Captain Buckley, Scots Fusilier Guards, who was supposed to be wounded. Sergeant Craig brought in, with the assistance of a drummer, the body of that officer, whom he found dead—in the performance of which act he was wounded.

First Foot, Second Battalion.

Private (No. 1672) JOSEPH PROSSER.—1st. On the 18th June, 1855, when on duty in the trenches before Sevastopol, for pursuing and apprehending (while exposed to two cross-fires) a soldier in the act of deserting to the enemy. 2nd. On the 11th August, 1855, before Sevastopol, for leaving the most advanced trench, and assisting to carry in a soldier of the 9th Regiment, who lay severely wounded and unable to move. This gallant and humane act was performed under a very heavy fire from the enemy.

Third Foot.

Brevet Lieut.-Colonel FREDERICK MAUDE, C.B. (now Senior Lieut.-Colonel 3rd Foot).—For conspicuous and most devoted bravery on the 8th September, 1855, when in command of the covering and ladder-party of the Second Division, on the assault of the Redan, to which he gallantly led his men. Having entered the Redan, he, with only nine or ten men, held a position between traverses, and only retired when all hope of support was at an end, himself dangerously wounded.

Private (No. 2649) JOHN CONNORS.—Distinguished himself most conspicuously at the assault on the Redan, 8th September, 1855, in personal conflict with the Russians; rescued an officer of the 30th Regiment, who was surrounded by Russians, by shooting one and bayoneting another, and was observed, inside the Redan, in personal combat with the Russians for some time. Was selected by his company for the French War Medal.

Fourth Foot.

Private THOMAS GRADY.—Date of acts of bravery, 18th October, 1854, and 22nd November, 1854.—For having on the 18th October, 1854, volunteered to repair the embrasures of the Sailors' Battery on the left attack, and effected the same, with the assistance of one other volunteer, under a very heavy fire from a line of batteries.—For gallant conduct on 22nd November, 1854, in the repulse of the Russian attack on the advanced trench of the left attack, when, on being severely wounded, he refused to quit the front, encouraging by such determined bearing the weak force engaged with the enemy to maintain its position.

Fifth Foot.

Private **PETER M'MANUS**.—Date of act of bravery, 26th September, 1857.—A party, on the 26th of September, 1857, was shut up and besieged in a house in the city of Lucknow by the rebel sepoys. Private M'Manus kept outside the house until he was himself wounded, and, under cover of a pillar, kept firing on the sepoys, and preventing their rushing on the house. He also, in conjunction with Private John Ryan, rushed into the street and took Captain Arnold, of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, out of a dooly, and brought him into the house in spite of a heavy fire, in which Captain Arnold was again wounded.—Extract from Divisional Orders of Major-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., dated 14th October, 1857.

Seventh Fusiliers.

Lieutenant **HENRY MITCHELL JONES** (afterwards Captain in the Regiment; retired 28th August, 1857).—Date of act of bravery, 7th June, 1855.—For having distinguished himself while serving with the party which stormed and took the Quarries before Sevastopol, by repeatedly leading on his men to repel the continual assaults of the enemy during the night. Although wounded early in the evening, Captain Jones remained unflinchingly at his post until after daylight the following morning.

Lieutenant **WILLIAM HOPE** (retired 3rd March, 1857).—Date of act of bravery, 18th June, 1855.—After the troops had retreated on the morning of the 18th of June, 1855, Lieutenant W. Hope, being informed by the late Sergeant-Major William Bacon, who was himself wounded, that Lieutenant and Adjutant Hobson was lying outside the trenches, badly wounded, went out to look for him, and found him lying in an old agricultural ditch running towards the left flank of the Redan. He then returned and got four men to bring him in. Finding, however, that Lieutenant Hobson could not be removed without a stretcher, he then ran back across the open to Egerton's Pit, where he procured one, and carried it to where Lieutenant Hobson was lying. All this was done under a very heavy fire from the Russian batteries.

Assistant-Surgeon **THOMAS E. HALE, M.D.**—Date of act of bravery, 8th September, 1855.—1st. For remaining with an officer who was dangerously wounded—Capt. H. M. Jones, 7th Foot.—

in the fifth parallel, on the 8th September, 1855, when all the men in the immediate neighbourhood retreated, excepting Lieutenant W. Hope and Dr. Hale; and for endeavouring to rally the men in conjunction with Lieutenant W. Hope, 7th Royal Fusiliers.—2nd. For having on the 8th September, 1855, after the regiments had retired into the trenches, cleared the most advanced sap of the wounded, and carried into the sap, under a heavy fire, several wounded men from the open ground, being assisted by Sergeant Charles Fisher, 7th Royal Fusiliers.

Private (No. 3443) WILLIAM NORMAN.—On the night of the 19th December, 1854, he was placed on single sentry some distance in front of the advanced sentries of an outlying picquet in the White Horse Ravine, a post of much danger, and requiring great vigilance: the Russian picquet was posted about 300 yards in his front; three Russian soldiers advanced, under cover of the brushwood, for the purpose of reconnoitring. Private William Norman, single-handed, took two of them prisoners, without alarming the Russian picquet.

Private (No. 1879) MATHEW HUGHES.—Private Mathew Hughes, 7th Royal Fusiliers, was noticed by Colonel Campbell, 90th Light Infantry, on the 7th June, 1855, at the storming of the Quarries, for twice going for ammunition, under a heavy fire, across the open ground; he also went to the front and brought in Private John Hampton, who was lying severely wounded; and on the 18th June, 1855, he volunteered to bring in Lieutenant Hobson, 7th Royal Fusiliers, who was lying severely wounded, and in the act of doing so was severely wounded himself.

Tenth Foot.

Lieutenant HENRY MARSHMAN HAVELOCK (now Captain and Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry Marshman Havelock, Bart., 18th Foot).—In the combat at Cawnpore, Lieutenant Havelock was my Aide-de-Camp. The 64th Regiment had been much under artillery fire, from which it had severely suffered. The whole of the infantry were lying down in line, when perceiving that the enemy had brought out the last reserved gun, a 24-pounder, and were rallying round it, I called up the regiment to rise and advance. Without any other word from me, Lieutenant Havelock placed himself on his horse in front of the centre of the

64th, opposite the muzzle of the gun; Major Sterling commanding the regiment was in front dismounted; but the Lieutenant continued to move steadily on in front of the regiment at a foot pace on his horse. The gun discharged shot until the troops were within a short distance, when they fired grape. In went the corps, led by the Lieutenant, who still steered steadily on the gun's muzzle until it was mastered by a rush of the 64th.—Extract of a telegram from the late Major-General Havelock to the Commander-in-Chief in India. Dated Cawnpore, 18th August, 1857.

Thirteenth Foot.

Sergeant W. NAPIER (1st Battalion).—Date of act of bravery, 6th April, 1858.—For conspicuous gallantry near Azimghur, on the 6th April, 1858, in having defended, and finally rescued, Private Benjamin Milnes, of the same regiment, when severely wounded on the baggage guard. Sergeant Napier remained with him at the hazard of his life, when surrounded by sepoy, bandaged his wound under fire, and then carried him in safety to the convoy.—Despatch from Colonel Lord Mark Kerr, C.B., dated 2nd August, 1858.

Private PATRICK CARLIN.—Date of act of bravery, 6th April, 1858.—The Commander-in-Chief in India directs that the under-mentioned soldier of the 13th Foot, be presented, in the name of Her Most Gracious Majesty, with a medal of the Victoria Cross, for valour and daring in the field, viz.—Private Patrick Carlin, No. 3611, of the 13th Foot, for rescuing, on the 6th of April, 1858, a wounded Naick, of the 4th Madras Rifles, in the field of battle, after killing with the Naick's sword a mutineer sepoy, who fired at him while bearing off his wounded comrade on his shoulders.—Extract from a General Order from the Commander-in-Chief in India, dated Allahabad, June 29, 1858.

Seventeenth Foot,

Corporal (Lance Sergeant) PHILIP SMITH.—For repeatedly going out in the front of the advanced trenches against the Great Redan, on the 18th June, 1855, under a very heavy fire, after the column had retired from the assault, and bringing in wounded comrades.

Eighteenth Foot.

Captain THOMAS ESMONDE (now Major, unattached).—Date of acts of bravery, 18th and 20th June, 1855.—For having, after being engaged in the attack on the Redan, repeatedly assisted, at great personal risk, under a heavy fire of shell and grape, in rescuing wounded men from exposed situations; and also, while in command of a covering party two days after, for having rushed with the most prompt and daring gallantry to a spot where a fireball from the enemy had just been lodged, which he effectually extinguished before it had betrayed the position of the working party under his protection, thus saving it from a murderous fire of shell and grape, which was immediately opened upon the spot where the fireball had fallen.

Nineteenth Foot.

Private SAMUEL EVANS.—Date of act of bravery, 13th April, 1855.—For volunteering to go into an embrasure, thereby rendering very great assistance in repairing damage, under a very heavy fire from the enemy, 13th April, 1855.

Private (No. 1051) JOHN LYONS.—For, on the 10th June, 1855, taking up a live shell which fell among the guard of the trenches, and throwing it over the parapet.

Twenty-third Royal Welsh Fusiliers.

Brevet Lieut.-Colonel EDWARD W. D. BELL (now Lieut.-Colonel of the 2nd Battalion 23rd Regiment).—Recommended for his gallantry, more particularly at the Battle of the Alma, where he was the first to seize upon and capture one of the enemy's guns, which was limbered up, and being carried off. He, moreover, succeeded to the command of that gallant regiment, which he brought out of action; all his senior officers having been killed or wounded.

Sergeant LUKE O'CONNOR (now Captain 23rd Fusiliers).—Was one of the sergeants at the Battle of the Alma, and advanced between the officers, carrying the colours. When near the redoubt, Lieutenant Anstruther, who was carrying a colour, was mortally wounded, and he was shot in the breast at the same time, and fell; but, recovering himself, snatched up the colour from the ground, and continued to carry it till the end of the action, although urged by Captain Granville to relinquish it, and go to the

rear, on account of his wound ; was recommended for, and received his commission, for his services at the Alma. Also behaved with great gallantry at the assault on the Redan, 8th September, 1855, where he was shot through both thighs.

Lieutenant (now Captain) THOMAS BERNARD HACKETT.—Date of act of bravery, 18th November, 1857.—For daring gallantry at Secundra Bagh, Lucknow, on the 18th November, 1857, in having with others rescued a Corporal of the 20rd Regiment, who was lying wounded and exposed to a very heavy fire. Also for conspicuous bravery, in having under a heavy fire ascended the roof and cut down the thatch of a bungalow, to prevent its being set on fire. This was a most important service at the time.

Assistant-Surgeon HENRY THOMAS SYLVESTER, M.D.—Date of act of bravery, 8th September, 1855.—For going out, on 8th September, 1855, under a heavy fire, in front of the fifth parallel right attack, to a spot near the Redan where Lieutenant and Adjutant Dyneley was lying mortally wounded, and for dressing his wounds in that dangerous and exposed situation. N.B.—This officer was mentioned in General Sir James Simpson's despatch of the 18th September, 1855, for his courage in going to the front under a heavy fire to assist the wounded.

Corporal (No. 2945) ROBERT SHIELDS.—For volunteering, on the 8th of September, 1855, to go out to the front from the fifth parallel, after the attack on the Redan, to bring in Lieutenant Dyneley, who was wounded, and found afterwards to be mortally so.

Private GEORGE MONGER.—Date of act of bravery, 18th November, 1857.—For daring gallantry at Secundra Bagh, Lucknow, on the 18th November, 1857, in having volunteered to accompany Lieutenant Hackett, whom he assisted in bringing in a Corporal of the 23rd Regiment, who was lying wounded in an exposed position.

Thirtieth Regiment.

Lieutenant MARK WALKER (now Captain and Brevet-Major 3rd Foot).—Date of act of bravery, 5th November, 1854.—For having at Inkermann distinguished himself in front of his regiment, by jumping over a wall in the face of two battalions of Russian infantry which were marching towards it, for the purpose of en-

couraging his comrades by his example to advance against such heavy odds, which they did, and succeeded in driving back both battalions.

Thirty-fourth Regiment.

Private (No. 3837) **WILLIAM COFFEY**.—For having, on the 29th March, 1855, thrown a lighted shell, that fell into the trench, over the parapet.

Private (No. 3482) **JOHN J. SIMS**.—For having, on the 18th June, 1855, after the regiment had retired into the trenches from the assault on the Redan, gone out into the open ground, under a heavy fire, in broad daylight, and brought in wounded soldiers outside the trenches.

Forty-first Regiment.

Sergeant-Major **AMBROSE MADDEN**.—For having headed a party of men of the 41st Regiment, and having cut off and taken prisoners one Russian officer and fourteen privates, three of whom he, personally and alone, captured.

Brevet-Major **HUGH ROWLANDS** (now Major of a *Dépôt Battalion*).—For rescuing Colonel Haly, of the 47th Regiment, from Russian soldiers, Colonel Haly having been wounded and surrounded by them, and for gallant exertions in holding the ground occupied by his advanced picquet against the enemy, at the commencement of the Battle of Inkermann.

Forty-second Regiment.

Lieutenant **FRANCIS EDWARD HENRY FARQUHARSON**.—Date of act of bravery, 9th March, 1858.—For conspicuous bravery when engaged before Lucknow, on the 9th of March, 1858, in having led a portion of his company, stormed a bastion mounting two guns, and spiked the guns, by which the advanced position held during the night of the 9th of March was rendered secure from the fire of artillery. Lieutenant Farquharson was severely wounded while holding an advanced position on the morning of the 10th of March.

Quartermaster-Sergeant **JOHN SIMPSON**.—Date of act of bravery, 15th April, 1858.—For conspicuous bravery at the attack on the Fort of Ruhya on the 15th April, 1858, in having

volunteered to go to an exposed point within forty yards of the parapet of the fort under a heavy fire, and brought in, first, Lieutenant Douglas, and afterwards a private soldier, both of whom were dangerously wounded.

Lance-Corporal ALEXANDER THOMPSON.—Date of act of bravery, 15th April, 1858.—For daring gallantry on the 15th of April, 1858, when at the attack of the Fort of Ruhya, in having volunteered to assist Captain Groves, commanding the 4th Punjab Rifles, in bringing the body of Lieutenant Willoughby, of that corps, from the top of the glacis, in a most exposed situation, under a heavy fire.

Private JAMES DAVIS.—Date of act of bravery, 15th April, 1858.—For conspicuous gallantry at the attack on the Fort of Ruhya, when, with an advanced party to point out the gate of the fort to the engineer officer, Private Davis offered to carry the body of Lieutenant Bramley, who was killed at this point, to the regiment. He performed this duty of danger and affection under the very walls of the fort.

MEMORANDUM.—Private EDWARD SPENCE would have been recommended to Her Majesty for the decoration of the Victoria Cross had he survived. He and Lance-Corporal Thompson of that regiment volunteered at the attack of the Fort of Ruhya on the 15th of April, 1858, to assist Captain Groves, commanding the 4th Punjab Rifles, in bringing in the body of Lieutenant Willoughby from the top of the glacis. Private Spence dauntlessly placed himself in an exposed position, so as to cover the party bearing away the body. He died on the 17th of the same month from the effects of the wound which he received on the occasion.

Colour-Sergeant WILLIAM GARDNER.—Date of act of bravery, 5th May, 1858.—For his conspicuous and gallant conduct on the morning of the 5th of May last, in having saved the life of Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, his commanding officer, who during the action at Bareilly on that day had been knocked from his horse, when three fanatics rushed upon him. Colour-Sergeant Gardner ran out, and in a moment bayoneted two of them, and was in the act of attacking the third when he was shot down by another soldier of the regiment.—Letter from Captain Macpherson, 42nd Regiment, to Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, commanding that regiment.

Private WALTER COOK and Private DUNCAN MILLAR.—Date of acts of bravery, 15th January, 1859.—In the action at Maylah Ghaut, on the 15th of January, 1859, Brigadier-General Walpole reports that the conduct of Privates Cook and Millar deserves to be particularly pointed out. At the time the fight was the severest, and the few men of the 42nd Regiment were skirmishing so close to the enemy, who were in great numbers, that some of the men were wounded by sword cuts, and the only officer with the 42nd was carried to the rear, severely wounded, and the Colour-Sergeant was killed, these soldiers went to the front, took a prominent part in directing the company, and displayed a courage, coolness, and discipline which was the admiration of all who witnessed it.

Forty-fourth Regiment.

Sergeant (No. 2802) WILLIAM M'WHEENEY.—Volunteered as sharpshooter at the commencement of the siege, and was in charge of the party of the 44th Regiment; was always vigilant and active, and signalised himself on the 20th October, 1854, when one of his party, Private John Keane, 44th Regiment, was dangerously wounded in the Woronzoff Road, at the time the sharpshooters were repulsed from the Quarries by overwhelming numbers. Sergeant M'Wheeney, on his return, took the wounded man on his back, and brought him to a place of safety. This was under a very heavy fire. He was also the means of saving the life of Corporal Courtenay. This man was one of the sharpshooters, and was severely wounded in the head, 5th December, 1854. Sergeant M'Wheeney brought him from under fire, and dug up a slight cover with his bayonet, where the two remained until dark, when they retired. Sergeant M'Wheeney volunteered for the advanced guard of General Eyre's Brigade, in the Cemetery, on the 18th June, 1855, and was never absent from duty during the war.

Forty-seventh Regiment.

Private (No. 2040) McDERMOND.—For saving the life of Colonel Haly, on the 5th November, 1854, by his intrepid conduct in rushing up to his rescue when lying on the ground disabled and surrounded by a party of Russians, and killing the man who had disabled him.

Forty-ninth Regiment.

Lieutenant JOHN AUGUSTUS CONOLLY (now Captain and Brevet-Major Coldstream Guards).—Date of act of bravery, 26th October, 1854.—In the attack by the Russians against the position held by the Second Division, 26th October, 1854, Major Conolly—then a Lieutenant in the 49th Foot,—while in command of a company of that regiment on outlying picquet, made himself most conspicuous by the gallantry of his behaviour. He came particularly under the observation of the late Field Marshal Lord Raglan, while in personal encounter with several Russians in defence of his post. He ultimately fell dangerously wounded. Lieutenant Conolly was highly praised in General Orders, and promoted into the Coldstream Guards as a reward for his exemplary behaviour on this occasion.

Corporal JAMES OWENS.—Greatly distinguished himself on the 30th October, 1854, in personal encounter with the Russians, and nobly assisted Major Conolly, Coldstream Guards.

Sergeant GEORGE WALTERS.—Highly distinguished himself at the Battle of Inkermann, in having rescued Brigadier-General Adams, C.B., when surrounded by Russians, one of whom he bayoneted.

Fifty-second Regiment.

Bugler ROBERT HAWTHORNE.—Date of act of bravery, September 14th, 1857.—Bugler Hawthorne, who accompanied the explosion party, not only performed the dangerous duty on which he was employed, but previously attached himself to Lieutenant Salkeld, of the Engineers, when dangerously wounded, bound up his wounds under a heavy musketry fire, and had him removed without further injury.—General Order of Major-General Sir Archdale Wilson, Bart., K.C.B., dated Head Quarters, Delhi City, September 21st, 1857.

Lance-Corporal HENRY SMITH.—Date of act of bravery, September 14th, 1857.—Lance-Corporal Smith most gallantly carried away a wounded comrade under a heavy fire of grape and musketry on the Chaundee Chouck, in the city of Delhi, on the morning of the assault on the 14th September, 1857.—General Order of Major-General Sir Archdale Wilson, Bart., K.C.B., dated Head Quarters, Delhi City, September 21st, 1857.

Fifty-third Regiment.

Lieutenant ALFRED KIRKE FFRENCH.—Date of act of bravery, 16th November, 1857.—For conspicuous bravery on the 16th of November, 1857, at the taking of the Secundra Bagh, Lucknow, when in command of the grenadier company, being one of the first to enter the building. His conduct was highly praised by the whole company. Elected by the officers of the regiment.

Private J. KENNY.—Date of act of bravery, 16th November, 1857.—For conspicuous bravery at the taking of the Secundra Bagh, at Lucknow, on the 16th of November, 1857, and for volunteering to bring up ammunition to his company under a very severe cross fire. Elected by the private soldiers of the regiment.

Private C. IRWIN.—Date of act of bravery, 16th November, 1857.—For conspicuous bravery at the assault of the Secundra Bagh, at Lucknow, on the 16th of November, 1857. Although severely wounded through the right shoulder, he was one of the first men of the 53rd Regiment who entered the buildings under a very severe fire. Elected by the private soldiers of the regiment.

Sergeant-Major (now Ensign) CHARLES PYE.—Date of act of bravery, 17th November, 1857.—For steadiness and fearless conduct under fire, at Lucknow, on the 17th of November, 1857, when bringing up ammunition to the mess-house, and on every occasion when the regiment had been engaged. Elected by the officers of the regiment.

Fifty-fifth Regiment.

Private THOMAS BEACH.—For conspicuous gallantry at the Battle of Inkermann, 5th November, 1854, when on picquet, in attacking several Russians who were plundering Lieutenant-Colonel Carpenter, 41st Regiment, who was lying wounded on the ground. He killed two of the Russians, and protected Lieutenant-Colonel Carpenter until the arrival of some men of the 41st Regiment.

Brevet-Major FREDERICK C. ELTON (now Major of a Depot Battalion).—For distinguished conduct on the night of the 4th August, 1855, when in command of a working party in the advanced trenches in front of the Quarries, in encouraging and inciting his men, by his example, to work under a dreadful fire; and, when there was some hesitation shown, in con-

sequence of the severity of the fire, going into the open, and working with pick and shovel—thus showing the best possible example to the men. In the words of one of them, "There was not another officer in the British army who would have done what Major Elton did that night." In the month of March, 1855, Major Elton volunteered with a small party of men, to drive off a body of Russians who were destroying one of our new detached works, and succeeded in doing so, taking prisoner one of the enemy with his own hands. On the night of the 7th June, 1855, Major Elton was the first of his party to leave our trenches leading his men; when in the Quarries, he several times rallied his men around him.

Fifty-seventh Regiment.

Colour-Sergeant GEORGE GARDINER.—Date of acts of bravery, 22nd March and 18th June, 1855.—For distinguished coolness and gallantry upon the occasion of a sortie by the enemy, and when he was acting as orderly sergeant to the Field Officers of the trenches—left attack upon Sevastopol—in having rallied the covering parties which had been driven in by the Russians, thus regaining and keeping possession of the trenches. Also for unflinching and devoted courage in the attack on the Redan on 18th June, 1855, in having remained and encouraged others to remain in the holes made by the explosion of shells, from whence, by making parapets of the dead bodies of their comrades, they kept up a continuous fire until their ammunition was exhausted, thus clearing the enemy from the parapet of the Redan. This was done under a fire in which nearly half the officers and a third of the rank and file of the party of the regiment were placed *hors-de-combat*.

Private (No. 1971) CHARLES M'CORRIE.—On the night of the 23rd June, 1855, he threw over the parapet a live shell, which had been thrown from the enemy's battery.

Sixtieth Rifles.

Private V. BAMBRICK (1st Battalion).—Date of act of bravery, 6th May, 1858.—For conspicuous bravery at Bareilly, on the 6th of May, 1858, when in a serai, he was attacked by three Ghazees, one of whom he cut down. He was wounded twice on this occasion.

Sixty-fourth Regiment.

Drummer THOMAS FLINN.—Date of act of bravery, 28th November, 1857.—For conspicuous gallantry in the charge on the enemy's guns on the 28th November, 1857, when, being himself wounded, he engaged in a hand to hand encounter two of the rebel artillerymen.

Sixty-eighth Regiment.

Captain T. DE COURCY HAMILTON (now Major, unattached).—For having, on the night of the 11th May, 1855, during a most determined sortie, boldly charged the enemy, with a small force from a battery of which they had obtained possession in great numbers, thereby saving the works from falling into the hands of the enemy. He was conspicuous on this occasion for his gallantry and daring conduct.

Private JOHN BYRNE.—At the Battle of Inkermann, when the regiment was ordered to retire, Private John Byrne went back towards the enemy, and, at the risk of his own life, brought in a wounded soldier, under fire. On the 11th May, 1855, he bravely engaged in a hand to hand contest with one of the enemy on the parapet of the work he was defending—prevented the entrance of the enemy, killed his antagonist, and captured his arms.

Seventy-fifth Regiment.

Ensign (now Lieutenant) RICHARD WADESON.—Date of act of bravery, 18th July, 1857.—For conspicuous bravery at Delhi on the 18th July, 1857, when the regiment was engaged in the Subjee Munde, in having saved the life of Private Michael Farrell, when attacked by a sowar of the enemy's cavalry, and killing the sowar. Also, on the same day, for rescuing Private John Barry, of the same regiment, when, wounded and helpless, he was attacked by a cavalry sowar, whom Ensign Wadeson killed.

Private PATRICK GREEN.—Date of act of bravery, 11th September, 1857.—The Commander-in-Chief in India is pleased to approve that the under-mentioned soldier be presented, in the name of Her Most Gracious Majesty, with a Medal of the Victoria Cross, for valour and daring in the field, viz.—Private Patrick Green, Her Majesty's 75th Foot, for having, on the 11th Sep-

tember, 1857, when the picket at Koodsia Baugh, at Delhi was hotly pressed by a large body of the enemy, successfully rescued a comrade who had fallen wounded as a skirmisher.—Extract from a General Order issued by the Commander-in-Chief in India, dated Head Quarters, Allahabad, July 28th, 1858.

Seventy-seventh Regiment.

Sergeant (No. 2600) JOHN PARK.—For conspicuous bravery at the Battles of Alma and Inkermann. Highly distinguished at the taking of the Russian rifle pits, on the night of the 19th April, 1855. His valour, during that attack, called forth the approbation of the late Colonel Egerton. He was severely wounded. Remarkd for determined resolution at both attacks on the Redan.

Private (No. 2239) ALEXANDER WRIGHT.—For conspicuous bravery through the whole Crimean war. Highly distinguished on the night of the 22nd March, 1855, in repelling a sortie. Highly distinguished at the taking of the Russian rifle pits, on the night of the 19th April, 1855; remarked for the great encouragement he gave the men while holding the pits under a terrible fire. He was wounded. Highly distinguished on the 30th August, 1855 (wounded).

Seventy-eighth Regiment.

Lieutenant J. P. H. CROWE (now Captain 10th Foot).—For being the first to enter the redoubt at Bourzekee Chowkee, the entrenched village in front of the Buserut-gunge, on the 12th August.—Telegram from the late Major-General Havelock to the Commander-in-Chief in India, dated Cawnpore, 18th August, 1857.

Lieutenant HERBERT TAYLOR MACPHERSON (now Captain and Brevet-Major 82nd Foot).—Date of act of bravery, 25th September, 1857.—For distinguished conduct at Lucknow, on the 25th September, 1857, in setting an example of heroic gallantry to the men of the regiment at the period of the action in which they captured two brass nine-pounders at the point of the bayonet.—Extract from Field Force Orders of the late Major-General Havelock, dated 17th October, 1857.

Assistant-Surgeon VALENTINE M. McMASTER.—Date of act of

bravery, 25th September, 1857.—For the intrepidity with which he exposed himself to the fire of the enemy, in bringing in and attending to the wounded on the 25th of September, at Lucknow.—Extract from Field Force Orders of the late Major-General Havelock, dated 17th October, 1857.

Colour-Sergeant STEWART M'PHERSON.—Date of act of bravery, 26th September, 1857.—For daring gallantry in the Lucknow Residency on the 26th September, 1857, in having rescued, at great personal risk, a wounded private of his company, who was lying in a most exposed situation under a very heavy fire. Colour-Sergeant M'Pherson was also distinguished on many occasions by his coolness and gallantry in action.

Private HENRY WARD.—Date of act of bravery, 25th and 26th September, 1857.—For his gallant and devoted conduct in having on the night of the 25th, and morning of the 26th of September, 1857, remained by the dooly of Lieutenant H. M. Havelock, 10th Foot, Deputy Assistant-Adjutant-General Field Force, who was severely wounded, and on the morning of the 26th of September, escorted that officer and Private Thomas Pilkington, 78th Highlanders, who was also wounded, and had taken refuge in the same dooly, through a very heavy cross fire of ordnance and musketry. This soldier remained by the side of the dooly, and by his example and exertions kept the dooly bearers from dropping their double load throughout the heavy fire, with the same steadiness as if on parade, thus saving the lives of both, and bringing them in safety to the Baillie Guard.—Extract from Divisional Orders of Major-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., dated 27th October, 1857.

Private JAMES HOLLOWELL.—Date of act of bravery, 26th September, 1857.—A party, on the 26th of September, 1857, was shut up and besieged in a house in the city of Lucknow by the rebel sepoys. Private James Hollowell, one of the party, behaved throughout the day in the most admirable manner; he directed, encouraged, and led the others, exposing himself fearlessly, and, by his talent in persuading and cheering, prevailed on nine dispirited men to make a successful defence in a burning house with the enemy firing through four windows.—Extract from Divisional Orders of Major-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., dated 14th October, 1857.

Eighty-fourth Regiment.

Captain the Hon. AUGUSTUS HENRY ARCHIBALD ANSON (now of the 7th Hussars).—Dates of acts of bravery, 28th September and 16th November, 1857.—For conspicuous bravery at Boolundshuhur on the 28th September, 1857. The 9th Light Dragoons had charged through the town, and were reforming in the Serai; the enemy attempted to close the entrance by drawing their carts across it, so as to shut in the cavalry, and form a cover from which to fire upon them. Captain Anson, taking a lance, dashed out of the gateway, and knocked the drivers off their carts. Owing to a wound in his left hand, received at Delhi, he could not stop his horse, and rode into the middle of the enemy, who fired a volley at him, one ball passing through his coat. At Lucknow, at the assault of the Secundra Bagh, on 16th November, 1857, he entered with the storming party on the gates being burst open. He had his horse killed, and was himself slightly wounded. He has shown the greatest gallantry on every occasion, and has slain many enemies in fight.—Despatch from Major-General Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B., dated 12th August, 1858.

Sergeant-Major GEORGE LAMBERT (now Lieutenant and Adjutant 84th Foot).—Dates of acts of bravery, 29th July, 16th August, and 25th September, 1857.—For distinguished conduct, at Onao, on the 29th of July; at Bithoor, on the 16th of August; and at Lucknow, on the 25th of September.—Extract from Field Force Orders of the late Major-General Havelock, dated 17th October, 1857.

Lance-Corporal ABRAHAM BOULGER.—Date of acts of bravery, from 12th July to 25th September, 1857.—For distinguished bravery and forwardness, as a skirmisher, in all the twelve actions fought between 12th July and 25th September, 1857.—Extract from Field Force Orders of the late Major-General Havelock, dated 17th October, 1857.

Private JOEL HOLMES.—For distinguished conduct in volunteering to assist in working a gun of Captain Maude's battery, under a heavy fire, from which gun nearly all the artillerymen had been shot away.—Extract from Field Force Orders of the late Major-General Havelock, dated 17th October, 1857.

Lance-Corporal SINNOTT.—Date of act of bravery, 6th October, 1857.—For conspicuous gallantry at Lucknow, on the 6th of October, 1857, in going out with Sergeants Glinn and Mullins, and Private Mullins, to rescue Lieutenant Gibaut, who, in carrying out water to extinguish a fire in the breastwork, had been mortally wounded, and lay outside. They brought in the body under a heavy fire. Lance-Corporal Sinnott was twice wounded. His comrades unanimously elected him for the Victoria Cross, as the most worthy. He had previously repeatedly accompanied Lieutenant Gibaut when he carried out water to extinguish the fire.—Despatch from Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, Bart., G.C.B., dated 2nd December, 1857.

Private P. MYLOTT.—For being foremost in rushing across a road, under a shower of balls, to take an opposite enclosure; and for gallant conduct at every engagement at which he was present with his regiment, from 12th of July, 1857, to the relief of the garrison. Elected by the private soldiers of the regiment.

Eighty-sixth Regiment.

Lieutenant and Adjutant HUGH STEWART COCHRANE (now Captain 7th Foot).—Date of act of bravery, 1st April, 1858.—For conspicuous gallantry near Jhansi, on the 1st April, 1858, when No. 1 company of the regiment was ordered to take a gun, in dashing forward at a gallop, under a heavy musketry and artillery fire, driving the enemy from the gun, and keeping possession of it till the company came up. Also for conspicuous gallantry in attacking the rear-guard of the enemy, when he had three horses shot under him in succession.—Despatch from Major-General Sir Hugh Henry Rose, G.C.B., dated 23rd April, 1858.

Ninetieth Regiment.

Sergeant ANDREW MOYNIHAN (now Lieutenant 8th Foot).—At the assault of the Redan, 8th September, 1855, he personally encountered and killed five Russians. Rescued from near the Redan a wounded officer, under a heavy fire.

Lieutenant and Adjutant WILLIAM RENNIE.—Dates of acts of bravery, 21st and 25th September, 1857.—For conspicuous gal-

lantry in the advance upon Lucknow, under the late Major-General Havelock, on the 21st of September, 1857, in having charged the enemy's guns in advance of the skirmishers of the 90th Light Infantry, under a heavy musketry fire, and prevented them dragging off one gun, which was consequently captured. For conspicuous gallantry at Lucknow on the 25th of September, 1857, in having charged in advance of the 90th column, in the face of a heavy fire of grape, and forced the enemy to abandon their guns.

Private (No. 2932) JOHN ALEXANDER.—After the attack on the Redan, 18th June, 1855, went out of the trenches, under a very heavy fire, and brought in several wounded men. Also, when with a working party in the most advanced trench, on the 6th of September, 1855, went out in front of the trenches, under a very heavy fire, and assisted in bringing in Captain Buckley, Scots Fusilier Guards, lying dangerously wounded.

Surgeon ANTHONY DICKSON HOME (now Staff-Surgeon).—Date of act of bravery, 26th September, 1857.—For persevering bravery and admirable conduct in charge of the wounded men left behind the column, when the troops under the late Major-General Havelock forced their way into the Residency of Lucknow, on the 26th September, 1857. The escort left with the wounded, had, by casualties, been reduced to a few stragglers; and, being entirely separated from the column, this small party with the wounded were forced into a house, in which they defended themselves till it was set on fire. They then retreated to a shed a few yards from it, and in this place continued to defend themselves for more than twenty-two hours, till relieved. At last, only six men and Mr. Home remained to fire. Of four officers who were with the party, all were badly wounded, and three are since dead. The conduct of the defence during the latter part of the time devolved therefore on Mr. Home; and to his active exertions, previously to being forced into the house, and his good conduct throughout, the safety of any of the wounded, and the successful defence is mainly to be attributed.

Assistant-Surgeon WM. BRADSHAW (now 32nd Foot).—Date of act of bravery, 26th September, 1857.—For intrepidity and good conduct when ordered with Surgeon Home, 90th Regiment, to remove the wounded men left behind the column that

forced its way into the Residency of Lucknow, on the 26th September, 1857. The dooly bearers had left the doolies, but by great exertions, and notwithstanding the close proximity of the sepoy, Surgeon Home and Assistant-Surgeon Bradshaw got some of the bearers together, and Assistant-Surgeon Bradshaw with about twenty doolies, becoming separated from the rest of the party, succeeded in reaching the Residency in safety by the river bank.

Major (now Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel) JOHN CHRISTOPHER GUISE.—Dates of acts of bravery, 16th and 17th November, 1857.—For conspicuous gallantry in action on the 16th and 17th of November, 1857, at Lucknow. Elected by the officers of the regiment.

Sergeant S. HILL.—Dates of acts of bravery, 16th and 17th November, 1857.—For gallant conduct on the 16th and 17th of November, 1857, at the storming of the Secundra Bagh at Lucknow, in saving the life of Captain Irby, warding off with his firelock a tulwar cut made at his head by a sepoy, and in going out under a heavy fire to help two wounded men. Also for general gallant conduct throughout the operations for the relief of the Lucknow garrison. Elected by the non-commissioned officers of the regiment.

Private P. GRAHAM.—Date of act of bravery, 17th November, 1857.—For bringing in a wounded comrade under a very heavy fire, on the 17th of November, 1857, at Lucknow. Elected by the private soldiers of the regiment.

Ninety-third Regiment.

Captain WILLIAM GEORGE DRUMMOND STEWART (now Major, unattached).—Date of act of bravery, 16th November, 1857.—For distinguished personal gallantry at Lucknow, on the 16th November, 1857, in leading an attack upon and capturing two guns, by which the position of the mess-house was secured. Elected by the officers of the regiment.

Sergeant J. PATON.—Date of act of bravery, 16th November, 1857.—For distinguished personal gallantry at Lucknow, on the 16th of November, 1857, in proceeding alone round the Shah Nujiff under an extremely heavy fire, discovering a breach on the opposite side, to which he afterwards conducted the regiment,

by which means that important position was taken. Elected by the non-commissioned officers of the regiment.

[Lance-Corporal J. DUNLEY.—Date of act of bravery, 16th November, 1857.—For being the first man, now surviving, of the regiment, who, on the 16th November, 1857, entered one of the breaches in the Secundra Bagh, at Lucknow, with Captain Burroughs, whom he most gallantly supported against superior numbers. Elected by the private soldiers of the regiment.

Private D. MACKAY.—Date of act of bravery, 16th November, 1857.—For great personal gallantry in capturing an enemy's colour after a most obstinate resistance, at the Secundra Bagh, Lucknow, on the 16th of November, 1857. He was severely wounded afterwards at the capture of the Shah Nujiff. Elected by the private soldiers of the regiment.

Private P. GRANT.—Date of act of bravery, 16th November, 1857.—For great personal gallantry, on the 16th of November, 1857, at the Secundra Bagh, in killing five of the enemy with one of their own swords, who were attempting to follow Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart, when that officer was carrying a colour which he had captured. Elected by the private soldiers of the regiment.

Lieutenant and Adjutant (now Captain) WILLIAM McBEAN.—Date of act of bravery, 11th March, 1858.—For distinguished personal bravery in killing eleven of the enemy with his own hand in the main breach of the Begum Bagh, at Lucknow, on the 11th of March, 1858.

Ninety-seventh Regiment.

Sergeant JOHN COLEMAN.—Conspicuous for great coolness and bravery on the night of the 30th August, 1855, when the enemy attacked a "New Sap" and drove the working party in; he remained in the open, perfectly exposed to the enemy's rifle pits until all around him had been killed or wounded. He finally carried one of his officers, who was mortally wounded, to the rear.

Brevet-Major CHARLES HENRY LUMLEY (afterwards Major 23rd Fusiliers; since dead).—For having distinguished himself highly by his bravery at the assault on the Redan, 8th September, 1858, being among the first inside the work, where he was immediately engaged with three Russian gunners reloading a field

piece, who attacked him ; he shot two of them with his revolver, when he was knocked down by a stone, which stunned him for the moment, but, on recovery, he drew his sword, and was in the act of cheering the men on, when he received a ball in his mouth, which wounded him most severely.

Rifle Brigade.

FIRST BATTALION.

Brevet-Major Hon. HENRY H. CLIFFORD (now Major and Brevet Lieut.-Colonel, unattached).—For conspicuous courage at the Battle of Inkermann, in leading a charge and killing one of the enemy with his sword, disabling another, and saving the life of a soldier.

Lieutenant (now Captain and Brevet-Major) CLAUDE THOMAS BOUCHIER.—Highly distinguished at the capture of the Rifle Pits, 20th November, 1854. His gallant conduct was recorded in the French General Orders.

First Lieutenant (now Captain) WILLIAM JAMES CUNINGHAME.—Highly distinguished at the capture of the Rifle Pits, 20th November, 1854. His gallant conduct was recorded in the French General Orders.

Private F. WHEATLEY.—For throwing a live shell over the parapet of the trenches.

SECOND BATTALION.

Private (No. 2074) R. MCGREGOR.—For courageous conduct when employed as a sharpshooter in the advanced trenches in the month of July, 1855 ; a rifle pit was occupied by two Russians, who annoyed our troops by their fire. Private McGregor crossed the open space under fire, and taking cover under a rock, dislodged them, and occupied the pit.

Private (No. 2638) ROBERT HUMPHSTON.—A Russian rifle pit, situated among the rocks overhanging the Woronzoff road, between the third parallel, right attack, and the Quarries (at that period in possession of the enemy), was occupied every night by the Russians, and their riflemen commanded a portion of the left attack, and impeded the work in a new battery then being erected on the extreme right front of the second parallel, left attack. It was carried in daylight on the 22nd of April, 1855, by two riflemen, one of whom was Private Humphston ; he received a gratuity

of £5, and was promoted. The rifle pit was subsequently destroyed on further support being obtained.

Private (No. 3471) JOSEPH BRADSHAW.—A Russian rifle pit, situated among the rocks overhanging the Woronzoff road, between the third parallel, right attack, and the Quarries (at that period in possession of the enemy, was occupied every night by the Russians, and their riflemen commanded a portion of the left attack, and impeded the work in a new battery then being erected on the extreme right front of the second parallel, left attack. It was carried in daylight on the 22nd of April, 1858, by two riflemen, one of whom was Private Bradshaw; he has since received the French War Medal. The rifle pit was subsequently destroyed on further support being obtained.

Captain (now Brevet-Major) HENRY WILMOT, Corporal W. NASH, and Private DAVID HAWKES.—Date of act of bravery, 11th March, 1858.—For conspicuous gallantry at Lucknow, on the 11th March, 1858. Captain Wilmot's company was engaged with a large body of the enemy near the Iron Bridge. That officer found himself at the end of a street with only four of his men, opposed to a considerable body. One of the four was shot through both legs and became utterly helpless; the two men lifted him up, and although Private Hawkes was severely wounded, he carried him for a considerable distance, exposed to the fire of the enemy, Captain Wilmot firing with the men's rifles and covering the retreat of the party.—Despatch of Brigadier General Walpole, C.B., dated 20th March, 1858.

THIRD BATTALION.

Private SAME SHAW.—Date of act of bravery, 13th June, 1858.—For the act of bravery recorded in a despatch from Major-General James Hope Grant, K.C.B., commanding the Lucknow Field Force, to the Deputy-Adjutant General of the army, of which the following is an extract:—"Nowabgunge, 17th June, 1858.—I have to bring to notice the conduct of Private Same Shaw, of the 3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade, who is recommended by his commanding officer for the Victoria Cross. An armed rebel had been seen to enter a tope of trees. Some officers and men ran into the tope in pursuit of him. The man was a Ghazee. Private Shaw drew his short sword, and with that weapon rushed single-handed on the Ghazee. Shaw received a severe ~~talwar~~

wound, but after a desperate struggle he killed the man. I trust his excellency will allow me to recommend this man for the Victoria Cross, and that he will approve of my having issued a Division Order, stating that I have done so."

Royal Marines.

Lieutenant GEORGE DARE DOWELL, R.M.A.—An explosion having occurred in one of the rocket boats of the "Arrogant," during the attack on some forts near Viborg, Lieutenant Dowell (who was on board the "Ruby" gunboat, while his own boat was receiving a supply of rockets) was the first to jump into the quarter-boat of the "Ruby," and with three volunteers, himself pulling the stroke-oar, proceeded instantly, under a heavy fire of grape and musketry, to the assistance of the cutter's crew. The Russians endeavoured to prevent his object of saving the men and boat, but Lieutenant Dowell succeeded in taking up three of the boat's crew and placing them on board the "Ruby;" and, on his returning to the spot, was mainly instrumental in keeping afloat and bringing off the sinking cutter.—Despatch from Rear-Admiral Honourable Sir R. S. Dundas, 17th July, 1855, and letter from Colonel Wesley, Deputy Adjutant-General of Royal Marines.

Corporal JOHN PRETTYJOHN, R.M.—Reported for gallantry at the Battle of Inkermann, having placed himself in an advanced position, and noticed as having himself shot four Russians.—Despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkins, Senior Officer of Marines engaged at Inkermann, and letter from Colonel Wesley, Deputy Adjutant-General.

Bombardier THOMAS WILKINSON, R.M.A.—Specially recommended for gallant conduct in the advanced batteries, 7th June, 1855, in placing sand-bags to repair the work under a galling fire; his name having been sent up on the occasion, as worthy of special notice, by the commanding officer of the artillery of the right attack.—Letter from Colonel Wesley, Deputy Adjutant-General Royal Marines.

Naval Brigade.

JOHN HARRISON and Lieutenant (now Commander) NOWELL SALMON.—Date of act of bravery, 16th November, 1857.—For conspicuous gallantry at Lucknow, on the 16th of November,

1857, in climbing up a tree, touching the angle of the Shah Nujiff, to reply to the fire of the enemy, for which most dangerous service the late Captain Peel, K.C.B., had called for volunteers.

EDWARD ROBINSON, A.B.—Date of act of bravery, 13th March, 1858.—For conspicuous bravery in having, at Lucknow, on the 13th of March, 1858, under a heavy musketry fire, within fifty yards, jumped on the sand-bags of a battery, and extinguished a fire among them. He was dangerously wounded in performing this service.

Bengal Horse Artillery.

Gunner WILLIAM CONNOLLY.—Date of act of bravery, July 7th, 1857.—This soldier is recommended for the Victoria Cross for his gallantry in action with the enemy at Jhelum, on the 7th of July, 1857. Lieutenant Cookes, Bengal Horse Artillery, reports, that “about daybreak on that day I advanced my half troop at a gallop, and engaged the enemy within easy musket range. The sponge-man of one of my guns having been shot during the advance, Gunner Connolly assumed the duties of second sponge-man, and he had barely assisted in two discharges of his gun, when a musket ball through the left thigh felled him to the ground. Nothing daunted by pain and loss of blood, he was endeavouring to resume his post, when I ordered a movement in retirement, and though severely wounded, he was mounted on his horse in the gun-team, and rode to the next position which the guns took up, and manfully declined going to the rear when the necessity of his so doing was represented to him. About eleven o'clock a.m., when the guns were still in action, the same gunner, while sponging, was again knocked down by a musket ball striking him on the hip, thereby causing great faintness and partial unconsciousness, for the pain appeared excessive, and the blood flowed fast. On seeing this I gave directions for his removal out of action; but this brave man, hearing me, staggered to his feet, and said, ‘No, sir, I’ll not go there while I can work here;’ and shortly afterwards he again resumed his post as sponge-man. Later in the afternoon of the same day my three guns were engaged at 100 yards from the walls of a village with the defenders, viz., the Fourteenth Native Infantry, mutineers, amid a storm of bullets,

which did great execution. Gunner Connolly, though suffering severely from his two previous wounds, was wielding his sponge with an energy and courage which attracted the admiration of his comrades, and while cheerfully encouraging a wounded man to hasten in bringing up the ammunition, a musket ball tore through the muscles of his right leg ; but with the most undaunted bravery he struggled on ; and not till he had loaded six times did this man give way, when through loss of blood he fell in my arms, and I placed him on a waggon, which shortly afterwards bore him in a state of unconsciousness from the fight."

Captain GEORGE ALEXANDER RENNY.—Date of act of bravery, 16th September, 1857.—Lieutenant-Colonel Farquhar, commanding the 1st Belooch Regiment, reports that he was in command of the troops stationed in the Delhi Magazine after its capture on the 16th of September, 1857. Early in the forenoon of that day a vigorous attack was made on the post by the enemy, and was kept up with great violence for some time without the slightest chance of success. Under cover of a heavy cross fire from the high houses on the right flank of the magazine, and from Selinghur and the Palace, the enemy advanced to the high wall of the magazine, and endeavoured to set fire to a thatched roof. The roof was partially set fire to, which was extinguished at the spot by a sepoy of the Belooch Battalion, a soldier of the 61st Regiment having in vain attempted to do so. The roof having been again set on fire, Captain Renny, with great gallantry, mounted to the top of the wall of the magazine, and flung several shells with lighted fuzes over into the midst of the enemy, which had an almost immediate effect, as the attack at once became feeble at that point, and soon after ceased there.

Sergeant BERNARD DIAMOND and Gunner RICHARD FITZGERALD.—Date of act of bravery, September 28, 1857.—For an act of valour performed in action against the rebels and mutineers at Boolundshuhur, on the 28th of September, 1857, when these two soldiers evinced the most determined bravery in working their gun under a very heavy fire of musketry, whereby they cleared the road of the enemy, after every other man belonging to it had been either killed or disabled by wounds.—Despatch of Major Turner, Bengal Horse Artillery, dated Boolundshuhur, October 2, 1857.

Bengal Artillery.

Lieutenant-Colonel (now Colonel) HENRY TOMBS, C.B., and Lieutenant JAMES HILLS.—Date of act of bravery, July 9th, 1857.—For very gallant conduct on the part of Lieutenant Hills before Delhi in defending the position assigned to him in case of alarm, and for noble behaviour on the part of Lieutenant-Colonel Tombs in twice coming to his subaltern's rescue, and on each occasion killing his man.—See Despatch of Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie, commanding 1st Brigade of Horse Artillery, dated Camp near Delhi, 10th of July, 1857, published in the Supplement to the London Gazette of the 16th of January, 1858.

Captain (now Lieut.-Colonel) WILLIAM OLPHERTS, C.B.—Date of act of bravery, 25th September, 1857.—For highly distinguished conduct on the 25th of September, 1857, when the troops penetrated into the city of Lucknow, in having charged on horseback, with Her Majesty's 90th Regiment, when, gallantly headed by Colonel Campbell, it captured two guns in the face of a heavy fire of grape, and having afterwards returned, under a severe fire of musketry, to bring up limbers and horses to carry off the captured ordnance, which he accomplished.—Extract from Field Force Orders of the late Major-General Havelock, dated 17th October, 1857.

Bombardier J. THOMAS (1st Battalion).—Date of act of bravery, 27th September, 1857.—For distinguished gallantry at Lucknow, on the 27th September, 1857, in having brought off on his back, under a heavy fire, under circumstances of considerable difficulty, a wounded soldier of the Madras Fusiliers, when the party to which he was attached was returning to the Residency from a sortie, whereby he saved him from falling into the hands of the enemy.

Lieutenant HASTINGS EDWARD HARRINGTON, Rough Rider E. JENNINGS, Gunner J. PARK, Gunner T. LAUGHMAN, and Gunner H. McINNES.—Date of acts of bravery, from 14th to 22nd November, 1857.—Elected respectively under the 13th clause of the Royal Warrant of the 29th of January, 1856, by the officers and non-commissioned officers generally, and by the private soldiers of each troop or battery, for conspicuous gallantry at the relief of Lucknow, from the 14th to the 22nd of November, 1857.

Lieutenant FREDERICK SLEIGH ROBERTS.—Date of act of

bravery, 2nd January, 1858.—Lieutenant Roberts's gallantry has on every occasion been most marked. On following up the retreating enemy on the 2nd January, 1858, at Khodagunge, he saw in the distance two sepoy going away with a standard. Lieutenant Roberts put spurs to his horse, and overtook them just as they were about to enter a village. They immediately turned round and presented their muskets at him, and one of the men pulled the trigger, but fortunately the caps snapped, and the standard-bearer was cut down by this gallant young officer, and the standard taken possession of by him. He also, on the same day, cut down another sepoy who was standing at bay, with musket and bayonet, keeping off a sowar. Lieutenant Roberts rode to the assistance of the horseman, and rushing at the sepoy, with one blow of his sword cut him across the face, killing him on the spot.

First Bengal Engineers.

MEMORANDUM.—Lieutenants DUNCAN CHARLES HOME and PHILIP SALKELD, Bengal Engineers, upon whom the Victoria Cross was provisionally conferred by Major-General Sir Archdale Wilson, Bart., K.C.B., for their conspicuous bravery in the performance of the desperate duty of blowing in the Cashmere Gate of the fortress of Delhi, in broad daylight, under a heavy fire of musketry, on the morning of the 14th September, 1857, preparatory to the assault, would have been recommended to Her Majesty for confirmation in that distinction had they survived.

Lieutenant JOHN JAMES M'LEOD INNES.—Date of act of bravery, 23rd February, 1858.—At the action at Sultanpore, Lieutenant Innes, far in advance of the leading skirmishers, was the first to secure a gun which the enemy were abandoning. Retiring from this, they rallied round another gun further back, from which the shot would, in another instant, have plunged through our advancing columns, when Lieutenant Innes rode up, unsupported, shot the gunner who was about to apply the match, and, remaining undaunted at his post, the mark for a hundred matchlock men, who were sheltered in some adjoining huts, kept the artillerymen at bay, until assistance reached him.—Letter from Major-General Thomas Harte Franks, K.C.B., of 12th March, 1858.

Sergeant JOHN SMITH (Bengal Sappers and Miners).—Date of act of bravery, September 14th, 1857.—For conspicuous gallantry, in conjunction with Lieutenants Home and Salkeld, in the performance of the desperate duty of blowing in the Cashmere Gate of the fortress of Delhi in broad daylight, under a heavy and destructive fire of musketry, on the morning of the 14th of September, 1857, preparatory to the assault.—General Order of Major-General Sir Archdale Wilson, Bart., K.C.B., dated Head Quarters, Delhi City, September 21st, 1857,

First Bengal European Light Cavalry.

Lieutenant HUGH HENRY GOUGH.—Dates of acts of bravery, 12th November, 1857, and 25th February, 1858.—Lieutenant Gough, when in command of a party of Hodson's Horse, near Alumbagh, on the 12th of November, 1857, particularly distinguished himself by his forward bearing in charging across a swamp, and capturing two guns, although defended by a vastly superior body of the enemy. On this occasion he had his horse wounded in two places, and his turban cut through by sword cuts, whilst engaged in combat with three sepoy. Lieutenant Gough also particularly distinguished himself near Jellalabad, Lucknow, on the 25th of February, 1858, by showing a brilliant example to his regiment, when ordered to charge the enemy's guns, and by his gallant and forward conduct he enabled them to effect their object. On this occasion he engaged himself in a series of single combats, until at length he was disabled by a musket-ball through the leg, while charging two sepoy with fixed bayonets. Lieutenant Gough on this day had two horses killed under him, a shot through his helmet and another through his scabbard, besides being severely wounded.

First Bengal European Fusiliers.

Private JOHN M'GOVERN.—Date of act of bravery, 23rd June, 1857.—For gallant conduct during the operations before Delhi, but more especially on the 23rd of June, 1857, when he carried into camp a wounded comrade under a very heavy fire from the enemy's battery, at the risk of his own life.

Sergeant J. M'GUIRE and Drummer M. RYAN.—Date of act of bravery, 14th September, 1857.—At the assault on Delhi on the

14th September, 1857, when the brigade had reached the Cabul Gate, the 1st Fusiliers and 75th Regiment and some Sikhs were waiting for orders, and some of the regiments were getting ammunition served out (three boxes of which exploded from some cause not clearly known, and two others were in a state of ignition), when Sergeant M'Guire and Drummer Ryan rushed into the burning mass, and, seizing the boxes, threw them, one after the other, over the parapet into the water. The confusion consequent on the explosion was very great, and the crowd of soldiers and native followers, who did not know where the danger lay, were rushing into certain destruction, when Sergeant M'Guire and Drummer Ryan, by their coolness and personal daring, saved the lives of many at the risk of their own.

Lieutenant THOMAS ADAIR BUTLER.—Date of act of bravery, 9th March, 1858.—“Of which success the skirmishers on the other side of the river were subsequently apprized by Lieutenant Butler of the Bengal Fusiliers, who swam across the Goomtee, and, climbing the parapet, remained in that position for a considerable time under a heavy fire of musketry until the work was occupied.”—Extract of Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram's Memorandum of operations carried on under his command at the siege of Lucknow, published in the Governor-General's Gazette Extraordinary of 5th April, 1858, and re-published in General Orders by the Commander-in-Chief in India on 27th December, 1858.

Fourth Bengal Native Infantry.

Lieutenant (now Captain) FREDERICK ROBERTSON AIKMAN.—Date of act of bravery, 1st March, 1858.—This officer, commanding the 3rd Sikh Cavalry on the advanced picquet, with 100 of his men, having obtained information, just as the force marched on the morning of the 1st of March last, of the proximity, three miles off the high road, of a body of 500 rebel infantry, 200 horse, and two guns, under Moosahib Ali Chuckbdar, attacked and utterly routed them, cutting up more than 100 men, capturing two guns, and driving the survivors into and over the Goomtee. This feat was performed under every disadvantage of broken ground, and partially under the flanking fire of an adjoining fort. Lieutenant Aikman received a severe sabre cut in the face in a personal encounter with several of the enemy.

Thirteenth Bengal Native Infantry.

Lieutenant WILLIAM GEORGE CUBITT.—Date of act of bravery, 30th June, 1857.—For having, on the retreat from Chinhut, on the 30th of June, 1857, saved the lives of three men of the 32nd Regiment, at the risk of his own.

Twenty-sixth Bengal Native Infantry.

Lieutenant HANSON CHAMBERS TAYLOR JARRETT.—Date of act of bravery, 14th October, 1858.—For an act of daring bravery at the village of Baroun, on the 14th of October, 1858, on an occasion when about seventy sepoy were defending themselves in a brick building, the only approach to which was up a very narrow street, in having called on the men of his regiment to follow him, when, backed by only some four men, he made a dash at the narrow entrance, where, though a shower of balls was poured upon him, he pushed his way up to the wall of the house, and, beating up the bayonets of the rebels with his sword, endeavoured to get in.

Thirty-seventh Bengal Native Infantry.

Sergeant-Major M. ROSAMOND.—Date of act of bravery, 4th June, 1857.—This non-commissioned officer volunteered to accompany Lieutenant Colonel Spottiswoode, commanding the 37th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, to the right of the lines, in order to set them on fire, with the view of driving out the sepoy, on the occasion of the outbreak at Benares on the evening of the 4th of June, 1857; and also volunteered, with Sergeant-Major Gill, of the Loodiana Regiment, to bring off Captain Brown, Pension Paymaster, his wife and infant, and also some others, from a detached bungalow into the barracks. His conduct was highly meritorious, and he has since been promoted.

Sixty-sixth (Ghoorkha) Bengal Native Infantry.

Lieutenant JOHN ADAM TYTLER.—Date of act of bravery, 10th February, 1858.—On the attacking parties approaching the enemy's position under a heavy fire of round shot, grape, and musketry, on the occasion of the action at Choopoorah, on the 10th of February last, Lieutenant Tytler dashed on horseback ahead of all, and alone, up to the enemy's guns, where he re-

mained engaged hand to hand, until they were carried by us; and where he was shot through the left arm, had a spear wound in his chest, and a ball through the right sleeve of his coat.—Letter from Captain C. C. G. Ross, commanding 66th (Ghoorkha) Regiment, to Captain Brownlow, Major of Brigade, Kemaon Field Force.

Bengal Veteran Establishment.

Captain GEORGE FORREST.—Date of act of bravery, 11th May, 1857.—For gallant conduct in the defence of the Delhi Magazine, on the 11th of May, 1857.

Captain WILLIAM RAYNOR.—Date of act of bravery, 11th May, 1857.—For gallant conduct in the defence of the Magazine at Delhi, on the 11th of May, 1857.

Commissariat Department—Bengal Establishment.

Deputy-Assistant Commissary of Ordnance JOHN BUCKLEY.—Date of act of bravery, 11th May, 1857.—For gallant conduct in the defence of the Magazine at Delhi, on the 11th of May, 1857.

Bengal Army, unattached.

Ensign (now Lieutenant) PATRICK RODDY.—Date of act of bravery, 27th September, 1858.—Major-General Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B., commanding Oudh Force, bears testimony to the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Roddy on several occasions. One instance is particularly mentioned. On the return from Kuthirga of the Kupperthulla Contingent on the 27th of September, 1858, this officer, when engaged with the enemy, charged a rebel (armed with a percussion musket), whom the cavalry were afraid to approach, as each time they attempted to do so the rebel knelt and covered his assailant; this, however, did not deter Lieutenant Roddy, who went boldly in, and when within six yards the rebel fired, killing Lieutenant Roddy's horse, and before he could get disengaged from the horse the rebel attempted to cut him down. Lieutenant Roddy seized the rebel until he could get at his sword, when he ran the man through the body. The rebel turned out to be a subadar of the late 8th Native Infantry,—a powerful man, and a most determined character.

First Punjaub Cavalry.

Lieutenant JOHN WATSON.—Date of act of bravery, 14th November, 1857.—Lieutenant Watson, on the 14th November, with his own squadron, and that under Captain (then Lieutenant) Probyn, came upon a body of the rebel cavalry. The *ressaldar* in command of them,—a fine specimen of the Hindustani Mussulman—and backed up by some half dozen equally brave men, rode out to the front. Lieutenant Watson, singled out this fine-looking fellow, and attacked him. The *ressaldar* presented his pistol at Lieutenant Watson's breast at a yard's distance, and fired, but most providentially without effect; the ball must, by accident, have previously fallen out. Lieutenant Watson ran the man through with his sword, and dismounted him; but the native officer, nothing daunted, drew his *tulwar*, and with his sowars renewed his attack upon Lieutenant Watson, who bravely defended himself until his own men joined in the *mêlée*, and utterly routed the party. In this rencontre, Lieutenant Watson received a blow on the head from a *tulwar*, another on the left arm, which severed his chain gauntlet glove, a *tulwar* cut on his right arm, which fortunately only divided the sleeve of the jacket, but disabled the arm for some time; a bullet also passed through his coat, and he received a blow on his leg, which lamed him for some days afterwards.—Despatch from Major-General Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B., dated 10th January, 1858.

Second Punjaub Cavalry.

Captain (now Major) DIGHTON MACNAGHTEN PROBYN, C.B.—Has been distinguished for gallantry and daring throughout this campaign. At the battle of Agra, when his squadron charged the rebel infantry, he was some time separated from his men, and surrounded by five or six sepoy. He defended himself from the various cuts made at him, and before his own men had joined him, had cut down two of his assailants. At another time, in single combat with a sepoy, he was wounded in the wrist by the bayonet, and his horse also was slightly wounded; but, though the sepoy fought desperately, he cut him down. The same day he singled out a standard-bearer, and, in presence of a number of the enemy, killed him, and captured the standard. These are only a few of the gallant deeds of this brave young officer.—Despatch

from Major-General Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B., dated 10th January, 1858.

Loodiana Regiment.

Sergeant-Major PETER GILL.—Date of act of bravery, 4th June, 1857.—This non-commissioned officer also conducted himself with gallantry at Benares on the night of the 4th of June, 1857. He volunteered with Sergeant-Major Rosamond, of the 37th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, to bring in Captain Brown, Pension Paymaster, and his family from a detached bungalow to the barracks, as before recorded, and saved the life of the Quartermaster-Sergeant of the 25th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry in the early part of the evening, by cutting off the head of the sepoy who had just bayoneted him. Sergeant-Major Gill states, that on the same night he faced a guard of twenty-seven men, with only a sergeant's sword; and it is also represented that he twice saved the life of Major Barrett, 27th Regiment of Bengal Native Infantry, when attacked by sepoys of his own regiment.

Twenty-fourth Bombay Native Infantry.

Lieutenant WILLIAM ALEXANDER KERR.—Date of act of bravery, July 10th, 1857.—On the breaking out of a mutiny in the 27th Bombay Native Infantry, in July, 1857, a party of the mutineers took up a position in the stronghold, or paga, near the town of Kolapore, and defended themselves to extremity. Lieutenant Kerr, of the Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse, took a prominent share of the attack on the position, and at the moment when its capture was of great public importance, he made a dash at one of the gateways with some dismounted horsemen, and forced an entrance by breaking down the gate. The attack was completely successful, and the defenders were either killed, wounded, or captured, a result that may with perfect justice be attributed to Lieutenant Kerr's dashing and devoted bravery.—Letter from the Political Superintendent at Kolapore to the Adjutant-General of the Army, dated September 10th, 1857.

First Madras Fusiliers.

Sergeant PATRICK MAHONEY.—Date of act of bravery, 21st September, 1857.—For distinguished gallantry (whilst doing duty with the Volunteer Cavalry) in aiding in the capture of the regi-

mental colour of the 1st Regiment Native Infantry, at Mungulwar, on the 21st of September, 1857.—Extract from Field Force Orders of the late Major-General Havelock, dated 17th October, 1857.

Private JOHN RYAN.—Date of act of bravery, 26th September, 1857.—In addition to the act described at page 265 (Fifth Foot), Private Ryan distinguished himself throughout the day by his intrepidity, and especially devoted himself to rescuing the wounded in the neighbourhood from being massacred. He was most anxious to visit every dooly.—Extract from Divisional Orders of Major-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., dated 14th October, 1857.

Private THOMAS DUFFY.—For his cool intrepidity and daring skill, whereby a 24-pounder gun was saved from falling into the hands of the enemy.—Extract from Divisional Orders of Major-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., dated 16th October, 1857.

Private J. SMITH.—Date of act of bravery, 16th November, 1857.—For having been one of the first to try and enter the gateway on the north side of the Secundra Bagh. On the gateway being burst open, he was one of the first to enter, and was surrounded by the enemy. He received a sword-cut on the head, a bayonet wound on the left side, and a contusion from the butt end of a musket on the right shoulder, notwithstanding which he fought his way out and continued to perform his duties for the rest of the day. Elected by the private soldiers of the detachment, 1st Madras Fusiliers.

The Victoria Cross has recently been accorded to the two civilians mentioned on the following page, for services in India :—

War Office, 6th July, 1859.

THE QUEEN having been graciously pleased, by a Warrant under Her Royal Sign Manual, bearing date the 13th of December, 1858, to declare that non-military persons who, as Volunteers, have borne arms against the Mutineers, both at Lucknow and elsewhere, during the late operations in India, shall be

considered as eligible to receive the Decoration of the Victoria Cross, subject to the rules and ordinances already made and ordained for the government thereof, provided that it be established in any case that the person was serving under the orders of a General or other Officer in command of troops in the field when he performed the act of bravery for which it is proposed to confer the Decoration ; Her Majesty has accordingly been pleased to signify her intention to confer this high distinction on the under-mentioned Gentlemen, whose claims to the same have been submitted for Her Majesty's approval, on account of acts of bravery performed by them in India, as recorded against their names, viz. :—

Mr. THOMAS HENRY KAVANAGH, Assistant Commissioner in Oude.—Date of act of bravery, 8th November, 1857.—On the 8th of November, 1857, Mr. Kavanagh, then serving under the orders of Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, in Lucknow, volunteered on the dangerous duty of proceeding through the city to the camp of the Commander-in-Chief, for the purpose of guiding the relieving force to the beleaguered garrison in the Residency,—a task which he performed with chivalrous gallantry and devotion.

Mr. ROSS LOWIS MANGLES, of the Bengal Civil Service, Assistant Magistrate at Patna.—Date of act of bravery, 30th July, 1857.—Mr. Mangles volunteered and served with the force, consisting of detachments of Her Majesty's 10th and 37th Regiments, and some native troops, despatched to the relief of Arrah, in July, 1857, under the command of Captain Dunbar, of the 10th Regiment. The force fell into an ambuscade on the night of the 29th of July, 1857, and during the retreat on the next morning, Mr. Mangles, with signal gallantry and generous self-devotion, and notwithstanding that he had himself been previously wounded, carried for several miles, out of action, a wounded soldier of Her Majesty's 37th Regiment, after binding up his wounds under a murderous fire, which killed or wounded almost the whole detachment ; and he bore him in safety to the boats.

MILITARY STUDIES.

“ Have I not heard great ordnance in the field,
And heaven’s artillery thunder in the skies ?
Have I not in a pitched battle heard
Loud ’larums, neighing steeds, and trumpets’ clang ?”
TAMING OF THE SHREW.



MILITARY STUDIES.

SHAKSPERE.

LOED CAMPBELL has recently written a pamphlet to show that "Shakspere's legal acquirements" must have been gained by the poet having passed some of his time in an attorney's office; and the Rev. T. R. Eaton, M.A., has lately published a work entitled "Shakspere and the Bible," in which many of the celebrated passages are traced to parallel ones in Holy Writ. J. C. Bucknill, M.D., in "The Psychology of Shakspere," has exhibited the poet's knowledge of mental disease. The following selections from his works are made to prove that our great dramatist also possessed *military* acquirements. Whether he had ever borne arms in his youth, like Ben Jonson, may be problematical; but Mrs. Green published, in August 1857, a "Calendar of State Papers," illustrative of the reign of James I., in which was a certificate, dated 23rd of September, 1605 (the Gunpowder Plot year), under the hands of Sir Fulke Greville, Sir Edward Greville, and Thomas Spencer, of the names and arms of trained soldiers, what in these days would be designated trained militia; in this was the name of WILLIAM SHAKSPERE, and the musters being for the hundred of Barlickway (in which Stratford on Avon is situated), in the county

of Warwick, there can scarcely be a doubt that this was the immortal bard. The warlike ardour displayed in his works, whether the result of actual service or not, must ever make his productions full of delight to the military reader; no poet, indeed, has ever clothed in such glowing language the "pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war." Whether lawyer, doctor, or soldier, Shakspeare knew, to quote his own words,

"All qualities with a learned spirit
Of human dealings."

In the "Comedy of Errors" (Act iv., Scene 3) occurs the phrase "*sets up his rest*," in allusion to the matchlock of that day.

"The soldier's music and the rites of war," are commanded by *Fortinbras* for *Hamlet*, in the concluding portion of that tragedy; a technical expression occurs in the same play, in the Prince's letter to *Horatio*, wherein he speaks of words (Act iv., Scene 6),

"Much too light for the *bore* of the matter."

In Act iii., Scene 4, *Hamlet* alludes to

"The engineer
Hoist with his own petar."

No play contains more military allusions than "*Othello*." *Iago's* description of *Cassio* is the first.

"That never set a squadron in the field,
Nor the division of a battle knows
More than a spinster;"

and he continues these "epithets of war" when he adds—

"He, in good time, must his *lieutenant* be,
And I (God bless the mark!) his *Moorship's ancient*."

This same *Iago* uses the term "*cashier'd*" more than once; *Bardolph*, in the "*Merry Wives of Windsor*," hath also this word *cashier'd*; and one of the servants of *Varro*, in "*Timon of Athens*," asks "What does his cashier'd worship mutter?" *Iago* is friendly to "*preferment*," going by the "*old gradation*," and speaks of showing "out a *flag* and sign of love." In Act ii., Scene 3, he thinks *Desdemona's* eye

" Sounds a *parley* of provocation,"

and her voice is compared to "*an alarm* to love."

The "plumed troop," "the neighing steed," "the shrill trump," "the spirit-stirring drum," "the ear-piercing fife," and, above all, "the royal banner," prove how conversant Shakspeare was with the phraseology and the thoughts of a soldier; like the wise and foreseeing general does *Othello* administer his reprimand (Act ii., Scene 3) to the night-brawlers,

" What! in a town of war,
Yet wild, the people's hearts brimful of fear,
To manage private and domestic quarrel,
In night, and on the court and guard of safety!"

In "*Othello*," what a powerful example of the remorse arising from drunkenness is shown in the sorrow of *Cassio*. Unfortunately this vice is but too prevalent, not only in the army, but in other portions of the community, and it is astonishing how any one can give himself to such wretched debauchery after an acquaintance with this tragedy, which contains as fine a homily as can be conceived against so debasing a propensity. It occurs in Act ii., Scene 3, and it seems scarcely necessary to premise that *Cassio* has been dis-

missed from his post for drunkenness, and the sense of shame has half restored him to a state of consciousness. When *Cassio*, prior to this, hopes to be saved, and *Iago* expresses a like desire, the reply, showing the distinction of rank, is, "Ay, but, by your leave, not before me; the lieutenant is to be saved before the ancient." This is the old term for ensign.

"*Iago*. What, are you hurt, lieutenant?

Cas. Ay, past all surgery.

Iago. Marry, heaven forbid!

Cas. Reputation, reputation, reputation! O, I have lost my reputation! I have lost the immortal part, sir, of myself, and what remains is bestial.—My reputation, *Iago*, my reputation.

Iago. As I am an honest man, I thought you had received some bodily wound; there is more offence in that, than in reputation. Reputation is an idle and most false imposition; oft got without merit, and lost without deserving. You have lost no reputation at all, unless you repute yourself such a loser. What, man! there are ways to recover the general again: You are but now cast in his mood, a punishment more in policy than in malice; even so as one would beat his offenceless dog, to affright an imperious lion: sue to him again, and he is yours.

Cas. I will rather sue to be despised, than to deceive so good a commander, with so slight, so drunken, and so indiscreet an officer. Drunk? and speak parrot? and squabble? swagger? swear? and discourse fustian with one's own shadow?—O thou invisible spirit of wine, if thou hast no name to be known by, let us call thee—devil!

Iago. What was he that you followed with your sword? What had he done to you?

Cas. I know not.

Iago. Is it possible?

Cas. I remember a mass of things, but nothing distinctly; a quarrel, but nothing wherefore.—O, that men should put an enemy in their mouths, to steal away their brains! that we should, with joy, revel, pleasure, and applause, transform ourselves into beasts!

Iago. Why, but you are now well enough : How came you thus recovered ?

Cas. It hath pleased the devil drunkenness to give place to the devil wrath : one unperfectness shows me another, to make me frankly despise myself.

Iago. Come, you are too severe a moraler : As the time, the place, and the condition of this country stands, I could heartily wish this had not befallen ; but, since it is as it is, mend it for your own good.

Cas. I will ask him for my place again ; he shall tell me I am a drunkard ! Had I as many mouths as Hydra, such an answer would stop them all. To be now a sensible man, by and by a fool, and presently a beast ! O strange !—Every inordinate cup is unblessed, and the ingredient is a devil."

How soldierlike is *Othello's* description of his sword :—

" *Oth.* Behold ! I have a weapon ;
A better never did itself sustain
Upon a soldier's thigh : I have seen the day,
That with this little arm, and this good sword,
I have made my way through more impediments
Than twenty times your stop."

Unfortunately these extracts only show imperfectly the military spirit embodied in this wondrous tragedy, for *Othello*, *Iago*, and *Cassio* all breathe of the camp.

In "*Troilus and Cressida*" there are images of a more pristine era of warfare ; *Ulysses* (Act i., Scene 3), in a lengthened speech, says :—

" Now play him me, Patroclus,
Arming to answer in a night alarm.
And with a palsy-fumbling on his gorget,
Shake in and out the rivet."

And quoting again from *Ulysses* :—

"So that the *ram*, that batters down the wall,
For the great swing and rudeness of his poize,
They place before his hand that made the engine."

In Act iii., Scene 3, *Ulysses* says:—

"Or, like a gallant horse fallen in first rank,
Lie there for pavement to the abject rear,
O'errun and trampled on."

In Act v., Scene 3, *Cassandra* speaks of "notes of *sally*," and *Troilus* of the "fiery truncheon." Whilst in Scene 6, *Hector* exclaims:—

"I like thy armour well;
I'll frush it, and unlock the rivets all,
But I'll be master of it."

And, in Scene 9:—

"*Achilles*. Hark! a retreat upon our Grecian part.
Myrmidon. The Trojan trumpets sound the like, my lord.
Achilles. The dragon wing of night o'erspreads the earth,
And, *stickler* like, the armies separate."

Sticklers were arbitrators, judges, or sidesmen.

In "Love's Labour's Lost (last Scene of Act iii.), *Biron* makes allusion to "*a corporal of his field*;" the term "corporal" was formerly appropriated to a liberal military rank. In the armament sent by Queen Elizabeth to aid the Scots against the French, in 1560, Holinshed speaks of the corporals, whereby he means captains, they being next mentioned to the majors. These were called "corporals of the field," they held equal rank to a captain of horse, and their duty was similar to that of an aide-de-camp at present.

In "Richard III.," Act i., Scene 1, *Gloster* soliloquizes:—

" Now are our brows bound with victorious wreaths ;
 Our bruised arms hung up for monuments ;
 Our stern alarums chang'd to merry meetings,
 Our dreadful marches to delightful measures."

The *Friar*, in " *Romeo and Juliet* (Act iii., Scene 3), in administering reproof to *Romeo*, has this comparison :—

" Like powder in a skillless soldier's flask,
 Is set on fire by thine own ignorance,
 And thou dismember'd with thine own defence."

Evidently in allusion to the lighted match suspended at the belts of the matchlockmen, in close contiguity to the powder-flask. In Act v., Scene 3, *Romeo* speaks of

" Beauty's *ensign* yet
 Is crimson in thy lips, and in thy cheeks,
 And death's pale *flag* is not advanced there."

Fenton, in the " *Merry Wives of Windsor*" (Act iii., Scene 4), says " I must advance the colours of my love."

Benedick in " *Much Ado About Nothing*" (Act ii., Scene 1), inquires of *Claudio* whether the willow garland is to be worn " under your arm like a lieutenant's scarf?"

What a truthful and vivid picture is given, at the commencement of the fourth act, by the Chorus in " *Henry V.*," of the camp at Agincourt.

" Now entertain conjecture of a time,
 When creeping murmur, and the poring dark,
 Fills the wide vessel of the universe.
 From camp to camp, through the foul womb of night,
 The hum of either army stilly sounds,
 That the fix'd sentinels almost receive
 The secret whispers of each other's watch :

Fire answers fire ; and through their paly flames
Each battle sees the other's umber'd face :
Steed threatens steed, in high and boastful neighs,
Piercing the night's dull ear ; and from the tents,
The armourers, accomplishing the knights,
With busy hammers closing rivets up,
Give dreadful note of preparation.
The country cocks do crow, the clocks do toll,
And the third hour of drowsy morning name.
Proud of their numbers, and secure in soul,
The confident and over-lusty French
Do the low-rated English play at dice ;
And chide the cripple tardy-gaited night,
Who, like a foul and ugly witch, doth limp
So tediously away. The poor condemned English,
Like sacrifices, by their watchful fires
Sit patiently, and inly ruminate
The morning's danger ; and their gesture sad,
Investing lank-lean cheeks, and war-worn coats,
Presenteth them unto the gazing moon
So many horrid ghosts. O, now, who will behold
The royal captain of this ruin'd band,
Walking from watch to watch, from tent to tent,
Let him cry—"Praise and glory on his head!"
For forth he goes, and visits all his host ;
Bids them good-morrow, with a modest smile ;
And calls them—brothers, friends, and countrymen.
Upon his royal face there is no note
How dread an army hath enrounded him ;
Nor doth he dedicate one jot of colour
Unto the weary and all-watched night ;
But freshly looks, and overbears attaint
With cheerful semblance, and sweet majesty ;
That every wretch, pining and pale before,
Beholding him, plucks comfort from his looks."

A good military maxim is that expressed by the
King in the commencing speech of Act iv. :—

"Gloster, 'tis true, that we are in great danger ;
The greater therefore should our courage be."

The following conversation between the soldiers and *Henry V.*, on the eve of the battle of Agincourt, is a fine military study, and also an admirable specimen of soldierlike morality. It occurs in Act iv., Scene 1, of this play :—

"Enter BATES, COURT, and WILLIAMS.

Court. Brother John Bates, is not that the morning which breaks yonder ?

Bates. I think it be : but we have no great cause to desire the approach of day.

Will. We see yonder the beginning of the day, but, I think, we shall never see the end of it.—Who goes there ?

K. Hen. A friend.

Will. Under what captain serve you ?

K. Hen. Under Sir Thomas Erpingham.

Will. A good old commander, and a most kind gentleman : I pray you, what thinks he of our estate ?

K. Hen. Even as men wrecked upon a sand, that look to be washed off the next tide.

Bates. He hath not told his thought to the king ?

K. Hen. No ; nor it is not meet he should. For, though I speak it to you, I think, the king is but a man, as I am ; the violet smells to him, as it doth to me ; the element shows to him, as it doth to me ; all his senses have but human conditions : his ceremonies laid by, in his nakedness he appears but a man ; and though his affections are higher mounted than ours, yet, when they stoop, they stoop with the like wing ; therefore when he sees reason of fears, as we do, his fears, out of doubt, be of the same relish as ours are : Yet, in reason, no man should possess him with any appearance of fear, lest he, by showing it, should dishearten his army.

Bates. He may show what outward courage he will : but, I believe, as cold a night as 'tis, he could wish himself in the Thames

up to the neck ; and so I would he were, and I by him, at all adventures, so we were quit here.

K. Hen. By my troth, I will speak my conscience of the king ; I think he would not wish himself anywhere but where he is.

Bates. Then, 'would he were here alone ; so should he be sure to be ransomed, and a many poor men's lives saved.

K. Hen. I dare say, you love him not so ill, to wish him here alone : howsoever you speak this, to feel other men's minds : Methinks, I could not die anywhere so contented, as in the king's company ; his cause being just, and his quarrel honourable.

Will. That's more than we know.

Bates. Ay, or more than we should seek after ; for we know enough, if we know we are the king's subjects ; if his cause be wrong, our obedience to the king wipes the crime of it out of us.

Will. But if the cause be not good, the king himself hath a heavy reckoning to make ; when all those legs, and arms, and heads, chopped off in a battle, shall join together at the latter day, and cry all—' We died at such a place ; ' some, swearing ; some, crying for a surgeon ; some, upon their wives left poor behind them ; some, upon the debts they owe ; some, upon their children rawly left. I am afeard there are few die well, that die in battle ; for how can they charitably dispose of anything, when blood is their argument ? Now, if these men do not die well, it will be a black matter for the king that led them to it ; whom to disobey, were against all proportion of subjection.

K. Hen. So, if a son, that is by his father sent about merchandise, do sinfully miscarry upon the sea, the imputation of his wickedness, by your rule, should be imposed upon his father that sent him : or if a servant, under his master's command, transporting a sum of money, be assailed by robbers, and die in many irreconciled iniquities, you may call the business of the master the author of the servant's damnation :—But this is not so : the king is not bound to answer the particular endings of his soldiers, the father of his son, nor the master of his servant ; for they purpose not their death, when they purpose their services. Besides, there is no king, be his cause never so spotless, if it come to the arbitrement of swords, can try it out with all unspotted soldiers. Some, peradventure, have on them the

guilt of premeditated and contrived murder; some, of beguiling virgins with the broken seals of perjury; some, making the wars their bulwark, that have before gored the gentle bosom of peace with pillage and robbery. Now, if these men have defeated the law, and outrun native punishment, though they can outstrip men, they have no wings to fly from God: war is his beadle, war is his vengeance; so that here men are punished, for before-breach of the king's laws, in now the king's quarrel: where they feared the death, they have borne life away; and where they would be safe, they perish: Then if they die unprovided, no more is the king guilty of their damnation, than he was before guilty of those impieties for the which they are now visited. Every subject's duty is the king's; but every subject's soul is his own. Therefore should every soldier in the wars do as every sick man in his bed, wash every mote out of his conscience: and dying so, death is to him advantage; or not dying, the time was blessedly lost, wherein such preparation was gained: and, in him that escapes, it were not sin to think, that making God so free an offer, he let him outlive that day to see his greatness, and to teach others how they should prepare.

Will. 'Tis certain, every man that dies ill, the ill is upon his own head, the king is not to answer for it.

Bates. I do not desire he should answer for me; and yet I determine to fight lustily for him.

K. Hen. I myself heard the king say, he would not be ransomed.

Will. Ay, he said so, to make us fight cheerfully: but, when our throats are cut, he may be ransomed, and we ne'er the wiser.

K. Hen. If I live to see it, I will never trust his word after.

Will. 'Mass, you'll pay him then! That's a perilous shot out of an elder gun, that a poor and private displeasure can do against a monarch! you may as well go about to turn the sun to ice, with fanning in his face with a peacock's feather. You'll never trust his word after! come, 'tis a foolish saying.

K. Hen. Your reproof is something too round; I should be angry with you, if the time were convenient.

Will. Let it be a quarrel between us, if you live.

K. Hen. I embrace it.

Will. How shall I know thee again ?

K. Hen. Give me any gage of thine, and I will wear it in my bonnet : then, if ever thou darest acknowledge it, I will make it my quarrel.

Will. Here's my glove ; give me another of thine.

K. Hen. There.

Will. This will I also wear in my cap : if ever thou come to me and say, after to-morrow, ' This is my glove,' by this hand, I will take thee a box on the ear.

K. Hen. If ever I live to see it, I will challenge it.

Will. Thou darest as well be hanged.

K. Hen. Well, I will do it, though I take thee in the king's company.

Will. Keep thy word ; fare thee well.

Bates. Be friends, you English fools, be friends : we have French quarrels enough, if you could tell how to reckon.

K. Hen. Indeed, the French may lay twenty French crowns to one, they will beat us ; for they bear them on their shoulders : But it is no English treason, to cut French crowns ; and, to-morrow, the king himself will be a clipper.

[*Exeunt Soldiers.*

Upon the king ! let us our lives, our souls,

Our debts, our careful wives,

Our children, and our sins, lay on the king ;—

We must bear all.

O hard condition ! twin-born with greatness,

Subjected to the breath of every fool, whose sense

No more can feel but his own wringing !

What infinite heart's ease must kings neglect,

That private men enjoy ?

And what have kings, that privates have not too,

Save ceremony, save general ceremony ?

And what art thou, thou idle ceremony ?

What kind of god art thou, that suffer'st more

Of mortal griefs, than do thy worshippers ?

What are thy rents ? what are thy comings-in ?

O ceremony, show me but thy worth !

What is the soul of adoration ?
Art thou aught else but place, degree, and form,
Creating awe and fear in other men ?
Wherein thou art less happy being fear'd
Than they in fearing.
What drink'st thou oft, instead of homage sweet,
But poisoned flattery ? O, be sick, great greatness,
And bid thy ceremony give thee cure !
Think'st thou, the fiery fever will go out
With titles blown from adulation ?
Will it give place to flexure and low bending ?
Canst thou, when thou command'st the beggar's knee,
Command the health of it ? No, thou proud dream,
That play'st so subtly with a king's repose ;
I am a king, that find thee ; and I know,
'Tis not the balm, the sceptre, and the ball,
The sword, the mace, the crown imperial,
The intertissued robe of gold and pearl,
The farced title running 'fore the king,
The throne he sits on, nor the tide of pomp
That beats upon the high shore of this world,
No, not all these, thrice-gorgeous ceremony,
Not all these, laid in bed majestical,
Can sleep so soundly as the wretched slave ;
Who, with a body fill'd, and vacant mind,
Gets him to rest, cramm'd with distressful bread ;
Never sees horrid night, the child of hell ;
But, like a lackey, from the rise to set,
Sweats in the eye of Phœbus, and all night
Sleeps in Elysium ; next day, after dawn,
Doth rise, and help Hyperion to his horse ;
And follows so the ever-running year,
With profitable labour, to his grave :
And, but for ceremony, such a wretch,
Winding up days with toil and nights with sleep,
Had the forehand and vantage of a king.
The slave, a member of the country's peace,
Enjoys it ; but in gross brain little wots,

What watch the king keeps to maintain the peace,
Whose hours the peasant best advantages."

When was there ever a more inspiriting speech
(Act iv., Scene 3) than that of the *King* on hearing
the wish from *Westmoreland* for

"But one ten thousand of those men in England,
That do no work to-day!

K. Hen. What's he, that wishes so?

My cousin Westmoreland?—No, my fair cousin:

If we are marked to die, we are enow

To do our country loss; and if to live,

The fewer men, the greater share of honour.

God's will! I pray thee, wish not one man more.

By Jove, I am not covetous for gold;

Nor care I, who doth feed upon my cost;

It yearns me not, if men my garments wear;

Such outward things dwell not in my desires:

But, if it be a sin to covet honour,

I am the most offending soul alive.

No, faith, my coz, wish not a man from England:

God's peace! I would not lose so great an honour,

As one man more, methinks, would share from me,

For the best hope I have. O, do not wish one more.

Rather proclaim it, Westmoreland, through my host,

That he, which hath no stomach to this fight,

Let him depart; his passport shall be made,

And crowns for convoy put into his purse:

We would not die in that man's company,

That fears his fellowship to die with us.

This day is call'd—the feast of Crispian:

He, that outlives this day, and comes safe home,

Will stand a tip-toe when this day is nam'd,

And rouse him at the name of Crispian.

He, that shall live this day, and see old age,

Will yearly on the vigil feast his friends,

And say,—'To-morrow is St. Crispian:'

Then will he strip his sleeve, and show his scars,

And say, 'these wounds I had on Crispin's day.'

Old men forget ; yet all shall be forgot,
 But he'll remember, with advantages,
 What feats he did that day : Then shall our names,
 Familiar in their mouths, as household words,—
 Harry the king, Bedford and Exeter,
 Warwick and Talbot, Salisbury and Gloster,—
 Be in their flowing cups freshly remember'd :
 This story shall the good man teach his son ;
 And Crispin Crispian shall ne'er go by,
 From this day to the ending of the world,
 But we in it shall be remembered :
 We few, we happy few, we band of brothers ;
 For he, to-day that sheds his blood with me,
 Shall be my brother ; be he ne'er so vile,
 This day shall gentle his condition :
 And gentlemen in England, now a-bed,
 Shall think themselves accurs'd, they were not here ;
 And hold their manhoods cheap, while any speaks,
 That fought with us upon St. Crispin's day."

In the debates in Parliament during the first Sikh war, Lord John Russell forcibly used an expression from this play ; speaking of Moodkee, he remarked, that small as the British force then was, there were none amongst the soldiers who would wish for one man more from England.

A very different spectacle was exhibited on the plains of Agincourt, on the 17th of May, 1816, when the Twelfth, or Prince of Wales' Light Dragoons, which formed part of the army of occupation, assembled on this memorable field in order that the Waterloo medals might be distributed to the officers and men.

In Act iv., Scene 6, occurs that pathetic description of the death of the *Duke of York* and the *Earl of Suffolk* :—

K. Hen. Well have we done, thrice-valiant countrymen :
But all's not done, yet keep the French the field.

Exe. The Duke of York commends him to your majesty.

K. Hen. Lives he, good uncle ? thrice within this hour,
I saw him down ; thrice up again, and fighting ;
From helmet to the spur, all blood he was.

Exe. In which array (brave soldier,) doth he lie,
Larding the plain : and by his bloody side,
(Yoke-fellow to his honour-owing wounds,)
The noble earl of Suffolk also lies.

Suffolk first died : and York, all haggled over,
Comes to him, where in gore he lay insteep'd,
And takes him by the beard ; kisses the gashes,
That bloodily did yawn upon his face ;
And cries aloud,—‘ Tarry, dear cousin Suffolk !
My soul shall thine keep company to heaven :
Tarry, sweet soul, for mine, then fly a-breast ;
As, in this glorious and well-foughten field,
We kept together in our chivalry !’

Upon these words I came, and cheer'd him up :
He smil'd me in the face, raught me his hand,
And with a feeble gripe, says,—‘ Dear, my lord,
Commend my service to my sovereign.’
So did he turn, and over Suffolk's neck
He threw his wounded arm, and kiss'd his lips ;
And so, espous'd to death, with blood he seal'd
A testament of noble-ending love.
The pretty and sweet manner of it forc'd
Those waters from me, which I would have stopp'd ;
But I had not so much of man in me,
But all my mother came into mine eyes,
And gave me up to tears.

K. Hen. I blame you not ;
For, hearing this, I must perforce compound
With mistful eyes, or they will issue too.— [*Alarum.*]
But, hark ! what new alarum is this same ?—
The French have reforc'd their scatter'd men :—
Then every soldier kill his prisoners ;
Give the word through.” [*Exeunt.*]

A counterpart to this pathetic episode may be found in modern days, as will be seen in the following incident, which occurred at the Campo Mayor affair, on the 25th of March, 1811, from the journal of an officer, published in Clarke's "Life of the Duke of Wellington:"—"Yesterday a French captain of dragoons brought over a trumpet, demanding permission to search amongst the dead for his colonel. His regiment was a fine one, with bright brass helmets and black horse-hair, exactly like what the old Romans are depicted with. It was truly a bloody scene, being almost all sabre wounds. It was long before we could find the French colonel, for he was lying on his face, his naked body weltering in blood; and as soon as he was turned up, the officer knew him: he gave a sort of scream and sprang off his horse, dashed his helmet on the ground, knelt by the body, took the bloody hand and kissed it many times in an agony of grief: it was an affecting and awful scene. I suppose there were about six hundred naked dead bodies lying on the ground at one view. The French colonel was killed by a corporal of the Thirteenth. This corporal had killed one of his men, and he was so enraged, that he sallied out himself and attacked the corporal, who was well mounted and a good swordsman, as was the colonel himself. Both defended for some time; the corporal cut him twice across the face; his helmet came off at the second, when the corporal slew him by a cut which nearly cleft his skull asunder, cutting in as deep as the nose through the brain."

Antony, in "Julius Cæsar," will "cry *Havock*, and let slip the dogs of war." This cry of "*havock*" is of some import, for the ordinances of Richard II. award

"that they who shall begin the cry of 'havock' shall be beheaded, and their bodies afterwards hanged up by the arms."

And in the ordinances of Henry V. it is enjoined: "If anyone shall be found to have in any manner begun the clamour called 'havock,' without our special license, he shall be punished with death, and his followers with arrest of body and goods."

Nearly every nation had the custom of commencing the attack with loud shouts called cries of war, or of arms. These shouts were meant to terrify the foe; to occupy the minds of the soldiers; and prevent their hearing the shouts of the enemy. Froissart says, that "at the battle of Cressy, fifteen thousand Genoese archers began to yell in a most frightful manner, to terrify the English." In these cries every nation, and almost every leader, had their peculiar word or sentence, which also served as a kind of watchword to distinguish friends from foes; cries of arms were likewise used to rally broken squadrons, especially when their banner was in danger.

The ancient English cry was "St. George." This was in such estimation, that a military writer, Davis, in the beginning of the seventeenth century, inserts the observance of it among the military laws, to the obedience of which he would have all soldiers sworn. "Item," says he, "that all soldiers entering into battle, assault, skirmish, or other actions of arms, shall have for their common cry and word, '*St. George! St. George!* forward, or upon them, *St. George!*' whereby the soldier is much comforted, and the enemy dismayed, by calling to mind the ancient valour of England, which, with that name, had been so often

victorious ; therefore, he that shall maliciously omit it, shall be punished for his obstinacie."

Henry V. (in Act iii. Scene 1), when before Har-leur, uses the cry of St. George, in that memorable speech of:—

"Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more ;
Or close the wall up with our English dead !
In peace, there's nothing so becomes a man,
As modest stillness, and humility :
But when the blast of war blows in our ears,
Then imitate the action of the tiger ;
Stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood,
Disguise fair nature with hard-favour'd rage :
Then lend the eye a terrible aspect ;
Let it pry through the portage of the head,
Like the brass cannon ; let the brow o'erwhelm it,
As fearfully, as doth a galled rock
O'erhang and jutty his confounded base,
Swill'd with the wild and wasteful ocean.
Now set the teeth, and stretch the nostril wide ;
Hold hard the breath, and bend up every spirit
To his full height !—On, on, you noblest English,
Whose blood is set from fathers of war-proof !
Fathers, that, like so many Alexanders,
Have, in these parts, from morn till even fought,
And sheath'd their swords for lack of argument.
Dishonour not your mothers ; now attest,
That those, whom you call'd fathers, did beget you !
Be copy now to men of grosser blood,
And teach them how to war !—And you, good yeomen,
Whose limbs were made in England, show us here
The mettle of your pasture ; let us swear
That you are worth your breeding : which I doubt not ;
For there is none of you so mean and base,
That hath not noble lustre in your eyes.
I see you stand like greyhounds in the slips,
Straining upon the start. The game's a-foot ;

Follow your spirit ; and, upon this charge,
Cry—'God for Harry ! England ! and Saint George !' ”

The muster-book and the roll are well known by Shakspeare, as witness the enlistment of recruits in “Henry IV.” (Part 2, Act iii., Scene 2) :—

“*Shallow*. Where's the roll ? Where's the roll ? Where's the roll ?”

Falstaff will have *Shadow*, because he will serve for summer, and because they “have a number of shadows to fill up the muster-book.”

False musters were not, at this date, therefore unknown. How wittily doth the fat knight in the same scene let off the recruits that will pay to be free :—

“*Fal*. Come, sir, which men shall I have ?

Shal. Four of which you please.

Bard. Sir, a word with you :—I have three pound to free Mouldy and Bull-calf.

Fal. Go to ; well.

Shal. Come, Sir John, which four will you have ?

Fal. Do you choose for me.

Shal. Marry, then,—Mouldy, Bull-calf, Feeble, and Shadow.

Fal. Mouldy and Bull-calf :—For you, Mouldy, stay at home still ; you are past service ; and, for your part, Bull-calf, —grow till you come unto it ; I will none of you.

Shal. Sir John, Sir John, do not yourself wrong ; they are your likeliest men, and I would have you served with the best.

Fal. Will you tell me, Master Shallow, how to choose a man ? Care I for the limb, the thewes, the stature, bulk, and big assemblance of a man ! Give me the spirit, Master Shallow.—Here's Wart ;—you see what a ragged appearance it is : he shall charge you, and discharge you, with the motion of a pewterer's hammer ; come off, and on, swifter than he that gibbets on the brewer's bucket. And this same half-faced fellow, Snadow,—

give me this man; he presents no mark to the enemy; the foeman may with as great aim level at the edge of a penknife: And, for a retreat, how swiftly will this Feeble, the woman's tailor, run off? O, give me the spare men, and spare me the great ones.—Put me a caliver into Wart's hand, Bardolph.”

In “Henry VI.” (Part 1, Act i., Scene 4), *Talbot* uses the phrase, “*a guard of chosen shot*”:—

“*Sal.* Yet tell'st thou not how thou wert entertain'd.

Tal. With scoffs, and scorns, and contumelious taunts.

In open market-place produc'd they me,

To be a public spectacle to all:

‘Here,’ said they, ‘is the terror of the French,

The scarecrow that affrights our children so.’

Then broke I from the officers that led me;

And with my nails digg'd stones out of the ground,

To hurl at the beholders of my shame.

My grisly countenance made others fly;

None durst come near, for fear of sudden death.

In iron walls they deem'd me not secure;

So great fear of my name 'mongst them was spread,

That they suppos'd, I could rend bars of steel,

And spurn in pieces posts of adamant:

Wherefore a *guard of chosen shot* I had,

That walk'd about me every minute-while;

And if I did but stir out of my bed,

Ready they were to shoot me to the heart.”

In Queen Elizabeth's time, each company of infantry generally consisted of men armed five different ways; forty in every hundred were “*men-at-arms*,” and sixty “*shot*,” the former were ten halberdiers, or battle-axe men, and thirty pikemen; and the “*shot*” were twenty archers, twenty musketeers, and a like number of harquebusiers, and each man carried, in addition to his principal weapon, a sword and dagger.

The *Sir John Fastolfe* of "Henry VI." is a craven knight; this is quite a distinct character from the witty *Falstaff*; his punishment is summary, as will be seen in the accompanying extract from Act iv., Scene 1, of "Henry VI.," Part 1:—

"Enter SIR JOHN FASTOLFE.

"*Fast.* My gracious sovereign, as I rode from Calais,
To haste unto your coronation,
A letter was deliver'd to my hands,
Writ to your grace from the Duke of Burgundy.

Talbot. Shame to the duke of Burgundy, and thee!
I vow'd, base knight, when I did meet thee next,
To tear the garter from thy craven's leg,

[*Plucking it off.*

(Which I have done) because unworthily
Thou wast installed in that high degree.—
Pardon me, princely Henry, and the rest:
This dastard, at the battle of Patay,
When but in all I was six thousand strong,
And that the French were almost ten to one,—
Before we met, or that a stroke was given,
Like to a trusty squire, did run away;
In which assault we lost twelve hundred men;
Myself, and divers gentlemen beside,
Were there surpris'd, and taken prisoners.
Then judge, great lords, if I have done amiss;
Or whether that such cowards ought to wear
This ornament of knighthood, yea, or no.

Gloster. To say the truth, this fact was infamous,
And ill beseeeming any common man;
Much more a knight, a captain, and a leader.

Tal. When first this order was ordain'd, my lords,
Knights of the garter were of noble birth;
Valiant, and virtuous, full of haughty courage.
Such as were grown to credit by the wars;
Not fearing death, nor shrinking for distress,
But always resolute in most extremes.

He then, that is not furnish'd in this sort,
 Doth but usurp the sacred name of knight,
 Profaning this most honourable order;
 And should (if I were worthy to be judge,)
 Be quite degraded, like a hedge-born swain
 That doth presume to boast of gentle blood.

K. Hen. Stain to thy countrymen! thou hear'st thy doom:
 Be packing therefore, thou that wast a knight;
 Henceforth we banish thee, on pain of death.—

[*Exit FASTOLFE.*"]

In this play there is a manly sentiment placed in the mouth of *Charles the Dauphin*, afterwards king of France. It occurs when it is proposed to hack the bones asunder of the gallant *Talbot* and his no less dauntless son, who are carried off dead:—

"*Charles.* O, no; forbear: for that which we have fled
 During the life, let us not wrong it dead."

The last scene of "*Macbeth*" exhibits a fine military trait in old *Siward*, when informed of his son's death:—

"*Siward.* Had he his hurts before?

Rosse. Ay, on the front.

Siward. Why, then, God's soldier be he!

Had I as many sons as I have hairs,
 I would not wish them to a fairer death;
 And so his knell is knoll'd.

Malcolm. He's worth more sorrow,
 And that I'll spend for him.

Siward. He's worth no more;
 They say, he parted well, and paid his score:
 So, God be with him!"

In the article on the works of William Shakspeare, the text revised by the Rev. Alexander Dyce, in the *Quarterly Review*, for January, 1859, allusion is

made to Mr. Collier's adoption of "*report of war*," on the ground, that "point of war" has no meaning. The quotation is from "Henry IV.," Part 2, Act iv., Scene 1 :—

"*Westmoreland*. And your tongue divine
To a loud trumpet, and *a point of war*."

Mr. Dyce quotes Peele's "Edward I.," from Mr. Collier's edition of Dodsley's Plays :—

"*Matravers*, thou
Sound proudly here *a perfect point of war*
In honour of thy sovereign's safe return."

"Point of war" is, however, the true phrase, and the following shows that Shakspeare was more proficient in military phraseology than some of his editors.

"Point of war, a loud and impressive beat of the drum, the perfect execution of which requires great skill and activity. The point of war is beat when a battalion charges."—*James's Military Dictionary*, 1810.

These are only some of the passages which indicate the subtle knowledge possessed by the great dramatist of all shades of military life; but the careful student will find the martial characters in his works thoroughly imbued with the soldier's modes of thought. Surely the great Duke of Marlborough was undeservedly sneered at for the admission that his knowledge of English history was derived from Shakspeare's Historical Plays, affording, as they do, a valuable picture of the warlike days of old, true to the spirit, if not always to the letter.

STERNE.



"The broken soldier, kindly bade to stay,
Sat by his fire, and talk'd the night away;
Wept o'er his wounds, or, tales of sorrow done,
Shoulder'd his crutch, and show'd how fields were won."

THE DESERTED VILLAGE.



STERNE.

WHATEVER doubts may exist as to the fact of Shakspeare ever having served as a soldier, there can be none as to the source from which Sterne has derived many of the military opinions, criticisms, and habits of thought eliminated in "Tristram Shandy." It is therefore proposed to select such passages as will illustrate these peculiarities, as it is conceived they express the opinions of officers then serving regarding the battles and sieges of the time of King William III. and Marlborough; for it will be remembered that the father of Sterne had shared in the campaigns of the period, and his son Laurence, until he was ten years of age, saw much of the soldier's life, being brought up amongst the veterans of Blenheim and Ramillies and the other actions of that era. Their recitals doubtless sank deep into the mind of the embryo novelist, and were reproduced with all the touches of matured genius, when Sterne composed his celebrated work, which was not commenced until he reached the age of forty-five. The first two volumes were published in 1760, and took the town by storm. Horace Walpole, in one of his letters, calls it a very insipid and tedious performance. The characters in the "Castle of Otranto" were, like its gigantic helmet, at once seen to be impossibilities; they belong to the artificial school, but Sterne's

creations are real personages, and, like those of Shakspeare, Scott, Thackeray, and Dickens, when once known, become fixed in the memory, always receiving the welcome of old acquaintances whenever their society is renewed.

These "Military Studies" are confined to Uncle Toby and his servant, Corporal Trim. The former was doubtless the reflex of Sterne's father; Trim is the counterpart of his master, who was wounded at the siege of Namur, the only success of William III., by a piece of splintered stone from the fortress. Uncle Toby is induced to reside at his brother's, at Shandy Hall. Both Tristram and his brother Toby ride their hobby-horses, and naturally come into collision when in any demonstration of the elder Shandy there is the least allusion, real or otherwise, to military matters, for then Uncle Toby at once breaks out into a professional speech, to be again interrupted by the elder brother's remarks. Two characters so opposite in their natures, and yet marked with such truthful touches, are nearly unequalled in the world of fiction. It must be premised that Mr. Shandy had been a Turkey merchant, and from reading out-of-the-way books had become full of the strangest fancies. The other characters not being within the scope of these "Military Studies," will not pass under review, and the reader (if he has not had that gratification) is recommended to study the whole of "The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy."

With what art are the characters of the two brothers brought out in the following passages, and what a charm is cast around the bed of the invalid officer. These and the accompanying selections, which

occur at intervals in the work, are here arranged in groups, so that the reader, if he has not made acquaintance with Sterne, may have a clear idea of the characters chosen for "Military Studies."

"My father, at that time, was just beginning business in London, and had taken a house; and as the truest friendship and cordiality subsisted between the two brothers,—and that my father thought my uncle Toby could no where be so well nursed and taken care of as in his own house,—he assigned him the very best apartment in it. And, what was a much more sincere mark of his affection still, he would never suffer a friend or an acquaintance to step into the house, on any occasion, but he would take him by the hand, and lead him up-stairs to see his brother Toby, and chat an hour by his bedside.

"The history of a soldier's wound beguiles the pain of it—my uncle's visitors, at least, thought so, and, in their daily calls upon him, from the courtesy arising out of that belief, they would frequently turn the discourse to that subject,—and from that subject the discourse would generally roll on to the siege itself.

"These conversations were infinitely kind; and my uncle Toby received great relief from them, and would have received much more, but that they brought him into some unforeseen perplexities, which, for three months together, retarded his cure greatly; and, if he had not hit upon an expedient to extricate himself out of them, I verily believe they would have laid him in his grave.

"I must remind the reader, in case he has read the history of King William's wars;—but if he has not, I then inform him that one of the most memorable attacks in that siege was that which was made by the English and Dutch upon the point of the advanced counterscarp, before the gate of St. Nicholas, which inclosed the great sluice or water-stop, where the English were terribly exposed to the shot of the counter-guard and demi-bastion of St. Roch: the issue of which hot dispute, in three words, was this,—that the Dutch lodged themselves upon the counter-guard, and that the English made themselves masters of the covered way before St. Nicholas's gate, notwithstanding the gallantry of

the French officers, who exposed themselves upon the glacis sword in hand.

"As this was the principal attack of which my uncle Toby was an eye-witness at Namur,*—the army of the besiegers being cut off, by the confluence of the Maes and Sambre, from seeing each other's operations,—my uncle Toby was generally more eloquent and particular in his account of it; and the many perplexities he was in arose out of the almost insurmountable difficulties he found in telling his story intelligibly, and giving such clear ideas of the differences and distinctions between the scarp and counterscarp,—the glacis and covered-way,—the half-moon and ravelin,—as to make his company fully comprehend where and what he was about.

"Writers themselves are too apt to confound these terms; so that you will the less wonder if, in his endeavours to explain them, and in opposition to many misconceptions, that my uncle Toby did oftentimes puzzle his visitors, and sometimes himself too.

"To speak the truth, unless the company my father led upstairs were tolerably clear-headed, or my uncle Toby was in one of his explanatory moods, it was a difficult thing, do what he could, to keep the discourse free from obscurity.

"What rendered the account of this affair the more intricate to my uncle Toby was this,—that in the attack of the counterscarp before the gate of St. Nicholas, extending itself from the bank of the Maes, quite up the great water-stop, the ground was cut and cross-cut with such a multitude of dykes, drains, rivulets, and sluices, on all sides, and he would get so sadly bewildered and set fast amongst them, that frequently he could neither get backwards nor forwards, to save his life, and was oftentimes obliged to give up the attack upon that very account only.

* The following remarkable incident occurred during the siege of Namur. The Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. Godfrey, nearly related to Sir Edmondbury Godfrey, whose death caused such excitement in Charles II.'s time, was killed by a shot in the trenches before Namur in 1695, while standing near King William III. His visit to head-quarters in order to make arrangements regarding an advance of money for the payment of the army thus cost him his life.

"These perplexing rebuffs gave my uncle Toby Shandy more perturbations than you would imagine; and, as my father's kindness to him was continually dragging up fresh friends, and fresh inquiries, he had but a very uneasy task of it.

"No doubt, my uncle Toby had great command of himself, and could guard appearances, I believe, as well as most men; yet anyone may imagine that, when he could not retreat out of the ravelin without getting into the half-moon, or get out of the covered-way without falling down the counterscarp, nor cross the dyke without danger of slipping into the ditch, but that he must have fretted and fumed inwardly. He did so, and the little and hourly vexations, which may seem trifling and of no account to the man who has not read Hippocrates, yet, whoever has read Hippocrates or Dr. James M'Kenzie, and has considered well the effects which the passions and affections of the mind have upon the digestion (why not of a wound, as well as of a dinner?) may easily conceive what sharp paroxysms and exacerbations of his wound my uncle Toby must have undergone upon that score only.

"My uncle Toby could not philosophize upon it; it was enough he felt it was so, and, having sustained the pain and sorrows of it for three months together, he was resolved, some way or other, to extricate himself.

"He was one morning lying upon his back in his bed, the anguish and nature of the wound upon his groin suffering him to lie in no other position, when a thought came into his head, that if he could purchase such a thing, and have it pasted down upon a board, as a large map of the fortifications of the town and citadel of Namur with its environs, it might be a means of giving him ease. I take notice of his desire to have the environs, along with the town and citadel, for this reason, because my uncle Toby's wound was got in one of the traverses, about thirty toises from the returning angle of the trench, opposite to the salient angle of the demi-bastion of St. Roch; so that he was pretty confident he could stick a pin upon the identical spot of ground where he was standing when the stone struck him."

Like his master, Trim had also been wounded; but he cannot be better introduced than in the author's own words:—

"I must here inform you that this servant of my uncle Toby's, who went by the name of Trim, had been a corporal in my uncle's own company: his real name was James Butler; but having got the nick-name of Trim in the regiment, my uncle Toby, unless when he happened to be very angry with him, would never call him by any other name.

"The poor fellow had been disabled for the service by a wound on his left knee by a musket-bullet, at the battle of Landen, which was two years before the affair of Namur; and as the fellow was well beloved in the regiment, and a handy fellow into the bargain, my uncle Toby took him for his servant; and of an excellent use was he, attending my uncle Toby in the camp and in his quarters, as a valet, groom, barber, cook, sempster, and nurse; and, indeed, from first to last, waited upon him and served him with great fidelity and affection.

"My uncle Toby loved the man in return; and what attached him more to him still was the similitude of their knowledge. For Corporal Trim (for so, for the future, I shall call him), by four years' occasional attention to his master's discourse upon fortified towns, and the advantage of prying and peeping continually into his master's plans, etc., exclusive and besides what he gained HOBBY-HORSICALLY as a body-servant (*non Hobby-horsical per se*), had become no mean proficient in the science; and was thought, by the cook and chambermaid, to know as much of the nature of strongholds as my uncle Toby himself.

"I have but one more stroke to give to finish Corporal Trim's character,—and it is the only dark line in it. The fellow loved to advise,—or rather to hear himself talk; his carriage, however, was so perfectly respectful, 'twas easy to keep him silent when you had him so; but set his tongue a-going,—you had no hold of him; he was voluble;—the eternal interlardings of *your honour*, with the respectfulness of Corporal Trim's manner, interceding so strongly in behalf of his elocution—that, though you might have been incommoded,—you could not well be angry. My uncle Toby was seldom either the one or the other with him,—or, at least, this fault in Trim broke no squares with 'em. My uncle Toby, as I said, loved the man;—and, besides, as he ever looked upon a faithful servant but as an humble friend, he could not bear to stop his mouth. Such was Corporal Trim."

The bowling-green is to be the scene of important operations, and Trim opens his plans fully to his master's satisfaction.

"If I durst presume," continued Trim, 'to give your honour my advice, and speak my opinion in this matter'——

"Thou art welcome, Trim," quoth my uncle Toby; 'speak,——speak what thou thinkest upon the subject, man, without fear.'

"Why then," replied Trim (not hanging his ears and scratching his head like a country lout, but) stroking his hair back from his forehead, and standing erect as before his division, 'I think,' quoth Trim, advancing his left, which was his lame leg, a little forwards, and pointing with his right hand open towards a map of Dunkirk, which was pinned against the hangings, 'I think,' quoth Corporal Trim, 'with humble submission to your honour's better judgment, that these ravelins, bastions, curtains, and horn-works, make but a poor, contemptible, fiddle-faddle piece of work of it here upon paper, compared to what your honour and I could make of it were we in the country by ourselves, and had but a rood, or a rood and a-half, of ground to do what we pleased with. As summer is coming on,' continued Trim, 'your honour might sit out of doors, and give me the nography'——

"Call it ichnography," quoth my uncle.

"Of the town or citadel, your honour was pleased to sit down before, and I will be shot by your honour upon the glacis of it, if I do not fortify it to your honour's mind.'

"I dare say thou wouldst, Trim," quoth my uncle.

"For if your honour," continued the corporal, 'could but mark me the polygon, with its exact lines and angles'——

"That I could do very well," quoth my uncle.

"I would begin with the fosse, and if your honour could tell me the proper depth and breadth'——

"I can to a hair's breadth, Trim," replied my uncle.

"I would throw out the earth upon this hand towards the town for the scarp, and on that hand towards the campaign for the counterscarp.'

"Very right, Trim," quoth my uncle Toby.

"And when I had sloped them to your mind, an' please your honour, I would face the glacis, as the finest fortifications are

done in Flanders, with sods,—and as your honour knows [they should be, and I would make the walls and parapets with sods too.]

“‘The best engineers call them gazons, Trim,’ said my uncle Toby.

“‘Whether they are gazons or sods, is not much matter,’ replied Trim; ‘your honour knows they are ten times beyond a facing either of brick or stone.’

“‘I know they are, Trim, in some respects,’ quoth my uncle Toby, nodding his head; ‘for a cannon-ball enters into the gazon right onwards, without bringing any rubbish down with it, which might fill the fosse (as was the case at St. Nicholas’s Gate), and facilitate the passage over it.’

“‘Your honour understands these matters,’ replied Corporal Trim, ‘better than any officer in His Majesty’s service: but would your honour please to let the bespeaking of the table alone, and let us but go into the country, I would work, under your honour’s directions, like a horse, and make fortifications for you something like a tansy, with all their batteries, saps, ditches, and palisadoes, that it should be worth all the world’s riding twenty miles to go and see it.’

“My uncle Toby blushed as red as scarlet as Trim went on; but it was not a blush of guilt, of modesty, or of anger; it was a blush of joy; he was fired with Corporal Trim’s project and description.

“‘Trim!’ said my uncle Toby, ‘thou hast said enough.’

“‘We might begin the campaign,’ continued Trim, ‘on the very day that His Majesty and the allies take the field, and demolish ’em town by town, as fast as’——

“‘Trim,’ quoth my uncle Toby, ‘say no more.’

“‘Your honour,’ continued Trim, ‘might sit in your arm-chair (pointing to it) this fine weather, giving me your orders, and I would’——

“‘Say no more, Trim,’ quoth my uncle Toby.

“‘Besides, your honour would get not only pleasure and good pastime, but good air, and good exercise, and good health, and your honour’s wound would be well in a month.’

“‘Thou hast said enough, Trim,’ quoth my uncle Toby (putting his hand into his breeches pocket), ‘I like thy project mightily.’

“And if your honour pleases, I’ll this moment go and buy a pioneer’s spade to take down with us, and I’ll bespeak a shovel and a pickaxe, and a couple of’—

“Say no more, Trim,’ quoth my uncle Toby, leaping up upon one leg, quite overcome with rapture, and thrusting a guinea into Trim’s hands. ‘Trim,’ said my uncle Toby, ‘say no more ; but go down, Trim, this moment, my lad, and bring up my supper this instant.’

“Trim ran down and brought up his master’s supper, to no purpose. Trim’s plan of operation ran so in my uncle Toby’s head, he could not taste it.

“‘Trim,’ quoth my uncle Toby, ‘get me to bed.’

“’Twas all one. Corporal Trim’s description had fired his imagination ; my uncle Toby could not shut his eyes. The more he considered it, the more bewitching the scene appeared to him ; so that, two full hours before daylight, he had come to a final determination, and had concerted the whole plan of his and Corporal Trim’s decampment.

“My uncle Toby had a little neat country-house of his own, in the village where my father’s estate lay at Shandy, which had been left him by an old uncle, with a small estate of about one hundred pounds a-year. Behind this house, and contiguous to it, was a kitchen-garden of about half an acre ; and at the bottom of the garden, and cut off from it by a tall yew hedge, was a bowling-green, containing just about as much ground as Corporal Trim wished for ; so that as Trim uttered the words, ‘a rood and a-half of ground to do what they would with,’ this identical bowling-green instantly presented itself, and became curiously painted, all at once, upon the retina of my uncle Toby’s fancy, which was the physical cause of making him change colour, or, at least, of heightening his blush to that immoderate degree I spoke of.

“Never did lover post down to a beloved mistress with more heat and expectation, than my uncle Toby did to enjoy this self-same thing in private. I say in private, for it was sheltered from the house, as I told you, by a tall yew-hedge, and was covered on the other three sides from mortal sight, by rough holly, and thick-set flowering shrubs ; so that the idea of not being seen did not a little contribute to the idea of pleasure pre-

conceived in my uncle Toby's mind. . . . Vain thought ! how-ever thick it was planted about,—or private soever it might seem,—to think, dear uncle Toby, of enjoying a thing which took up a whole rood and a-half of ground, and not have it known !

“How my uncle Toby and Corporal Trim managed this matter,—with the history of their campaigns, which were no way barren of events, may make no uninteresting under-plot in the epitasis and working up of this drama. At present the scene must drop, and change for the parlour fire-side.”

What a kindliness of heart, too, is displayed in Uncle Toby, and with what felicity is his character sketched :—

“I would not, I would not, brother Toby, have my brains so full of saps, mines, blinds, gabions, palisadoes, ravelins, half-moons, and such trumpery, to be proprietor of Namur, and of all the towns in Flanders with it.

“My uncle Toby was a man patient of injuries ; not from want of courage ; I have told you, in a former chapter, ‘that he was a man of courage ;’ and will add here that, where just occasions presented, or called it forth, I know no man under whose arm I would have sooner taken shelter ; nor did this arise from any insensibility or obtuseness of his intellectual parts ; for he felt this insult of my father's as feelingly as a man could do ; but he was of a peaceful, placid nature, no jarring element in it, all was mixed up so kindly with him, my uncle Toby had scarce a heart to retaliate upon a fly.

“‘Go,’ says he, one day at dinner, to an overgrown one which had buzzed about his nose, and tormented him cruelly all dinner-time, and which, after infinite attempts, he had caught at last, as it flew by him ; ‘I'll not hurt thee,’ says my uncle Toby, rising from his chair, and going across the room with the fly in his hand, ‘I'll not hurt a hair of thy head. Go,’ says he, lifting up the sash, and opening his hand as he spoke, to let it escape ; ‘go, poor devil, get thee gone, why should I hurt thee ? This world surely is wide enough to hold both thee and me.’”

This is the mode in which Uncle Toby and Trim carry on their imitative miniature sieges :—

"My uncle Toby came down, as the reader has been informed, with plans along with him, of almost every fortified town in Italy and Flanders ; so let the Duke of Marlborough, or the Allies, have set down before what town they pleased, my uncle Toby was prepared for them.

"His way, which was the simplest one in the world, was this:—As soon as ever a town was invested (but sooner when the design was known) to take the plan of it (let it be what town it would), and enlarge it upon a scale to the exact size of his bowling-green ; upon the surface of which, by means of a large roll of packthread, and a number of small piquets driven into the ground, at the several angles and redans, he transferred the lines from his paper ; then, taking the profile of the place, with its works to determine the depths and slopes of the ditches, the talus of the glacis, and the precise height of the several *banquettes*, parapets, etc., he set the Corporal to work ; and sweetly went it on. The nature of the soil, the nature of the work itself, and, above all, the good nature of my uncle Toby, sitting by from morning to night, and chatting kindly with the Corporal upon past-done deeds—left *labour* little else but the ceremony of the name.

"When the place was finished in this manner, and put into a proper posture of defence, it was invested ; and my uncle Toby and the Corporal began to run their first parallel. I beg I may not be interrupted in my story, by being told *That the first parallel should be at least three hundred toises distant from the main body of the place, and that I have not left a single inch for it* ; for my uncle Toby took the liberty of encroaching upon his kitchen-garden, for the sake of enlarging his works on the bowling-green ; and, for that reason, generally ran his first and second parallels betwixt two rows of his cabbages and his cauliflowers : the conveniences and inconveniences of which will be considered at large in the history of my uncle Toby's and the Corporal's campaigns, of which this I'm now writing is but a sketch, and will be finished, if I conjecture right, in three pages (but there is no guessing). The campaigns themselves will take up as many books ; and therefore I apprehend it would be hanging too great a weight of one kind of matter in so flimsy a performance as this to rhapsodize them, as I once intended, into the body of the work ; surely they

had better be printed apart. We'll consider the affair ; so take the following sketch of them in the meantime :—

“When the town, with its works, was finished, my uncle Toby and the Corporal began to run their first parallel, not at random, or any how, but from the same points and distances the Allies had begun to run theirs ; and regulating their approaches and attacks by the accounts my uncle Toby received from the daily papers, they went on, during the whole siege, step by step, with the Allies.

“When the Duke of Marlborough made a lodgment, my uncle Toby made a lodgment too : and when the face of a bastion was battered down, or a defence ruined, the Corporal took his mattock and did as much, and so on ; gaining ground, and making themselves masters of the works, one after another, till the town fell into their hands.

“A cow broke in upon uncle Toby's fortifications, and ate up two rations and a-half of dried grass, tearing up the sods with it, which fuced his horn-work and covered way.”

Trim considered that the unfortunate animal should be tried by court-martial. His ingenuity is put to the test to provide mortars for the mimic siege, and this is the ready expedient :—

“‘Pray what's the matter ? Who is there ?’ cried my father, waking, the moment the door began to creak. ‘I wish the smith would give a peep at that confounded hinge.’

“‘’Tis nothing, an' please your honour,’ said Trim, ‘but two mortars I am bringing in.’

“‘They shan't make a clatter with them here,’ cried my father, hastily. ‘If Dr. Slop has any drugs to pound, let him do it in the kitchen.’

“‘May it please your honour,’ cried Trim, ‘they are two mortar-pieces for a siege next summer, which I have been making out of a pair of jack-boots, which Obadiah told me your honour had left off wearing.’

“‘By heaven !’ cried my father, springing out of his chair, as he swore, ‘I have not one appointment belonging to me which I set so much store by, as I do by these jack-boots ; they were our great-grandfather's, brother Toby ; they were hereditary.’

“ ‘Then, I fear,’ quoth my uncle Toby, ‘Trim has cut off the entail.’

“ ‘I have only cut off the tops, an’ please your honour,’ cried Trim.”

In one portion of the work the elder Shandy, in his learned manner, is showing that the son ought to pay the mother respect, by referring to the “Institutes” of Justinian, which he directs Yorick, the clergyman, to read; who remarks that he can read it as well in the church catechism. Uncle Toby then comes to the rescue:—

“ ‘Trim can repeat every word of it by heart,’ quoth my uncle Toby.

“ ‘Pugh,’ said my father, not caring to be interrupted with Trim’s saying his catechism.

“ ‘He can, upon my honour,’ replied my uncle Toby. ‘Ask him, Mr. Yorick, any question you please.’

“ ‘The fifth commandment, Trim?’ said Yorick, speaking mildly, and with a gentle nod, as to a modest catechumen.

“ The Corporal stood silent.

“ ‘You don’t ask him right,’ said my uncle Toby, raising his voice, and giving it rapidly like the word of command: ‘the fifth?’ cried my uncle Toby.

“ ‘I must begin with the first, an’ please your honour,’ said the Corporal.

“ ‘Yorick could not forbear smiling. ‘Your reverence does not consider,’ said the Corporal, shouldering his stick, like a musket, and marching into the middle of the room to illustrate his position, ‘that ’tis exactly the same thing as doing one’s exercise in the field.’

“ ‘*Join your right hand to your firelock,*’ cried the Corporal, giving the word of command, and performing the motion.

“ ‘*Poise your firelock,*’ cried the Corporal; doing the duty still of both adjutant and private man.

“ ‘*Rest your firelock,*—One motion, an’ please your reverence, you see leads into another. If his honour will but begin with the first.’

“ ‘*The first*,’ cried my uncle Toby, setting his hand upon his side.

“ ‘*The second*,’ cried my uncle Toby, waving his tobaccopipe, as he would have done his sword at the head of a regiment.

“ The Corporal went through his *manual* with exactness; and having *honoured his father and mother*, made a low bow, and fell back to the side of the room.

“ ‘Everything in this world,’ said my father, ‘is big with jest, and has wit in it, and instruction, too, if we can but find it out.—Here is the *scaffold-work of instruction*; it’s true point of folly, without the *building* behind it.—Here is the glass for pedagogues, preceptors, tutors, governors, gerund-grinders, and bear-leaders, to view themselves in, in their true dimensions. Oh! there is a husk and shell, Yorick, which grows up with learning, which their unskilfulness knows not how to fling away! *Sciences may be learned by rote, but wisdom not.*’

“ Yorick thought my father inspired; ‘I will enter into obligations this moment,’ said my father, ‘to lay out all my aunt Dinah’s legacy in charitable uses’—of which, by the by, my father had no high opinion—‘if the Corporal has any one determinate idea annexed to any one word he has repeated.’

“ ‘Prithee, Trim,’ quoth my father, turning round to him, ‘What dost thou mean by *honouring thy father and mother*?’

“ ‘Allowing them, an’ please your honour, three-halfpence a day out of my pay, when they grow old.’

“ ‘And didst thou do that, Trim?’ said Yorick.

“ ‘He did indeed,’ replied my uncle Toby.

“ ‘Then, Trim,’ said Yorick, springing out of his chair, and taking the Corporal by the hand, ‘thou art the best commentator upon that part of the Decalogue; and I honour thee more for it, Corporal Trim, than if thou hadst had a hand in the Talmud itself.”

Those who are acquainted with the army, know that this exemplification of the above commandment is still practised by soldiers, many of whom transmit all they can spare for their relatives at home.

Trim’s idea of radical moisture is unique, his experience being drawn from the siege of Limerick:—

“ ‘I believe, an’ please your honour,’ quoth the Corporal, ‘that if it had not been for the quantity of brandy we set fire to every night, and the claret and cinnamon with which I plied your honour off’—

“ ‘And the Geneva, Trim,’ added my uncle Toby, ‘which did us more good than all.’

“ ‘I verily believe,’ continued the Corporal, ‘we had both, an’ please your honour, left our lives in the trenches, and been buried in them, too.’

“ ‘The noblest grave, Corporal,’ cried my uncle Toby, his eyes sparkling as he spoke, ‘that a soldier could wish to lie down in !’

“ ‘But a pitiful death for him ! an’ please your honour,’ replied the Corporal.

“ ‘Prithee, Trim,’ said Yorick, without staying for my father’s leave, ‘tell us honestly, what is thy opinion concerning this selfsame radical heat and radical moisture ?’

“ ‘With humble submission to his honour’s better judgment,’ quoth the Corporal, making a bow to my uncle Toby.

“ ‘Speak thy opinion freely, Corporal,’ said my uncle Toby. ‘The poor fellow is my servant, not my slave,’ added my uncle Toby, turning to my father.

“ ‘The Corporal put his hat under his left arm, and, with his stick hanging upon the wrist of it, by a black thong split into a tassell about the knot, he marched up to the ground where he had performed his catechism ; then, touching his underjaw with the thumb and fingers of his right hand before he opened his mouth, he delivered his notion thus :—‘The city of Limerick, the siege of which was begun under his Majesty King William himself, the year after I went into the army, lies, an’ please your honours, in the middle of a devilish wet swampy country.’

“ ‘‘Tis quite surrounded,’ said my uncle Toby, ‘with the Shannon, and is, by its situation, one of the strongest fortified places in Ireland.’

“ ‘I think this a new fashion,’ quoth Dr. Slop, ‘of beginning a medical lecture.’

“ ‘‘Tis all true,’ answered Trim.

“ ‘Then I wish the faculty would follow the cut of it,’ said Yorick.

“ ‘Tis all cut through, an’ please your reverence,’ said the Corporal, ‘with drains and bogs ; and besides, there was such a quantity of rain fell during the siege, the whole country was like a puddle :—’twas that, and nothing else, which brought on the flux, and which had like to have killed both his honour and myself. Now there was no such thing, after the first ten days,’ continued the Corporal, ‘as for a soldier to lie dry in his tent, without cutting a ditch round it to draw off the water ; nor was that enough for those who could afford it, as his honour could, without setting fire every night to a pewter dish full of brandy, which took off the damp of the air, and made the inside of the tent as warm as a stove.’

“ ‘And what conclusion dost thou draw, Corporal Trim,’ cried my father, ‘from all these premises?’

“ ‘I infer, an’ please your worship,’ replied Trim, ‘that the radical moisture is nothing in the world but ditch-water, and that the radical heat, of those who can go to the expense of it, is burnt brandy. The radical heat and moisture of a private man, an’ please your honours, is nothing but ditch-water and a dram of Geneva ; and give us but enough of it, with a pipe of tobacco to give us spirits and drive away the vapours, we know not what it is to fear death.’

“ ‘I am at a loss, Captain Shandy,’ quoth Dr. Slop, ‘to determine in which branch of learning your servant shines most, whether in physiology or divinity.’”

Never could master and man be better matched than uncle Toby and Trim ; here is one of the many instances in which their characters, both as soldiers and men, shine forth :—

“ ‘Did ever man, brother Toby,’ cried my father, raising himself upon his elbow and turning himself round to the opposite side of the bed, where my uncle Toby was sitting in his old fringed chair, with his chin resting upon his crutch, ‘did ever a poor unfortunate man, brother Toby,’ cried my father, ‘receive so many lashes?’

“ ‘The most I ever saw given,’ quoth my uncle Toby (ringing the bell at the bed’s head for Trim), ‘was to a grenadier, I think in Mackay’s regiment.’

"Had my uncle Toby shot a bullet through my father's heart, he could not have fallen down with his nose upon the quilt more suddenly.

"'Bless me !' said my uncle Toby.

"'Was it Mackay's regiment,' quoth my uncle Toby, 'where the poor grenadier was so unmercifully whipped at Bruges about the ducats?'

"'O Christ ! he was innocent !' cried Trim, with a deep sigh. 'And he was whipped, may it please your honour, almost to death's door. They had better have shot him outright, as he begged, and he had gone directly to heaven, for he was as innocent as your honour.'

"'I thank thee, Trim,' quoth my uncle Toby.

"'I never think of his,' continued Trim, 'and my poor brother Tom's misfortunes, for we were all three schoolfellows, but I cry like a coward.'

"'Tears are no proof of cowardice, Trim ; I drop them oft-times myself,' cried my uncle Toby.

"'I know your honour does,' replied Trim, 'and so am not ashamed of it myself.'

"'But to think, may it please your honour,' continued Trim, a tear stealing into the corner of his eye as he spoke, 'to think of two virtuous lads, with hearts as warm in their bodies and as honest as God could make them, the children of honest people, going forth with gallant spirits to seek their fortunes in the world, and fall into such evils ! Poor Tom ! to be tortured upon the rack for nothing but marrying a Jew's widow who sold sausages ! Honest Dick Johnson's soul to be scourged out of his body for the ducats another man put into his knapsack ! Oh ! these are misfortunes,' cried Trim, pulling out his handkerchief, 'these are misfortunes, may it please your honour, worth lying down and crying over.'

"'My father could not help blushing.

"'Twould be a pity, Trim,' quoth my uncle Toby, 'thou shouldst ever feel sorrow of thy own, thou feelest it so tenderly for others.'

"'Alack-a-day,' replied the Corporal, brightening up his face, 'your honour knows I have neither wife nor child ; I can have no sorrows in this world.'

"My father could not help smiling.

"As few as any man, Trim,' replied my uncle Toby; 'nor can I see how a fellow of thy light heart can suffer but from the distress of poverty in thy old age, when thou art past all services, Trim, and hast outlived thy friends.'

"An' please your honour, never fear,' replied Trim, cheerily.

"But I would have thee never fear, Trim,' replied my uncle Toby, 'and therefore,' continued my uncle Toby, throwing down his crutch and getting up upon his legs as he uttered the word *therefore*, 'in recompense, Trim, of thy long fidelity to me, and that goodness of thy heart I have had such proofs of, whilst thy master is worth a shilling thou shalt never ask elsewhere, Trim, for a penny.'

"Trim attempted to thank my uncle Toby, but had not power; tears trickled down his cheeks faster than he could wipe them off. He laid his hands upon his breast, made a bow to the ground, and shut the door.

"I have left Trim my bowling-green,' cried my uncle Toby. My father smiled. 'I have left him, moreover, a pension,' continued my uncle Toby. My father looked grave."

There is a wide difference in the opinions of the two brothers:—

"When I reflect, brother Toby, upon man, and take a view of that dark side of him which represents his life as open to so many causes of trouble; when I consider, brother Toby, how oft we eat the bread of affliction, and that we are born to it as to the portion of our inheritance'—

"I was born to nothing,' quoth my uncle Toby, interrupting my father, 'but my commission.'

"Zooks!' said my father, 'did not my uncle leave you a hundred and twenty pounds a-year?'

"What could I have done without it?' replied my uncle Toby.

"That's another concern,' said my father, testily; 'but, I say, Toby, when one runs over the catalogue of all the cross-reckonings and sorrowful items with which the heart of man is overcharged, 'tis wonderful by what hidden resources the mind is enabled to stand it out and bear itself up, as it does, against the impositions laid upon our nature.' ...

“ ‘Tis by the assistance of Almighty God,’ cried my uncle Toby, looking up and pressing the palms of his hands close together, ‘tis not from our own strength, brother Shandy ;—a sentinel, in a wooden sentry-box, might as well pretend to stand it out against a detachment of fifty men. We are upheld by the grace and the assistance of the Best of beings.’ ”

The hero, or at least he who gives the name to the book, is, by mistake, christened Tristram. Uncle Toby remarks to Trim that his brother “ maintains that a great deal more depends upon Christian names than what ignorant people imagine ;—for he says there never was a great or heroic action performed, since the world began, by one called Tristram. Nay, he will have it, Trim, that with such a name a man can neither be learned, nor wise, nor brave ”:—

“ ‘Tis all fancy, an’ please your honour : I fought just as well,’ replied the Corporal, ‘ when the regiment called me Trim, as when they called me James Butler.’ ”

“ ‘ And, for my own part,’ said my uncle Toby, ‘ though I should blush to boast of myself, Trim ; yet, had my name been Alexander, I could have done no more at Namur than my duty.’ ”

“ ‘ Bless you honour ! ’ cried Trim, advancing three steps as he spoke, ‘ does a man think of his Christian name when he goes upon the attack ! ’ ”

“ ‘ Or when he stands in the trench, Trim ? ’ cried my uncle Toby, looking firm.

“ ‘ Or when he enters a breach ? ’ said Trim, pushing in between two chairs.

“ ‘ Or forces the lines ? ’ cried my uncle, rising up, and pushing his crutch like a pike.

“ ‘ Or facing a platoon ? ’ cried Trim, presenting his stick like a firelock.

“ ‘ Or when he marches up the glacis ? ’ cried my uncle Toby, looking warm, and setting his foot upon his stool.”

Whilst Trim is reading a sermon to the brothers and Dr. Slop, the military knowledge of two of the

parties breaks forth when a verse from the book of Ecclesiasticus is quoted, ending with "his mind shall tell him more than seven watchmen that sit above upon a tower on high."

"A tower has no strength,' quoth my uncle Toby, 'unless it is flanked.'

"Well, what dost thou think of it,' said my father, speaking to Corporal Trim, as he reached his tobacco-box.

"I think,' answered the Corporal, 'that the seven watchmen upon the tower, who, I suppose, are all sentinels there, are more, an' please your honour, than were necessary; and to go on at that rate would harass a regiment all to pieces; which a commanding officer who loves his men, will never do, if he can help it; because two sentinels,' added the Corporal, 'are as good as twenty. I have been a commanding officer myself, in the *Corps-de-garde* a hundred times,' continued Trim (rising an inch higher in his figure, as he spoke); 'and all the time I had the honour to serve his Majesty King William, in relieving the most considerable posts, I never left more than two in my life.'

"Very right, Trim,' quoth my uncle Toby, 'but you do not consider, Trim, that the towers in Solomon's days were not such things as our bastions, flanked and defended by other works. This, Trim, was an invention since Solomon's death; nor had they horn-works, or ravelins before the curtain, in his time; or such a fossé as we make, with a cuvette in the middle of it, and with covered-ways and counterscarps palisadoed along it, to guard against a *coup-de-main*: so that the seven men upon the tower were a party, I dare say, from the *Corps-de-garde*, set there, not only to look out, but to defend it.'

"They could be no more, an' please your honour, than a corporal's guard.'

"My father smiled inwardly, but not outwardly; the subject being rather too serious, considering what had happened, to make a jest of. So putting his pipe into his mouth, which he had just lighted, he contented himself with ordering Trim to read on."

The following portion of the sermon excites Trim's heartfelt sympathy:—

“In how many kingdoms of the world—[Here Trim kept waving his right hand, from the sermon to the extent of his arm, returning it backwards and forwards to the conclusion of the paragraph]—

“In how many kingdoms of the world has the crusading sword of the misguided saint-errant spared neither age, nor merit, nor sex, nor condition ? and, as he fought under the banners of a religion which set him loose from justice and humanity, he showed none ; mercilessly trampled upon both, heard neither the cries of the unfortunate, nor pitied their distresses !

“I have been in many a battle, an’ please your honour,’ quoth Trim, sighing, ‘but never in so melancholy a one as this : I would not have drawn a trigger in it, against these poor souls, to have been made a general officer.

“Why, what do you understand of the affair ?’ said Dr. Slop, looking towards Trim, with something more of contempt than the Corporal’s honest heart deserved. ‘What do you know, friend, about this battle you talk of ?’

“I know,’ replied Trim, ‘that I never refused quarter in my life to any man who cried out for it : but to a woman, or a child, continued Trim, ‘before I would level my musket at them, I would lose my life a thousand times.’

“Here’s a crown for thee, Trim, to drink with Obadiah to-night,’ quoth my uncle Toby, ‘and I’ll give Obadiah another too.’

“God bless your honour,’ replied Trim ; ‘I had rather these poor women and children had it.’

“Thou art an honest fellow,’ quoth my uncle Toby.

“My father nodded his head, as much as to say, ‘And so he is.’”

Here is one of the military criticisms for which Sterne doubtless was indebted to his reminiscences of the mess-room. The battle of Steinkirk was fought on the 3rd of August, 1692 ; but the corps in advance not being supported in time to enable them to complete the success at first gained, King William was compelled to retreat. The regiments named by the Corporal have since been disbanded, with the excep-

tion of Cutts's, now Coldstream Guards; Leven's, now Twenty-fifth Foot—Uncle Toby and Corporal Trim are represented as belonging to this regiment—and Angus's, now Twenty-sixth Foot.

"My uncle Toby had just then been giving Yorick an account of the battle of Steinkirk, and of the strange conduct of Count Solmes, in ordering the foot to halt and the horse to march where it could not act; which was directly contrary to the king's command, and proved the loss of the day.

" 'Corporal Trim,' replied my uncle Toby (putting on his hat, which lay upon the table), if anything can be said to be a fault, when the service absolutely requires it should be done, 'tis I certainly who deserves the blame; you obeyed your orders.'

" 'Had Count Solmes, Trim, done the same at the battle of Steinkirk,' said Yorick, drolling a little upon the Corporal, who had been run over by a dragoon in the retreat—he had saved thee.'

" 'Saved!' cried Trim, interrupting Yorick, and finishing the sentence for him after his own fashion—he had saved five battalions, an' please your reverence, every soul of them. There was Cutts's,' continued the Corporal, clapping the fore-finger of his right hand upon the thumb of his left, and counting round his hand, 'there was Cutts's, Mackay's, Angus's, Graham's, and Leven's, all cut to pieces; and so had the English Life-guards, too, had it not been for some regiments upon the right, who marched up boldly to their relief, and received the enemy's fire in their faces, before any one of their own platoons discharged a musket.'

" 'They'll go to heaven for it,' added Trim.

" 'Trim is right,' said my uncle Toby, nodding to Yorick; 'he's perfectly right.'

" 'What signified his marching the horse,' continued the Corporal, 'where the ground was so strait, that the French had such a nation of hedges, and copses, and ditches, and felled trees laid this way and that, to cover them (as they always have). Count Solmes should have sent us; we would have fired muzzle to muzzle with them for their lives. There was nothing to be done for the horse: he had his foot shot off, however, for his pains,' continued the Corporal, 'the very next campaign, at Landen.'

" 'Poor Trim got his wound there,' quoth my uncle Toby.

"'Twas owing, an' please your honour, entirely to Count Solmes; had we drubbed them soundly at Steinkirk, they would not have fought us at Landen.'

"Possibly not, Trim,' said my uncle Toby; 'though, if they had the advantage of a wood, or you give them a moment's time to intrench themselves, they are a nation which will pop and pop for ever at you. There is no way but to march coolly up to them receive their fire, and fall in upon them, pell-mell.'

"'Ding-dong,' added Trim.

"Horse and foot,' said my uncle Toby.

"Helter-skelter,' said Trim.

"Right and left,' cried my uncle Toby.

"Blood and 'ounds!' shouted the Corporal

"The battle raged; Yorick drew his chair a little to one side for safety; and after a moment's pause, my uncle Toby, sinking his voice a note, resumed the discourse as follows:—

"King William,' said my uncle Toby, addressing himself to Yorick, 'was so terribly provoked at Count Solmes for disobeying his orders, that he would not suffer him to come into his presence for many months after.'

"I fear,' answered Yorick, 'the Squire will be as much provoked at the Corporal as the King at the Count. But 'twould be singularly hard in this case,' continued he, 'if Corporal Trim, who has behaved so diametrically opposite to Count Solmes, should have the fate to be rewarded with the same disgrace: too often, in this world, do things take that train.'

"I would spring a mine,' cried my uncle Toby, rising up, 'and blow up my fortifications, and my house with them, and we would perish under their ruins, ere I would stand by and see it.'

"Trim directed a slight but a grateful bow towards his master, and so the chapter ends."

Equally graphic is the reminiscence of the battle of Landen, which was fought in the year following, namely, on the 29th of July, 1693; in which the Duke of Luxembourg was again successful, but the conquerors were so worn out, that they were unable to pursue. It was in this battle that Corporal Trim

was wounded, and was so humanely tended by the kind-hearted Beguine.

Lord Macaulay, in his "History of England," thus alludes to the British and French commanders—William III. and Luxembourg—at the battle of Landen :—

"At Landen, two poor sickly beings, who, in a rude state of society, would have been regarded as too puny to bear any part in combats, were the souls of two great armies. In some heathen countries they would have been exposed while infants. In Christendom they would, six hundred years earlier, have been sent to some quiet cloister. But their lot had fallen on a time when men had discovered that the strength of the muscles is far inferior in value to the strength of the mind. It is probable that, among the hundred and twenty thousand soldiers who were marshalled round Neerwinden under all the standards of western Europe, the two feeblest in body were the hunchbacked dwarf who urged forward the fiery onset of France, and the asthmatic skeleton who covered the slow retreat of England."

An excellent anecdote has been handed down in reference to the Duke of Luxembourg's deformed figure. William III., his constant antagonist, is reported to have exclaimed, impatiently, "What! shall I never beat this hump-backed fellow?" This speech coming to the duke's ears, he is stated to have replied, "How should he know the shape of my back? I am sure he never saw me turn it to him."

"Your honour remembers, with concern," said the Corporal, "the total route and confusion of our camp and army at the affair of Landen; every one was left to shift for himself; and if it had

not been for the regiments of Wyndham, Lumley, and Galway, which covered the retreat over the bridge of Neerspeeken, the king himself could scarce have gained it ; he was pressed hard as your honour knows, on every side of him.'

" 'Gallant mortal !' cried my uncle Toby, caught with enthusiasm, 'this moment, now that all is lost, I see him galloping across me, Corporal, to the left, to bring up the remains of the English horse along with him, to support the right and tear the laurel from Luxembourg's brows, if yet 'tis possible : I see him with the knot of his scarf just shot off, infusing fresh spirits into poor Galway's regiment ; riding along the line, then wheeling about, and charging, Conti at the head of it. Brave ! brave, by heaven !' cried my uncle Toby ; 'he deserves a crown.'

" 'As richly as a thief a halter,' shouted Trim.

" My uncle Toby knew the Corporal's loyalty, otherwise the comparison was not at all to his mind ; it did not altogether strike the Corporal's fancy when he had made it, but it could not be recalled, so he had nothing to do but to proceed :—

" 'As the number of wounded was prodigious, and no one had time to think of anything but his own safety ; though Talmash,' said my uncle Toby, 'brought off the foot with great prudence.'

" 'But I was left upon the field,' said the Corporal.

" 'Thou wast so, poor fellow !' replied my uncle Toby.

" 'So that it was noon the next day,' continued the Corporal 'before I was exchanged ; and put into a cart with thirteen or fourteen more, in order to be conveyed to our hospital.' "

The regiments of Lumley and Wyndham are now represented by the First and Sixth Dragoon Guards ; that of Galway was disbanded. Falstaff is said to have been exhibited in love at Queen Elizabeth's suggestion ; and Sterne, without any royal command, has placed Uncle Toby in a similar predicament. This is the plan of operations for the attack on the widow :—

" 'But your honour's two razors shall be new set, and I will get my Montero-cap furbished up, and put on poor Lieutenant Le Fevre's regimental coat, which your honour gave me to wear for

his sake ; and as soon as your honour is clean shaved, and has got your clean shirt on, with your blue and gold or your fine scarlet, sometimes one and sometimes t'other, and every thing is ready for the attack, we'll march up boldly, as if 'twas to the face of a bastion ; and whilst your honour engages Mrs. Wadman in the parlour, to the right, I'll attack Mrs. Bridget in the kitchen, to the left ; and having seized that pass, I'll answer for it,' said the Corporal snapping his fingers over his head, 'that the day is our own.'

" 'I wish I may but manage it right,' said my uncle Toby, 'but I declare, Corporal, I had rather march up to the very edge of a trench.' "

Surely Professor Longfellow must have had this in view when portraying "Miles Standish," for the Captain remarks :—

"I can march up to a fortress and summon the place to surrender, But march up to a woman with such a proposal, I dare not. I'm not afraid of bullets, nor shot from the mouth of a cannon, But of a thundering 'No !' point-blank from the mouth of a woman,

That I confess I'm afraid of, nor am I ashamed to confess it !"

The description of the costume which is routed up for the love attack, independent of its humour, is valuable as showing the uniform of the army at the period in question :—

"Though the Corporal had been as good as his word in putting my uncle Toby's great Ramillies wig into pipes, yet the time was too short to produce any great effects from it : it had lain many years squeezed up in the corner of his old campaign trunk ; and as bad forms are not so easy to be got the better of, and the use of candle-ends not so well understood, it was not so pliable a business as one would have wished. The Corporal, with cheery eye and both arms extended, had fallen back perpendicular from it a score times, to inspire it, if possible, with a better air :—had *Spleen* given a look at it, 'twould have cost her ladyship a smile ; —it curled everywhere but where the Corporal would have it ;

and where a buckle or two, in his opinion, would have done it honour, he could as soon have raised the dead.

"Such it was, or, rather, such would it have seemed upon any other brow ; but the sweet look of goodness which sat upon my uncle Toby's assimilated everything around it so sovereignly to itself, and Nature had, moreover, wrote *Gentleman* with so fair a hand in every line of his countenance, that even his tarnished gold-laced hat and huge cockade of flimsy taffety became him ; and, though not worth a button in themselves, yet the moment my uncle Toby put them on, they became serious objects, and, altogether, seemed to have been picked up by the hand of Science to set him off to advantage.

"Nothing in this world could have co-operated more powerfully towards this than my uncle Toby's blue and gold, *had not quantity, in some measure, been necessary to grace.* In a period of fifteen or sixteen years since they had been made, by a total inactivity in my uncle Toby's life (for he seldom went further than the bowling-green), his blue and gold had become so miserably too strait for him that it was with the utmost difficulty the Corporal was able to get him into them ; the taking them up at the sleeves was of no advantage ; they were laced, however, down the back, and at the seams of the sides, etc., in the mode of King William's reign ; and, to shorten all description, they shone so bright against the sun that morning, and had so metallic and doughty an air with them, that, had my uncle Toby thought of attacking in armour, nothing could have so well imposed upon his imagination."

The popular military belief that "every bullet has its billet" is exemplified in the following extracts. Jonathan is the coachman, which will account for his idea of death :—

"For my own part, I declare it, that, out of doors, I value not death at all—not this," added the Corporal, snapping his fingers, but with an air which no one not the Corporal could have given to the sentiment. "In battle I value death not this—and let him not take me cowardly, like poor Joe Gibbons, in scouring his gun. What is he ? A pull of a trigger ; a push of a bayonet an inch this way or that, makes the difference. Look along the

line to the right. See! Jack's down! Well, 'tis worth a regiment of horse to him. No; 'tis Dick. Then Jack's no worse. Never mind which; we pass on, in hot pursuit: the wound itself which brings him is not felt,—the best way is to stand up to him. The man who flies is in ten times more danger than the man who marches up into his jaws. I've looked him,' added the Corporal, 'a hundred times in the face, and know what he is;—he's nothing, Obadiah, at all in the field.'

"'But he's very frightful in a house,' quoth Obadiah.

"'I never minded it myself,' said Jonathan, 'upon a coach-box.'

"'And could I escape him by creeping into the worst calf's skin that ever was made into a knapsack, I would do it there,' said Trim; 'but that is nature.'

Trim sees "good in everything," and believes in predestination:—

"'King William was of an opinion, an' please your honour,' quoth Trim, 'that everything was predestined for us in this world; insomuch, that he would often say to his soldiers, that "every ball had its billet."'

"'He was a great man,' said my uncle Toby.

"'And, I believe,' continued Trim, 'to this day, that the shot which disabled me at the battle of Landen, was pointed at my knee for no other purpose than to take me out of his service, and place me in your honour's, where I should be taken so much better care of in my old age.'

"'It shall never, Trim, be construed otherwise,' said my uncle Toby."

The brothers and Trim visit the Abbey of St. Germain, and are shown the tombs, amongst which is one containing the bones of St. Maxima:—

"'Tis supposed,' continued the Benedictine, 'that St. Maxima has lain in this tomb four hundred years, and two hundred before her canonization.'

"'Tis but a slow rise, brother Toby,' quoth my father, 'in this self-same army of martyrs.'

“ ‘A desperate slow one, an’ please your honour,’ said Trim, ‘unless one could purchase.’ ”

“ ‘I should rather sell out,’ quoth my uncle Toby.

“ ‘I am pretty much of your opinion, brother Toby,’ said my father.

“ ‘I’ll see the rest of these good gentry to-morrow,’ said my father, as we crossed over the square.

“ ‘And while you are paying that visit, brother Shandy, quoth my uncle Toby, ‘the Corporal and I will mount the ramparts.’ ”

Dates are quite unnecessary in tales, for uncle Toby considers that “a story passes very well without these niceties, unless one is pretty sure of ‘em.” Chronology and geography, too, are about the same to Trim, who thus commences about dates :

“ ‘Sure of ‘em !’ said the Corporal, shaking his head.

“ ‘Right,’ answered my uncle Toby ; ‘it is not easy, Trim, for one bred up as thou and I have been to arms, who seldom looks further forward than to the end of his musket, or backwards beyond his knapsack, to know much about this matter.’ ”

“ ‘God bless your honour !’ said the Corporal, won by the manner of my uncle Toby’s reasoning, as much as by the reasoning itself, ‘he has something else to do. If not in action, or on a march, or upon duty in his garrison, he has his firelock, an’ please your honour, to furbish, his accoutrements to take care of, his regimentals to mend, himself to shave and keep clean, so as to appear always like what he is upon the parade. What business,’ added the Corporal triumphantly, ‘has a soldier, an’ please your honour, to know anything at all of *geography* ?’ ”

“ ‘Thou wouldst have said *chronology*, Trim,’ said my uncle Toby, ‘for as for geography, ’tis of absolute use to him. He must be acquainted intimately with every country and its boundaries where his profession carries him ; he should know every town and city, and village and hamlet, with the canals, the roads and hollow-ways which lead up to them. There is not a river or a rivulet he passes, Trim, but he should be able, at first sight, to tell thee what is its name, in what mountains it takes its rise,

what is its course, how far it is navigable, where fordable, where not. He should know the fertility of every valley, as well as the hind who ploughs it, and be able to describe, or, if it is required, to give thee an exact map of all the plains and defiles, the forts, the acclivities, the woods and morasses, through and by which his army is to march ; he should know their produce, their plants, their minerals, their waters, their animals, their seasons, their climates, their heats and colds, their inhabitants, their customs, their language, their policy, and even their religion.

“ ‘Is it else to be conceived, Corporal,’ continued my uncle Toby, rising up in his sentry-box as he began to warm in this part of his discourse, ‘how Marlborough could have marched his army from the banks of the Maes to Belburg ; from Belburg to Kerpenord’ (here the Corporal could sit no longer), ‘from Kerpenord, Trim, to Kalsaken ; from Kalsaken to Newdorf ; from Newdorf to Landenbourg ; from Landenbourg to Mildenheim ; from Mildenheim to Elchingen ; from Elchingen to Gingen ; from Gingen to Balmerchoffen ; from Balmerchoffen to Skellenburg, where he broke in upon the enemy’s works, forced his passage over the Danube, crossed the Lech, pushed on his troops into the heart of the empire, marching at the head of them through Fribourg, Hokenwert, and Schönevelt, to the plains of Blenheim and Hochstet ? Great as he was, Corporal, he could not have advanced a step, or made one single day’s march, without the aids of geography. As for chronology, I own, Trim,’ continued my uncle Toby, sitting down again coolly in his sentry-box, ‘that, of all others, it seems a science which the soldier might best spare, was it not for the lights which that science must one day give him, in determining the invention of powder ; the furious execution of which, reversing everything like thunder before it, has become a new era to us of military improvements, changing so totally the nature of attacks and defences, both by sea and land, and awakening so much art and skill in doing it, that the world cannot be too exact in ascertaining the precise time of its discovery, or too inquisitive in knowing what great man was the discoverer, and what occasions gave birth to it.’ ”

The charming and pathetic story of *Le Fevre*, although generally known, is so priceless a gem, that

to omit it, especially when regarded as a military study, would be like the performance of "Hamlet" with the principal part omitted. This delightful *morceau* gave a fresh impulse to the excitement of the public, and evinced that Sterne possessed pathetic powers of narration—a quality which Dr. Johnson, it may be from a spirit of contradiction, denied to this great novelist. Gray, the poet, on the other hand, has remarked that Sterne may sometimes fail in humour, but never in pathos. To such as know the tale a repetition may not be disagreeable, and to those who do not, no apology is necessary:—

"THE STORY OF LE FEVRE.

"It was some time in the summer of that year in which Dendermond was taken by the Allies, which was about seven years before my father came into the country, and about as many after the time that my uncle Toby and Trim had privately decamped from my father's house in town, in order to lay some of the finest sieges to some of the finest fortified cities in Europe; when my uncle Toby was one evening getting his supper, with Trim sitting behind him at a small sideboard—I say sitting—for, in consideration of the Corporal's lame knee (which sometimes gave him exquisite pain) when my uncle Toby dined or supped alone, he would never suffer the Corporal to stand; and the poor fellow's veneration for his master was such that, with a proper artillery, my uncle Toby could have taken Dendermond itself with less trouble than he was able to gain this point over him; for many a time, when my uncle Toby supposed the Corporal's leg was at rest, he would look back, and detect him standing behind him with the most dutiful respect. This bred more little squabbles betwixt them than all other causes, for five-and-twenty years together: but this is neither here nor there, why do I mention it? Ask my pen: it governs me, I govern not it.

"He was one evening sitting thus at his supper, when the landlord of a little inn in the village came into the parlour, with an empty phial in his hand, to beg a glass or two of sack.

" 'Tis for a poor gentleman, I think of the army,' said the landlord, 'who has been taken ill at my house four days ago, and has never held up his head since, or had a desire to taste anything, till just now, that he has a fancy for a glass of sack and a thin toast. *I think*, says he, taking his hand from his forehead, *it would comfort me.*'

" 'If I could neither beg, borrow, nor buy such a thing,' added the landlord, 'I would almost steal it for the poor gentleman, he is so ill. I hope in God he will still mend,' continued he; 'we are all of us concerned for him.'

" 'Thou art a good-natured soul, I will answer for thee,' cried my uncle Toby: and thou shalt drink the poor gentleman's health in a glass of sack thyself, and take a couple of bottles with my service, and tell him he is heartily welcome to them, and to a dozen more, if they will do him good.'

" 'Though I am persuaded,' said my uncle Toby, as the landlord shut the door, 'he is a very compassionate fellow, Trim, yet I cannot help entertaining a high opinion of his guest too. There must be something more than common in him, that, in so short a time, should win so much upon the affections of his host.'

" 'And of his whole family,' added the Corporal, 'for they are all concerned for him.'

" 'Step after him,' said my uncle Toby; 'do Trim; and ask if he knows his name.'

" 'I have quite forgot it truly,' said the landlord, coming back into the parlour with the Corporal; 'but I can ask his son again.'

" 'Has he a son with him, then?' said my uncle Toby.

" 'A boy,' replied the landlord, 'of about eleven or twelve years of age; but the poor creature has tasted almost as little as his father: he does nothing but mourn and lament for him night and day. He has not stirred from the bedside these two days.'

" My uncle Toby laid down his knife and fork, and thrust his plate from before him, as the landlord gave him the account; and Trim, without being ordered, took it away, without saying one word, and in a few minutes after, brought him his pipe and tobacco.

" 'Stay in the room a little,' said my uncle Toby.

" 'Trim !' said my uncle Toby, after he lighted his pipe, and smoked about a dozen whiffs.

" Trim came in front of his master, and made his bow ; my uncle Toby smoked on, and said no more.

" 'Corporal !' said my uncle Toby.

" The Corporal made his bow.

" My uncle Toby proceeded no further, but finished his pipe.

" 'Trim !' said my uncle Toby, 'I have a project in my head, as it is a bad night, of wrapping myself up warm in my *roquelaure*, and paying a visit to this poor gentleman.'

" 'Your honour's *roquelaure*,' replied the Corporal, 'has not once been had on since the night before your honour received your wound, when we mounted guard in the trenches before the gate of St. Nicholas ; and, besides, it is so cold and rainy a night that, what with the *roquelaure*, and what with the weather, 'twill be enough to give your honour your death, and bring on your honour's torment in your groin.'

" 'I fear so,' replied my uncle Toby ; 'but I am not at rest in my mind, Trim, since the account the landlord has given me. I wish I had not known so much of this affair,' added my uncle Toby, 'or that I had known more of it. How shall we manage it?'

" 'Leave it, an' please your honour, to me,' quoth the Corporal. 'I'll take my hat and stick, and go to the house and reconnoitre, and act accordingly ; and I will bring your honour a full account in an hour.'

" 'Thou shalt go, Trim,' said my uncle Toby, 'and here's a shilling for thee to drink with his servant.'

" 'I shall get it all out of him,' said the Corporal, shutting the door.

" My uncle Toby filled his second pipe ; and had it not been that he now and then wandered from the point, with considering whether it was not full as well to have the curtain of the *tenaille* a straight line as a crooked one, he might be said to have thought of nothing else but poor Le Fevre and his boy the whole time he smoked it.

" It was not till my uncle Toby had knocked the ashes out of his third pipe, that Corporal Trim returned from the inn, and gave him the following account :—

" 'I despaired, at first,' said the Corporal, 'of being able to

bring back your honour any kind of intelligence concerning the poor sick lieutenant.'

" 'Is he in the army, then?' said my uncle Toby.

" 'He is,' said the Corporal.

" 'And in what regiment?' said my uncle Toby.

" 'I'll tell your honour,' replied the Corporal, 'everything straightforwards, as I learnt it.'

" 'Then, Trim, I'll fill another pipe,' said my uncle Toby, 'and not interrupt thee till thou hast done ; so sit down at thy ease, Trim, in the window-seat, and begin thy story again.'

" The Corporal made his old bow, which generally spoke as plain as a bow could speak it, '*Your honour is good*;' and having done that, he sat down, as he was ordered, and began the story to my uncle Toby over again in pretty near the same words.

" 'I despaired, at first,' said the Corporal, 'of being able to bring back any intelligence to your honour about the lieutenant and his son ; for, when I asked where his servant was, from whom I made myself sure of knowing every thing which was proper to be asked'—

" 'That's a right distinction, Trim,' said my uncle Toby.

" 'I was answered, an' please your honour, that he had no servant with him ; that he had come to the inn with hired horses, which, upon finding himself unable to proceed (to join, I suppose, the regiment), he had dismissed the morning after he came.'

" 'If I get better, my dear,' said he, as he gave his purse to his son to pay the man, 'we can hire horses from hence.'

" 'But, alas ! the poor gentleman will never go from hence,' said the landlady to me, 'for I heard the death-watch all night long ; and, when he dies, the youth, his son, will certainly die with him, for he is broken-hearted already.'

" 'I was hearing this account,' continued the Corporal, 'when the youth came into the kitchen, to order the thin toast the landlord spoke of'—

" 'But I will do it for my father myself,' said the youth.

" 'Pray let me save you the trouble, young gentleman,' said I, taking up a fork for the purpose, and offering him my chair to sit down upon by the fire, whilst I did it.

" 'I believe,' said he, very modestly, 'I can please him best myself.'

“‘I am sure,’ said I, ‘his honour will not like the toast the worse for being toasted by an old soldier.’”

“‘The youth took hold of my hand, and instantly burst into tears.’”

“‘Poor youth!’ said my uncle Toby; ‘he has been bred up from an infant in the army; and the name of a soldier, Trim, sounded in his ears like the name of a friend! I wish I had him here.’”

“‘I never, in the longest march,’ said the Corporal, ‘had so great a mind for my dinner, as I had to cry with him for company. What could be the matter with me, an’ please your honour?’”

“‘Nothing in the world, Trim,’ said my uncle Toby, blowing his nose, ‘but that thou art a good-natured fellow.’”

“‘When I gave him the toast,’ continued the Corporal, ‘I thought it was proper to tell him I was Captain Shandy’s servant, and that your honour (though a stranger) was extremely concerned for his father; and that if there was anything in your house, or cellar’——”

“‘And thou mightst have added my purse, too,’ said my uncle Toby.

“‘He was heartily welcome to it. He made a very low bow (which was meant to your honour), but no answer; for his heart was full; so he went up-stairs with the toast. I warrant you, my dear,’ said I, as I opened the kitchen-door, ‘your father will be well again. Mr. Yorick’s curate was smoking a pipe by the kitchen fire; but said not a word, good or bad, to comfort the youth. I thought it wrong,’ added the Corporal.

“‘I think so, too,’ said my uncle Toby.

“‘When the lieutenant had taken his glass of sack and toast, he felt himself a little revived, and sent down into the kitchen to let me know that, in about ten minutes, he should be glad if I would step up-stairs.’”

“‘I believe,’ said the landlord, ‘he is going to say his prayers; for there was a book laid upon the chair by his bed-side, and, as I shut the door, I saw his son take up a cushion.

“‘I thought,’ said the curate, ‘that you gentlemen of the army, Mr. Trim, never said your prayers at all.’”

“‘I heard the poor gentleman say his prayers last night,’ said the landlady, ‘very devoutly, and with my own ears, or I could not have believed it.’”

“ ‘Are you sure of it?’ replied the curate.

“ ‘A soldier, an’ please your reverence,’ said I, ‘prays as often (of his own accord) as a parson; and when he is fighting for his king, and for his own life, and for his honour, too, he has the most reason to pray to God of any one in the whole world.’

“ ‘Twas well said of thee, Trim,’ said my uncle Toby.

“ ‘But when a soldier,’ said I, ‘an’ please your reverence, has been standing for twelve hours together in the trenches, up to his knees in cold water, or engaged,’ said I, ‘for months together in long and dangerous marches; harassed, perhaps, in his rear to-day; harassing others to-morrow; detached here; countermanded there; resting this night out upon his arms; beat up in his shirt the next; benumbed in his joints—perhaps without straw in his tent to kneel on; must say his prayers *how* and *when* he can—I believe,’ said I—for I was piqued, quoth the Corporal, for the reputation of the army—‘I believe, an’ please your reverence,’ said I, ‘that when a soldier gets time to pray, he prays as heartily as a parson, though not with all his fuss and hypocrisy.’

“ ‘Thou shouldst not have said that, Trim,’ said my uncle Toby, ‘for God only knows who is a hypocrite, and who is not. At the great and general review of us all, Corporal, at the day of judgment (and not till then), it will be seen who have done their duties in this world, and who have not; and we shall be advanced, Trim, accordingly.’

“ ‘I hope we shall,’ said Trim.

“ ‘It is in the Scripture,’ said my uncle Toby, ‘and I will show it thee to-morrow. In the meantime we may depend upon it, Trim, for our comfort,’ said my uncle Toby, ‘that God Almighty is so good and just a Governor of the world that, if we have but done our duties in it, it will never be inquired into whether we have done them in a red coat or a black one.’

“ ‘I hope not,’ said the Corporal.

“ ‘But go on, Trim,’ said my uncle Toby, ‘with thy story.’

“ ‘When I went up,’ continued the Corporal, ‘into the lieutenant’s room, which I did not do till the expiration of the ten minutes, he was lying in his bed, with his head raised upon his hand, with his elbow upon the pillow, and a clean white cumbric handkerchief beside it. The youth was just stooping down to take up the cushion, upon which I supposed he had been kneel-

ing ; the book was laid upon the bed ; and, as he arose, in taking up the cushion with one hand, he reached out his other to take it away at the same time. "Let it remain there, my dear," said the lieutenant. He did not offer to speak to me till I had walked up close to his bed-side. "If you are Captain Shandy's servant," said he "you must present my thanks to your master, with my little boy's thanks along with them, for his courtesy to me. If he was of Leven's," said the lieutenant—I told him your honour was—"then," said he, "I served three campaigns with him in Flanders, and remember him ; but 'tis most likely, as I had not the honour of any acquaintance with him, that he knows nothing of me. You will tell him, however, that the person his good-nature has laid under obligations to him is one Le Fevre, a lieutenant in Angus's; but he knows me not," said he, a second time, musing ; "possibly he may my story, added he. Pray tell the captain I was the ensign at Breda, whose wife was most unfortunately killed with a musket-shot, as she lay in my arms in my tent."

"I remember the story, an' please your honour," said I, 'very well.'

"Do you so?" said he, wiping his eyes with his handkerchief, "then well may I." In saying this, he drew a little ring out of his bosom, which seemed tied with a black ribbon about his neck, and kissed it twice. "Here, Billy," said he. The boy flew across the room to the bed-side, and, falling down upon his knee, took the ring in his hand and kissed it too, then kissed his father, and sat down upon the bed and wept.

"I wish," said my uncle Toby, with a deep sigh, 'I wish, Trim, I was asleep.'

"Your honour," replied the Corporal, 'is too much concerned. Shall I pour your honour out a glass of sack to your pipe?'

"Do, Trim," said my uncle Toby.

"I remember," said my uncle Toby, sighing again, 'the story of the ensign and his wife, with a circumstance his modesty omitted ; and particularly well that he, as well as she, upon some account or other (I forget what), was universally pitied by the whole regiment. But finish the story thou art upon.'

"'Tis finished already," said the Corporal, 'for I could stay no longer ; so wished his honour a good-night. Young Le Fevre rose from off the bed, and saw me to the bottom of the stairs.'

and, as we went down together, told me that they had come from Ireland, and were on their route to join the regiment in Flanders. But alas !' said the Corporal, 'the lieutenant's last day's march is over !'

" 'Then what is to become of his poor boy ?' cried my uncle Toby.

" 'It was to my uncle Toby's eternal honour, though I tell it only for the sake of those who, when cooped in betwixt a natural and a positive law, know not, for their souls, which way in the world to turn themselves, that, notwithstanding my uncle Toby was warmly engaged at that time in carrying on the siege of Dendermond, parallel with the Allies—who pressed theirs on so vigorously that they scarce allowed him time to get his dinner—that nevertheless he gave up Dendermond, though he had already made a lodgment upon the counterscarp, and bent his whole thoughts towards the private distresses at the inn ; and, except that he ordered the garden-gate to be bolted up, by which he might be said to have turned the siege of Dendermond into a blockade, he left Dendermond to itself—to be relieved or not by the French king, as the French king thought good—and only considered how he himself should relieve the poor lieutenant and his son.

" 'That kind Being who is a friend to the friendless, shall recompense thee for this.

" ' 'Thou hast left this matter short,' said my uncle Toby to the Corporal, as he was putting him to bed, 'and I will tell thee in what, Trim. In the first place, when thou madest an offer of my services to Le Fevre—as sickness and travelling are both expensive, and thou knewest that he was but a poor lieutenant, with a son to subsist as well as himself out of his pay—that thou didst not make an offer to him of my purse ; because, had he stood in need, thou knowest, Trim, he had been as welcome to it as myself.'

" ' 'Your honour knows,' said the Corporal, 'I had no orders.'

" ' 'True,' quoth my uncle Toby, 'thou didst very right, Trim, as a soldier, but certainly very wrong as a man. In the second place, for which, indeed, thou hast the same excuse,' continued my uncle Toby, 'when thou offeredst him whatever was in my house, thou shouldst have offered him my house, too. A sick brother officer should have the best quarters, Trim ; and if we

had him with us, we could tend and look to him. Thou art an excellent nurse thyself, Trim ; and what with thy care of him, and the old woman's, and his boy's, and mine together, we might recruit him again at once, and set him upon his legs. In a fortnight or three weeks,' added my uncle Toby, smiling, 'he might march.'

" 'He will never march, an' please your honour, in this world,' said the Corporal.

" 'He *will* march,' said my uncle Toby, rising up from the side of the bed with one shoe off.

" 'An' please your honour,' said the Corporal, 'he will never march but to his grave.'

" 'He *shall* march,' cried my uncle Toby, marching the foot which had a shoe on, though without advancing an inch—'he *shall* march to his regiment.'

" 'He cannot stand it,' said the Corporal.

" 'He shall be supported,' said my uncle Toby.

" 'He'll drop at last,' said the Corporal, 'and what will become of his boy ?'

" 'He *shall not* drop,' said my uncle Toby, firmly.

" 'Ah, well-a-day ; do what you can for him,' said Trim, maintaining his point, 'the poor soul will die.'

" 'He *shall not die, by G—!*' cried my uncle Toby.

" The *accusing spirit*, which flew up to heaven's chancery with the oath, blushed as he gave it in ; and the *recording angel*, as he wrote it down, dropped a tear upon the word, and blotted it out for ever.

" The sun looked bright the morning after, to every eye in the village but Le Fevre's and his afflicted son's ; the hand of death pressed heavy upon his eyelids ; and hardly could the wheel at the cistern turn round its circle—when my uncle Toby, who had risen up an hour before his wonted time, entered the lieutenant's room, and, without preface or apology, sat himself down upon the chair by the bed-side ; and, independently of all modes and customs, opened the curtain in the manner an old friend and brother-officer would have done it ; and asked him how he did, how he had rested in the night, what was his complaint, where was his pain, and what he could do to help him ; and, without giving him time to answer any one of these inquiries, went on, and told him of the

little plan which he had been concerting with the Corporal the night before for him.

“ ‘You shall go home directly, Le Fevre,’ said my uncle Toby, ‘to my house, and we’ll send for a doctor to see what’s the matter; and we’ll have an apothecary; and the Corporal shall be your nurse; and I’ll be your servant, Le Fevre.’

“There was a frankness in my uncle Toby, not the *effect* of familiarity, but the *cause* of it, which let you at once into his soul, and showed you the goodness of his nature. To this, there was something in his looks, and voice, and manner superadded, which eternally beckoned to the unfortunate to come and take shelter under him; so that, before my uncle Toby had half finished the kind offers he was making to the father, had the son insensibly pressed up close to his knees, and had taken hold of the breast of his coat, and was pulling it towards him. The blood and spirits of Le Fevre, which were waxing cold and slow within him, and were retreating to their last citadel, the heart, rallied back; the film forsook his eyes for a moment; he looked up wishfully in my uncle Toby’s face; then cast a look upon his boy; and that *ligement*, fine as it was, was never broken!

“Nature instantly ebbed again; the film returned to its place; the pulse fluttered, stopped; went on, throbbled, stopped again; moved, stopped. Shall I go on? No.

“I am so impatient to return to my own story that what remains of young Le Fevre’s—that is, from this turn of his fortune to the time my uncle Toby recommended him for my preceptor—shall be told in a very few words. All that is necessary to be added is as follows:—

“That my uncle Toby, with young Le Fevre in his hand, attended the poor lieutenant, as chief mourners, to his grave.

“That the governor of Dendermond paid his obsequies all military honours, and that Yorick, not to be behindhand, paid him all ecclesiastic—for he buried him in his chancel. And it appears, likewise, he preached a funeral sermon over him.

“When my uncle Toby had turned everything into money, and settled all accounts betwixt the agent of the regiment and Le Fevre, and betwixt Le Fevre and all mankind, there remained nothing more in my uncle Toby’s hands than an old regimental coat and sword; so that my uncle Toby found little or no oppo-

sition from the world in taking administration. The coat my uncle Toby gave the Corporal. 'Wear it, Trim,' said my uncle Toby, 'as long as it will hold together, for the sake of the poor lieutenant. And this,' said my uncle Toby, taking up the sword in his hand, and drawing it out of the scabbard as he spoke—'and this, Le Fevre, I'll save for thee; 'tis all the fortune,' continued my uncle Toby, hanging it up upon a crook and pointing to it, 'tis all the fortune, my dear Le Fevre, which God has left thee; but if he has given thee a heart to fight thy way with it in the world, and thou doest it like a man of honour, 'tis enough for us.'

Finally, young Le Fevre seeks his fortune under Prince Eugene, and then comes the leave-taking:—Uncle Toby places the sword in the son's hand:—

"'If thou art brave, Le Fevre,' said my uncle Toby, 'this will not fail thee; but Fortune,' said he, musing a little, 'Fortune may; and if she does,' added my uncle Toby, embracing him, 'come back again to me, Le Fevre, and we will shape thee another course.'

"The greatest injury could not have oppressed the heart of Le Fevre more than my uncle Toby's paternal kindness. He parted from my uncle Toby as the best of sons from the best of fathers; both dropped tears, and, as my uncle Toby gave him his last kiss, he slipped sixty guineas, tied up in an old purse of his father's, in which was his mother's ring, into his hand, and bade God bless him."

Misfortunes, including sickness, overtake the young officer, and at length he is compelled to return home. Uncle Toby receives the news in a manner easily to be conceived:—

"As this letter came to hand about six weeks before Susannah's accident, Le Fevre was hourly expected, and was uppermost in my uncle Toby's mind all the time my father was giving him and Yorick a description of what kind of a person he would choose for a preceptor to me; but as my uncle Toby thought my father at first somewhat fanciful in the accomplishments he required, he forbore mentioning Le Fevre's name, till the character, by Yorick's interposition, ending unexpectedly in one who should

be gentle-tempered, and generous, and good, it impressed the image of Le Fevre and his interest upon my uncle Toby so forcibly, that he rose instantly off his 'chair, and, laying down his pipe, in order to take hold of both my father's hands, 'I beg, brother Shandy,' said my uncle Toby, 'I may recommend poor Le Fevre's son to you.'

"'I beseech you do!' added Yorick.

"'He has a good heart,' said my uncle Toby.

"'And a brave one too, an' please your honour,' said the Corporal.

"'The best hearts, Trim, are ever the bravest,' replied my uncle Toby.

"'And the greatest cowards, an' please your honour, in our regiment were the greatest rascals in it. There was Sergeant Kumber and Ensign'——

"'We'll talk of them,' said my father, 'another time.'"

In concluding these "Military Studies" from Sterne, it is certain that every reader of *Tristram Shandy* will endorse the author's eloquent tribute to "dear uncle Toby," who, feared nothing "but the doing a wrong thing:"—

"Peace and comfort rest for evermore upon thy head! Thou enviedst no man's comforts, insultedst no man's opinions; thou blackenedst no man's character, devouredst no man's bread! Gently, with faithful Trim behind thee, didst thou ramble round the little circle of thy pleasures, jostling no creature in thy way. For each one's sorrows thou hadst a tear, for each man's need thou hadst a shilling. Whilst I am worth one to pay a weeder, thy path from thy door to thy bowling-green shall never be grown up. Whilst there is a rood and a-half of land in the Shandy family, thy fortifications, my dear uncle Toby, shall never be demolished."

COLONEL MONRO.



“He did look far
Into the service of the time, and was
Disciple of the bravest :— * * * *
Such a man
Might be a copy to these younger times.”
SHAKSPEARE.

“Nowise a clothes-horse and patent digester, but a genuine
man.”—CARLYLE.



COLONEL MONRO.

VISITORS to our military chapels must be impressed with the fervour and decorum therein exhibited; and the two accompanying selections are introduced, not as the only instances of religious officers—of whom there have been, and it is hoped ever will be, bright examples in the army—but merely as types of a class in which a certain quaintness of character at once attracts attention. It is needless to do more than advert to Colonel Gardiner, Sir Henry Havelock, and Captain Vicars, whose memoirs have been read by all, and it is, therefore, unnecessary to introduce them in this place. Colonels Monro and Blackader are not, however, so generally known.

In all the Waverley romances, and their name is legion, can a rarer compound of wit, humour, and bravery, be instanced than the redoubted ritt-master and student of Mareschal College, Aberdeen, Captain Dugald Dalgetty, of Drumthwacket, who figures so prominently in "A Legend of Montrose." 'Tis true that a character of this stamp has been sketched by Shakspeare in the play of "Henry the Fifth," for in Captain Fluellen is demonstrated that the classics might be always at hand to illustrate the events of modern warfare, and to show that the situation of Macedon and Monmouth were alike; and that Alexander's life might form a parallel with that of Harry of Monmouth—the killing of Clytus being likened to the

dismissal of Falstaff, "for there is figures in all things." So it was with Colonel Robert Monro, who had the knack of always comparing ancient times with passing events, or as Thomas Carlyle hath it, of "reconciling the distant with the present." It is worthy of notice, too, that our great dramatist has made this a characteristic of the *Scots* Captain Jamy, who is described by Fluellen as "a marvellous falo-rous gentleman, that is certain: and of great expedition, and knowledge, in the *ancient wars*," and, moreover, is well versed "in the disciplines of the pristine wars of the Romans." The valiant *Irish* Captain Macmorris (the only Hibernian character in Shakspeare) was deficient in this quality, for Fluellen speaks disparagingly of him as having "no more directions in the true disciplines of the wars, look you, of the Roman disciplines, than is a puppy dog." A closer acquaintance with a scarce *tome*, which was repeatedly consulted by Sir Walter Scott, while composing the romance before adverted to, may not prove unacceptable, particularly when it is remembered that he has stated that the book itself is, in a great measure, written in the humour of Captain Dalgetty. There is, it will be seen, a higher principle in our hero than mere humour, for Monro was not only a fighter but a thinker, and like every conscientious man, endeavoured to make his actions correspond with his belief.

The title of the work, which was published in 1637, is too formidable for quotation, but it commences with "MONRO HIS EXPEDITION," and purports to give an account of his first service under the "magnanimous King of Denmark," and afterwards under

the "Invincible King of Sweden," "collected and gathered together at spare houres." The colonel's plan is this: first to describe a "dutie discharged," and then to give his observations thereon. The first part contains his adventures in the Danish service, and consists of twenty-two duties, with a like number of observations. The second part embraces his career under the King of Sweden, and consists of "forty-two" duties and as many observations. Then follows "An Abridgement of Exercise," and "Certaine Observations worthy the YOUNGER Officer, his consideration," to which is added, "The Christian *Souldier* going on Service his Meditations." Some of the words of command in the exercise are curious when compared with those now in use in the army, for example:—

"To the right hand countermarch and lose no ground."

"To the left hand as you were."

"To the left hand turne, dresse your Ranks and Files, and be *silent*."

The meditations are equally quaint, for instance, "When thou seest thy Camerade going to Muster with a faire show outwardly deckt with brave clothes, and delighting in his plumes, thinke with thy selfe, such an outward show is nothing without the inward gifts of the *minde*." This agrees with Shakspere, who has likewise said:—

"'Tis the *mind* that makes the body rich;

And as the sun breaks through the darkest clouds,

So honour peereth in the meanest habit."

Here is another sample, "When thou seest thy Camerade fix in his Armes, and well exercised with Pike, Musket, and Sword; then thinke with thy selfe

that thy dutie is, to trust in the Lord, and to doe goode."

We must not dwell longer upon this portion of the work, neither will space permit us to give even a summary of the campaigns in which the colonel bore so distinguished a part; he did good 'service under Gustavus the "Lyon of the North," and was the schoolfellow and comrade of Colonel Sir John Hepburn, whose regiment (now represented by the First Foot) was for some years brigaded with that of which Monro was colonel, Lumsdell's, and Stargate's. This was the celebrated Green Brigade of the "magnifique" Gustavus, which performed such gallant deeds during the protracted contest known as "the thirty years' war."

Monro commences the "first dutie" with the proverb, "A good beginning makes a good ending, and to lead a good life is the way to a happy death." The following shows the spirit with which trouble should be met. It appeared that certain officers were dissatisfied, without reason, with the King of Denmark, under whom Monro was first employed, upon which he remarks, "A wise man makes the trouble lesse by fortitude, when a foule stoupes to it. The world has nothing so glorious as vertue, which is like the passage of Haniball over the Alpes, a work of trying toyle, of infinite danger, but once performed, it lets him in into the worlds garden, Italy, leaving him a lasting fame." Had our author lived in modern times how he would have pored over the account of Napoleon's passage of the same mountains, and how he would have sought for similarities between the ancient and the modern exploit, not to mention the

recent conveyance of troops to Italy over these historic mountains.

The reader, in the two following extracts, will recognize something which forms part of the conversation of Captain Dalgetty: "The want of pay at the Waser made our souldiers a little discontent, seeing the English get due weekely pay; nevertheless, I did never heare of our nations mutinie, nor of their refusal to fight, when they saw their enemies, though I have seene other Nations call for Guilt, being going before their enemy to fight, a thing very disallowable in either Officer or Souldier, to preferre a little money to a world of credit." The next is of a different character: "I was once made to stand in my younger yeares at the Louver gate in Paris, being then in the Kings regiment of the Guards, passing my prentiship; for sleeping in the morning, when I ought to have beene at my exercise,—for punishment I was made from eleven before noone to eight of the Clocke in the night Centry, Armed with Corslet, Head-piece, Bracelets, being iron to the teeth, in a hot Summers day, till I was weary of my life, which ever after made me the more stricte in punishing those under my command." Strange, though true, that strictness should have this effect; but every-day experience shows that servants or apprentices, when treated harshly, almost invariably exercise the same tyranny after they have themselves become masters.

Monro considers "it is better to be buried in oblivion than to be evil spoken of to posteritie." Here, too, is a little classic *morceau* with which the book abounds:—"Adversity is like Penelopes night, which undoes all that ever the day did weave." Does

not wonder at taking a man from the plough to be soldier, for the same is recorded of Cincinnatus and Quintus to be consul, and speaks of the Porter of Fowles, Mac-Weattiche, proving "as valiant as a sword."

At Oldenburgh, Monro "received a favourable marke, being hurt in the inner side of my right knee with the end of mine own Partizan, being shot off by the Cannon bullet." The following incident shows that there's many a slip between the cup and the lip:—A barrel of beer being sent in, the officers beat out the head of it that every man might come with hat or head-piece; while flocking round the waggon, a shot came in the midst, and blew the barrel and beer into the air without injuring any one. "This (observes Monro) was the neerest misse I did ever see." A similar escape is mentioned in one of the letters from the camp before Sevastopol:—"I had a very narrow escape myself the other night when I was at work in the trenches. It was about twelve o'clock at night, and we were having our grog served out to us, and I had just got the pot to my lips when a grape-shot, weighing about two pounds, whizzed past, and took the pot right out of my hand—not doing me any harm, but disappointing me very much in respect of losing my grog."

Monro condemns those arrogant spirits who being hurt will be so foolishly valiant to stay for a second hurt worse than the first, and without condemning him that runnes away first, he "cannot allow of him that, out of ostentation, will stay after all his Camerades are gone, till he yeeld himselfe prisoner, or die unnecessarily there, where he might have preserved

himself with honour for a better occasion." When necessity called, however, he did not regard life; being ordered to proceed to Colberg, he was directed to "fight to the last man, and not to give over the castle." Upon being summoned to treat, although in great stress, Monro's reply was that "we had no such orders, but we had powder and ball at their service." Our colonel considers that "we must not preferre the safety of our owne bodies to the publike weale of our Camerades and countrimen dead or living, but we ought, with the hazard of our owne lives, to bring off the dead and hurt." Instances Cæsar causing the head of Pompey to be buried: Alexander restoring unto the mother of Darius the dead body of her son; and Hannibal interring that of his enemy Marcellus.

In reprehending plundering, an illustration is given of the Pythagorean who "bought a pair of shoes upon trust; the shoemaker dyes, the Philosopher is glad, and thinks them gaine; but a while after his Conscience touches him, and becomes a perpetuall chider, he repaires to the house of the dead, casts in his money with these words: '*There, take thy due; thou livest to me, though dead to all besides.*' Certainly," Monro continues, "in my opinion, ill-gotten gaines are farre worse than losses with preserved honestie. These grieve but once, the others are continually grating upon our quiet; and he diminishes his owne contentment that would adde unto it by unlawfulnessse."

The sixteenth observation commences with, "When cannons are roaring and bullets flying, he that would have honour must not fear dying." Sir

Walter Scott, by a slight alteration, and by the addition of two lines, has turned the same into the song hummed by Dalgetty on more than one occasion :—

“ When the cannons are roaring, lads, and the colours are flying,
The lads that seek honour must never fear dying ;
Then stout cavaliers, let us toil our brave trade in,
And fight for the Gospel and the bold King of Sweden.”

Monro was of opinion that “ the world is but a perpetuall warre and a wedding. When the Assyrian fell, the Persian rose ; when the Persian fell, the Grecian rose ; the losse of one man is the gaine of another. It is vicissitude that maintaines the world.” That “ like leaves on trees, we are the sport of every puffle that bloweth, and with the least guste may be shaken from our lives and nutriment.” Speaking of men straining everything to “ hoarding up of fatall gold,” and the uncertainty of life, from which “ a haire or a flie may snatch him in a moment,” he winds up his observation by remarking, “ We should never care too much for that we are not sure to keepe ; yet we should respect somewhat more than for our owne time, that we may be beneficiall to posteritie ; but for my owne parte, I will cast this, as my life, on Gods providence, and live here as a Pilgrime of one night, not being sure to see the morrow.” The enemy’s cannon having shot four great bullets, of a hundred and sixty pounds weight, out of mortars, through the top of his lodging where he was sleeping, Monro recommended his soul to God, and resolved that he was well guarded whom the Lord had a care of, and that He would not suffer him to be smothered under walls, after having delivered him from so many dangers.

Our hero's idea of married life and its duties, viewed in relation to military discipline, is too curious to be passed over. Speaking of Gustavus, who was in the Dutch wars deprived for two years "from the sweete society of his Queene," Monro remarks, "We see here that cavaliers, though tied by Gods ordinance to live with their wives, being once severed and tied to serve, they cannot with credit quit their charge to come to their wives." The colonel thinks very highly of soldiers' wives—instances many examples from antiquity—and gives the following anecdote of Felt-Marshal Gustave Horne: "The peste having entred his lodging, and taken away two of his children, seazed on his vertuous Lady, daughter to the chancellor of Sweden; the Cavaliers love was so great, that in the extremitie of her sicknesse, he never suffered her to be out of his armes till she died, and then caused her to be put in a silver coffin, that she might be transported for her country, to be buried amongst her friends; and his love was so great unto her, that after her death, though a young man, he could never be moved to lead his life with any other woman."

Leigh Hunt in "The Indicator," has written "A word upon Indexes," in order to prove that index-making is neither the lowest nor the driest species of writing, and has shown that indexes often present us with a variety of pleasant memories and contrasts. No one, he continues, can read the indexes of the "Tatler" and "Spectator," and call them dry. That writer also remarks, "As grapes, ready to burst with wine, issue out of the most stony places, like jolly fellows bringing Burgundy out of a cellar; so an index, like the 'Tatler's,' often gives us a taste of the

quintessence of his humour ;" this is especially the case with Monro's index : for instance, "A Commander keeping a Fort, is like a body infected with a canker, who to preserve the body must resolve to lose a member, 11. Many will desire to be partakers of our good fortunes, who never minded to taste the bitter cup of our adversity, 44. The King of Sweden, in extremity of cold, being all wet, did eate before he changed clothes, 21. Men of our profession ought to beare their troubles patiently, that in the ende they may gaine credit and honour, 72. Novices in warre sometimes are made sicke with the thundering of Cannon before they come neare danger, 70. As the Rudder in the ship doth governe, so God moves and governes the world, and doth not stirre himselfe, 60. The Spade and the Shovel ever good companions in danger, 52. The want of feathers is a great impediment unto flying, 87."

In parting with our colonel it is well to refer to his address : "Therefore, worthy Reader, what you find here, if you please like ; but howsoever, remember always to censure sparingly the writings of the shallow-brained Souldier, not adorned with eloquent phrase, but with truth and simplicities." The foregoing selections will show that our hero was no "shallow-brained Souldier," as he styles himself, but one of whom his country may be proud ; for the religious spirit still breathes in our officers and men ; while in other respects, they resemble him in giving to the world their experiences of battle-fields, without the quaintness it is true, but with all the modesty that distinguished Monro.

COLONEL BLACKADER.



“Every subject’s duty is the king’s ; but every subject’s soul is his own. Therefore should every soldier in the wars do as every sick man in his bed, wash every mote out of his conscience : and dying so, death is to him advantage ; or not dying, the time was blessedly lost, wherein such preparation was gained : and, in him that escapes, it were not sin to think, that making God so free an offer, He let him outlive that day to see His greatness, and to teach others how they should prepare.”—HENRY V.



COLONEL BLACKADER.

How many works are thrown by after perusal ! There are, however, others which, when once read, are still returned to with increased pleasure and instruction. Amongst the latter may be classed the "Life and Diary of Lieutenant-Colonel John Blackader," and our readers will probably be glad to have their attention directed to a volume which is not so generally known as it deserves to be. It is a *heart-book*, and shows the workings of the mind of a conscientious man. His struggles have been those of all men, although they may not have to gain their experience in the "tented field." As the Diary was never intended for the public gaze, the entries therein are the more valuable ; we may not, indeed, have to share in the actions of warriors of our time ; but, like him, we have to sustain a conflict with enemies in our own hearts, the victories over whom are fully equal to those gained by the greatest conquerors. The original manuscripts were preserved in a singular manner ; after being overlooked for many years, they were sold with other papers to a tobacconist of Stirling, who rescued them from destruction. The subject of this paper was the son of the Rev. John Blackader, and was born in the parish of Glencairn, on the 14th of September, 1664. His father was minister of Troqueer, in the presbytery of Dumfries, and was expelled, at the restoration of Charles II., for non-compliance with episco-

pacy, which the government attempted to force on the Scottish people. Nothing has been preserved of young Blackader's earlier years, save his fondness for frequenting conventicles and communions, which were celebrated in the open fields. Frequent allusions, amid the din of battles, and the profligacy too common in camps, to these gatherings, are contained in his papers to the "sweet counsel" which he had held with some friend on these occasions. His first appointment to the army, was in the regiment enrolled at the time of the Revolution, now the Twenty-sixth of the Line, which has since retained its title of Cameronians. The devotional spirit of the officers and men, caused it to be scoffingly named the "Psalm-singing regiment;" but their piety did not render them less brave and enterprising, as was testified upon such memorable fields as Steenkirk, Blenheim, and Ramillies. Space will not permit the detail of his earlier services; suffice it to say, that two years after the battle of Dunkeld, in 1689, he proceeded with his regiment to Flanders, and was present at most of the engagements fought by King William in that country, without receiving a wound. It was not, however, until the year 1700 that his *Diary* commenced; the first entry is as follows:—

"*October, 1700.*—I complain, that though well-directed in business, better than could be expected, yet I am not thankful. My life is a struggle, as it were, between faith and corrupt nature,—a combat, in which sometimes strengthening grace prevails, sometimes earthly affections and sensual appetites gain ground, yet partly involuntary."

Many, if they kept a book of their thoughts and

actions, would have to record something like the foregoing; it should make all act upon the advice of Burns, no mean authority on the subject, when he says:—

“ Then gently scan your brother man,
Still gentlier sister woman ;”

* * * *

“ What’s done we partly may compute,
But know not what’s resisted.”

In the following month, November, occurs this singular entry:—

“ Dejected and dissatisfied with myself, the more from my wretchedness and want of settled employment. I am sensible of this my infirmity. Solitude is the nursery of melancholy. *Tried to divert it by amusement, and, as a frolicksome experiment, went to see a comedie.* More convinced of the folly and vanity of worldly pleasures. Faith is the best remedy, but too little used . . . My resolution is, to live more by faith, and converse less with carnal and worldly men. This places me, as it were, between Scylla and Charybdis; too much company dissipates the mind, and gives it an earthly ‘sett;’ too much retirement from conversation sours the temper, makes it morose, chagrined, unsocial. Melancholy is no friend to grace, and a great enemy to religion.”

At the commencement of a new year (1701), our hero makes resolutions to improve his time; but regrets that “*foolish and idle amusements*” are great hindrances. Is conscious that his “is but a fresh-weather belief, and has never yet been in any great storm. It is like a weak anchor, that slips in the least gale.” A prayer is then added for strength to increase

it, and that anxiety, fear, and distrust may be excluded. Shortly afterwards he writes, "I regret that my conversation and discourse is so idle, trifling, and unprofitable. *It answers no solid purpose when the company is not made better by it . . .* I dare not converse with, or haunt that company which the world calls good and genteel. I think no graceless debauched company can be good or genteel, be they of ever so great quality. Perhaps this wrongs my reputation among fashionable people, but I value not their opinion." On the 20th of July, 1701, "a solitary Sabbath at sea," he appears to have gone up in the afternoon to the cradle at the top of the mast "*to be retired;*" but had not spent much time in prayer and meditation, when there arose a fresh gale, which obliged him to come down in great haste, and the seamen to handle their sails.

He had, at this period, determined to change his *single and solitary life*; and in this event he endeavours to obtain a prognostication or special interposition of Providence; and happening, within half-an-hour afterwards, to fall unexpectedly into the company of Mrs. Blackader, *in perspective*, he looked upon it as somewhat observable, and "*encouraging me to go on.*" They were married on the 4th of February, 1702, and although a family was denied them, their mutual affections did not abate. He cherished for her an ardent and steady attachment; she accompanied him to the Continent, and during the campaigns generally remained in some of the Dutch frontier towns.

The war of the Spanish succession occasioned his regiment to be ordered to Flanders, to form part

of the force under the Duke of Marlborough. On the 7th of March, 1702, the last day of King William's reign, the Twenty-Sixth (Cameronians) Regiment embarked for the seat of war. Captain Blackader remained for a time in Scotland levying the necessary complement of men, and, disdaining the then common and alluring arts of an officer so employed, was very successful in recruiting; another want, more to his taste, was providing a chaplain for the regiment in the place of Mr. Shields, who proceeded on the unfortunate Darien expedition, and met his death in the West Indies. His gratification at the success of his recruiting is characteristically mentioned, and there occurs the following remark:—"The one that run away some time ago, came back after wandering up and down several weeks, and says he could have no peace until he returned to me again." This is unequalled; but in his professional as well as private pursuits, there is always a trustful dependence on Providence. On the 13th of July, 1702, the Captain embarked with his recruits for Flanders, and after suffering fears from contrary winds and storms, arrived in the Maese ten days afterwards. At this time he received some considerable accession to his fortune, from which, with commendable generosity, he devoted £100 a-year to the relief of his sister, a widow in straitened circumstances, with seven children. A few years subsequently, he generously renounced his claims, upon the death of his brother, in favour of his sister and family.

Upon his arrival at Maestricht, which he had not visited for many years, the Captain is reminded of having been instrumental in depriving a brother officer

of his life. He appears to have been entirely blameless, for his antagonist, after taking offence at what was never intended, and refusing all explanation, rushed upon him with his sword drawn, and our hero was obliged to defend himself. The whole contest was witnessed by several soldiers from the walls of the town, and after a regimental trial, he was honourably acquitted. It is recorded, however, that the anniversary of the day was always observed by him as one of humiliation. It is touching to find that he visited the scene of this fatal rencontre, and made a fervent prayer to be absolved from the "*crimson dye of that poor man's blood.*" Another instance occurs of his receiving a challenge, which he refuses to accept, when his adversary threatened to post him as a coward. Some desperate undertaking being resolved upon, the Duke of Marlborough hesitated as to which officer should take the command, when Captain Blackader volunteered his services, which were accepted. He came off uninjured, although with great loss of men; his character as a brave man and an able officer was raised in general estimation by this circumstance, which evinced that his refusal did not arise from lack of courage, but from the heartfelt conviction, that no code of honour, although supported by the example of his military superiors, and enforced by the penalties of infamy amongst men of the world, could justify duelling; a practice happily no longer prevalent as in past days.

The memorable campaign of 1704, afforded Captain Blackader further opportunities of gaining distinction, and he expresses his belief, that he shall be able to set up his "*Ebenezers*" through Germany. Although he

betrays an irritability of mind at times, yet there is not one entry of anxiety about facing the approaching dangers, and scarcely any regarding bodily fatigue; but the inclement weather, and the almost impassable state of the roads, might have afforded reasonable grounds for such complaints; it is, however, evident that his composure did not arise from thoughtlessness of his condition; his constant exercise of private devotion prevented his being overcome by surprise, and made him prepared for all vicissitudes. In the battle of Schellenberg, he was not called into action, for only a portion of his regiment was actively engaged; on the day following, there is this remarkable entry:—"June 22nd. In the evening I went alone into the field of battle, and there got a *preaching from the dead*. The carcases were very thick strewed upon the ground, naked and corrupting; yet all this works no impression or reformation upon us, seeing the bodies of our comrades and friends lying as dung upon the face of the earth. Lord, make me humble and thankful! I trusted in Thee that I should set up many *Ebenezers* through Germany, and here in the field of the slain do I set up my memorial, '*Hitherto thou hast helped me.*'" The next entry will remind the reader of some of the intelligence preceding, and even subsequent to, the preparations made by Great Britain and France against the designs of Russia upon Turkey; it is this:—"Things begin now in this country to take another aspect. *Nothing is talked of here but accommodation and peace*; but perhaps we count without our host too hastily." This remark was made just before the battle of Blenheim was fought. It is not within our limits to describe the thrice-told

tale of the battle of Blenheim, further than to say, that after an engagement of five hours, the allies, under many disadvantages, gained as complete a victory as any on record in modern times. The Danube, since become of historical importance, and "familiar in our mouths as household words," received in its waters thirty battalions of the enemy, who threw themselves into the river to escape, and perished before the eyes of the victors. Twenty-eight battalions, and twelve squadrons of horse, surrendered; and the British, after the toils of the day, remained on their arms all night to guard the prisoners, who were kept enclosed in a hollow square, formed by the troops at the village of Blenheim, on which duty Captain Blackader was one of the officers employed. He speaks of the wound he received as follows:—"Among the rest, I have also got a small touch of a wound in the throat; but this, so far from making me doubt of the care of Providence, is really to me a great confirmation, and a remarkable instance of His protection; for the wound is so gently and mercifully directed, that there is no danger; whereas, if it had been half an inch either to one side or other, it might have proved mortal or dangerous." On the following morning he revisited the scene of attack, and there, among the dead, again gave thanks for his wonderful deliverance.

Captain Blackader returned to Scotland in the autumn, in order to recruit the regiment, and rejoined the army in May, 1705. In writing to his wife, he remarked, "You see I have altered my seal, and chosen another motto,—*Séparés de corps et non de cœurs*. . . . I ought, both as a soldier and a

Christian, to wish that I loved earthly enjoyments less, and that I kept a looser hold of them. I think I could part with all other comforts pretty easily, without much regret, except thyself. . . . Let me know what you are at present reading." Pursuing our purpose to extract those portions of his journal which develop the peculiar temperament of the writer, it would not be right to pass over the following entries:—"Wherever we set up our standards, there have I some memorial of His mercy to set up. If we encamp on the banks of the Maese, there I had my *Ebenezers* fourteen years ago, and also great deliverances two years ago. If we encamp on the Moselle, I had my preservations there last year. If on the banks of the Danube, I have Schellenberg and Hochstet. Wherever I go, I meet with some remembrancer to stir me up to gratitude and thankfulness, and to beget confidence and trust for the time to come."

"*July 4th.* This morning, putting my hand to a small affair before prayer, it went wrong. I checked myself that I should undertake anything before prayer, so I went to my knees; and after prayer I set about the same affair, and went through it with ease." His regiment formed part of the twenty battalions which, under General Churchill, were to have commenced the attack on the enemy, in his well fortified and strong post at *Waterloo*. The Duke of Marlborough's intention was overruled by the Dutch generals, who pronounced the enterprise too hazardous; otherwise an Addison might probably have written on a subject which failed to increase the popularity of Sir Walter Scott, when commemorating

a victory gained at the same place about a century afterwards. While lying in the forest of Soignies on the 7th of August, 1705, Captain Blackader retired frequently for meditation, which appears to have been invariably his custom when opportunity offered. Upon the death of his colonel, Brigadier-General Ferguson, in September following, Captain Blackader was raised to the majority of the regiment. In December, he appears to have had an interview with the British commander:—"I talked this forenoon with the duke about my business, and got a good answer (for none ever get ill words from him)." This is interesting, for it shows the cause of the illustrious Marlborough being beloved by those serving under him. Upon obtaining his major's commission, he (Captain Blackader) states, "I wish it may not be a burden too heavy for my weak shoulders."

Major Blackader was present at the celebrated battle of Ramillies, in which a kindred spirit, Ensign (afterwards Colonel) Gardiner, was shot through the head by a musket-ball, which entered his mouth and passed through without killing him. Notwithstanding his strictness, Major Blackader had a tender and benevolent disposition, and was never slow to use his influence on the side of mercy. There is much sound truth in the concluding portion of the following extract:—"I was taken up all day in a court-martial, and much concerned to save a poor creature's life that I had some interest in. I was earnest to have him spared, but could not get it, for the whole court agreed to have him hanged; nor would they recommend him to mercy after they had sentenced him. I dealt with the general, and it pleased the

Lord to incline his heart to mercy, for in a few days a pardon came down, which was read at the head of the regiment. I confess the fault deserved death, but there were circumstances that helped to exculpate the offender; and *I think extremes of severity should never be used when the example is not like to serve any good end.*" His excellent discipline met its proper reward, and the major was publicly thanked at the head of the regiment by the general, when inspecting the troops at a grand review. No reader of the recently published Marlborough despatches can be ignorant of the hardships his soldiers underwent in consequence of bad weather; but even that circumstance serves the major with suitable food for reflection:—"In the evening we had one of the severest storms I have ever seen of hail, rain, and wind. Most of our tents were bent down and torn, and the hollow ways running like rivers. I observed what a poor shiftless creature man is. If any of the elements were let loose upon us, or any accident, how soon would we be reduced to our first nothing!" Speaking of the battle of Oudenarde, another "*great Ebenezer*" of his life, on the 11th of July, 1708, he states, "My frame was more serene and spiritual than ordinary. My thoughts were much upon the 103rd Psalm, which I sung (in my heart) frequently upon the march. Our regiment, properly speaking, was not engaged in the attack; but what was worse, we were obliged to stand in cold blood, exposed to the enemy's shot, by which we had several killed and wounded, for there was heavy firing for about two hours." On the following morning he went again through the field of battle, "*getting a lecture on mortality from*

the dead." Major Blackader was next engaged in manoeuvres, but without leading to a battle. To use his own words, "Whether we acted prudently or not, I shall not say. It does not become me to blame generals, but to obey." During the celebrated siege of Lisle, the capital of French Flanders, the major was selected to command at one of the attacks on the place. Although his regiment was not there,—the Duke of Marlborough with the main army being employed in covering the siege, which was carried on by Prince Eugene and by the Prince of Orange Nassau,—Major Blackader appears to have had constant impressions that he should have a share in some attack on the city, and when thus ordered *naïvely* writes: "So it is God that commands me there. *I take the order from Him and not from the brigade-major.*" It was on a Sunday evening, and he appears to have read over several "comfortable promises" from the Bible in one of the chambers in which the men were lodged, when, casting his eyes upon the chimney-piece, he saw a coat of arms thereon, with the motto, *Deus fortitudo mea*: no wonder he derived encouragement from a circumstance which corresponded so entirely with the faith of his whole life. In a short time he was wounded in the arm; all the other officers being wounded, he remained to encourage the grenadiers to keep their "warm post." Shortly afterwards he got another shot in the head: mark his entry of this event. "I then thought it was time to come off. Both these shots were so mercifully directed that there is not a bone broken; and I still say, notwithstanding these two wounds, that God put a hedge round about me, and gave his

angels charge over me. The nice ordering of the bullets to touch there, and go no deeper, is to me a clear proof of it, and that he only wounds to make me a greater monument of mercy and kindness." After an obstinate siege of two months, Lisle surrendered; but the citadel held out two months longer. According to custom, the major visited the place as soon as he was able, to view the breach and the spot where he was wounded, and was nearly killed by a cannon-ball from the citadel, which came hard by and battered upon the wall close beside him. This draws forth a remark which shows that, although always ready for the post of danger, he was not one to rush unbidden into it, for he writes, "I would have had no peace to have been wounded in this manner, where I had no call." After the capture of Tournay, fresh regiments were ordered for the siege of the citadel, "which will probably," continues Blackader, "bring the next siege of a town to our door. But I am not anxious about any of these things. *No general can send me till Providence sign the order.*"

In consequence of the great loss of officers at the battle of Malplaquet, the subject of this study was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and shortly afterwards dined with the General, on which he writes, "I find there are temptations in great men's company that much overbalance all the advantages we can get from their good-will." Our hero had his "*preaching from the dead*" after this battle, for it was as sanguinary as any that had been fought during the war, and enabled him to send "*a new Ebenezer*" to his wife; and he adds, "When you grow anxious and thoughtful, take my riddled hat

and hang it up before you, and trust in God who hath delivered, and doth daily deliver." Strange contrasts, too, are presented in his correspondence, for, in the letter to his wife in which the preceding passage occurs, he almost immediately adds, "This day was appointed to be a thanksgiving. *We had a sermon and a feu-de-joie at night.*"

On the 17th of October, 1709, we find that he had been promoted to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the regiment; for there occurs the following entry at that date: "I have now got my commission, and the charge of the regiment. I pray the Lord to take charge of both me and them, otherwise they will be very ill ordered." At this period he was very much engaged with courts-martial: even on that duty his journal testifies his great anxiety "to judge righteous judgment, and, if possible, to temper justice with mercy," besides bearing witness that he sought for light and guidance to direct his judgments, for he states (what most must have felt at times), that "indeed in many cases we know not the right side from the wrong." "Oh," adds the Lieut.-Colonel, "that my sentence may be such as Thou dost approve, and such as would come from thy righteous tribunal of equity."

In 1711, Lieut.-Col. Blackader retired from the service, and, in his petition to the Duke of Marlborough, he states as his reason, that "his gray hairs increasing fast upon him, gave him notice that it was time he should think of a retreat; also that the circumstances of his private affairs in North Britain required his presence." The request was granted; and it appears that he was quite overwhelmed "to

hear of the kind and obliging things which my Lord Duke spoke about me to the generals, after I was gone out. *I say not this to flatter myself, or to be fuel to vanity, but to stir up thankfulness.*" Shortly after his liberation from the army, he arrived in London, but it was not a spot to his liking, for "no place I ever was in gives me a greater idea of the vanity of the world than this city: most people walk in a vain show." While here he frequently visited his old commander, then shorn of his military honours, which afforded "a sad emblem of the inconstancy of human things." Scarcely a day passed in which he did not attend public worship, either at the morning lectures, or at some of the religious institutions in the metropolis. He appears to have been much edified by a sermon preached by the celebrated Bishop of Salisbury (Burnet), but complains that impressions speedily wear out, and that his affections grew cold. His journey to Edinburgh lasted more than a fortnight—a lively contrast to the time now occupied. The turmoil of war was exchanged for the rural quiet and retirement of Craighforth, a change more in accordance with his temper and habits; and his leisure hours were occasionally devoted to angling or field sports. The dissensions in religious matters occasioned him much disquietude; his wish, however, is better expressed in his own words: "I would desire to be strict myself in my own walk, but easy and charitable to others that differ in opinions from me. We often take that for zeal, which is nothing but natural temper." Hymeneal festivities did not even escape the contagion: "Going this day to a country wedding. Every public meeting now becomes an occasion of snares and tempta-

tions, people are so divided in their opinions. I was cheerful, and perhaps gave too great a swing to railery, but I hope not light or vain in conversation. I desire always to have my speech seasoned with salt, and ministering profit to the hearers. Sitting up late and merry enough, though I hope innocent; but I will not justify myself."

The anticipated invasion in favour of the Pretender caused a corps of volunteers to be raised in the west of Scotland, and Blackader accepted the appointment of Colonel. At the battle of Sheriffmuir, on Sunday, the 13th of November, 1715, he writes, "I saw one of the most melancholy sights I ever beheld in my life—our army flying before their enemies. O Lord, what shall we say when Israel turn their backs, and fly before the enemy? But we have sinned." The Glasgow battalion was not in this action, having been ordered to occupy the bridge at Stirling. The rebellion was soon suppressed; and on Colonel Blackader's arrival at Glasgow the people showed great affection for him. He soon became deputy-governor of Stirling Castle; and being returned a member to the General Assembly, afforded him opportunities of trying his talents as a public speaker; but, from his own account, he was slow of speech, and a stammering tongue, and had not the gift of delivering his mind with eloquence. There was a degree of pride about him to become an orator, for he has preserved some of his speeches, which do no discredit to his rhetorical powers, when regarded as the unpremeditated expression of those feelings which arose during the debate.

It appears, that on the 18th of February, 1718,

he was betrayed into a fit of passion with one of his servants, for which he did not justify himself, though he believed he had the right on his side; he has registered this circumstance with the remark, that "there is too much self even in our anger, and our zeal against sin. We know not what spirit we are of; there is much fuel within, which would soon break out if left to ourselves. *Every one of us carries about with him, as it were, a barrel of gunpowder, and a lighted match to kindle it.*" His anxiety to rectify disorders in the garrison of Stirling, he was apprehensive would give him the character of being severe: by his journal, it seems that he was on the 13th of October at home writing letters, "*but perhaps showing too much teeth in them. I should not be severe to others' faults, as knowing as I have many of my own.*" In the following month he was made a justice of the peace, and there is the same seeking for grace to discharge the duties of the appointment. The new year (1721) was commenced by him in a proper manner, for the 6th of January was spent in "writing most part of the day about business, and in recommendations of one who, I believe, is wronged. *There is a great pleasure in doing good offices to them that stand in need of us.*" Here is another instance of the goodness of his heart: "Burying a sergeant in the garrison. I was troubled I did not see him before he died; he was calling for me. I should embrace every opportunity of doing good to poor souls." Perhaps his mind may be considered too sensitive, for at this period he gave up chess-playing, as a diversion "*which trifled away too much time, and made the spirit too keen about frivolities.*"

The uniformity of his mode of living, and the routine of his military avocations, made him discontinue his diary at the end of the year 1728, and he closes the register with some cursory remarks on the review of his career. He did not live many months after; his health, although comparatively vigorous, gave way to repeated attacks of the malady which afflicted another celebrated diarist, namely, Samuel Pepys. To the last his mind retained its firmness, and his piety its usual fervour. He died on Sunday morning, the 31st of August, 1729, within a few days of completing his sixty-fifth year. A plain marble tablet in the West Church of Stirling marks the place of his interment.

The foregoing extracts have been chiefly selected to show the prominent features of the writer's character; those who would obtain a deeper insight therein would do well to peruse the whole of the diary, wherein will be found not a mere boastful catalogue of his own deeds,—for no one could be less susceptible to mere name-glory; his was a nobler object, which was to treasure up the various phases of his mind, in order to judge of his advance in the Christian's path. The soldier's life is supposed by many to be incompatible with religious principle, but the perusal of this work will teach otherwise. Colonel Blackader has said that camps had been sweet places to him; his choicest mercies had been in them. Doubtless there are many similarly situated who can coincide in this opinion, and with him have kept the anniversaries of their several battles, the preservation of their lives being to them so many "*Ebenezers*" in the hazardous but honourable path of a soldier's career.

STATISTICAL.

FLUELLEN. "Is it not lawful, an' please your Majesty, to tell
how many is killed?"

KING HENRY. "Yes, captain; but with this acknowledgment,
that God fought for us."

HENRY V.



STATISTICAL.

DATES OF THE DIFFERENT GENERAL ACTIONS IN THE PENINSULA, AND THE NUMBER OF TROOPS EMPLOYED IN THAT COUNTRY AT THOSE PERIODS.

Actions.	Dates of Actions.	Number of Troops.			
		Present and fit for Duty.	Sick.	On Command.	Total.
Roleia	17th August, 1808	14,871
Vimeira	21st August, 1808	18,903
Douro	12th May, 1809	20,652	2,358	1217	24,227
Talavera	27th & 28th July, 1809	28,987	4,827	1596	35,410
Busaco	27th Sept., 1810	29,138	7,079	2526	38,743
Fuentes d'Onor.	3rd & 5th May, 1811	34,647	9,298	4912	48,857
Ciudad Rodrigo	19th January, 1812	37,014	12,392	4217	53,623
Badajoz	6th April, 1812	36,025	12,711	4433	53,169
Salamanca	22nd July, 1812	38,531	13,891	5004	57,426
Vittoria	21st June, 1813	47,927	9,605	4294	61,826
Pyrenees	28th July to 2nd August, 1813	41,263	12,698	4916	58,877
Bidassoa	7th October, 1813	42,793	14,170	4555	61,518
Nivelle	10th Nov., 1813	45,104	13,658	4425	63,187
Nive	9th to 13th Dec., 1813	43,680	14,732	5007	63,419
Orthes	27th Feb., 1814	42,959	12,972	4690	60,621
Toulouse	10th April, 1814	42,807	12,907	5638	61,352

NUMBER OF MEN WHO WERE KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING, IN THE ACTIONS IN FLANDERS, ON THE 16TH, 17TH, AND 18TH JUNE, 1815.

	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.		
	Killed.	Died of Wounds.	Suffered Amputation.
Cavalry of the Line	453	112	18
Foot Guards	218	132	38
Infantry of the Line	700	513	148
Royal Artillery	52	17	12
King's { Cavalry	67	9	6
German { Infantry	212	69	12
Legion. { Artillery	13	4	2
Total	1,715	856	236

N.B.—In addition to the above numbers, there were 353 men not afterwards heard of, and who were supposed to be dead.

NUMBER KILLED AND WOUNDED OF THE ARMY IN THE CRIMEA, FROM THE DATE OF EMBARKATION FOR THE EAST, TO THE 30TH APRIL, 1856.

	Cavalry.		Artillery.		Sappers and Miners.		Infantry.	
	Officers.	N. C. O. and Men.	Officers.	N. C. O. and Men.	Officers.	N. C. O. and Men.	Officers.	N. C. O. and Men.
Killed in action	9	114	11	121	9	32	125	2331
Died of wounds	4	26	1	52	6	23	73	1832
Died of disease, etc.	23	1007	10	1298	5	175	105	13,414
Total deaths	36	1147	22	1471	20	230	303	17,577
Wounded { severely	12	113	6	632	7	31	254	5186
{ slightly	14	124	24		6	55	181	5220
Total wounded	26	237	30	632	13	86	435	10,406
Number who suffered amputation	1	22	1	32	2	7	34	810

**NUMBER OF KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING IN THE BATTLES
OF THE ALMA AND INKERMANN IN THE CRIMEA, AND IN
THE ASSAULTS ON SEVASTOPOL, ON THE 18TH JUNE,
1855, AND 8TH SEPTEMBER, 1855.**

	Officers.			Men.		
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
<i>Battle of the Alma, 20th September, 1854.</i>						
Cavalry
Artillery and Sappers and Miners	3	1	...	9	20	...
Infantry	21	73	...	328	1530	19
Staff	1	7
Total.....	25	81	...	337	1550	19
<i>Battle of Inkermann, 5th November, 1854.</i>						
Cavalry	1	4	5	...
Artillery and Sappers and Miners	2	4	...	16	79	...
Infantry	35	85	1	569	1693	62
Ambulance Corps	1	...
Staff	5	11
Total.....	43	100	1	589	1778	62
<i>Assault on 18th June, 1855.</i>						
Cavalry
Artillery and Sappers and Miners	3	4	...	11	22	...
Infantry	18	64	...	219	1114	20
Staff	1	3
Land Transport and Ambulance Corps	4
Total.....	22	71	...	230	1136	24
<i>Assault on 8th September, 1855.</i>						
Cavalry
Artillery and Sappers and Miners	1	5	...	8	39	...
Infantry	28	113	1	348	1723	175
Staff	6
Total.....	29	124	1	356	1762	175

STRENGTH OF THE ARMY IN THE CRIMEA AT THE UNDER-MENTIONED PERIODS.

	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.			
	Cavalry.	Artillery	Sappers and Miners.	Infantry
Under Arms.....	1982	2797	357	18,246
Bâtmén, and otherwise employed	112	59	14	1053
On Command	190	151	...	2904
Sick { Present	159	...	5	164
{ Absent	331	221	4	5893
Total, 2nd October, 1854.....	2774	3228	380	28,260
Under Arms.....	1181	2335	301	17,841
Bâtmén, and otherwise employed	287	67	11	1765
On Command	252	172	28	2648
Sick { Present	266	...	29	2107
{ Absent	509	592	6	6338
Total, 27th November, 1854 ..	2495	3166	375	30,699
Under Arms.....	966	2472	289	15,244
Bâtmén, and otherwise employed	326	75	48	4319
On Command	266	85	139	1964
Sick { Present	210	431	55	5326
{ Absent	592	587	95	10,311
Total, 28th January, 1855 ...	2360	3650	626	37,164
Under Arms.....	849	3354	362	18,027
Bâtmén, and otherwise employed	266	81	39	2139
On Command	479	2	118	1404
Sick { Present	126	212	54	3161
{ Absent	206	542	76	8490
Total, 16th April, 1855	1926	4191	619	33,221

STRENGTH OF THE ARMY, ETC.—*Continued.*

	Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.			
	Cavalry.	Artillery	Sappers and Miners.	Infantry
Under Arms.....	2640	4402	429	24,333
Bátmen, and otherwise employed	391	96	40	2425
On Command	114	1	151	1085
Sick { Present	279	571	83	2743
{ Absent	102	341	55	6587
Total, 17th June, 1855	3526	5411	758	37,173
Under Arms.....	3369	5216	368	26,071
Bátmen, and otherwise employed	462	114	38	1694
On Command	236	...	143	1155
Sick { Present	779	672	73	4341
{ Absent	378	499	57	6050
Total, 10th September, 1855 .	5224	6501	679	39,311
Under Arms	2191	6361	521	29,550
Bátmen, and otherwise employed	205	120	40	1748
On Command	3208	186	167	2779
Sick { Present	195	409	23	2145
{ Absent	375	420	17	3890
Total, 25th November, 1855 .	6174	7496	768	40,112
Under Arms.....	260	5590	723	34,266
Bátmen, and otherwise employed	30	98	47	1783
On Command	5791	209	167	7068
Sick { Present	21	264	34	1364
{ Absent	1	67	10	2735
Total, 31st March, 1856	6103	6228	981	47,216

**NUMBER OF DESERTIONS, AND REJOINED FROM DESERTION,
FROM THE ARMY IN THE CRIMEA, FROM THE DATE OF
EMBARKATION FOR THE EAST, TO THE 30TH APRIL, 1856.**

	Deserted.	Rejoined from Desertion.
Cavalry	24	12
Artillery
Sappers and Miners	5	1
Infantry	210	90
Total	239	103

STATE OF EDUCATION IN THE ARMY, 1858.

	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery.	Engineers.
Number who neither read nor write	1233	27,757	4548	51
Number who read but cannot write, or can barely write their name	2501	28,386	4147	54
Number who can read and write...	10,359	60,691	13,357	3255
Number of superior education ...	951	4150	379	488
Total.....	15,044	120,984	22,431	3848

**NUMBER OF EPISCOPALIANS, PRESBYTERIANS AND ROMAN
CATHOLICS IN THE ARMY, EXCLUSIVE OF MEN ON PAS-
SAGE OUT OR COMING HOME, IN APRIL, 1859.**

		Non-Commissioned Officers and Men.			
		Cavalry.	Artillery	Engineers.	Infantry.
Protestants {	Episcopalians .	15,876	16,155	2,645	80,155
	Presbyterians .	1,376	4,336	866	15,132
Roman Catholics		2,596	3,142	436	50,005
Total.....		19,848	23,633	3,947	145,292

TRADES AND CALLINGS OF MEN, SERVING IN THE ARMY IN 1858, as FAR AS THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED; THERE ARE, HOWEVER, NEARLY 18,000 MEN WHO COME UNDER MISCELLANEOUS HEADS, NOT SPECIFIED AMONGST THE UN-DERMENTIONED.

		Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery and Engineers.
Labourers { Agricultural, 34,340 Branches unde- fined...59,772 }	94,112	1437	30,335	2568
Weavers	7913	3777	48,577	7418
Shoemakers	6868	347	6569	997
Servants	5019	674	5218	976
Grooms or Ostlers	4993	960	3543	516
Tailors	4869	826	2959	1208
Clerks { Attorneys... 514 Commercial 3655 }	4169	440	3632	797*
Carpenters and Joiners	3778	1046	2464	659
Smiths, generally	2850	539	2238	1001
Miners	2583	396	1710	744
Bakers	2390	144	1771	668
Blacksmiths	2315	327	1755	308
Masons	2089	234	1593	488
Painters	1924	207	1248	634
Bricklayers	1888	226	1332	366
Butchers	1580	206	1241	441
Engine and Machine Makers	1101	295	1095	190
Gardeners	1086	222	702	177
Printers	1055	209	696	181
Sawyers	1055	182	730	143
Cabinet Makers	885	91	734	230
Iron Moulders	854	170	540	175
Plasterers	846	119	624	111
Saddle or Harness Makers ...	758	122	580	144
		142	309	307

* Thomas Hackwood, a tailor, in the time of Edward III., quitted his trade, and went a soldier into France, where he was knighted for his valour; whilst in Italy he gained the favour of the Duke of Milan, whose natural daughter he married. After the Duke's death, he served the Commonwealth of Florence; and on his decease the Florentines erected an equestrian marble statue to his memory as a testimony of their gratitude for his valour and services. He was the son of a tanner in Essex. Tailors were also instrumental in completing the ranks of the Fifteenth Hussars, when raised, as narrated at page 204.

		Cavalry.	Infantry.	Artillery and Engineers.
Brickmakers	752	57	568	127
Founders	684	82	520	82
Dyers	683	70	530	83
Coopers	678	81	505	92
Plumbers and Glaziers	656	89	434	133
Farmers or Graziers	607	253	301	53
Potters	596	74	472	50
Wheelwrights	585	56	268	261
Drapers	567	159	315	93
Grocers	567	154	336	77
Clothworkers	539	54	430	55
Farriers	516	250	204	62
Nailmakers	511	26	459	26
Turners	480	68	333	79
Millers	458	68	291	99
Silk Manufacturers	421	18	235	168
Woolen Cloth ditto	420	54	334	32
Watchmakers	406	87	304	15
Stockingmakers	404	53	280	71
Ropemakers	399	34	311	54
Lacemakers	360	40	297	23
Timmen	358	33	260	65
Cotton and Calico Printers ...	349	20	274	55
Linen Flax Manufacturers ...	326	16	286	24
Bookbinders	318	41	235	42
Coachmakers	298	55	212	31
Hairdressers	294	32	239	23
Curriers	284	43	192	49
Locksmiths	280	18	249	13
Warehousemen	279	52	183	44
Hatters	266	36	206	24
Tanners	253	30	200	23
Druggists	228	55	133	40
Bleachers	211	16	136	59
Papermakers	189	31	139	19
Worsted Manufacturers	180	15	148	17
Shipwrights	176	30	117	29
Brewers	164	21	128	15
Glassblowers	154	19	119	16
Glovers	112	11	83	18
Hurdle Makers or Thatchers	108	3	95	10

Those of Trades below 100 are not inserted.

TABLE.

COMPARISON OF THE NEW-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND
OF THE LAST SERVICE IN 1854.

ENGLAND.			
Lancashire	11,572	Essex	11,572
Middlesex	11,572	Staffordshire	11,572
Yorkshire	11,572	Cheshire	11,572
Kent	11,572	Wiltshire	11,572
Somersetshire	11,572	Berk	11,572
Surry	11,572	Sussex	11,572
Norfolk	11,572	Newcastle-upon-Tyne	11,572
Suffolk	11,572	Leicestershire	11,572
Hants	11,572	The other counties vary	
Devonshire	11,572	from Lincolnshire	11,572
Warwickshire	11,572	to Rutland	11,572
Gloucestershire	11,572		
WALES.			
Highest, Glamorganshire	496	Lowest, Anglesey	10
IRELAND.			
Cork	5738	Galway	11,572
Dublin	5537	Clare	11,572
Antrim	4100	Mayo	11,572
Tipperary	4013	The other counties vary	
Down	3324	from Tyrone	11,572
Limerick	3185	to Louth	11,572
Armagh	3168		
SCOTLAND.			
Lanark	3966	The other counties vary	
Edinburgh	2974	from Ayr	11,572
Renfrew	1241	to Orkney and Shet-	
Aberdeen	1223	land	11,572







I.

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
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
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
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








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* * * * *

Accept, therefore, the present notice as my acknowledgment both of your kindness and ability to handle the subject you have chosen; and with it permit me to send you a copy of the Posthumous work of the man you have so highly and, I will say, so justly eulogized. Believe me, Sir, with great esteem,

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I am much obliged by your kind inquiry concerning my health. I am but slowly recovering from an illness which has been very prevalent this season, and this circumstance, with the pressure of duty arising from our half-yearly examinations, has prevented me from answering your letter earlier.

I remain, my dear Sir,
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NAPIER, K.C.B.** *to the Author.—Printed by permission.*

SCINDE HOUSE, CLAPHAM, NEAR LONDON,
June 2d, 1852.

SIR,

I HAVE received and read with great pleasure the work you have been so kind as to send to me. In conjunction with Lieutenant Jervis' Manual of Field Operations, it will, I hope and believe, turn the attention of young officers to the study of their profession in the highest branch, and it will enable them to understand military history, and separate trash from useful knowledge, by giving them a test of criticism. There are some points requiring observation, and, as I am exceedingly ill, I hope you will excuse me for touching on them briefly.

- 1°. The definition of a base of operations is too restricted.
A single seaport town may be a base of operations as well as a line of country.
- 2°. The same objection lies against the definition of decisive strategical points. A point may be seized which has none of the advantages of intersections of roads and junctions of rivers, and yet furnish the means of separating an enemy's forces, and compelling him to retreat or to accept battle disadvantageously. Perhaps you mean to include these by saying a small path may become more important than a great road.
- 3°. Your reader of proofs has treated you ill. Jomini is spelt throughout Jomini, &c. &c.

I must now finish with reiterating my warm approval of the work, which contains a very acute and able condensation of the leading principles of war; and I congratulate you on having the approval of Professor Narrien, whose theoretic opinions I hold as high as any man's; though there are things to be considered in war which nothing but practice can enable a man to comprehend and class.

I remain, Sir,

Your obliged Servant,

W. NAPIER.

EDWARD YATES, Esq.



P R E F A C E.

THE Preface of a Treatise on Military Science should be concise. The Preface divides itself into two parts:—

1. The Scope of the treatise.
2. Reasons for writing it.

The Scope is briefly *and of necessity very imperfectly exhibited* in the Table of Contents placed after this Preface, and to it the reader is referred, it being premised that the object the Author proposed to himself was to write an Analytical Elementary Treatise on the Science of Tactics, and on certain parts of the Science of Strategy, on the model of the best treatises on the Mathematical Sciences. It is, therefore, hoped, that the treatise is characterised in a special degree by definiteness, conciseness, order, and comprehensiveness.

The necessary definitions are given, accompanied by examples, and it is hoped that every idea, principle, and thing, presented to the student in this treatise is perfectly clear and definite, because it is certain that the operations of a mind working with distinct, well-defined ideas and conceptions, are not only far less liable to error, but also much more rapid; in fact, a mind working with definite ideas, having before it the exact and perfect thing signified by every word used, possesses in rapidity and exactitude all

the advantages of a workman who, with tools which he sees, does in the light work on objects he sees, over one working in the dark, with tools and objects whose outlines are partially and imperfectly distinguishable. To no man is the power of definite and rapid thought so important, as to a soldier; a soldier should never think on any subject except with the utmost rapidity of which his mind is capable.

The reasons for writing are—

1. That ~~no~~ treatise at all resembling the present in scope and object exists in English.

2. That treatises similar to the ~~present~~ in scope and object do exist in other countries, especially in Russia, and are even written by order of the Governments.

3. That the general principles, maxims, and rules of war, and instructions for applying these to the data in the construction of combinations, have their application in the *least and greatest* operations of war, the movements of armies, the operations of a great battle, the attack and defence of a defile of all descriptions, the attack and ~~defence~~ of posts, &c. &c.

4. That an English military student wishing to obtain a knowledge of the definitions, principles, maxims, data, and method of constructing tactical combinations no less than strategical, by applying the principles and maxims to the data, will, at a vast and useless expense of time and labour, wander from treatise to treatise, article to article, and that without attaining his object.

5. That many of the articles and treatises which a military student will, in the endeavour to obtain a comprehensive knowledge of his Science, hunt out for himself, are

decidedly vicious and erroneous, all disorderly, without principles or comprehensiveness, and filled with particular points of detail brought incongruously together. For example, the 'Treatise on War in the "Encyclopædia Britannica" is eminent for complete and mischievous error, incongruous points of detail, and the probability of its falling into the hands of an inquiring military student.

6. That it may be very fairly doubted, if not confidently asserted, whether, without a knowledge of military history, a power of generalization, a knowledge of foreign languages, and *an amount of time and labour* which it would be in the very great majority of cases unreasonable to expect, a military student could acquire the information which, it is hoped, will be found simple, definite, condensed, and orderly, in the present treatise.

7. That comprehensive analytical treatises on the definitions, principles, maxims, leading operations, &c. of Tactics and Strategy are required *to prepare the way for and render advantageous* the reading of campaigns, which *without such previous preparation is comparatively, and in most cases actually, useless.*

8. That a want of the knowledge and recognition, as well as a cultivation of the power of applying correctly the principles of war to the construction of combinations, involves immense unnecessary expense, as well as what is more to be deplored, an unnecessary sacrifice of the lives of brave men.

9. That the Writer will be perfectly satisfied if he shall facilitate a single student who may earnestly desire to serve his country and humanity worthily to the best of his abilities, in acquiring the true principles of his science.

10. That the Writer having, in his Elementary Treatise on Strategy, left certain points untouched on which it appears expedient to treat in an Elementary Treatise on Strategy, and having treated some points with less fulness than appears expedient, is desirous to remedy those defects by means of the present treatise, by treating in it as well on Tactics as on those points in Strategy untouched on in his treatise on that subject, and by treating more fully on those points to which too little attention appears there to have been paid.

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CHAPTER I.

ON DEFINITIONS.

THIS brief chapter is devoted to a few definitions, which it appears necessary should be placed together at the commencement of the treatise.

It being necessary that the definition of Strategy should be premised—

Def.—Strategy is that division of the science of war, which superintends the direction of all operations and the construction of all combinations, except during the intervals of action; the instant at which the opposing forces, of whatever magnitude, come in sight of one another, being, in all cases (whether the affair be a battle, attack of post, siege, or of whatever kind) the signal for strategy to leave its presidency, and the instant at which they lose sight of one another, that for its return.

Def. 1.—Tactics is that division of the science of war which presides over all military operations whenever strategy does not preside.

Def. 2.—The lines on which the divisions of an army manœuvre, after the armies come in sight of one another, are called Tactical Lines. In all the plans of battles attached to this treatise, the tactical lines, on which the armies moved from their first position to their second and again to their third, are represented by dotted lines, as is stated in the explanation of the plans, which explanation is placed immediately before the plans, must be attentively and had best be read here. In the accounts of the battles of Rivoli, Dresden, Albuera, and Austerlitz, which are given with plans in explanation, illustration, and exemplification of the Principles and Maxims, examples of tactical lines will be found. By turning to the Plan 3, which is the plan of the battle of Albuera, the reader may see the

tactical lines by which the French moved from their first position, painted light yellow, to their second position, painted dark yellow.

Def. 3.—The whole area of ground, which it is necessary to take into consideration at any time during a campaign in order to construct correctly a tactical combination, is called the Tactical Theatre of War.

Def. 4.—Those points whose possession conduces, in an especial degree, to the possession of the communications or roads in the tactical theatre of war, are called Decisive Tactical Points.

Example 1.—It will be seen by the account of the battle of Dresden, hereafter given, that, on that battle field, the village of Plauen was a decisive tactical point; because it was by passing through this village only, that the right and centre of the Russo-Austrians could bring succour and assistance to their left, from which they were separated by the precipitous ravine of Plauen.

Example 2.—It will also be seen from the account of the battle of Rivoli, that Osteria and the adjacent intrenchments was a decisive tactical point on that battle field.

Def. 5.—An army, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, arranged in any way whatever for the purpose of attacking or repelling an enemy, is defined to be a Line of Battle.

Obs.—Such an arrangement is called a *line* of battle, because it approaches more or less to a line.

Def. 6.—When a line of battle is so constructed as to present any marked particularity, such as being very concave or very convex towards the enemy, considerably stronger on the centre than on the wings, considerably stronger on one wing than on the centre and remaining wing, &c. &c., it is then said to be of an Order, the name of the order being derived from the particularity which the line possesses; thus we say, a concave order of battle, a convex order of battle, an oblique order of battle, &c.

Ex. 1.—The Russo-Austrian line of battle at Dresden, (see Plan 2) painted light yellow, was of the concave order.

Ex. 2.—The Russian line of battle at Friedland, on the Alle, was of the convex order.

Ex. 3.—Hannibal's line of battle at Cannæ was of the concave order.

Def. 7.—The Tactical Front of an army is defined to be the strip of ground along which an army is arranged, either continuously or at intervals, after the two armies come in sight of one another. Hence, the length of the Tactical Front is coincident with that of the line of battle after the line of battle is formed. The length is of course different for different battles, and the tactical manœuvres on tactical lines which precede them, and may vary considerably during the same battle and the tactical manœuvres on tactical lines which precede it. The depth is also different,—one mile may be given as an approximation after the line of battle is formed,—and this area of ground defined as the Tactical Front will then in general contain the whole army.

Ex.—In Plan 4 the positions of the French and Russo-Austrian armies on the evening of December 1st, the evening before Austerlitz, are marked in light red and light yellow respectively; and the positions of the same armies on the morrow, at the time the decisive shock took place between the centre and left of the French and the centre and right of the Russo-Austrians, are coloured respectively dark red and dark yellow. If, then, a line be drawn along the front of either of these four positions, the area of ground a mile deep lying behind this line, and bounded by another line parallel to it, will furnish an example of a tactical front. It will be seen from the plan, to which a scale is attached, that the light yellow Russo-Austrian front is about ten miles in length.

Def. 8.—A point in the field of battle which presents more than ordinary difficulty to the assailant, as any fortification whatever, a wood, a fortified farmhouse, an intrenched battery, a village, &c., is called a Tactical Pivot.

Obs.—The term pivot is derived from the following fact, that a line of battle, or a portion of a line of battle, has frequently moved backwards and forwards round one of these strong obstacles, as a line rotates about a fixed pivot, for example, as the hand of a clock round the pivot in the centre of the face.

Ex. 1.—The village of Castel Ceriolo, on the plains of Marengo, was a tactical pivot, supporting the right of the French, and was defended during the day against reiterated attacks; and around it, as about a pivot, the centre and left of the French advanced and receded alternately.

Ex. 2.—The powerful entrenched battery of 19 pieces, formed in a bastioned field-work open at the gorge, on the large hill or mamelon on the centre of the Russian line, at the battle of the Mosqua, may be taken as an example, and about this, as about a pivot, the left of the Russian line retrograded and advanced alternately, according as the *flèches* covering their left were taken and retaken, until the Prince of the Mosqua (Ney), having taken the large battery, and all the field works on the Russian left, and the village of Semenowskaja, the final French position was taken up.

Ex. 3.—The fortified house at Hougomont, on the field of Waterloo, was a tactical pivot.

Def. 9.—The Decisive Point of a field of battle is in all battles of one of four kinds, and it may be of either of these.

1. That part of the field of battle, *already occupied by and in the possession of the enemy*, of which it is *most expedient to force and take possession*, by directing to that object *the utmost combined efforts of which the whole army is capable*.

2. That part of the field of battle left unoccupied by the enemy, and not yet occupied by the army, on which it is *most expedient to seize*, in consequence of its possession when seized leading *inevitably* to subsequent most advantageous offensive operations.

3. That part of the field of battle left unoccupied by the enemy, and not yet occupied by the army, on which it is *most expedient to seize*, in order to the excellence of subsequent defensive operations.

4. That part of the field of battle already occupied by, and in the possession of the army, of which it is *most expedient to hold and keep possession*, by directing to that object the utmost united efforts of which the whole army is capable, in the case that the enemy attack.

A chapter is hereafter devoted to the subject of the deter-

mination of the decisive point of a field of battle. Examples will be found in the accounts of the battles of Rivoli, Dresden, Albuera, and Austerlitz.

The next definition is of great importance.

Def. 10.—Interior tactical lines are such tactical lines that the several portions of an army moving on them are more easily uniteable, so as to lend one another a mutual support for defending, or act unitedly and simultaneously in attacking, and be in amply superior numbers on any point which may be made the decisive point of the field of battle, than the portions of the enemy are on the lines on which he is moving.

Hence Interior Lines are defined relatively to those of the enemy. That which is required of tactical lines in order to be interior is, to use somewhat different words to those employed in the definition,—that they should allow the army moving on them to have a decisive numerical superiority, the configuration of the ground and relative value of the troops being taken into consideration, on any point which may become a point of collision.

Since Interior Tactical Lines are defined relatively to the tactical lines of the enemy, the lines of either army are interior or exterior according to the relation they bear to those of the other; and the same tactical lines may be interior or exterior according as the enemy chooses his own. Examples will be given of interior tactical lines in the accounts of the battles of Rivoli, Dresden, Albuera, and Austerlitz. The British tactical lines were manifestly interior at Salamanca.

Def. 11.—A line of natural or artificial obstacles, presenting more than ordinary difficulties to an army attacking it, and greater advantages to one defending it, and employed in manœuvres, in which it plays an important part during the time that Tactics presides, is called a Tactical Base of Manœuvres.

Ex.—The portion of the large brook in the field of Austerlitz (see Plan 4), between Kobelnitz and Telnitz, with the two ponds of Kobelnitz and the tactical pivots along it, viz. the villages of Kobelnitz, Sokolnitz, and Telnitz, and the chateau and wood of Sokolnitz, and the ridge

a tactical base of manœuvres, of which Napoleon made a most brilliant use.

Def. 12.—When an army advances or retires from the several points on a strategical or tactical front occupied by its several separated portions towards the *same* point, each of the portions taking a different strategical or tactical line of its own leading to the point, such point is called a Point of Concentration.

Ex.—The fortress of Brunn was the French Point of Concentration before the battle of Austerlitz.

Def. 13.—The tactical front with the ground generally slopes on its front and on its flanks, is defined to be a Position.

Def. 14.—The whole area of ground in any point of which the information which has been obtained by one or other of the different means of obtaining information leads to the conclusion that the enemy may be able and ready to deal a blow, is defined to be the Circle of the Enemy's Activity.

It appears expedient, that before the Chapter of Definitions is closed, the strict meaning of the terms *in front*, *in écharpe*, *in reverse*, *in rear*, should be explained.

Let (Plan 6, fig. 1) *o* be the centre of a battalion *a b* deployed in line.

Through *o* draw the straight line *fr* perpendicular to *a b*, and also the straight lines *c d*, *e h* inclined at 45 degrees to *a b*.

Let the front of the battalion be towards the extremity *f* of *fr*, and the rear towards the other extremity *r*.

Then, when the enemy directs his attack on the front of the battalion in any direction more nearly inclined to *fr* than to *c d*, *e h*, or *a b*, i.e. within $22\frac{1}{2}$ degrees on either side of *f o*, the attack is said to be *in front*.

When the attack is on the front of the battalion, but more nearly inclined to *c d* or *e h* than to *a b* or *fr*, i.e. within $22\frac{1}{2}$ degrees on either side of *o c* or *o e*, the attack is said to be made *in écharpe*.

When the attack is more nearly inclined to *a b* than to either of the other lines, whether the attack be made on

the front or rear of the battalion, *i.e.* within $22\frac{1}{2}$ degrees on either side of oa or ob , the attack is said to be made *in flank*.

When the attack is on the rear of the battalion, and more nearly inclined to either of the straight lines ho , do than to ab or fr , *i.e.* within $22\frac{1}{2}$ degrees on either side of oh , od , the attack is said to be made *in reverse*.

When the attack is on the rear of the battalion, and more nearly inclined to or than to either of the other lines, *i.e.* within $22\frac{1}{2}$ degrees on either side of or , the attack is said to be made *in rear*.

The parallelogram ab has been supposed to represent a battalion deployed in line; but it may with equal propriety be a battalion in column or in square, or a line of battle, or any portion of a line of battle formed in any way whatever. Nor is it necessary that the point o should be taken in the centre; for wherever o be taken, the directions of the lines remain the same; and it is with the directions alone that we are concerned in the matter; hence what has been said is perfectly general, and the exact meaning of the five terms *in front*, *in écharpe*, *in flank*, *in reverse*, and *in rear* explained.

The preceding definitions are all that it appears necessary to place together in the Chapter of Definitions. Others not exclusively tactical will, however, occur in the course of the treatise; and whenever any new name or expression is introduced which seems to call for a definition, one will be given, that obscurity and ambiguity may be replaced by distinctness, definiteness, and certainty.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF TACTICS, AND ON SEVERAL MAXIMS OF WAR.

THE leading Principles and Maxims of Tactics will now be given together in a series. Each will afterwards receive what appears to be the necessary or expedient explanation, discussion, and illustration, by examples from Military History, in the order in which it stands in the series. The Principles and Maxims are thus all presented together, because, while discussing, and notably while presenting historical examples of *one* of the principles and maxims, *several others* will of necessity be illustrated and exemplified at the same time. It is hardly possible to select a portion which shall illustrate and exemplify one military principle or maxim only; and certainly it would be highly inexpedient, and contrary to the object in view to do so. Besides, by illustrating and exemplifying several principles and maxims by a single portion of military history, the treatise is shortened; and it will not be questioned by any true soldier that every man ought both to speak and write whatever he has to express in the fewest possible words. Other principles not included in this series, will be enunciated in the course of the treatise. They are not included in the series, because they are too intimately connected with the particular operation or portion of tactics to which they belong, to admit or require a separate discussion.

List of the Principles and Maxims of Tactics.

PRINCIPLE I. — Operate always on Interior Tactical Lines.

The following are 9 Particular Cases of this Principle:—

Particular Case 1.—Avoid allowing the columns, when

in the neighbourhood of the enemy, or when coming on to the field of battle,—in other words, when in the circle of the enemy's activity—to be *separated by insurmountable natural obstacles*, or by *obstacles so difficult to be surmounted as to allow the enemy time* to overwhelm with the mass of his forces, and **destroy** one column before the others can come to its assistance, or, worse still, to overwhelm with the mass of his forces several of the isolated columns successively.

Case 2.—Take care that the tactical front is not intersected by any natural obstacles running at right angles to or across the direction of its length; but that the tactical front is, on the contrary, furnished with excellent communications running along its length. And take care that, if possible, the contrary is the case with the enemy's tactical front.

Case 3.—Take the utmost care to ensure that the columns, when arriving on the field of battle in face of the enemy, shall arrive simultaneously.

Case 4.—Take care not to leave either so large a gap, or so large a very weak interval or intermediate portion of the line, that the enemy suddenly and vigorously attacking may enter at it, and so take each of the separated portions of the army in flank, which will enable him to engage both advantageously, and probably (which has often been the case) contain the one portion by a much smaller portion of his own army; which he is enabled to do, either because the tactical front he occupies with the containing portion of his army across the flank of the contained portion of the separated army is strong and good, or because a change of front in the presence of an enemy, and under fire, is an operation which requires time, and presents immense difficulty; while with the rest of his army he attacks the other separated portion in front and flank as vigorously as possible, and overwhelms it by the great superiority of numbers, which consideration will show he is thus enabled to bring on it.

Case 5.—When the army is moving in separated columns from the different points which its portions occupied on a strategical front, or on a tactical front, either in

tration is out of the enemy's reach,—in other words, out of his circle of activity, so that he may not be able, by a rapid march, to anticipate the columns at the point of concentration, introduce the mass of his army between the separated columns, and so defeat them successively by great superiority of numbers.

Case 6.—Take care not to leave so large a gap in the line of battle that the enemy may be enabled, by attacking vigorously at, and entering the gap, to separate the army, throw the mass of his forces on, and overwhelm by great superiority of numbers the one portion of it, before the other—which he will contain and hinder, as far as possible, by a much smaller part of his army destined to that purpose—can find time to come to its assistance. And do not leave the gap, lest the enemy should profit by it, *in any other way whatever*, to act on interior lines.

Case 7.—Beware of separating the army into two parts, in hopes of turning an enemy's wing, as it leads to a large gap in the line.

Case 8.—If a wing of an army break the enemy's wing opposed to it, it must be borne in mind that the victorious wing of the army is not to pursue the opposing broken wing of the enemy too far, because it may, and frequently has happened, that the other wing of the enemy has also broken the other wing of the army opposed to it. For if the victorious wing of the army pursue the broken wing of the enemy too far, and the victorious wing of the enemy detaches a sufficiency to keep the broken wing of the army in retreat, or hold it in check for a sufficient time till the rest of the victorious wing of the enemy uniting with its centre shall have thus, by superiority of numbers, destroyed the centre of the army, then the victorious wing of the army which has pursued too far, may, on returning, find the field of battle in possession of the victorious enemy, and may in its turn be overwhelmed, or be glad to seek safety in flight. It is concluded, then, that the proper course for a wing of an army, which has defeated and broken the opposing wing of the enemy, is to detach

a sufficiency to keep the wing it has broken in retreat, or hold it in check for a sufficient time, till the rest of it, co-operating with the centre and remaining wing of the army, shall have defeated the centre and remaining wing of the enemy. To do this, is to act on interior lines; to act contrary to this is to violate the principle.

PRINCIPLE II.—Operate as much as possible on the communications of the enemy without exposing one's own, is one of the great principles of Strategy, and it is *equally* one of the great principles of Tactics.

Particular Case 1.—"When two armies are in the neighbourhood of one another, and a battle is at hand, if one of the armies be obliged to retire in *one* particular direction, while the other can retire in *all* directions, every advantage is on the side of the latter. Now is the time for a general to be bold. Let him operate and strike with vigour. Let him manœuvre on the flanks of his enemy till he finds his opening. Victory is in his hands."—*Napoleon Bonaparte.*

Case 2.—Endeavour to seize beforehand (*i.e.* as soon as there is a reasonable probability that a certain field will become a field of battle,) the communications about and around the field of battle, that the army may be able to retreat in as many directions as possible under the circumstances, and the enemy may be curtailed as much as possible in the number of ways in which he can retreat. Or, taking the field of battle as a centre, and considering a circle drawn around this centre, endeavour so to seize the communications, in the tactical theatre of war about and around the field of battle, that the largest possible part of the circumference of this circle may be open to the army, so that it can retreat on any point of it, and the least part possible of the circumference similarly open to the enemy. And one principal way of doing this is to *seize, occupy, and fortify*, as far as possible, all the Decisive Tactical Points, such as fords, defiles, bridges, forts, or large stone buildings capable of being turned into forts, interfering with, commanding, or closing the communications, on the tactical bases of manœuvres which may lie adjacent to and around the field of battle.

tactical operations, and is as follows:—

It is the height of folly not to take the greatest care in every respect of the line of operations one possesses, until another has become practicable. But to change the line of operations for a new one when this is practicable, in order “to operate as far as possible on the communications of the enemy without exposing one’s own,” is among the ablest and most decisive manœuvres of war.

Case 4.—Wherever there is a tactical base of manœuvres which projects into the tactical theatre of war, as, for instance, a base of manœuvres somewhat in the form of a straight line, and lying parallel to the tactical lines of the two armies, or approximately in the shape of a projecting angle, whose bisecting line is parallel or nearly so to the tactical lines of the two armies, it is an aim or object to seize such tactical base of manœuvres by seizing the decisive tactical points on it, *and having done this*, to operate as far as possible from that extremity of it which lies towards the enemy’s base of operations.

Case 5.—In giving battle, endeavour to fight so that the enemy shall be driven towards and on some great natural obstacle, as a river, a lake, a chain of mountains, a marsh, &c. in case he is defeated; for being driven on an obstacle he cannot pass by a superior and victorious force, and thus deprived of all communications by which to retreat, he will be entirely ruined; or, at least, immensely greater fruits may be expected from the victory than if the enemy had lines of retreat open. And, on the other hand, take care not to engage so as, in case of defeat, to be driven on such great natural obstacle.

PRINCIPLE III.—It is a great aim or object always to be held in view in all tactical manœuvres, *i. e.* in all manœuvres during the whole time tactics presides over the operations of war, (see Def. of Tactics,) to bring the Mass of the forces successively in contact with Fractions of the enemy, and that on ground as advantageous as possible. And similarly to bring larger fractions of the army into collision with smaller of the enemy.

This principle is the statement of a great aim or object

always to be held in view in all tactical manœuvres; and as the principle is also a principle of Strategy, it is the statement of a great aim or object, always to be held in view in all the operations of war. Some problems and difficulties are far more difficult to state and prepare for solution, than to solve when a clear statement of the thing really required has been made out; and sometimes it is not much less difficult to know exactly what has really to be aimed at and effected than to effect this when clearly discovered. The solution of such problems, then, and difficulties is already, to a greater or less degree, advanced, when a clear statement of the real object really wanted has been made; and it is as a statement of this kind that the preceding principle is to be regarded. The principle will now be followed by particular cases of it, each of which is perhaps worthy of being itself dignified into a distinct principle of war. It is, however, more in accordance with scientific arrangement to treat a particular case, however important it may itself be, as a particular case.

Case 1.—Look out for an opportunity of catching the enemy, at a time when his columns are separated the one from the other by insurmountable natural obstacles, or by obstacles which are *sufficiently* insurmountable; so that by throwing the mass of the army on one of these isolated columns, it may be overwhelmed before the difficulty of passing the obstacles allows time for assistance to come to it. Look well out for the chance of thus catching the enemy with his columns so separated by sufficiently difficult obstacles, the one from the other; and if it should present itself, throw the mass of the army on as many of such isolated columns, the one after the other, as is possible. As soon as there is good reason to believe that the enemy has selected strategical lines or tactical lines, separated by obstacles of *sufficient* magnitude, make a forced march or marches to catch him in his fault.

Case 2.—Endeavour to induce the enemy by some means or other, (as, for example, by making an apparently bad disposition,) to think that by separating his columns

cessively overwhelming his columns while separated by the obstacles, if he falls into the trap and the opportunity presents itself.

Case 3.—If the enemy be found in order of battle on a tactical front intersected by any natural obstacles, as, for example, precipitous ravines, rivers, brooks, &c. running at right angles to or across the direction of its length, so that support cannot be brought from one part of the line to another part, or at least cannot be sufficiently quickly brought, profit by this to overwhelm one, or, if possible, several of the fractions of the enemy successively, with the mass of the army.

Case 4.—Endeavour by manœuvring to induce the enemy, by the fallacious hopes of an advantage, to come on to a tactical front intersected by natural objects, as in the last case; and if he comes, put the principle in force.

Case 5.—When in order of battle awaiting the coming of the enemy, if his columns do not come simultaneously or sufficiently so on to the field in presence, an opportunity presents of attacking one or more of the columns separately. Be on the look out for such opportunity of exploring the principle, and seize it.

Case 6.—Endeavour by manœuvring to induce the enemy to leave a large gap in his line, or a large and weak portion or interval of the line equivalent to a gap. Let, for example, the enemy, judging from previous manœuvres, think the army is wanting to retreat, and wishes to avoid fighting; then if the enemy separate his army, in order to prevent this retreat by cutting the army from its communications, he leaves a gap. Undue anxiety as well to turn a wing may induce the enemy to separate his army, and so leave a gap or weak interval. Whenever a large gap or such like weak interval presents this particular case of the principle, it teaches that *the mass of the army is to be thrown on one of the portions into which the enemy is thus divided, while the remainder of the army contains the other portion, and hinders it, by profiting by obstacles of ground, by planting a very powerful battery*

or batteries, &c. from coming to the assistance of the other portion till such time, at least, that the mass of the army shall have had time to break the portion on which it was thrown, after which it, or a large portion of it, will come to the assistance of the containing part, and the two together, forming the mass of the army, will now be thrown on the contained portion of the enemy in its turn.

Case 7.—When the enemy is found moving in separated columns, on several strategical or on several tactical lines, with a view, there is good reason to believe, of uniting his army at a certain convenient point of concentration, discover whether it is possible, by rapid marching, to anticipate him at this his point of concentration; and if so, this particular case orders, by rapid marching, to seize his point of concentration, get between the enemy's columns, and overthrow them successively with the army united. Such an opportunity is to be carefully watched for, in case it should come of itself; and watchfulness is also to be exercised as to whether it be not possible to prepare such an opportunity by previous manœuvres.

Case 8.—Watch, in case it should come of itself, and if not, endeavour, by manœuvres, to prepare an opportunity of catching the enemy at a time when he is in the act of crossing a large river, either when he is advancing or retreating, because in this case one portion of his army being on one side of the river, and the other portion on the other side, the mass of the army may be thrown on a portion of the enemy. Such opportunity might, for example, be prepared by a rapid march in advance, so as to come on the enemy suddenly without his expecting it, while he is crossing, or by retiring across a river as if in retreat, when, if the enemy pursue and commence crossing, by returning suddenly he is attacked while one portion of his army is still on the further side.

Case 9.—Lose no opportunity of defending a defile, by coming into a position on that extremity of the defile from which the enemy debouches, because by so doing the mass of the army has the option of attacking any portion whatever of the enemy which may be judged best, for the

on the other side.

Case 10.—This case asserts that no exertion is to be spared to come up with a *retreating* enemy when he is just beginning to cross, or while in the act of crossing a large river, over which he has no *tête-de-pont*, or only an inefficient one, or when he is beginning to enter or in the act of passing a defile, because in these cases the mass of the army can be always more or less brilliantly engaged with a fraction of the enemy.

Case 11.—Endeavour to direct the army as much as possible on one flank, and on one wing only of the enemy, by putting the line of battle of the army into a position with respect to the line of battle of the enemy as nearly analogous as possible to that of the straight line *a*, fig. 4. Plan 6, to the straight line *b* (*b* being at right angles to *a*), for by so doing the mass of the forces will be brought continually into contact with a fraction of the enemy in the course of the most vigorous attack, which of course, if so favourable a position could be obtained for the army, ought to be made. The straight line *a*, representing the line of battle of the army, might, of course, be with advantage replaced by a portion of a circle with its concavity turned to *b*.

The five following principles may appear at first sight only particular cases of the preceding Principle III., but are, in reality, particular cases, *and something more*, and will, therefore, be given as separate principles.

PRINCIPLE IV.—It is a principle of Strategy, that if the enemy have a strategical front so extended as to afford one a reasonably certain expectation of being able to divide his forces into two parts, by directing the army on a point towards *the centre* of his strategical front, which two parts can afterwards be defeated separately, then this point towards *the centre of his front is the point of strategical attack*, and towards this point the mass of the army is to be directed; because the enemy, when divided into two parts, is placed on exterior strategical lines, unity of command is lost to him, or greatly impaired, and by thus attacking on a point *towards the centre of his front*, more fractions of the enemy

are manifestly likely to be brought into collision with the mass of the army, or with greater fractions of it. If, however, the enemy's strategical front is not so extended as to afford a reasonable expectation of being able to divide his forces into two parts, and defeat them separately, then to direct the attack on a point towards the centre might be only to give the signal for a greater concentration on his part; and for this and many other reasons, the principles of Strategy determine that the point of strategical attack is *towards one or other extremity* of the enemy's strategical front. And, similarly, it is no less a principle of Tactics, that if the enemy have a tactical front so extended as to offer one a reasonably certain expectation of being able to divide his forces, *more or less, if not entirely*, into two parts, by directing the mass of the army on a point towards the centre of his tactical front, so as to be able to defeat afterwards these two parts, *more or less, if not entirely, separately*, then this point *towards the centre of the front* is the point of tactical attack, and towards this point the mass of the army is to be directed; because the enemy when divided, *more or less, if not entirely*, into two parts, is placed on exterior tactical lines, unity of command is lost to him, or greatly impaired, and by thus attacking on a *point towards the centre* of his front, more fractions of the enemy are manifestly likely to be brought into collision with the mass of the army, or with greater fractions of it. If, however, the enemy's tactical front is not so extended as to afford a reasonable expectation of being able to divide his forces, *more or less, if not entirely*, into two parts, and, in consequence, defeat them afterwards, more or less, if not entirely, separately, then to direct the attack on a point towards the centre might only be to give the signal for greater concentration on his part, and for this and many other reasons, the point of tactical attack is *towards one or other extremity* of the enemy's tactical front.

V.—The object of all tactical manœuvres previous to, and on the day of, a great battle, until the decisive point of the field of battle is gained, is—the bringing on to the decisive point of the field of battle, and then putting into

rapid, vigorous, and well-combined action, such a mass of forces as shall be amply sufficient to obtain possession of the decisive point. And this *requisite numerical superiority* on the decisive point is only to be obtained by **profiting** by the obstacles and accidents of ground, and too extended or ill-combined movements of the enemy to *contain or hold in check for a sufficient time, on some part or parts of the tactical front, a much greater mass of the enemy's forces with a much less number of one's own*, or by *manœuvring so that a large portion of the enemy shall remain of necessity unengaged and idle, or very nearly so, until sufficient time has elapsed for the seizure of the decisive point, and destruction of the remaining portion.* And the second part of this principle of tactics is, that it is an aim or object in all tactical manœuvres to have on the field of battle such a mass of forces as shall be amply sufficient to win the battle; and this requisite numerical superiority is to be obtained by profiting by obstacles and accidents of the configuration of the country, and too extended or ill-combined movements of the enemy, to contain or hold in check, by means of obstacles and accidents of country or intervals of time, (for distance, without any obstacle, is an obstacle, and therefore an interval of time is an obstacle,) for a sufficient time on some part or parts of the tactical front, a much greater mass of the enemy's forces with a much less number of one's own.

VI.—The principles of tactics indicate, that when it is determined on overlapping and turning a wing of the enemy, or on attacking the wing in flank and in reverse, the operation is to be performed without separating the army in order to do it.—*Napoleon Bonaparte.*

VII.—Any considerable detachment from the main army sent previous to a battle beyond hearing of the artillery, for the purpose of advantageously cooperating with the main army during the battle, seldom fails to involve either itself or the main army, or both, in some disaster. Experience teaches the extreme danger and folly of such detachments for such objects.

VIII.—Before a battle every battalion, squadron, or battery which it is possible to bring up before the battle,

must be brought up before it; and every battalion, squadron, or battery which may possibly arrive during the battle, must be sent for. The presence of a single battalion, squadron, or battery, may decide the fate of the day.

IX.—A battle ought never to be fought while there is good reason to believe that delay will render the chances still greater in one's favour; and a battle ought to be fought as soon as practicable when there is good reason to believe that time, with the advantages and disadvantages it is bringing, is on the whole augmenting the enemy's chances, and that it will continue to do so.

X.—It is an aim or object in all strategical, as well as in all tactical manœuvres, to induce or compel the enemy to *attack a fortified or intrenched position*, as well as any *fortress or fortification*, permanent or the contrary, and *any natural obstacle whatever*, which is of the nature of *a fortification*.

XI.—It is an aim or object in all strategical, as well as in all tactical manœuvres, to induce or compel the enemy to make detachments.

XII.—Before engaging and attacking, determine *well and surely* which is the decisive point of the field of battle, and give to this *the utmost and most earnest consideration*, without, as far as circumstances which may forbid, and time which may press, allow, leaving anything to conjecture which can possibly be ascertained with certainty, even though the probabilities should appear exceedingly favourable to the conjecture which may have been formed.

Obs.—A short chapter is hereafter devoted to the determination of the decisive point of the field of battle. The preceding principle only indicates the necessity of consideration and caution in correctly determining the decisive point.

XIII.—There is in all battles *a moment* when every weapon, every man, every combination of force that can be brought to bear, is to be brought into full and rapid action, in order to obtain and ensure the victory. The spot on which the grand struggle takes place is of course the

decisive point of the field of battle, the correct determination of which is all-important; and after it, the correct determination of *the moment most advantageous for making the grand struggle to obtain possession of the decisive point* is a most important consideration in the conduct of a battle, and this moment may be called the Decisive Moment.

XIV.—When the decisive point of the field of battle has been decided on “well and surely,” in accordance with Principle XII., and the requisite numerical superiority has been obtained by exploring the means to this end stated in Principle V. and the decisive moment has arrived, the attack itself on the decisive point must be made *with the utmost audacity, vigour, and rapidity*.

XV.—Simplicity is the parent of order, rapidity, and vigour in the execution of every tactical plan or combination, and in every tactical evolution whatever. Simplicity in the arrangement of the details is a great essential of every tactical offensive or defensive combination. *Simplicity is the soul of every tactical evolution*. The absence of simplicity in tactical evolutions, and in the details of tactical plans and combinations is the absence of order, vigour, and rapidity, and the presence of disorder, feebleness, and confusion.

XVI.—Concise definiteness is the soul of every tactical order, and of every order given in War.

XVII.—“Never do anything that the enemy manifestly desires you to do, for the simple reason that he does desire you to do it.”—*Napoleon Bonaparte*.

The three following principles being particular cases of the preceding one, but being at the same time capable of being considered as somewhat more than particular cases of it, are put as separate principles.

XVIII.—A strong position taken up by the enemy, especially if the enemy has had time to reconnoitre and fortify it, and has done so, or if the enemy has had time to well reconnoitre it and settle down in it, must never be attacked when it can be turned by menacing the communications.

XIX. In carrying on war in a mountainous country,

a great number of very strong positions are everywhere found. Such positions are not to be attacked when occupied by the enemy. The great principle in carrying on war in a mountainous country is—occupy positions on the flanks or rear of the enemy such as to leave him only the two alternatives, of evacuating his position to retire on another in his rear, or of coming out of his position to attack.

XX.—A strong position taken up by the enemy, especially if the enemy has had time to reconnoitre and fortify it, and has done so, or if the enemy has had time to well reconnoitre it and settle down in it, must never be attacked in front when it can be attacked in flank.

XXI.—In mountain warfare, the attacker having the disadvantage, the general principle of action is—oblige the enemy to attack.

XXII.—An army must always, at every moment, be in a condition to make use of all the force of which it is capable.

Particular Case 1.—Every soldier must always have his arms and ammunition with him.

Case 2.—The infantry must always have its cavalry and artillery with it.

Case 3.—The cavalry must always have its artillery with it.

Case 4.—The different divisions must be always ready to sustain, support, and protect one another.

Case 5.—The army must never halt or encamp in a position which has not all the requirements* of a good position, or field of battle.

XXIII.—Flank marches (*i. e.* marches in which one turns the flank to the enemy) within reach of the enemy are rash, injudicious, and entirely opposed to the principles of war; but when executed just without reach of the enemy, may be among the most splendid and decisive operations.

XXIV.—War is not a conjectural Art. In other words—Combinations are to be constructed so that they may

* A short Chapter is hereafter devoted to the discussion of the requirements of a good position, or field of battle.

depend *vitally*, as little as possible, for success or misfortune on data, of the truth and certainty of which one has not good reason to feel certain. *Never inadvertently, or otherwise, be induced to leave to even the best based conjecture anything of importance, concerning which actual information is to be obtained without much difficulty.* Conjecture must never be allowed to supply the place of actual information where it is practicable to obtain it, and no pains must be spared, and no stone left unturned, in order to obtain accurate information. It is, in general, the want of correct information, though it has even been at times an inadvertent reliance on very strongly based conjecture when real information *was* to be obtained, which occasions the difference between the theory of war and the practice of it, when conducted by a great captain.

XXV.—A battery must always, if possible, be masked before the beginning of the action, either by the ground or by infantry. "Artillery too often, by occupying the highest ground, and not masking the guns, assists the enemy in determining the numbers opposed."—*Frederick the Great.*

XXVI.—*The power of making offensive movements, whether one avails oneself of this power and makes the movements, or whether the power of making is retained, no actual movement ensuing therefrom, is the very foundation and soul of a good defence.*

XXVII.—Neither a river, however great and rapid, nor any other line of obstacles whatever can be defended, unless there are one or more points on it from which one is fully prepared to take a vigorous offensive. When one has done no more than place one's forces for the passive defence of a river, if one is nowhere prepared to take an active offensive, nothing more has been done than to expose the army to the blows of the enemy and to disasters, without the hopes of causing the enemy any misfortune in return; in fact, nothing more has been done than to afford the enemy opportunities of acting on and employing the important Principle V. A passive defence is inadmissible in War. "In war," says Napoleon, "a river as large as

the Vistula, and rapid as the Danube at its mouth, is nothing, unless there are good points of passage, and a head quick to take the offensive. The Ebro is nothing—a mere line.”

XXVIII.—No arm must be employed on ground not suited to its operation.

XXIX.—“In war, the psychical and mental force of an army are to the physical force of the army, in point of power, towards the attainment of success and victory, in the ratio of 3 to 1.”—*Napoleon Bonaparte*.

XXX.—When an army is evidently winning, no fresh troops ought on any pretence to be kept unengaged, but every man ought to be engaged. A complete success places the courage and spirits of the two armies in such a relative state, that *the triumphs of the morrow are certain*.

XXXI.—It is a principle of Strategy, to maintain as large a strategical front as possible, consistently with the observance of the principle of interior strategical lines, until such time as the enemy's plans being sufficiently developed and known, and the plan of action thence determined on, concentration and rapid marches become necessary to its execution; and it is equally a principle of Tactics, to maintain as large a tactical front as possible, consistently with the observance of the principle of interior tactical lines, until such time as the opportunity of striking a decisive blow on some point of the enemy's tactical front having been obtained, concentration towards that point becomes necessary.

XXXII.—“On every field of battle, during the whole course of every campaign, and in all sieges, it is equally the Artillery which plays the principal part.”—*Napoleon Bonaparte*.

XXXIII.—“The *better* the Infantry is, the *more* necessary and expedient it is to protect and support it by a very powerful Artillery. Good Infantry is doubtless the sinew of an army, but if the *very best* Infantry have to fight for any length of time, and support several encounters against an enemy very superior in Artillery, *it will lose its courage, and be ruined*. It may be that a general, very skilful in

manœuvring, more able than his adversary, and possessing better infantry, will obtain successes during a *part* of a campaign, notwithstanding that his Artillery is very inferior; but on the day of a decisive general action, he will feel most cruelly his inferiority in Artillery.”—*Napoleon Bonaparte*.

XXXIV.—The batteries are to be placed in positions suitable to their operation, *as far as possible in advance of the lines of Infantry and Cavalry consistently with their safety*. The Batteries are to command the field of battle from the greatest elevations on the tactical front. The Batteries should be placed, as far as possible, in positions which allow them to turn their fire in all directions, so as to be able to cross their fire before the line of battle, and take the attacking columns' lines and squadrons in *écharpe* and flank.

XXXV.—“To reserve the Cavalry till the end of the battle, indicates ignorance of the power of the combined operation of Cavalry and Infantry for attack and defence.”—*Napoleon Bonaparte*.

XXXVI.—The order of march, when within the circle of the enemy's activity, and before a battle, is dependent on the order of battle previously determined on. Hence, when within the circle of the enemy's activity, the order of march is to be that from which it is most easy to deploy into the order of battle previously determined on. When out of the circle of the enemy's activity, this principle holds still, but in a minor degree, for it may then yield to the expediency of attaining greater convenience, facility, and rapidity, which are perhaps to be attained to a greater degree by a different order of march.

XXXVII.—The art of selecting a position for halting, or for encamping, is none other than the art of selecting a field of battle; the two are perfectly identical.*

XXXVIII.—Nothing is of greater importance in war than that the command should be entirely, completely, and without any reservations or restrictions whatever, in the hands of one man.

* A short Chapter is devoted to the selection of a field of battle.

XXXIX.--“It is a most brilliant manœuvre to make dispositions apparently bad, retaining to oneself the undoubted power of changing them into good ones, and doing this at the right moment. Nothing so greatly disconcerts the enemy, and is so likely to induce him to commit great faults; for while executing his combination for attacking one in a bad position, he suddenly finds himself badly placed in presence of a well-placed enemy; and if he do not change his dispositions, he is beaten; and if he changes them in the presence of his adversary, he is beaten likewise.”—*Maréchal de Saxe*.

XL.—“With an army inferior in number, inferior in Infantry, inferior in Cavalry, and inferior in Artillery, a general battle must be avoided. *Numbers* must be *supplied* by *Rapidity of Marching*; *Artillery*, by the *Nature of the Manœuvres*; *Cavalry*, by the *Choice of Positions*.”—*Napoleon Bonaparte*.

XLI.—Pursue with the *utmost vigour, rapidity, and audacity*. Retreat before an enemy who has just struck a decisive blow, and knows how to follow it up by exploring this principle to the utmost, will doubtless change into disorderly flight, and end in the ruin of the army.

XLII.—A line of battle is *cæteris paribus* more or less good according as it is more or less difficult to attack it in the direction of its length.

XLIII.—The siege artillery, different parks, baggage, &c., must not enter a defile till possession of the further extremity of the defile has been secured. These must be left in position outside, under a proper escort, till this has been done. It is clear that in case the enemy should oppose the passage of the defile at its further extremity, suddenly or otherwise, or should oppose the passage by occupying a position for that purpose in the defile itself, the embarrassment caused by the siege artillery, different parks, baggage, &c., if allowed to enter before the possession of the other extremity of the defile had been secured, might lead to very serious consequences.

XLIV.—It is the duty of Cavalry to follow up a Victory, make prisoners, and hinder the defeated army from rallying.

XLV.—Artillery being more necessary to Cavalry than to Infantry, since Infantry possesses its own powerful fire, whereas the fire of Cavalry is relatively inconsiderable, *Cavalry must always have its Artillery with it, whether it attacks, remains in position, or retires.*

XLVI.—“In war as in politics, the *lost moment never returns.* Fortune is a woman, and it is necessary to profit boldly by every opportunity.”—*Napoleon Bonaparte.*

XLVII.—When a defile has to be passed within the circle of the enemy's activity, the troops *halt and take position or halt only* on the further side, till the whole army has passed.

XLVIII.—In forming the plan of a campaign, every plan that the enemy can form, or at least every one of the principal ones, of which there will always be a very restricted number, must be taken into consideration; and the plan, when formed, must, in addition to its purely offensive part, (which it must always have, since a passive defensive is inadmissible,) contain within itself the means of successfully opposing every one of those plans which it is considered the enemy may have proposed to himself, as well as every offensive project the enemy may form.

XLIX.—When an army is experienced and warlike, that of the enemy newly levied, or from a long peace inexperienced in war, it is a maxim to endeavour by all possible means to force the enemy, as soon as possible, to a decisive general engagement. If, on the other hand, the case be reversed, one must fortify defiles, endeavour to bring about partial engagements on very favourable and, if possible, entrenched ground, make a liberal use of field-works, and, when a general engagement is determined on, take up a strong position, fortified as much as possible, and with the back well turned to good prepared lines of retreat.

L.—Field-fortifications are *always* useful and *never* injurious when constructed in accordance with the correct principles of the science of Fortification.

LI.—Use the utmost rapidity, gain time, be in readiness at the earliest moment.

LII.—“An army passes everywhere, and in all seasons, where two men can stand abreast.”—*Napoleon Bonaparte.*

LIII.—“It is a fact that when one is not in a desert, but in a peopled country, if the general is not well-informed it is because he is ignorant of his trade.”—*Napoleon Bonaparte.*

LIV.—When Death is despised and scorned he hides in the enemy's ranks.

List of several Maxims of War.

I.—In war it is frequently the height of good policy to make *one effort more*, though such course appear desperate. A general who fears to engage *most thoroughly* lest he should have his troops so broken that he will be unable to effect a retreat from the field, had better not fight at all, and retreat at once in the best possible order. “*Media via est tutissima,*” is not a maxim of war, but the *direct contrary* of a maxim of war. “*Media via non est tutissima,*” is a maxim of war; for in war a *middle* indecisive course is in general *certain defeat*. Let us hear Napoleon on this subject:—

“The Glory and Honour of his Country's Arms ought to be the first and highest consideration with a general who engages in battle. The safety and preservation of the army is only secondary. But it is also in that same Audacity and Obstinacy which the Honour and Glory of his Country's Arms demand, that the safety and preservation of the army is found. In a retreat, besides the Honour of his Country's Arms, he will often lose more men than in *two* battles—a reason *never* to despair while brave men remain around the standards. And by this Victory is obtained and *merited.*”

II.—The officer in command of an army, or of any portion of an army, when in the circle of the enemy's activity, ought frequently to say to himself, “What should I do if the enemy appears in front? what if on the right? what if on the left?”

III.—In war, it is a maxim of wisdom and prudence to

esteem an enemy one knows at his value, and one not known at above his value.

IV.—“A rapid march augments the courage of an army, and increases the probabilities of victory.”—*Napoleon*.

V.—“In Germany and Flanders, the number of the Cavalry ought to be one-fourth of the number of the Infantry; in Spain, one-sixth; on the Alps and Pyrenees, one-twentieth.”—*Napoleon*.

These, then, are the respective proportions in which Napoleon says Cavalry and Infantry ought to enter armies destined respectively to act in Germany, Flanders, Spain, the Alps and the Pyrenees. If, then, France be considered as a mean between Germany and Flanders on the one hand and Spain on the other, in respect of the natural configuration of the soil—an approximate fact which actual observation indicates to be the case, as well as the geographical position of France intermediate between those countries—the Cavalry in an army destined to act in France should be one-fifth of the Infantry. In the Russian Army the Cavalry is more numerous than in any other relatively to the Infantry, an arrangement indicated by the physical configuration and state of the country; and for an army destined to act in Russia, the Cavalry ought to be about one-third the number of the Infantry.

VI.—An officer is never truly and properly seconded, supported, and obeyed by his inferiors, unless he is known to be perfectly inflexible.

VII.—“That general, however able in all other respects, who is unable to obtain the affections of, and excite enthusiasm of some kind or other among his soldiers, is only an ignorant officer.”—*Napoleon*.

VIII.—There are five things which should never be separated from a soldier: his arms, his cartridges, his knapsack, his provisions for at least four days, and his pioneer's tool.

IX.—A soldier should be encouraged by all possible means to remain a soldier. This is to be done by manifesting respect and esteem for old soldiers, and by augmenting the pay as the duration of the soldier's service

increases. The pay of a soldier should depend on the time he has served. It is a great injustice not to pay a veteran better than a recruit.

X.—Infantry ought to be ranged in line on two full ranks only, because it is not possible to fire effectively in a deeper order than this, and because it is certain that the fire of the third rank is very imperfect in itself, and injurious to the fire of the other two. To the two full ranks must however be added a third rank, not full, containing *about* one-sixth the number of those in either of the full ranks, the men being distributed at equal intervals, one behind every sixth man.

XI.—A council of war never fights. A general commanding an army in chief ought never to hold a council of war unless he has previously determined not to fight, and wants to saddle a few others as well as himself with the responsibility of the course he had previously determined on. By discussing, debating, and holding councils of war, the worst and most pusillanimous course is almost always taken; and this is a certainty proved by the experience of all ages. For a general commanding an army *privately* to ask, consider, and profit by the views, experience, and advice of any officer in whose opinion he places confidence, is one thing, and most desirable,—to hold a council of war another, and seems little desirable, except in the case mentioned.

XII.—In war, nothing has been done while aught remains to do.

XIII.—In war, indecision is a cancer.

XIV.—In war, nothing is more necessary than to strike the iron when it is hot.

XV.—In war, a good Dodge, Trick, or Artifice is never to be despised.

Before proceeding to any explanation of the preceding principles and maxims, which may appear necessary, and to their illustration and exemplification from Military History, two subjects will be discussed, because, in illustrating and exemplifying the principles and maxims, they can at the same time be illustrated and exemplified.

And these two subjects are—

1. The choice of a Field of Battle, whether the tactical front is selected and occupied before the arrival of the enemy in presence on the field of battle, as was the Russian tactical front at Borodino, the English at Albuera; or whether the tactical front be selected and occupied in the presence of an enemy already in sight or presence at the end of, and as the result of, a quantity of manœuvres, as was the French tactical front at Austerlitz, the English at Salamanca.

2. The determination of the Decisive Point of a Field of Battle.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE CHOICE OF A FIELD OF BATTLE, WHETHER THE TACTICAL FRONT (SEE DEF. 7) IS SELECTED AND OCCUPIED BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF THE ENEMY IN PRESENCE ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE, AS WAS THE RUSSIAN TACTICAL FRONT AT BOMBARDINO, THE ALLIED TACTICAL FRONT AT ALBUERA; OR WHETHER THE TACTICAL FRONT IS SELECTED AND OCCUPIED IN THE PRESENCE OF AN ENEMY ALREADY IN SIGHT OR PRESENCE AT THE END OF, AND AS THE RESULT OF, A QUANTITY OF MANŒUVRES, AS WAS THE FRENCH TACTICAL FRONT AT AUSTERLITZ, THE ENGLISH AT SALAMANCA.

THE choice of a field of battle is the choice of an area of ground containing a position (see Def. 13 of a position) which the army is to occupy, and one or more opposing positions, either of which the enemy in giving battle to the army may assume.

The choice of a field of battle by either army obviously depends on the relative constitution of the two armies. A great preponderance of either of the three arms possessed by one of the two armies over the same arm in the other cannot be overlooked in the choice of a field of battle. Thus, for example, an army inferior in infantry, but superior in artillery, would, in selecting a position in which to give battle, choose one whose long, gentle, even, unencumbered slopes it could sweep in all directions to the extreme range of its artillery; whereas the enemy, inferior in artillery, but superior in infantry, would choose a position with steep, rugged, and encumbered slopes, and separated from any opposing position the enemy might assume by a steep narrow valley.

This being the case, it appears best to state the properties or requirements which a field of battle should possess in order to its being a good one, supposing each army to have the three arms enter its constitution in the same proportions, and afterwards introduce the modifications

resulting from a marked preponderance of either arm in either army.

Before stating these properties or requirements of a field of battle, or of the area of ground containing the position occupied by the army, and every one of the positions which the enemy may assume in order to engage the army, the two following premises have to be made.

1. That in order to make a brilliant or good application of either of the principles, it may be better to choose a field of battle which possesses the properties or requirements to be stated in a lesser degree, in preference to one which possesses them in a greater; the good application of the principle more than compensating for such inferiority in configuration of the inferior field of battle in the properties and requirements.

2. That in choosing a field of battle, the excellence of the tactical position which the army itself occupies is *not* alone to be considered; but it is the relative excellence of the position which the army occupies, considered with regard to that of either of the positions (if more than one) which the enemy may assume in order to engage the army in its position.

Regard being paid to these two premises, the properties or requirements of a field of battle are—

1. The field of battle shall have good and easy communications running along the whole length of the tactical front occupied by the army.

2. The field of battle shall have bad communications, the worse the better, intersected by natural obstacles, the greater the better, (as rivers, ravines, brooks, lakes, ponds, &c.) along the length of every one of the tactical fronts which the enemy can assume in order to engage the army.

3. The field of battle shall be such as to conceal from the enemy all movements made from one wing to the other of the army along the rear of its position.

4. The field of battle shall be such as to expose to the army all movements made from one wing to the other of the enemy along the rear of every one of the opposing positions the enemy may take up.

5. The field of battle shall afford the army easy lines of retreat.

6. The line or lines of retreat for the army shall lie behind the strongest and least attackable part of its position or of its tactical front, and shall have their direction such as to be the least possible exposed to the enterprises of the enemy.

7. The enemy's line or lines of retreat shall lie behind the weakest and most attackable part of his position, or of his tactical front, and shall be by their direction as much as possible exposed to the enterprises of the army.

8. The field of battle shall be such, that the flanks of the position which the army occupies shall be either supported and protected by strong tactical pivots, (see Def. 8,) so situated, if possible, that artillery placed in them shall be able to sweep the slopes of the position towards the front or flank in all directions to the full extent of its range; *or* that the flanks shall be protected by strong physical obstacles, as rivers, marshes, chains of impassable mountains, impassable woods, &c., forming a strong tactical defensive line protecting the flanks, and reducing the enemy to attack on some part of the front of the line of battle.

9. The field of battle shall be such, that if the enemy make a movement in the endeavour to turn a flank of the position occupied by the army, a *small* counteracting movement on the part of the army may oblige the enemy either to desist, or, if he persevere in his endeavour to turn the flank, greatly to extend his preconceived movement, and so engage him in a very large and hazardous movement, while executing which he will probably be attacked on some part of his tactical front and beaten.

10. The field of battle shall be such that if the enemy should endeavour to outflank and take one of the wings in reverse, its configuration presents a new position, which being occupied, a new advantageous position of battle is assumed beyond the menaced flank, which position shall be capable of being more readily occupied by the army than the new position which the enemy must assume to attack it can be by the enemy.

tain several good tactical pivots along the tactical front so situated.

(1.) That the enemy shall be obliged to take some of them before he can attempt to begin, and all of them before he can complete his grand attack on the decisive point of the position.

(2.) That, if possible, artillery placed in these tactical pivots may be well placed, *i.e.* may be enabled to turn its fire in all necessary directions and sweep the entire surface of the ground to a good range.

(3.) That Batteries placed in position along what may be called the main line of battle may be able to cross their fire before those of the tactical pivots situated in advance of it, in the same way as the fire of the flanks of the two adjacent bastions in a bastioned *enceinte* crosses before the angle of the intermediate bastion.

12. That the position occupied by the army shall secure to the artillery its full defensive effect.

Before proceeding to state briefly the modifications for a marked superiority of either arm in either army, it is again to be remarked:—

That the excellence of a field of battle does not depend absolutely and entirely on the excellence of the position in it assumed by the army, but on the *ratio* of the excellence of the position assumed by the army and of the positions to which it can by manœuvring thence pass, to that of any of the opposing positions in the field of battle which the enemy can assume, and those to which he can by manœuvring pass.

And this remark is to be taken with all the deductions from it which can be made with regard to the twelve requirements or properties which have been stated. Thus, for example, with regard to the property 1. A field of battle which affords the army a position whose communications running along the length of the tactical front are intersected and rendered less convenient by natural obstacles, may be a better field of battle than one which affords good and easy communications running along the whole length of the tactical front, because it may at the

same time give the enemy obstacles of a far higher magnitude, intersecting his communications along his tactical front from one wing to the other; and the latter might leave him with communication along his tactical front equally devoid of obstacles and easy with those of the army.

To state briefly the modifications for a considerable superiority of each of the three arms in an army.

1. If an army be considerably superior in Infantry.—A field of battle should be chosen which contains numerous tactical pivots, abounds in those minor obstacles, such as small deep brooks, hollow roads, small ravines, broken ground, &c., which destroy, or at least impede to a very great extent indeed, the action of cavalry and light artillery, while they assist, to a certain extent, the operations of infantry; and, lastly, the field chosen should be such, that the steep and broken slopes of the positions contained in it, reduce the effect of artillery by rendering its fire too plunging to have its full effect, and present numerous hollows into which the artillery cannot see, while the steepness of the slopes tends also to impede the operation of cavalry. The valleys too between the positions should be very narrow, that the lines of battle of the two armies may be brought as near as possible together.

2. If an army be considerably superior in Artillery.—A field of battle should be chosen such that the gentle slopes of the positions therein contained form glacises which, uninterrupted by hollows into which the artillery would not be able to see, secure to the artillery its full effect. The valleys too between the positions should be broad and the surface of the soil firm, that the artillery may manœuvre with ease and rapidity. All the approaches to the position occupied by the army should be capable of being beaten by the artillery to the full extent of its range.

3. If an army be considerably superior in Cavalry.—The field of battle should possess as few obstacles as possible, especially minor obstacles, such as small deep brooks, small deep ditches, hollow roads, small ravines, broken ground, because these minor obstacles hinder the

operation of cavalry to a far greater extent than they do that of infantry; and if they do not entirely stop its operation, hold it passive under fire, and destroy the impulsion and rapidity in which its power mainly consists. Provided the hills or eminences in the position occupied by the army present épaulements sufficiently elevated to shelter cavalry placed behind them from fire, the slopes can hardly be too gentle, or the hills or eminences of the position too little elevated.

It need hardly be remarked, that the length and magnitude of the positions presented by a field of battle must be in due proportion to the numbers and rapidity of evolution of the army, in order that it may be for the army a good field of battle. The slower an army is, the more contracted should be the positions it occupies.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE DETERMINATION OF THE DECISIVE POINT OF A FIELD OF BATTLE.

THE definition 9 is the definition of the decisive point of a field of battle.

Recopying that definition here for the convenience of the reader :—

Def. 9.—The Decisive Point of a field of battle is in all battles of one of four kinds, and it may be of either of these.

The Decisive Point of a field of battle is, then, either—

1. That part of the field of battle, *already occupied by and in the possession of the enemy*, of which it is *most expedient to force and take possession*, by directing to that object the utmost combined efforts of which the whole army is capable.

2. That part of the field of battle left unoccupied by the enemy, and not yet occupied by the army, on which it is *most expedient to seize*, in consequence of its possession when seized leading *inevitably* to subsequent most advantageous *offensive* operations.

3. That part of the field of battle left unoccupied by the enemy, and not yet occupied by the army, on which it is *most expedient to seize*, in order to the excellence of subsequent *defensive* operations.

4. That part of the field of battle already occupied by, and in the possession of the army, of which it is *most expedient to hold and keep possession*, by directing to that object the utmost united efforts of which the whole army is capable, in the case that the enemy attack.

Hence the decisive point of a field of battle may be either—

1. A point already occupied by and in possession of the enemy, of which possession is to be forced *offensively*, and

the whole army are to be directed.

Or it may be,

2. A point unoccupied as yet by either army, of which possession is to be seized offensively, in order to the subsequent inevitable very advantageous combined offensive action of the whole army.

Or it may be,

3. A point unoccupied as yet by either army, of which possession is to be seized, in order to the subsequent combined very advantageous defensive action of the whole army.

Or it may be,

4. A point already occupied by, and in the possession of the army, to holding and keeping possession of which against all attacks of the enemy the utmost combined efforts of the whole army are to be directed in case the enemy attack.

A decisive point of a field of battle of either of the two first of the four kinds is called an *Offensive* decisive point, and one of either of the two last of the four kinds is called a *Defensive* decisive point.

Hence it follows, is manifest, and *necessary to be remarked*, that if the decisive point of any field of battle selected by either of the two armies be an *offensive* decisive point, that army *of necessity, and as a necessary consequence*, takes the offensive, and attacks. And on the other hand; if either of the two armies takes the offensive and attacks, then the decisive point which has been selected by that army is *of necessity* an *offensive* decisive point.

And, similarly, it follows, that if the decisive point of any field of battle selected by either of the two armies be a defensive decisive point, that army *of necessity* takes the defensive. And on the other hand; if either of the two armies act defensively, then the decisive point which has been selected by that army is *of necessity* a *defensive* decisive point.

Every field of battle, then, has manifestly on its surface *two* decisive points, which it presents to the option or choice of each of the two armies, of which the one is an

Offensive decisive point, the other a Defensive decisive point.

Also it is evident that the Offensive decisive point for the one army is the Defensive decisive point for the other, and the Offensive decisive point for this other is the Defensive decisive point for that one. Hence, the discussion of the determination of the decisive point of a field of battle may be, and appears of necessity, divided into the following two parts:—

1. The determination of the two decisive points, the one Offensive, the other Defensive, which an army in sight and presence of another army possesses in the field of battle.

2. The choice between these two, viz., the Offensive point and the Defensive point, which an army is to make.

And if these two divisions of the subject be discussed, then the discussion of the determination of the decisive point will be complete, for a single point will have been determined on which is the Decisive Point of the Field of Battle.

To discuss the first of the two divisions,—

First.—To determine the Offensive decisive point of the field of battle for one of two armies on it.

To state, then, and exhibit the qualities of any point and considerations concerning it which render it a more or less decisive point according as they are possessed by the point in a greater or less degree.

These qualities of a point and considerations concerning it appear best exhibited in the form of questions, and a point will be more or less decisive according as the answers which can be given to these questions concerning it are more or less favourable and affirmative. Five principal questions will be given, and some of these will have several minor component questions.

QUESTION I. Is the point such, that in forcing possession of it, or seizing it, according as it is occupied or unoccupied by the enemy, a brilliant or good application is made of the principles of tactics?

And this question contains as many component questions as there are principles of tactics which bear upon the subject. Hence we have, referring to the Principles,—

1. Is the point such that in forcing possession of it the mass of the army is brought into collision with fractions of the enemy successively? (See PRIN. III.)

2. Is the point such that in the forcing possession of it the mass of the army is brought into collision with a fraction of the enemy which is separated from the rest of the enemy's army by a sufficiently insurmountable physical obstacle across the enemy's tactical front, and which fraction can be thus overwhelmed before it can be supported? (See PRIN. III. *Cases 2, 3, 4.*)

3. Is the point such that in the forcing possession of it the mass of the army is brought into collision with a fraction of the enemy separated from the rest of the enemy's army by too great a distance to permit succour to arrive in time? (See PRIN. III. *Cases 5, 6.*)

4. Is the point such that in forcing possession of it the mass of the army is brought to bear as much as possible on one wing and flank of the enemy? (See PRIN. III. *Case 11.*)

5. Is the point a point of concentration of the enemy's army, and as yet only occupied by a portion of the enemy, the remaining columns not having yet arrived? (See PRIN. III. *Case 7.*)

6. In the case that the enemy is thought to have assumed a too extended tactical front, is the point such that a reasonably certain expectation can be formed that in forcing possession of it the mass of the army will be brought into collision at a point towards the enemy's centre with a fraction of the enemy only, in consequence of the too great extension of the front preventing the arrival of succour soon enough, and that so the enemy will be divided into two parts? (See PRIN. IV.)

7. Is the point such that while the mass of the army is thrown on to a fraction of the enemy's line on it the remainder of the enemy can be kept in check by a much smaller body of the army, so that it cannot bring assistance on the point? (See PRIN. V.)

8. Is the point situated before *that* extremity of a defile or bridge (whether permanent or constructed by the enemy's engineers expressly for the purpose of crossing

the river at that point) *from which the enemy is debouching*, and such that by attacking at that point the mass of the army is brought into collision with a fraction of the enemy of the size it is deemed most expedient, in order to cause the enemy the greatest possible loss, the remainder of the army being still in the defile, or on the further side of the river? (See PRIN. III. *Cases 8, 9.*)

9. Is the point situated before that extremity of a defile or bridge at which a retreating enemy must enter in order to continue his retreat, and such that by attacking on it the mass of the army can be brought into collision with whatever fraction of the enemy is deemed most expedient in order to cause the enemy the greatest possible loss, the rest of the enemy having already entered the defile or crossed the bridge? (See PRIN. III. *Case 10.*)

QUESTION II.—Is the point such that the forcing possession of it is *easy*? for any of the following reasons:—

1. The absence of a tactical defensive line, or tactical obstacles, or tactical pivots, protecting and supporting it.

2. The inadequate and feeble occupation of the point by the enemy, who may not attach to the point the importance it deserves, and have directed his dispositions and strength to the defence of some other point, which it is not the interest of the army to attack.

3. A selection of a field of battle on the part of the enemy which is faulty, in consequence of his *not* having taken correctly into consideration *the relative constitution of the two armies*.

4. The entire non-occupation of the point by the enemy, who has entirely mistaken and neglected his defensive decisive point.

Before proceeding to Question III. it is to be remarked, that if any one of the nine component questions of the main Question I. can be favourably and satisfactorily answered respecting any point, it will also, as a necessary consequence, be in general *easy* to force possession of that point.

QUESTION III.—Is the point such, that, supposing it to *have been* taken possession of by force, or seized, according

as it is occupied or unoccupied by the enemy, the army is *then* in a position to make a brilliant or good application of either of the principles of tactics?

And this question contains, in the same way as the main Question I., the same number of component questions as there are principles of tactics and marked particular cases of principles which bear upon the subject. Thus,—

1. Is the point such that, supposing it to have been taken possession of by force, or seized, according as occupied or unoccupied, the army is *then* in a position to bring its men into collision with fractions of the enemy successively? (See PRIN. III.)

2. Is the point such that, supposing it to have been taken possession of by force, or seized, according as it is occupied or unoccupied, the army is *then* in such a position that the mass can be brought into collision successively with fractions of the enemy, separated from one another by insurmountable or sufficiently insurmountable physical obstacles, or if not with several successively, at least with a single fraction of the enemy, separated from the rest by a sufficiently insurmountable obstacle? (See PRIN. III. *Cases* 2, 3, 4.)

3. Is the point such that, supposing it to have been taken possession of, or seized, according as it is occupied or unoccupied, the army is *then* in such a position that the mass can be thrown successively on fractions of the enemy, separated from one another by too great distances to give time for the arrival of succour? (See PRIN. III.)

4. Is the point such that, supposing it to have been taken possession of by force, or seized, according as it is occupied or unoccupied, the army is *then* in a position to form its line of battle at right angles, or nearly so, to that of the enemy, and so attack him *in flank*, thus throwing at the same time the mass of the army on *one wing only* of the enemy? (See PRIN. III. *Case* 11.)

5. Is the point such that, supposing it to have been taken possession of by force, or seized, according as it is occupied or unoccupied, the enemy is anticipated at his point of concentration, and the army is in a position to

overwhelm the enemy's columns successively as they arrive or are found? (See PRIN. III. *Case 7.*)

6. Is the point such that, supposing it to have been taken possession of by force, or seized, according as it is occupied or unoccupied, *then* the enemy, on a too extended tactical front, will be divided into two parts, and the army in a position to defeat them successively? (See PRIN. IV.)

7. Is the point situated before that extremity of a defile or bridge (whether permanent or constructed expressly by the enemy's engineers) *from which* the enemy is debouching, and such that supposing it taken possession of by force, or seized, according as it is occupied or unoccupied, the army is in position to attack the enemy as soon as that fraction of his forces it is judged most expedient to attack, in order to cause him the greatest possible loss, has debouched from the defile or bridge? (See PRIN. III. *Case 9.*)

8. Is the point situated before that extremity of a defile or bridge at which a retreating army must *enter* in order to continue his retreat, and such that supposing it taken possession of by force, or seized, according as it is occupied or unoccupied, the army will be in a position to cause the fraction of the enemy still outside the defile great injury, and *enter the defile pêle-mêle with the enemy*? (See PRIN. III. *Case 10.*)

9. Is the point such that by attacking on it the mass of the army is brought into collision with a fraction of the enemy posted in position, or deployed in battle, in order to protect the remainder of the army which is *in columns, executing a flank march*, or executing any complicated manœuvre, or in a state of great unreadiness, so that possession of the point having been gained, the mass of the army can be thrown on an unprepared enemy? (See PRIN. XXIII.)

QUESTION IV.—Is the point such that, supposing it to have been taken possession of by force, having been occupied by the enemy, the army is then well placed, both *because* the configuration of the new position of battle thus assumed is good, and possesses good tactical pivots, and *because* the position is well occupied by the army?

The assistance which the Chapter on the Choice of a Field of Battle gives toward the solution of this question is manifest.

And the utility and necessity of the question, in case it should be thought necessary that these should be vindicated, appears from the fact, that if a point were seized in order to apply a principle, yet when seized puts the army in a very bad position, the enemy might be in a state to make a still better application of the principles than that which was made by the army in seizing the point.

QUESTION V.—Is the point such that the possession of it by the army, supposing it to have been taken possession of, or seized, according as it is occupied or unoccupied by the enemy, affects, operates upon, or closes the enemy's communications, or lines of retreat from the field of battle, and confers the power of driving him more or less from his communications?

It may be remarked how greatly the value of a point is raised, as an offensive decisive point, when its possession, supposing it acquired, affects to a very considerable degree the communications or lines of retreat of the enemy, and *most* especially if it confers the power of driving the enemy in case he is beaten on to some impassable or nearly impassable physical obstacle, as a large and deep river, a lake, a marsh, a chain of mountains, the sea, &c., for this is none other than depriving him at once of all his lines of retreat. (See PRIN. II. itself, and also PRIN. II. Case 5.)

We have, then, five principal questions, with their subordinate component questions, and the more affirmative and favourable the answers which can be given to these, when asked with respect to any point in the field of battle, the more likely it is that that point is The Offensive Decisive Point.

Hence, in order to determine the Offensive Decisive Point of a Field of Battle, those points which have any pretensions to be it (*and the number of these is always very restricted indeed*) have to be passed in review and consideration, and that of them concerning which the most favourable and affirmative answers to the five Questions and their

subordinate component Questions can be given, is The Offensive Decisive Point of the Field of Battle.

Or, recapitulating and abbreviating :—In order to discover the Offensive Decisive Point of a Field of Battle, the following questions may be asked concerning any point which has *prima facie* pretensions to be the offensive decisive point.

1. Is a more brilliant or better application of the principle of tactics made *in and whilst* directing the grand attack on that point than on any other point which has any pretensions to be the offensive decisive point?

2. Do the configuration of the ground, its tactical characteristics, and the disposition of the enemy indicate that it is easier and more advantageous to direct the attack on that point than on any other point which has any pretensions to be the offensive decisive point?

3. Supposing possession of the point to have been obtained, is the army *then in consequence* in a position to make a more brilliant or better application of the principles of tactics than it would be, supposing possession to have been obtained of any other of the points which have any pretensions to be the offensive decisive point?

4. Supposing possession of this point to have been obtained, is the army on a field of battle which is from the configuration of the ground and its tactical characteristics better than the field of battle which would be obtained, supposing possession to have been taken of either of the other points which have pretensions, and is the field of battle also better occupied by the army and worse by the enemy?

5. Supposing possession of this point to have been obtained, are the communications and lines of retreat of the enemy more seriously menaced, affected, or closed, than they would be if possession were obtained of either of the other points which have any pretensions to be the offensive decisive tactical point?

Having then discussed the determination of the Offensive Decisive Point which every army in presence of an enemy possesses in every field of battle, we have next in order—

To determine the Defensive Decisive Point which every

army in presence of an enemy possesses in every field of battle.

It is clear that the offensive decisive point of the army is the defensive decisive point of the enemy, and the offensive decisive point of the enemy is the defensive decisive point of the army. Hence we are enabled in the following manner at once to arrive at the object.

Let the army be supposed in the place of the enemy, and the enemy in the place of the army, then determine in the way already discussed which would be the offensive decisive point of the army. That point, then, which on this supposition would be the offensive decisive point of the army is in the army's actual position the Defensive Decisive Point which it is the object to discover.

This is the best, and appears to be the only way of determining the offensive decisive point of the field of battle. It is only by considering what the army might and ought to attempt, supposing it in the place of the enemy, that the defensive decisive point of the field of battle—in other words, that point to the attacking on and obtaining possession of which the enemy ought, in case he is determined to attack, to direct the utmost combined efforts of his whole army when the decisive moment arrives, (see PRIN. XIII. XIV.) and to the defence of which the army ought, if it remains on the defensive, to direct the utmost combined efforts of which it is capable—can be correctly determined. It is by supposing the army in the place of the enemy, and the enemy in place of the army, and then considering all the feasible manœuvres which the army would attempt, that all the manœuvres which the enemy may in reality attempt are discovered, and proper means in consequence taken for counteracting them.

The Principle XXIV. indicates the extreme value of correct information in war, and it will be seen in the Chapter on "The different means of obtaining correct information in war," how important a means in *obtaining, verifying, and correcting* information in all questions both Strategic and Tactical the art of making just suppositions on all the courses left open to the enemy is. Not to digress, the determination of the Offensive and Defensive

decisive points having been discussed, it now remains to speak as to the choice between these two.

Recopying the question which it has been said was now to be treated on in order:—

“ 2.—The choice between the two, *viz.* the Offensive Decisive Point, and the Defensive Decisive Point.”

And first, it has to be remarked that there are cases, and those numerous, where *no choice or option is left*, because it has been seen that to take the offensive is *of necessity* to choose an offensive point, and to take the defensive is *of necessity* to choose a defensive point; and *Strategical and Political Reasons* may compel and render it necessary for an army to take the offensive or the defensive, as the case may be, under which circumstances *no free option* between an offensive decisive point and a defensive decisive point is left. Though this is not, in consequence of the arrangement decided on, the place to illustrate and exemplify the subjects of the Second, Third, and this Fourth Chapters, *viz.* the Principles and Maxims, the Choice of a Field of Battle, and the determination of the Decisive Point, yet the preceding assertion appears to demand here a brief exemplification, before dismissing it for greater exemplification to the succeeding chapter. When Soult, coming from Andalusia, entered Estremadura, and found the Allies under Beresford in position across the road to Badajos at Albuera, the Allies had determined not to attack Soult, because their object was to prevent him from relieving the French garrison in Badajos, and they thought their position barring the road a strong one, with a good defensive decisive point protected by the village of Albuera, a tactical point, and because time was bringing them advantages and reinforcements. Hence Soult, whose main strategical object was to apply Principle III., by beating the Allied army under Beresford before it could be joined by the reinforcements which he knew the victory of Fuentes Onoro would allow to be sent to the Guadiana, and second object to relieve Badajos, the road to which it has been said the Allied army was barring, being in line of battle on a position across it, and who was, moreover, induced by this, that having marched from Andalusia expressly

to fight, to depart without fighting was to destroy or impair the military mental and psychical qualities of his army, found himself obliged by strategical reasons to take the offensive and attack. Hence Soult being obliged by strategical reasons to attack, had no option as to whether his decisive point was an Offensive or a Defensive. Higher reasons and weightier interests rendered Napoleon's decisive point at Borodino of necessity an Offensive point. Again, it has to be remarked that the choice appears never entirely free from the influence of Strategical and Political Reasons, which have always to be considered, and have their due weight, generally a considerable one, allowed them.

In Strategy the Initiative and Offensive ought *always* to be taken. In Tactics this is not so, and in Tactics the rule appears to be—

Do not take the offensive unless the army has some *very good* offensive decisive point, and consequently a *very good* application of the principles of tactics can be made. If the army has not a very good offensive decisive point, take the defensive and endeavour to induce the enemy to attack. If there is no very good offensive decisive point, and the enemy will not attack, then, if Political and Strategical Reasons allow time, and leave a free option, the army should manœuvre in order that either it may find a very good offensive decisive point, in consequence of the enemy having been induced to make a great blunder or having done so of his own accord, or in order that the enemy may be induced to lose patience and attack. If the army has at the same time a very good offensive point and a very good defensive point, and the enemy appears and is evidently willing to run the risks of making a grand attack on this very good defensive point, then it is a nice question of judgment whether to take the offensive by attacking on the very good offensive decisive point the army possesses, or to take the defensive on the very good defensive point, and let the enemy attack. But it is not to be understood that the army is to maintain a passive defensive. In those cases in which a defensive is recommended, it is not meant that the defensive is to be maintained *throughout* the battle, unless weakness

prevents the change in the defensive for the offensive *during* the battle at the right decisive moment (see Prin. XIII. XIV.), which will generally be the moment at which the enemy's great attack and effort have been repulsed. In all cases whatever, when the defensive is assumed at the commencement of the battle, the defensive should be changed for a vigorous offensive in the course of the battle at the right moment, or in general at the moment when the enemy's grand attack having developed itself, has been repulsed. Hence, recapitulating, it is not recommended to take the offensive at the beginning of a battle,—in other words, to fight an *offensive* battle (always, of course, supposing *Strategical* and *Political* Reasons leave a free option), except there is a *very good* offensive decisive point, and in consequence a *very good* application of the principles can be made. In other cases a Defensive-Offensive battle, *i.e.* a battle in which the army takes the defensive at the commencement, and changes to a vigorous offensive at the right moment in the course of the battle, is recommended. Too great weakness is the only excuse for not allowing the army at the right moment to change its defensive for a vigorous offensive,—in other words, for allowing a Defensive-Offensive to degenerate into a Defensive battle. It is reasonable that, as the range and accuracy of musketry and artillery increases in consequence of improvements, and that of the former has certainly of late made rapid strides, the advantages of the defensive in tactics, and consequently of defensive-offensive battles, will be augmented. The advantages of a defensive-offensive battle are already great, except in the cases where an offensive battle is recommended, for the attackers have to pass an area of ground more or less broad, swept by a fire of musketry and artillery, and cannot fail to experience considerable loss in so doing, and be in greater disorder than those who are to repulse them, and who have not been nearly so much exposed to fire; the attack, too, takes place on ground better known to the army than to the enemy—in fact, in general, on or about the crest of the army's position—and the army's reserves are nearer at hand than the enemy's. In fact, on con-

sidering the subject, " everything looks as if the attackers must be repulsed with considerable loss."* Then, supposing the attackers repulsed, the moment they have fairly turned their backs the decisive moment has, in general, arrived, and the defenders now becoming attackers, are to pass the valley between the positions close on the heels of, and, if possible, *pêle mêle* with the fugitives. The great advantages of changing in this way to the offensive is, that without doing so the *fruits* of the Victory are lost, and a victory is nothing without its fruits to what it is with them. For example, by allowing the victory to finish defensively, when it could be well finished offensively, an immense number of prisoners are lost which in the other case would certainly be taken, a large portion of the enemy's artillery, which would to a very high degree of probability, if not inevitably, be captured, is voluntarily resigned, and, what is as bad, *the military psychical and mental qualities of the enemy remain comparatively untouched.* Besides, the Principle XXIX. and the Maxim XIV., indicate that the moments of the enemy's greatest psychical, mental, and physical weakness are to be seized, and a vigorous offensive attack developing itself majestically at the moment the attacking columns or lines, in which the enemy placed his hopes of victory, are repulsed, and, in fact, already flying before it, is more likely to strike terror into the enemy than at any other time.

The stroke of an army in battle, when its grand attack has developed itself, and the decisive moment sounds, should have an analogy with the stroke of a mighty wave, which, having struck the opposing stranded ship in pieces, seems as yet not contented with its Victory, but still rolls on to overwhelm and surge around the fragments.

* Baron de Jomini, *Precis de l'Art de la Guerre.*

CHAPTER V.

ON THE EXPLANATION, ILLUSTRATION, AND EXEMPLIFICATION OF THE SUBJECTS OF THE THREE PRECEDING CHAPTERS, VIZ., THE PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF TACTICS, THE CHOICE OF A FIELD OF BATTLE, AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE DECISIVE POINT OF A FIELD OF BATTLE.

BEFORE proceeding to the subject of this chapter, since the reader will, in the course of it, be very frequently referred to the plans placed together at the end of the treatise, and because the way in which the configuration of the ground is represented in the plans requires explanation, and the colours by which the positions of the armies are represented require to be stated, it is thought best again to inform the reader, that *immediately preceding* the plans, which are placed together at the end of the book, there is inserted an explanation of the plans, with the reasons for using the kind of drawing employed.

The following account of the Battle of Rivoli is given in explanation, illustration, and exemplification of the particular cases 1, 3, of Principle I, and of particular cases 1, 7, of Principle III, especially, though it will be endeavoured to lose no opportunity which may present of explaining, illustrating, and exemplifying any others of the principles and maxims. To have a clear comprehension of the battle, it appears necessary to begin with the history of the campaign subsequent to December 30th, though this history in part falls within the domain of Strategy, and not of Tactics.

Positions of the Adverse Armies, December 30th, 1797.

AUSTRIANS.

Wurmser, with 15,000 men, having been compelled to take refuge in Mantua, is there invested.

Alvinzi, having been driven behind the Brenta, is now, with his army again reinforced and augmented to about 47,000 men, behind the Brenta, the Piave, and the Upper Adige, preparing to take the offensive, and rescue Wurmser.*

FRENCH.

The Division Serrurier, 10,000 strong, is before Mantua, blockading Wurmser in that place.

Division Augereau, 8,000 strong, is on the Adige, from Verona to beyond Legnago.

Division Joubert, 12,000 strong, is defending the inlets from the Tyrol, and closing the inlet between the east shore of Lake of Guarda and the right bank of the Adige, by occupying the strong positions of Ferrara, Corona della Madona, and Preabocco.

Division Massena, 12,000 strong, is at Verona.

Division Rey, 4,000, is at Desenzano, observing the valley of the Chiese, and the west shore of Lake of Guarda.

Hence, total Austrian force amounts to 62,000, and total French force to 46,000.

General Buonaparte waited in his positions till the offensive operations of Alvinzi should have sufficiently developed themselves, watching his opportunity.

Before narrating the course of the campaign, and the way in which Buonaparte learnt what Alvinzi's plan for commencing operations was, the reader had best be informed of thus much of Alvinzi's plan, viz., that he divided his 47,000 into 3 fractions, containing respectively 7,000, 10,000, and 30,000. Alvinzi directs the column of 7,000, under Balagich, by Vicence on Verona, and the column of 10,000, under Provera, on Legnago. He himself, with

* If the reader should not possess a good map of Northern Italy, and should have the two large maps of Central Europe attached to the Author's "Elementary Treatise on Strategy," good maps for reading anything concerning the last great war in Europe, which took place within the scope of the contents of those two maps, may be made by writing in them, from the best atlas to which access can be had, the names of the towns and rivers, which names were not inserted in the maps, that the eye of the reader might fall with greater facility on those places mentioned in the treatise to which the maps belong.

the column of 30,000, descends the valley of the Adige, principally by the right bank, in a manner which will afterwards be explained.

January 11th.—Buonaparte learns, from the advanced posts, that the heads of two columns are seen approaching, the one to Verona, the other to Legnago.

January 12th.—Massena's advanced posts on the road between Vicence and Verona are driven in; but the greater part of the division having deployed, the column is quickly driven back.

Hence Buonaparte acquires the certainty that the column directed on Verona is not composed of more than 7,000 men, and that this is not the main army.

January 13th.—Buonaparte learns in the afternoon, by a despatch from Joubert,

1. That he has been attacked in front by very superior forces near Madona della Corona, and is in retreat on Rivoli, and intends to continue his retreat from that place to Castel Nuovo.

2. That the portion of his division at Preabocco had, before receiving orders to fall back, in consequence of Joubert's retreat on Rivoli, discovered the approach of one numerous column by the right bank of the Adige, between that river and Mount Magnone, and of another column by the left bank.

Let us see what it is reasonable to suppose Buonaparte concluded, as to Alvinzi's plan of operations, from the information which he has been said to have acquired up to this time.

Joubert's despatch left Buonaparte no doubt that it was the main body of the enemy which was descending the valley of the Adige. Buonaparte knew of the existence of that column of 7,000 men on the road from Vicence to Verona, which the division Massena had driven back.

Buonaparte also knew, as has been stated, of the existence of another column directed on Legnago, and since this he had discovered not to be the main column, he would probably conclude to be of somewhere about the same magnitude as that directed on Verona, say 10,000 men; as well it is only reasonable to suppose that he had already received information as to the approximate

magnitude of this column. Having, then, recapitulated the data Buonaparte possessed, it is reasonable to suppose that he would thence conclude,—

That the Austrians had adopted very *exterior* lines in opposition to the principle of interior *lines*, equally a principle of Strategy and Tactics. That this violation of the principle of interior lines might not, however, be without a reason and object, for that the two smaller columns of 7,000 and 10,000, directed respectively on Verona and Legnago, might be sent solely for the purpose of drawing him eastwards towards the Brenta, either by the hopes of overwhelming one or both these fractions with the mass of his army, an error into which the Austrians might hope he would be the more likely to fall, from a belief that the rest of their army was between the Adige and the Brenta, in the rear of these two columns, and connecting them, say towards Montebello, San Bonifaccio, or Lovigo, and that in consequence he had nothing to fear for his communication; then, if he fell into this error and marched towards those columns to attack them, they would fall back before him according to their orders, and endeavour to draw him, by the hopes of applying the principle III, and overwhelming them with his mass, as far as possible, east of the Adige, while the main army, which it is to be remembered Buonaparte knew was descending the Adige towards Rivoli, and whose line of march was in fact a straight line, pointing to and passing through Mantua, would march straight to Mantua, raise the siege, relieve the place, liberate Wurmser with his 15,000 men, and thus place itself, augmented by these 15,000 in a position cutting him completely from his communications; and that this supposition as to Alvinzi's motives was somewhat strengthened, by the apparent readiness with which the column directed on Verona retreated when attacked by the division Massena.

Whether the preceding were the real motives which led to the dispositions of Alvinzi is not known for certain to the writer of this treatise, but to suppose that they were from the dispositions is to put *the most favourable construction on the dispositions*; and Buonaparte has therefore been supposed to have viewed Alvinzi's plan in this way, because

a general ought always to appreciate the full amount of danger with which his enemy's dispositions threaten him, and is bound to act on the supposition that his enemy appreciates and understands the full advantages which his own plan possesses. That Alvinzi had not any other motive than *that of surrounding the French army strategically*, in consequence of a belief in a false principle, viz. that an army ought to operate on exterior strategical and exterior tactical lines, appears very probable, for if his motives in detaching the two columns from the main army had been those which Buonaparte has been supposed to assign, it being his place to take the most favourable view, would he not have allowed a greater time to elapse between the appearances of the two minor columns before Verona and Legnago, and his attack on Joubert with the main army? for, as it has been said, the column of Verona did not appear till the 11th, that of Legnago not till the 12th, and Joubert was attacked on the morning of the 13th. If, then, these columns were detached, and thus the main army weakened by 17,000 men on the day of battle, for the purpose of drawing Buonaparte towards the Brenta, would not Alvinzi have allowed them more time to do so? ought not the column of Legnago to have presented itself first? and would it not have been better to have taken for the strategical line of the main army the valley of the Chiese, and the road by Lonato, Castiglione, and Goito, to Mantua, in preference to that by the valley of the Adige and Rivoli?

Alvinzi's plan was, taking the most favourable view of it, viz. that already explained, vicious, if not absurd: for it supposed that Buonaparte, who had already done enough to convince the most sceptical Austrian that he was a master of his trade, would, when already at a distance of more than 200 miles, measuring in a direct line from the nearest point of French ground, with a late enemy just reduced by force of arms to neutrality in his rear, viz. the King of Piedmont, and Southern Italy also hostile, in rear of and on his right flank, and a considerable body of English in Corsica, plunge on still farther towards the Brenta with the mass of his army, when his

army was already out of proportion to the length of his line of operations, and the boldness of its offensive position in pursuit of either or both the two smaller columns, (whose magnitude, too, and object he was almost certain at once to detect,) *before he had ascertained to a certainty that the main body of the Austrian army was not descending by either shore of the Lake of Garda, or by the valley of the Adige, or by the valley of the Chiese, to relieve Wurmser with his 15,000 men in Mantua, manifestly one of Alvinzi's great objects, and at the same time expose his communications as much as possible to the main Austrian army, reinforced by Wurmser's 15,000 men, who would thus, while possessing their own communications with the Tyrol (an Austrian province) free by Castiglione, Lonato, Gavardo, and the Chiese, cut him completely from his primary base of operations, viz. the Maritime Alps, which divide France from Piedmont.*

To continue the history of the campaign. When Buonaparte found from Joubert's despatch that the main Austrian army was descending the Adige, it was out of the question to go after the two minor columns, and so suffer the main Army to relieve Mantua and operate on his communications. He had then only the option of raising the siege, and retreating before the Austrians, thus losing the fruits of perhaps the most splendid series of operations ever conducted by any general, a thing out of the question with Buonaparte; or of throwing the mass of his army on the main Austrian army, while he contained the other two columns for a sufficient time, and then returning to them overwhelm them successively in their turn. This was an operation requiring great rapidity and concentration,—qualities without which no brilliant military operation was ever performed; but it was, at the same time to apply the principles of war, to have a due regard for his communications, and throw the mass of his army on fractions of the enemy. The way in which he applied the Principle V., to which the reader is here referred, in order to have a sufficient mass disposable, will appear in the course of the narration. It has been already said that, even if Alvinzi had led his main army down the

valley of the Adige, in a manner in accordance with the principles and maxims of war, Buonaparte would have been obliged to throw the mass of his army on it; but what put the question beyond *any shadow of a doubt* was:

That Joubert's despatch left Buonaparte no doubt but that the main Austrian army was descending the valley of the Adige, and approaching the position of Rivoli, with which Buonaparte was well acquainted, (having in person previously given directions on the spot for some fortifications to be raised at Osteria, see Plan 1,) in 3 separate columns at least, all separated from one another by very sufficiently insurmountable natural obstacles, viz. the Mount Magnone and the Adige; (see for the rest of the account of the battle of Rivoli, the plan of the battle, Plan 1;) and that if he could occupy the position of Rivoli before the Austrians arrived, and were no longer separated by those natural obstacles by which they were at present separated, he should have *seized an opportunity of attacking the enemy at a time when his columns were separated from one another by very sufficiently insurmountable physical obstacles, and would in all probability be enabled to overwhelm them successively, and would also have anticipated the enemy at a point of concentration; while it was very probable that the enemy's columns would not arrive simultaneously on the field of battle.*

Buonaparte makes the following dispositions:—

He instantly sends orders to Joubert, to maintain himself, at all cost, *in advance of Rivoli*, or at least in the position of Rivoli, till his arrival with the division Massena.

At the same time, he sends orders to Rey to hasten by Salo to Rivoli to join Joubert.

He orders 2,000 of the division Massena to entrench themselves in Verona, and prevent the passage of the Adige at that place, to observe as well as may be the column of 7,000 directed on Verona, and cooperate with the division Augereau.

He orders the division Augereau to defend the passage of the Adige generally against the column of 10,000, and notably the bridge at Legnago.

He leaves the care of the investment of Mantua,—for it

was not strictly speaking a siege, Buonaparte having no siege artillery,—to the division Serrurier, 10,000 strong, and occupying fortified posts in the suburbs, which he had previously had the care to construct, the principal of which were those of St. George, St. Antony, and La Favorite. These detached fortified posts afford a good example of lines of circumvallation and contravallation properly constructed, and served the double purpose of preventing any succouring army from relieving Mantua by attacking the besiegers, and of keeping Wurmser in the fortress.

He orders the remaining 10,000 of the division Massena to hasten by forced marches to Rivoli to join Joubert.

He himself instantly hastens to Rivoli to take the command in person.

To consider these dispositions :—

We see that the two columns, directed respectively on Verona and Legnago, and together containing 17,000, were to be contained or held in check by the 8,000 in the division Augereau, and the 2,000 detached from the division Massena, *i.e.* by 10,000, these latter profiting by the fortifications at Verona and Legnago, and the river Adige, a large natural obstacle; and herein is an application of the Principle V., to which the reader is referred; and on another part of the tactical front the 10,000 under Serrurier were blocking the 15,000 in Mantua,—a power they possessed in consequence of Mantua being one of those fortresses spoken of in the author's elementary treatise on Strategy, as being such as to be more favourable by the nature of their outlets for preventing a sortie than for making one; so that a smaller number of men, profiting by the nature of the outlets, can blockade a greater number within the walls. This blockade of Wurmser in Mantua, by the division Serrurier, was also an application of Principle V.; so that on the whole there are 20,000 French neutralizing 32,000 Austrians, by applying the Principle V., while the remainder are rapidly concentrating to strike the decisive blow, and apply at the same time most excellently other principles of tactics on the field of Rivoli.

Jan. 18th.—In the night of this day, Joubert receives the order of Buonaparte while in full retreat; and having already quitted the position of Rivoli, returns and occupies that position.

At Buonaparte's arrival at Rivoli about midnight, the moon shone beautifully, and the enemy's night fires reflected on the white mountains, discovered four separate camps,—one to the west of Mount Baldo.

The enemy, then, was not approaching in three columns, separated by very sufficiently insurmountable natural obstacles, viz. the Mount Magnone and the Adige, but in four, separated by the three very sufficiently insurmountable obstacles, Mount Magnone, Mount Baldo, and the Adige.

The column which was on the left bank of the Adige, or on the opposite bank to Rivoli, was commanded by Wukassowich, and composed of 6,000 men.

That which was between the Adige and the Mount Magnone was composed of 10,000 men, commanded by Quasdanowich, and with this was the greater part of the artillery and cavalry.

That which was between Mount Magnone and Mount Baldo was commanded by Alvinzi himself, and composed of 12,000.

That which was on the farther side of Mount Baldo was composed of 4,000, commanded by Lusignan.

Buonaparte, on discovering that the enemy is in four fractions so situated, makes the following dispositions:—

A demi-brigade of the division Joubert is to defend the entrenchments of Osteria, which, as it has been said, Buonaparte had previously directed to be raised, and which are indicated on the plan by a black mark drawn from the village to the Adige.

The division Massena had the order sent to it to detach a demi-brigade, to contain, or rather hinder and impede Lusignan, as far as possible, profiting by obstacles.

The Adige itself was containing Wukassowich.

Buonaparte determines to attack Alvinzi, who, it will be remembered, had brought down his column between Mount Magnone and Mount Baldo, with the remainder of the

On the death-bed of St. Helena the Emperor bestowed a gold repeating watch on a faithful servant, with these words :—" It sounded two o'clock at Rivoli when I gave Joubert the order to attack." That was the morning of January 14th, 1797.

It is needless to point out how these dispositions contain a brilliant application of the Principle V.

Buonaparte's object in attacking Alvinzi, so soon as Massena's advance ensured his cooperation, was that time was in fact in great part containing Lusignan, and he was not aware whether Lusignan had 4,000 or 8,000, and the demi-brigade, without the aid of time, would not be able to contain him on either supposition; time, too, was in part containing Quasdanowich, for if he persevered, he was sure to force the entrenchments of Osteria against a demi-brigade.

At or about two o'clock, then, of the morning, Joubert advanced from a position he had taken up on the hill *a*, and between that hill and the next to it towards Mount Baldo, to attack Alvinzi, and retake possession of St. Giovanni, the village which will be seen in the plan near the junction of the two rivulets. Then the bodies of men, marked light yellow on the plan, represent Alvinzi in line of battle, in the position he was when Joubert marched forward to attack him, his left resting on the village of St. Giovanni, a tactical pivot, and the remaining three fractions of the Austrians moving forward in columns, endeavouring to cooperate with and come to the assistance of Alvinzi, to defeat the French. The way in which the four fractions of the Austrians were separated from one another by the Mount Baldo, the Mount Magnone, and the Adige, will at once be seen from the plan. It may be remarked, as is perhaps, however, sufficiently clear from the plan, that Quasdanowich descending between the Adige and Mount Magnone, has to pass through a defile at Osteria, across which defile the entrenchments had been constructed, before he could cooperate with Alvinzi, so that, supposing him to have forced the entrenchments, he would still have

to traverse a portion of the defile which might be enfiladed by a battery.

The battle began hotly between Alvinzi and Joubert. Joubert's line had been strengthened on the right, and was weakest on the left, both because it was necessary to keep Alvinzi away from the outlet or *débouché* of the defile of Osteria, that he might not liberate Quasdanowich, and also that succour might more promptly arrive to the demi-brigade defending the entrenchments. Joubert's left fell back before Alvinzi; the right, seeing the left fall back, fell back as well, but the 14th regiment of the line, containing 3 battalions and about 2,000 men, sustained itself admirably in the centre, and gained time for the arrival of Massena's division. Buonaparte hastens to the left, and supports it and the centre by Massena's division as it arrives. The Austrians are in consequence driven back on their right and centre; but their left, still advancing, presses hard on the French right, which had been weakened by detachments sent to assist in containing Quasdanowich. At this moment the column of Quasdanowich having forced the entrenchments, continues its course through the defile, and begins to débouche from it in face of the artillery, infantry, and cavalry, part detached from the right of Joubert and part belonging to Massena's division, destined to receive it.

The bodies coloured dark yellow in the plan, represent the Austrians at this moment. Alvinzi's right and centre are yielding, his left still advancing. Quasdanowich is endeavouring to débouche from the defile, in face of a battery and the infantry and cavalry destined to receive him. Vicassowich, on the further bank of the Adige, is endeavouring to protect by his fire across the river the deployment of the head of Quasdanowich's column. Lusignan, who, instead of applying the Principle I., and acting on interior tactical lines as far as lay in his power, by marching instantly, as soon as he got clear of Mount Baldo, to join with Alvinri and attack the left flank of the French, in accordance with Principle III. Particular Case 11, followed the dotted line in plan, in order, perhaps, to surround the French tactically, thus assuming a very ex-

terior tactical line in placing himself in position on the hill in rear of Rivoli. The bodies of men marked dark red are the French at the same moment, the left and centre advancing, the right yielding. The fraction of the French army destined to the purpose is attacking the head of Quasdanowich's column. The demi-brigade which has done all in its power to stop Lusignan, is holding the town of Rivoli, to stop him if he advance as long as it is able. The red column near the village through which Lusignan's tactical line passes is the division Rey coming from Desenzano, marching with all speed to Rivoli, in consequence of Buonaparte's order, and now menacing the rear of Lusignan.

Raked by a battery enfilading the defile as it advanced, the head of the column, as it debouched from the defile, was attacked in either flank by infantry, a brilliant charge of cavalry was made *à propos* upon it, and the battery still firing into the defile, a howitzer shell exploded an ammunition carriage in the centre of it. At this moment confusion and terror were at their height, and the whole column, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, huddled together, fled *pêle-mêle* to Preabocco. Quasdanowich being disposed of, the left of Alvinzi was now vigorously attacked by the forces now become newly disposable, and as it had pressed on too hotly, suffered severely; and at this moment a singularly effective and destructive charge made by two small squadrons of cavalry on the left of Alvinzi affords a remarkable example of the efficacy of a small troop lanced very *à propos*. The confusion in the left of Alvinzi, which was brought to its height by this remarkable charge of cavalry, communicated itself to the already yielding centre and right, and the whole in confusion fled behind the Tasso.

A brigade with a battery of twelve-pounders is now detached to join the demi-brigade at Rivoli, and advance to attack Lusignan, who had no artillery, because the road by which he crossed the mountains was judged impassable for that arm by the Austrian General. At the same time, Rey, furnished with his divisional artillery, and who, it will be remembered, had 4,000 men, deploys in line of battle in Lusignan's rear. That General escapes with 300

to 400 cavalry ; the remainder of his 4,000 lay down their arms.

January 14th. In the evening after the battle of Rivoli, Buonaparte learned that Provera, whose column of 10,000, it will be remembered, was directed towards Legnago, had succeeded in passing the Adige at Angiazi, a little above Legnago, on the evening of the 13th, Augereau's division being scattered along the river, and that he was marching on Mantua. Buonaparte leaves Joubert and Rey to pursue the remains of Alvinzi, and starts at once that same evening for Mantua with the division Massena, to prevent Provera from raising the siege, and unite with Serrurier and Augereau to overwhelm him.

Jan. 14th.—Provera arrived at Nogara without meeting any obstacle, or being attacked ; but in the afternoon, Augereau, having succeeded in uniting the greater part of his division at Angiazi, fell on Provera's rear-guard, to which he did great mischief, and burned the bridge over the Adige, by which he had passed.

Jan. 15th.—Provera arrived before Mantua, and thought to enter the fortress through the suburb of St. George ; but it will be remembered that this was one of the posts which Buonaparte had constructed, and he found it entrenched and occupied by Serrurier.

In the evening of this same day Buonaparte with the division Massena arrived at Roverbella.

On this same day Joubert, indefatigable, again attacks Alvinzi, and takes 5,000 prisoners, affording an example to the Principle XLI., and the Maxims XII. and XIV.

Jan. 16th.—Provera tries to force an entrance into the town, by attacking on the side towards the citadel the post of La Favorite, while Wurmser, cooperating with him, attacks the post of St. Antony. Buonaparte arrives during the struggle, sends sufficient support to Serrurier to enable him to maintain himself in the two posts, and with the rest of the division Massena attacks Provera on his right wing. Wurmser repulsed by Serrurier, aided by the reinforcements furnished him by Buonaparte, retires into Mantua ; but Provera is attacked by the garrison of St. George on his left, having Serrurier in front, and

To put the finishing stroke to his misfortunes, Augereau coming from Castellaro in pursuit of him, appearing on his rear, he lays down his arms with 5,000 men.

From Jan. 16 to Feb. 2 the investment of Mantua continues.

Feb. 2d.—Mantua, abandoned to its own resources, capitulates, and 13,000 prisoners, the remains of Wurmser, pass to Trieste to be exchanged.

The results of these operations were as follows :—

30,000 prisoners, *at least*.

26 standards.

350 pieces of artillery, taken inside Mantua.

24 pieces of artillery, taken outside Mantua.

Large reinforcements soon arrived from the Rhine, and the Army of Italy came to number 75,000 men. With these Buonaparte undertook to make the Austrian Emperor tremble in his capital; marched forwards across the Noric Alps, more than 200 miles from the Adige and Mantua, and dictated the terms of the treaty of Campo Formio to the trembling throne of Hapsburg.

The following account of the battle of Dresden, and of the portion of the campaign preceding it, is given in illustration and exemplification of Principle I., Case 2; Principle II., Cases 2, 3, 5; Principle III., Case 3; and of Principles V., X., XVIII., XXIV., XXXVIII., XLVI.; and of the Determination of the Decisive Point of a field of battle.

Aug. 15th, 1813.—The armistice which preceded the campaign in which the battle of Dresden occurred finished, and hostilities recommenced on the morrow.

The contending parties were, on the one side, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Austria; on the other, France. At this time, it may be remarked, Napoleon and France had to sustain the unparalleled efforts of United Europe. In the campaign, a sketch of which is now to be given to

introduce the battle of Dresden, Napoleon was opposed by the united armies of Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Austria ; while, in the Peninsula, the whole force of Spain, Portugal, and the English army under Wellington, were pressing on his legions.

The strategical positions of the two armies at the commencement of the campaign were as follows :—

ALLIES.

A Russo-Prussian army, 200,000 strong, in the neighbourhood of Schweidnitz.

An Austrian army, 130,000 strong, in Bohemia.

A Russo-Prusso-Swedish army, 120,000 strong, under Bernadotte, in the neighbourhood of Berlin.

An army, 80,000 strong, under Walmoden, was in the neighbourhood of Lubeck and Hambourg, observing Davoust, who was occupying those places.

An Austrian army, 25,000 strong, was in the neighbourhood of Lintz.

FRENCH.

The principal French army, 230,000 strong, was cantoning in a triangle, of which Dresden, Gabel, and Lignitz may be said to be the angular points, and was opposed, by its strategical position, to the Russo-Prussian army, 200,000 strong, in the neighbourhood of Schweidnitz, and the Austrian army, 130,000 strong, in Bohemia.

A French army, 70,000 strong, under Oudinot, was in the neighbourhood of Dahme, on the road from Torgau to Berlin, opposed to the Russo-Prusso-Swedish army of 120,000, under Bernadotte.

Davoust, with 80,000, was occupying Hambourg and Lubeck, opposed to Walmoden's army of 30,000, which was observing him.

A Bavarian army of 25,000 was at Munich, and opposed to the Austrian army at Lintz, which it was observing.

A French army, 20,000 strong, under Augereau, was in the neighbourhood of Wurtzberg and Bamberg, sustaining, or rather, as Jomini says, containing, the Bavarian army of 25,000 at Munich ; for Napoleon's allies, whom, before his reverses commenced, he had loaded with advantages,

were already vacillating and untrustworthy, and the time was scarcely two months distant, when before Leipzig, in the middle of the battle, 40,000 Saxons were to pass over to the enemy, leave an unexpected gap in the French line, and turn their guns upon men who had for years been their faithful allies and comrades; and thus not only diminishing the number of Napoleon's army by 40,000, and augmenting that of the Allies by 40,000, so increasing the disparity of numbers by 80,000, but necessarily *ruining dispositions made on the supposition of their fidelity*, and executing the blackest and most profound act of treachery which the military annals of the whole world can produce.

Hence the total number of these allied armies prepared to take the field was 505,000, and according to Jomini they were furnished with 1,800 pieces of artillery.

Obs.—There were besides these armies, the garrisons of the fortresses, the militias, and irregular troops. The English furnished money and arms. They sent field-batteries, with the men to work them, to Bernadotte, and companies organised and instructed to use Congreve rockets, also the park of siege artillery which was used at the siege of Glogau, and 400,000 muskets and 100,000 sabres to put forward the armament of Germany. Jomini, giving as his authority an official statement drawn up by the Prussian Colonel Plotho, asserts that the whole force of the Allies, regular and irregular, amounted to the astonishing number of 810,000. Never were such gigantic efforts made to put an end to the dynasty of any man—a dynasty afterwards twice re-established; the first time by a single march, the second by a trifling skirmish and a few discharges of grape on the Italian Boulevards, and at present existing, ratified by the universal suffrage of France.

Hence, also, the total number of the French armies out of France, prepared to take the field in this campaign, was 350,000, not including the Bavarian army of 25,000; for if these are to be counted on either side, they might more correctly be counted on the side of the Allies. These French armies were furnished with 1,250 pieces of artil-

lery. Besides these armies, there were the garrisons of the places, and corps protecting the communications: and the total number of the French employed out of France in this campaign might be about 410,000.

To compensate to an extent for his numerical inferiority, and inferiority in artillery, Napoleon possessed all the Fortresses and *Têtes-de-Pont* on the Elbe and Oder, north of a line drawn east and west through Theresienstadt, while the Allies had no single fortified point of passage on either river. Napoleon's primary base of operations was of course the Rhine; his second, the Elbe; his third, the Oder.

On the Elbe he possessed—

A very good *tête-de-pont* and fort at Koenigstein, the most southerly fortified point of passage he possessed.

Small entrenched camp at Pirna.

Entrenched camp at Dresden, forming a *tête-de-pont*.

Torgau, Wittenberg, Magdeberg, and Hambourg, all fortresses and *têtes-de-pont*.

On the Oder he possessed, beginning from the south—

Glogau, Kustrin, Stettin, all fortresses and *têtes-de-pont*.

Dresden was the large southern *tête-de-pont* on the Elbe, and therefore a strategical decisive point of the very highest importance, and it is necessary to explain in what state it was. In 1810 the King of Saxony began to demolish the fortifications of Dresden, because he thought it very inconvenient to have a fortified capital. Napoleon had during the armistice partially repaired it, and built round the town, encircling the suburbs, 13 redoubts, 8 on the left bank, and 5 on the right, so that Dresden was a great *tête-de-pont*, formed by a large entrenched camp, and having a very imperfect old and partly destroyed fortress for *réduit*. Occupied by an army proportionate to its extent, Dresden was impregnable, but by a garrison only, or even three divisions, about 25,000 men, "might be carried by the assault of an army of 100,000 in a few hours," at least so said St. Cyr, such was the report of the officer of ordnance, Gourgeaud, whom Napoleon sent to report on the subject, and so thought the Allies. It may be remarked, again, that the direction of the French lines

of operation manifestly rendered Dresden during this campaign a strategical decisive point of the very highest importance; no decisive strategical point ever, perhaps, possessed more importance than Dresden did in this campaign.

The Allies' plan of operations for the campaign was arranged at a diplomatic and military conference at Trachenberg, and was—

1. That 100,000 Russo-Prussians, under Barclay, should leave what was before the main army in the neighbourhood of Schweidnitz, cross Bohemia, join the Austrian army of 130,000 in Bohemia, and together crossing the mountains which form the northern boundary of Bohemia, by the three roads of Toplitz, Marienberg, and Newstadt, descend and operate on the left bank of the Elbe.

2. That in order to avoid reverses on the secondary points, Blucher, who was to command the remaining 100,000 of the main army which was about Schweidnitz, and Bernadotte with his 120,000, should not accept battle when Napoleon himself with the mass of his forces attacked them, but retreat before him, and as soon as Napoleon should not be before them, they should then take the offensive.

This plan of the Allies was a very good one. It applied the principles of Strategy, by operating, as far as possible, on Napoleon's communications, by means of the base of operations formed by the mountains, which are the northern boundary of Bohemia and Moravia, and which was for the Allies in the position of the contending parties a base of one of the most favourable kinds, as explained in the writer's Elementary Treatise on Strategy, and which may be called a parallel and perpendicular base, because such bases are always approximately parallel to the enemy's line of operation, and perpendicular to one's own, that being, in fact, a definition of them. As well it obliged Napoleon to attack the mass of the Allies, because the mass was thus made to operate, as far as possible, on his communications, and it prevented him from applying the Principle III., by throwing his mass on either of the inferior armies, because the mass of the Allies menaced so

much his communications, that he dared not pursue either Blucher or Bernadotte far; and their orders were to retreat ever so far if menaced without accepting battle: and by retaking the offensive when Napoleon was not before them, they would reconquer the country, and it was hoped and expected would apply Principle III. at the same time.

Aug. 12th.—The 100,000 Russo-Prussians, under Barclay, commenced moving from Schweidnitz, though the Armistice did not allow such commencement till the 15th, and in this proceeding they cannot be accused of inconsistency in point of keeping good faith.

Aug. 15th.—Napoleon leaves Dresden and arrives at Zittau.

Aug. 16th.—Blucher, who remained at Silesia with 10,000, seizes on Breslau, and advances towards the Katsbach. The French troops in Silesia are on this day obliged to raise their cantonments, and retire behind the Bober.

Aug. 17th.—Napoleon having made an armed reconnaissance into Bohemia, learns the march of the 100,000 under Barclay through that country to join the Austrian army.

This same day he learns the advance of the remaining 100,000 under Blucher.

And that the army which has now become the main army of the Allies is descending the Elbe, but on which bank they intend to operate he does not learn.

Napoleon in consequence makes the following dispositions:—

St. Cyr, with three divisions, about 24,000 men, remained in Dresden.

Vandame, with three divisions, about 29,000, remained on the road from Gabel to Bautren.

Poniatowski, on the road from Gabel to Gorlitz, with three divisions, about 20,000.

Bellune around Zittau, with 18,000.

Napoleon himself with his mass, in number 140,000, marches rapidly to attack Blucher, endeavouring to apply the Principle III.

Aug. 21st.—Napoleon crosses the Bober.

Blücher retreats to Jauer, refusing battle, according to the plan.

Napoleon leaves Mackdonald with 80,000 to observe him, and with the remaining 60,000 commences his return to the rest of the army under Vandame, Poniatowski, and Bellune, about Zittau and Górlitz.

On this day the Russo-Prusso-Austrian army, in number 230,000, crosses the mountains which bound Bohemia on the north by the three roads, or, more properly speaking, by four, for Schwartzberg got some of his Austrians out towards *Ægra* for no particular reason.

Aug. 23d.—Oudinot is beaten in an indecisive and partial battle by Bernadotte near Gros-Beeren.

Aug. 24th.—Napoleon joins the army about Zittau and Górlitz with his 60,000 men.

Napoleon hesitates whether he should march to the protection of Dresden, or whether he should employ the Elbe, which, supposing Dresden could hold out, would be for him a base of operations of one of the most advantageous kinds; viz. a parallel and perpendicular base, because parallel to the enemy's line of operations when descending the left bank of the Elbe, and perpendicular to his own, and operate from that extremity of it towards the enemy's base by marching on Prague by Jung-Bunzlau. He would perhaps have done this, if he could have been sure that the Allies would not march on and be able to take Dresden, as appears from his instructions to Mackdonald, for in that case he had perhaps greater advantages in operating on their communications than they on his. By marching on Prague, he would have seized immense stores of provisions, arms, and ammunition, and might change his line of operations, taking the Danube as a new base, in accordance with Principle II. Case 3, and thus compel the Allies to operate in the northern part of the theatre of war, in which he held all the most important decisive strategical points, viz. his fortress-*têtes-de-ponts* on the Elbe and Oder, and where, in case of defeat, their destruction was inevitable. Such a proceeding would, too, produce a good *mental* and *psychical* effect (*i.e.* what is

usually termed *moral* effect; why is not known, for the effect is in appearance neither moral, nor the contrary, immoral) on Europe. On the other hand, in case he should march on Prague, and the Allies should take Dresden, and then return and beat him, Mackdonald, who was before Blucher, and the garrisons of the Oder would be lost, and Oudinot and the garrisons of the Elbe would hardly extricate themselves. Nor does his disposable mass appear sufficiently great for the operation; many of the troops were newly levied, and his inferiority in cavalry was very marked.

Aug. 25th.—Barclay, with his Russo-Prussians, who formed the right of the Allies, and had crossed the mountains by the road of Peterswold, arrived before Dresden in the morning. He had then taken four days to march the thirty miles between Hollendorf and Dresden; for the Allies, thanks to the immense efforts Schwartzenberg had made to obtain information, in accordance with Principle XXIV., were, till the morning of the 25th, perfectly ignorant that Napoleon had ever marched towards the Bober, and been 120 miles away from Dresden, and in consequence they had proceeded very slowly, and been very prudent and careful indeed, for they had, ever since the 21st, expected Napoleon to turn up somewhere and attack them. Though Napoleon's march to the Bober was in part within musket-shot of the Austrian frontier, full of custom-house officers, forest-guards, keepers, &c. such was Schwartzenberg's opinion as to the importance of correct information in war, and such the excellence and extent of the organisation he directed as commander-in-chief of the Allies for the purpose of obtaining it, that it was only on the morning of the 25th that the Allies heard, by a despatch from Blucher, that on the 21st Napoleon was with the mass of his army pressing him hard near Goldberg.

On this day, then, the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia, Schwartzenberg, &c., united at ten o'clock in the morning on the heights of Ræknitz, three miles from Dresden, had to decide on what they should do, they having, as it has been said, a few hours previously learned that

Napoleon was absent from Dresden. The Allies had passed through Dresden a few months before, and knew that the fortifications were in great part demolished.

Jomini says that at this time two courses were open to the Allies :—

1. To take up a position on the heights of Dippodiswald, with the right of the line strongest, and the line extending to Gieshibel, a position about nine miles in length, running nearly east and west, and lying to the east of Dippodiswald ; and thus by taking up a position analogous to that of the Russian army at Tarontina, menacing the French line of retreat from Moscow, oblige Napoleon to come and attack them in that strong position.

2. To endeavour to take Dresden by assault before Napoleon returned, and while its care was still committed to a garrison disproportionate to its size.

At the time the Allied Sovereigns and their Generalissimo Schwartzberg had, on the heights of Ræknitz, to determine what course they should pursue, two of St. Cyr's divisions were deployed in line of battle between the Gros Garten and the road to Dippodiswald, outside the entrenched camp, and with their backs turned to it, contrary to the Principle X. Here was then a good opportunity ; and a Russian General* proposed to attack at once, and take the town by assault, instancing the example of Lubeck, which the French had taken under similar circumstances, and not pushed on by aught resembling the advantages success in this case would confer, and stating that little could be lost in the attempt, and success would confer immense advantages. All except Schwartzberg agreed to this, and were willing at once to make the attack ; but though he agreed that the attack should be made, he overruled the matter, stating that it was best to wait for the Austrian army he was bringing by very bad roads, when he might have brought them by good ones, before making it, and put off the attack till four o'clock of the 26th, notwithstanding the opportunity St. Cyr's error presented, and unmindful of Principle XLVI., for thirty good hours, before a man decidedly

* Jomini, Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor Alexander.

superior to Cæsar in rapidity, on the showing of this latter, and not inferior to Hannibal in genius. Such were Schwartzenberg's notions of the value of hours in war.

On this same day, during the whole of which Schwartzenberg is keeping 100,000 men idle before a large entrenched camp occupied by 24,000 men, 16,000 of whom had come out of their fortifications, as if to ask him to overwhelm them, and entering *pêle-mêle* with them, take possession of the place, in the belief that 24,000 men can defend five miles of field fortifications so that it shall be impregnable on all points to an army of 100,000 men, Napoleon determines to march to the defence of Dresden, in consequence of St. Cyr's representations, that if the Allies attacked seriously he should be lost, and those of the ordnance officer Gourgaud he sent to bring him information on the matter.

Aug. 26th.—The Allied army, quietly waiting for Schwartzenberg's magic hour, —for four o'clock in the *afternoon* can hardly be supposed to be a military hour for an assault of this kind,—though already considerably augmented by the Austrians as they arrived, discovered, about one o'clock in the afternoon, by the sight of Napoleon's columns, which were rapidly descending the right bank of the Elbe, and beginning to cannonade their right across the river, near Striesen, three miles from Dresden, that he was arriving with the mass of his forces.

At two o'clock Napoleon's advanced guard is rapidly entering Dresden.

The Emperor Alexander, as soon as he knew, about one o'clock, of the return of Napoleon, (whose columns, as it has been said, began to enter Dresden about two o'clock,) and all others, saw and exclaimed against the absurdity of attacking Dresden after Napoleon had entered it and it had become an entrenched camp garrisoned by an army proportionate to its extent. Schwartzenberg apparently assented, but with the most extraordinary folly violated the Principle XVIII., to apply which properly under the circumstances he had only to take up the position already spoken of at Dippodiswald, determined he would pretend to forget, or delay till too late to countermand the orders

he had sent for attacking the place at four o'clock, and let the attack, now manifestly ridiculous and absurd, take place at that hour precisely. Precisely as the cathedral clock struck four, 120,000 men attacked the entrenched camp, to the great astonishment of every one except Schwartzberg and those in his confidence.

St. Cyr had recognised his fault in not profiting by all the advantages the fortifications conferred upon him ; his divisions were no longer outside the camp, but the columns of attack placed between the redoubts were ready to assail the enemy as soon as he should feel the effects of the fire from the works, and the battalions deployed in line between the works. The two divisions had been withdrawn into the camp the evening of the 25th.

There is nothing interesting in this extraordinary attack. It was made equally along the greater part of the circular frontage presented by the camp south of the Elbe. To attack with 120,000 when the camp was defended by 24,000, of which 16,000 had come out of the camp, was one thing ; to attack with 120,000 when properly defended by Napoleon with 60,000, rapidly increasing to 80,000, was another. The attack failed eminently, and the Allies retired with considerable loss. In the course of the night Napoleon was joined by the rest of his army, and on the morrow there were 110,000 French in Dresden.

Aug. 26th.—Napoleon sends orders to Vandamme to make a demonstration of debouching from Koenigstein on the 27th, in the hopes of furnishing the enemy with an additional inducement to retire by that artifice, and free his communications with France, which their position before Dresden, and the existence of the parallel and perpendicular base forming the northern boundary of Bohemia, menaced too much ; and as well that, in case the Allies were defeated before Dresden, he might be at hand to impede or stop up their easiest, largest, and most important line of retreat.

The portion of the circle passing through the eight redoubts on the south of Dresden, *i.e.* on the left bank of the Elbe, and the side menaced by the Allies, was about concentric with the arc passing through the old *enceinte* of

the place, and at about one mile distant from it. (See plan of the battle, Plan 2.)

Aug. 27th.—On the morning of this day the line of the Allies was formed on a curve round Dresden, the left from the Elbe below the town to the precipitous ravine of Plauen, at a distance of about two miles from the arc of the circle through the redoubts, and the rest of the line, its curvature at first rapidly diminishing and afterwards gradually increasing as it receded from the ravine of Plauen, finished at about one mile from the Elbe above the town, and three and a half miles from the same arc of the circle through the redoubts. It is to be remembered that strategical reasons already induced Napoleon to wish a battle, in order to free his communications.

Then the first thing which strikes the eye, in considering the Allies' position, is the precipitous ravine of Plauen (see PRIN. I. *Case 2*), dividing the left from the centre and right. (See Plan 2.) The second thing, that the village of Plauen is a decisive tactical point, (see Definition 4,) for that if it can be taken possession of, or even if an active attack be made and sustained on that point, then the only point is closed by which troops could pass with sufficient quickness from the centre to cooperate with and support the isolated left. This decisive tactical point (and it may be noticed that a decisive tactical point is a different thing from the decisive point of a field of battle, as appears at once from their definitions, *q. v.*) may therefore be said to be the key of the precipitous ravine of Plauen.

The Allies' line of battle, as it appeared to Napoleon on the morning of the 27th, is approximately represented in the Plan, and painted yellow.

The left, between the precipitous ravine of Plauen and the Elbe below the town, was composed of three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, in number about 26,000 men. Schwartzenberg, contrary to the advice of all, had placed them there for the following reasons which he alleged, "That they were directly closing Napoleon's communications, and that they were there to facilitate the junction of Klénau, who was to arrive by the road from Freyberg with 25,000 men in the evening or the next

day." From the ravine of Plauen towards the right, the Allies' line of battle extended about 6 miles. From the ravine to the three villages inserted on the plan, and, according to the conventions agreed upon for making the plans, and placed in a table just before the plans, painted dark brown, the line was very strongly formed, as may be judged from the fact that it contained about 125,000 men, of whom about 28,000 were cavalry, comprising among them not less than six divisions of cuirassiers. Beyond these villages the line, much weaker, extended about two miles in a direction advancing towards Dresden, and this portion contained about 24,000 men. Having, then, already pointed out that the first thing which would strike any one acquainted with the principles of tactics, in considering the Allies' position, was the precipitous ravine of Plauen, and that village itself the key of the ravine; and the shape of the line, and numbers occupying the different portions of it having been stated; it now remains, by aid of the skeleton plan and verbal description, to put the reader in possession of the remaining essential portions of the Allies' position. The enclosure around the letter D in plan indicates the position of the dilapidated and in great part destroyed *enceinte* of Dresden. The redoubts are inserted in the plan, around this, at about a mile distant. The village of Plauen, and the precipitous ravine of which it is the key, are also introduced in plan, and painted according to the conventions, the precipitous slopes of the ravine being painted light brown.

As to the ground occupied by the centre of the Allies:—From the ravine of Plauen to the three villages which are inserted in the plan, the Allies' line extended about four miles along a very strong position, formed by a ridge of hills called the heights of Ræknitz. This portion must be spoken of as the centre, and the right of it rested on the three villages and eastern slopes of the heights, the left on the ravine of Plauen.

As to the ground occupied by the left:—The portion of the Allies' tactical front between the ravine and the Elbe below the town, was better than the opposing portion of the French tactical front: but the left of the Allies, from

Plauen to the Elbe below the town, could barely be said to have a position at all.

The right, extending for about two miles beyond the three villages, was on weak ground, without undulations.

Having, then, given the essential features of the Allies' position, and the way in which their line, as regards its strength on the different portions of it, was formed on the morning of August 27th, it is now proposed to determine the French offensive decisive point of the field of battle.

Before this, it may be observed that since midnight of the 26th to 27th, torrents of rain had been falling, which still continued, and this, by its effects on the soil and the fire of the infantry, increased very considerably the value of cavalry relatively to infantry.

It appeared certain that, in order to free his communications, Napoleon would soon have to attack the Allies; hence, strategical reasons were influencing his decision to some extent, as it has been said in the chapter on the determination of the decisive point they almost always do, and inducing him to seize an opportunity of taking the offensive, and therefore of choosing an offensive decisive point. It appears at once clear from the five questions given in the chapter on the determination of the decisive point of a field of battle, and the discussion of the subject in the whole of that chapter, that the ground occupied by the portion of the Allies' line between the ravine and the Elbe below the town was the decisive point; for, in attacking on that point alone could a brilliant application of the principles of tactics be made; and in attacking on that point, a fraction of the enemy might be brought into collision with a much greater fraction of the French. (PRIN. III. Case 3.)

To attack on that point was easier than to attack on any other point.

The three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry occupying that point, were directly closing the French communications, and it was a good application of Principle II. Cases 2, 3.

It is quite true that this the French offensive decisive point was not of the very highest order; still, though success

obtained on it would not lead to the great results which success on some offensive decisive points, in some fields of battle, has given,—as, for instance, the heights of Pratzen, which were the French offensive decisive point at Austerlitz,—yet the results which were to be obtained by attacking on it were in compensation certain and success sure. It was quite clear that the heights of Ræknitz, forming a very strong position occupied by 125,000 men, *i.e.* at the rate of 30,000 to a mile, were inattackable for 110,000, who would be obliged to detach about 20,000 at least to contain the Allies' left beyond the ravine, and especially in the state of the ground and weather.

To recapitulate, for the sake of distinctness :—

The Allies' line, as formed on the morning of Aug. 27th, amid torrents of rain, is given in the plan, and painted yellow. The left contained three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, in all about 26,000 men, occupying three miles of ground, which could barely be called a position ; or from 8,000 to 9,000 to a mile. The line from the ravine to the three villages, about four miles in length, and occupying the strong position of Ræknitz, contained about 125,000 men in all, or about 30,000 to a mile, and had among them about 28,000 cavalry ; and the right of this portion of the line rested on the three villages, forming three tactical points, and the eastern slopes of the heights. The portion of the line extending beyond the villages contained 24,000, or 12,000 to the mile, and was formed on weak ground.

Having, then, recapitulated the disposition and nature of the Allies' position, before stating Napoleon's dispositions for attacking them, the faults committed by the Generalissimo of the Allies, Prince Schwartzberg, may be enumerated.

1. Extreme contempt for information, which rendered him absurdly ignorant, under the circumstances, of Napoleon's movements, in opposition to Principle XXIV.

2. Having learned, on the morning of the 25th, that Napoleon was absent from Dresden, which was therefore committed to the care of a small garrison relatively to its size as an entrenched camp, and the garrison being found in the commission of a gross fault in opposition to Prin-

ciple X., and it being decided on, and assented to by himself, that Dresden was in the absence of Napoleon to be attacked, he, in contempt of the Principle XLVI., delayed the attack till four o'clock on the next day, thus deliberately losing thirty hours before Napoleon.

3. When he knew, as early as one o'clock on the 26th, that Napoleon had returned, and that about two o'clock he had begun to enter Dresden, yet, in extreme contempt of Principle XVIII., he at four o'clock attacked an entrenched camp, defended by an army proportionate, and more than proportionate, to its magnitude, when he might have turned the entrenched camp altogether by occupying the position of Dippodiswald, menacing the French communications; and that he did this without having made the requisite preparation to ensure success, having neither the ladders nor fascines necessary to the nature of the assault he meditated, both of which he might most readily have procured.

4. That, having been repulsed in his absurd attack, admitting that the position of Dresden was better for his army than that of Dippodiswald, (though this is not clear,) and not blaming him therefore for remaining before Dresden, he exposed about 26,000 men on his left, beyond the precipitous ravine of Plauen, in opposition to Principle I. Case 2, to all the blows which Napoleon might please to deal them; and that he, moreover, provoked Napoleon to attack them, because they were placed barring the French communications, and this on the pretence that they were to facilitate the junction of 25,000 men under Klénau with the army, who he knew would not arrive before the evening or next day, thus exposing these 26,000 men alone for ten or twelve hours to Napoleon. Neither is it at all clear that this junction was any way put forward by this disposition, for Klénau was coming by the road from Freyberg. If the position of Dresden were occupied at all, he should not have extended his left beyond the precipitous ravine of Plauen.

Aug. 27th.—Napoleon attacked the Allies in the morning. His dispositions for the attack were as follows. He directed five divisions of infantry and Latour Maubourg's

heavy cavalry corps, containing four divisions, on the three divisions of the enemy's infantry and one division of cavalry placed beyond the ravine, directing that the village of Plauen, the decisive tactical point, which was the key of the defile, because the only point by which the left beyond the ravine could receive support, should be seized, or at least attacked with the utmost vigour. Three of the divisions of cavalry were directed towards the centre, and one to turn the extreme left. The line of infantry formed by the five divisions was strongest on its left, in order to seize Plauen and isolate the entire left of the enemy as far as possible, by driving it from the ravine.

From the ravine to the three villages, the corps of Marmont and St. Cyr, with their backs to the entrenched camp, to contain the enemy by repulsing any attacks he might make, and protect *the very numerous artillery which was distributed to contain the enemy along this portion of his line*, and cannonade the enemy's masses on the heights of Ræknitz.

It being impossible to undertake anything against the position of Ræknitz occupied by 125,000 men, the French operations along this portion of their line were confined to a tremendous cannonade to contain the enemy, and render attacks by the Allies along this portion of the French line impossible. It was in this way, viz. by the employment of very powerful batteries to compensate for his numerical inferiority on the portion of the line where he did not intend to strike, that Napoleon applied the Principle V.*

Beyond this Ney, with four divisions of the Young Guard, was to attack the 24,000 men who it has been said continued the Allies' line towards the Elbe above the town on

* There are three principal means by which the enemy may be contained along a portion of his tactical front in accordance with the Principle V. 1. By natural obstacles. 2. By distance or time. 3. By a very augmented fire of artillery. Perhaps the most remarkable example of this latter means is afforded by a battery of 100 pieces of artillery placed together, which Napoleon employed at Wagram to contain the enemy along a portion of his line, by sweeping the plain of Aderklaa, while he attacked on the parts (viz. the centre and left) which seemed good to him. Hence, too, the importance of a very numerous artillery.

the right of the three villages, and advancing towards the town, taking them in flank as far as consistent with his own safety.

These dispositions, as must be expected, appear all that can be desired. It is to be remarked that this is the only battle in which Napoleon attacked on the two wings. This he did consistently with Interior Tactical Lines, because his centre was supported on the entrenched camp.

The position of the French line after Plauen (whose value had not been appreciated by Schwartzenberg, and only imperfectly occupied) had been seized by the French, is painted red in the plan.

All that need be said of the course of the battle now, is that the portion of the Allies' line left of the precipitous ravine of Plauen was taken on its extreme left in flank and reverse by the division of cavalry directed for that purpose; while Murat, who commanded the three divisions directed towards the centre of this isolated left, succeeded in breaking the line shaken by superior numbers of infantry and artillery. The right half of the broken line was driven into the ravine with very great loss; the left half, whose fire was sensibly affected by the violent rain, which never ceased the whole day, pressed upon by Murat's cuirassiers and their horse artillery and almost surrounded, laid down its arms to the number of 10,000. All this time along the centre a tremendous cannonade was going on, and the cavalry of the enemy, in heavy masses to the number of 28,000 behind the centre, suffered considerably from the cannon balls and howitzer shells without being of the slightest use. On the French left Ney advanced and drove back the enemy, who had previously determined if attacked seriously to fall back to the heights of Leibnitz, which formed a *crochet* to the rear with the heights of Ræknitz; and the enemy thus falling back and yielding to the attack, the impetuous Marshal was very near advancing too far, placing the Elbe behind his back, with his flank towards Dresden, and letting the enemy in overwhelming numbers cut him from the rest of his line, and drive him into the river. The Allies did in fact change the front of about one third of their centre, in order to

effect this operation of isolating Ney and driving him into the river, in accordance with Principle II., Case 5, and Principle III., but with the usual confusion when greater attention is not paid to Principle XXXVIII., and there is not a far abler general than Prince Schwartzberg at the head of an army, though the change of front and everything necessary was executed and success seemed to stare them in the face, this operation was abandoned, no one could tell exactly why. At five o'clock the rain, which had been descending in torrents, increased; both parties had long been drenched, and the Allies, who had learned the passage of Vandamme at Koenigstein, determined on retreating. It must however be observed that they were in part induced to this by Schwartzberg confessing that the Austrians were in want of ammunition as they had been unable to bring more up; an amusing confession to the Russians and Prussians, who were not almost in their own territory as the Austrians were, and had contrived to bring sufficient. In these two days before Dresden the Allies lost 30,000 men, including the 10,000 prisoners lost beyond the ravine, and a great quantity of artillery left on the field and taken on the left.

In the pursuit they also lost 200 pieces of artillery and ammunition carriages, with an immense number of wagons of different kinds, and a multitude of stragglers and wounded.

The following account of the battle of Albuera is mainly based on the authority of the account of that battle given in Sir W. Napier's "History of the War in the Peninsula and South of France," and is given in illustration of the Principle I. Case 7; the Principle III.; the Principle III. Case 11; the Principles X. XXIV. XXIX. XLV.; the Maxim I.; the Choice of a Field of Battle; and the Determination of the Decisive Point of a Field of Battle.

ANNO DOMINI 1811.

As soon as Soult, then at the head of the army of Andalusia, and charged with the government of that province, heard that Beresford had appeared at Campo Mayor, a short distance north of Badajos, and intended laying

siege to Badajos, he determined to march to the relief of that fortress, and at the same time apply the Principle III. Wellington being absent with the main army near Almeida, 150 miles away.

May 5th.—The battle of Fuentes Onoro, a place near Almeida, was fought between Wellington and Massena, and both sides claimed the Victory.

May 8th.—Beresford's circle of investment around Badajos was completed.

May 10th.—Sout, in accordance with his determination, quitted Seville, with two strong brigades of Infantry, and 3,000 Heavy Dragoons. The brigades were commanded by Godinot and Werlé.

Sout had previously, by again beginning to work at the fortifications of several places in Andalusia, which had been for some time previously suspended, induced Beresford to suppose that, instead of being about to unite his disposable force into an army, and march with it to apply the Principle III., (which it is to be observed is equally a principle of Strategy and Tactics,) take the offensive and relieve Badajos, he was trembling for the safety of his own province. To recommence these fortifications at this time was to do a thing good in itself, and to do it very *à propos*.

May 11th. Sout enters Olalla.

May 12th. Wellington detached the 3d and 7th divisions, and 2d German Hussars, which the French dispositions subsequent to the battle of Fuentes Onoro had left disposable, and sent them to Beresford. He placed the rest of his army on the Avaza to oppose the army of Marmont, near Salamanca.

Before this day the news of the battle of Fuentes Onoro was known both to Sout and Beresford. Sout has an additional inducement to hasten a battle, because he might expect that in consequence of the French affairs and dispositions after the battle of Fuentes Onoro reinforcements for Beresford would most probably arrive on the Guadiana, so that by attacking as soon as possible, before the reinforcements could arrive, he would be making a further application of Principle III.

Beresford raises the siege of Badajos in consequence of his information as to Soult's advance.

May 13th.—Beresford and the Spanish Generals hold a conference at Valverde, and agree to receive battle in the position of Albuera.

In the night after this day, the artillery was removed from before Badajos.

May 14th.—Soult reached Villa Franca, about thirty miles from Badajos.

May 15th.—Before twelve o'clock all the guns and stores which were before Badajos had been withdrawn to the right bank of the Guadiana; Wellington leaves the Avaza, and starts in all haste for Estremadura, hearing of Soult's advance with a powerful army to take the offensive, and relieve Badajos. Wellington had hitherto been informed by Beresford that Soult was most entirely on the defensive. Before Wellington had arrived, the battle had been fought. The French army is concentrated at Santa Marta, about twenty miles from Badajos, and eight from Albuera. The original force which had started from Seville, had in its march been joined at Olalla and other places by different portions of the French force occupying Andalusia, and destined to form part of the army which was to attack Beresford, defeat him while the main army was in the north of Portugal, and before he could receive reinforcements, and raise the siege of Badajos.

On the morning of this day, the Anglo-Portuguese army occupied the left of the position of Albuera in the following way, the Spanish not having yet arrived. (See Plan 3.)

Alten's German Brigade, painted brown, occupied the village of Albuera, a tactical point in front of the centre of the line of battle.

A battery commanded the bridge.

Behind the village, between the Valverde and Badajos roads, the 2d Division of the British army, formed on one line, occupied the table land forming the crest of the hill, and is painted light red.

On the left of the 2d Division of the British, the Portugese, formed in line of battle on two rows, occupied the crest of the position, and are painted light purple.

The line of battle so formed was about $1\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile in length.

The left of the Albuera ridge, broader and higher than the rest, was left for the Spanish to occupy when they should arrive, because Beresford considered the hill between the Valverde and Badajos roads to be his defensive decisive point of the field of battle.

The Anglo-Portuguese army being then in their line of battle thus formed, which can be readily recognised in the plan by its description, about three o'clock of the afternoon of this day the whole mass of the Allied cavalry, followed closely by the French light horse, came in from Santa Marta.

Beresford, in consequence, constructs a temporary right wing with the Cavalry and Artillery on the ground which the Spaniards were to occupy when they arrived, viz. the ground occupied in plan by the parallelograms which are left unpainted, and are shaded and white at alternate intervals. At this time, that is, after the cavalry had come in, there were of the Allies 16,000 men in line of battle.

Beresford sends officers to hasten Blake's movements, but that general, though he had promised to be in line at twelve o'clock at noon, did not, though he had only a few miles of good road to march, arrive till eleven at night, and his rear not till three o'clock of the morning of the 16th.

Beresford sends at same time to Cole and Madden to come with all haste.

From the time that the mass of the cavalry coming from Santa Marta crossed the Albuera, and formed the temporary right wing, there was not a single man of the Allies on the right bank of the Albuera. Beresford stretched his piquets along the road to Almendral, and the heights on the right bank of the Albuera, which were woody, were abandoned altogether to the enemy. This was contrary to Principle XXIV.

On the evening of this day, (the 15th,) Soult, without hindrance, reconnoitres the Allies' position while his army is arriving behind the hills and woods on the right bank of the Albuera.

This is then the place where the configuration of the position and field of battle chosen by the Allies has with the assistance of the plan to be put before the reader, and their choice of a field of battle discussed in exemplification of Chapter III.

1st.—To put the position and field of battle before the reader.

The Albuera position (see Plan 3) is formed by a ridge of hills, about five miles in length, lying between the Rivers Albuera and Aroya.

The slopes of the position are easy, and suited to the operations of cavalry and artillery.

The table land on the crest of the ridge of hills on the wing of the ridge towards Almendral, is broader than the table land on the crest at any other part of the ridge, (see plan,) and is not less than three quarters of a mile in breadth. This same table land on the wing of the ridge towards Almendral is also higher than any other part of the ridge, a slope separating it from the adjacent table land occupied first by the temporary right wing of the Allies, formed of cavalry and artillery, and afterwards by the Spanish when they arrived.

The river Albuera and the Feria rivulet are both everywhere fordable in all parts of them which are represented in the plan; that is, in all parts of them which have to do with the field of battle. Attention has to be called to the hill running up into the angle between the Albuera and Feria rivulet and the woody heights on the right banks of the Albuera and Feria.

The Allies' only line of retreat was by the Valverde road, which runs across the ridge on the right of the 2d British Division. Through this the only line of retreat lies at first, as it leaves the ridge behind the centre of the Allies, yet an early change in its direction brings it soon in rear of the broad table land on the wing of the ridge towards Almendral. The remaining features are the bridge, whose position is indicated by the road to Santa Marta, which passes over it; and the village of Albuera, the only tactical pivot the position of the Allies possessed.

The Allies, though as it has been said they had de-

terminated on the 13th to receive battle in the position of Albuera, had neglected to raise a single field-work to protect their flanks or otherwise strengthen their position; a culpable neglect of Principle X.

Next, to consider the excellence of the field of battle chosen by the Allies, by means of and in exemplification to Chapter III.

Referring to that Chapter, it will be seen that regard being paid to the two preceding premises there stated, there are 12 principal requirements in a good field of battle, on the supposition of an approximate equality of each of the three arms in both armies; and these are followed by 3 principal modifications in the case of a superiority of each of the three arms in either army. Let the field of battle chosen by the Allies be considered in conjunction with each of the 12 requirements and each of the 3 modifications taken in order.

Referring to the requirements in Chapter III.

Requirement 1. Allies' field of battle satisfactory.

Req. 2. Admitting that in consequence of the existence of the Albuera this requirement is moderately though anything but markedly satisfied, supposing the French to assume every other of the tactical fronts they might assume in order to attack the Allies, yet, supposing it practicable for them to form their line of battle across the broadest part of the table land on the wing of the ridge towards Almendral, perpendicular to the Allies' line of battle, which table land was not less than three quarters of a mile wide, and the highest part of the ridge, separated from the table land, occupied first by the temporary right wing of cavalry and artillery and afterwards by the Spanish, by a slope, and would with its slopes and the plain of the Aroya admit the formation of a line of battle two and a half miles long, and thus assume a tactical front in order to engage the Allies, the requirement would in this case be wholly unsatisfied.

Req. 3. If the French attack in front, the requirement is satisfied; if they attack simultaneously on the centre and one wing, in accordance with Principle I. Case 7, the requirement is satisfied better if the French choose the left wing than the right: but if they form their line of

battle perpendicular to the Allies' beyond its right flank across the broadest part of the table land in the way spoken of above, then the French, being on the highest ground of all, could see every movement made by the Allies along the rear of their position, while the French movements along their rear would be concealed; and certainly the first thing which would strike an enemy wishing to attack the Allies' line of battle would be the existence of the position above spoken of, along which he ought, if practicable, to form his line of battle perpendicular to their right flank, before they could execute a change of front and dispositions, a position too which, with a singular absence of foresight, they had evidently from their manner of occupying the position of Albuera paid no attention to.

Req. 4. Beresford having, on the afternoon of the 15th, retired entirely to the left bank of the Albuera, and stretched his piquets along the Almendral road, the hill in the angle of the Albuera and Feria, and the woody heights on the right banks, were such that Beresford "could not see a man nor draw a sound conclusion as to the real plan of attack." * The field of battle then, as far as this requirement is concerned, was most unsatisfactory. It is to be observed here, how much Beresford neglected the Principle XXIV. No man was ever so remarkable as Napoleon for the excellence and frequency of his armed Strategical and Tactical reconnaissances; and no man less frequently abandoned a position or post, if it could be maintained reasonably and he expected that its maintenance would confer valuable information as to the enemy's plans and movements.

Req. 5. The line of retreat by the Valverde road was in itself, in point of size, &c. satisfactory.

Req. 6. It is true that the Allies' single line of retreat, the Valverde road, lay at first, as it left the ridge, *behind the centre and least attackable part* of the Allies' position; but its direction turning, it came to be seriously menaced by the reverse slopes of the *most attackable part*, viz. the broad and high table land beyond the right of the Allies.

* All sentences or paragraphs between inverted commas, in this account of the battle of Albuera, are taken from Sir W. Napier's Peninsular War.

Req. 7. The Allies' army was so slow and cumbrous, from its composition of three different nations, and *one of them Spanish*, relatively to Soult's French, that this requirement, whether satisfactory or not, was of no great moment.

Req. 8. Neither flank had any tactical pivots protecting it. And so far from the right flank having slopes down which artillery might fire in all directions towards the front and flank to the full extent of its range, the right flank rests beneath the foot of a gentle slope at right angles to it, and nearly $1\frac{1}{4}$ mile long, from the top of which artillery might enfilade the line.

Req. 9. Not satisfactory, for the French making their dispositions in secret, which the voluntary abandonment of the hill between the Albuera and Feria enabled them to do, might be in battle perpendicular to the right flank before the necessary counter-movements could be made.

Req. 10. Not satisfactory.

Req. 11. The field of battle possessed one tactical pivot, the village of Albuera; and this was, as all tactical pivots generally are, good; it was, however, so situated that it does not interfere with the enemy's main attack.

Req. 12. Satisfactory, if the French attack in front or on the left flank; very unsatisfactory, if they form their line of battle across the broadest part of table land on right flank.

For the three modifications.

These may be taken together. The Allies were, as they almost invariably were during the whole of the war in the Peninsula, very inferior in cavalry and inferior in artillery both as to weight of metal and number of guns; and as consequently they might have fully expected they would be on this occasion, they ought therefore to have selected a position favourable to infantry, in which their advantage lay, and unfavourable to the manœuvres of cavalry and artillery, and which therefore possessed the characteristics of configuration recommended under the circumstances (*viz.* inferiority of cavalry and artillery and superiority of infantry) in Chapter III. As it has been already said, they did, on the contrary, choose a position whose slopes are favourable to the evolutions of cavalry

and artillery. If it be objected,—This might be the best position they could find to fight on; the answer is,—It is generally admitted that it was a gross absurdity to fight at all under the strategical circumstances, so they were not driven to find a position at all.

Also the ridge of Albuera, more than five miles in length, was far too large for a comparatively slow and cumbrous army of some 35,000 men, for the Allies could hardly expect to put more and did not put so many in line in face of the very active and compact army Soult commanded.

The whole force which Soult knew he could bring up in the course of the evening and night, and with which the battle of Albuera was fought on the morrow, consisted of 19,000 Infantry, 4,000 Cavalry, 40 Guns. The total number of the French was then under 24,000. The Infantry consisted of three divisions. Two of these, containing each about 6,000 men, formed the 5th Corps d'Armée, commanded by Girard. The remaining division consisted of two strong Brigades of about 3,500 men each; the one Brigade commanded by Godinot, the other by Werlé. The heavy Cavalry was commanded by Latour Maubourg; the Artillery by Rutty.

Soult, having made his reconnaissances on the evening of the 15th, determines that, unless the dispositions of the Allies change in the course of the night,—

1. His offensive decisive point of the field of battle is the wing of the ridge towards Almendral, occupied by the broad and high table land, and extending as far towards Albuera as the middle of the ground or table land which the Spanish line occupied on the morrow, and which Spanish line, formed on two rows, is indicated in the plan by the two unpainted parallelograms shaded and white at intervals.

2. That before attacking, he will place his mass in line of battle across the broadest part of the table land on the Almendral wing of the Albuera ridge, and therefore across the right flank of the Allies' line of battle and perpendicular to it.

3. That under cover of the night, and of the hill running up into the angle between the Albuera and Feria

rivulet and of the woods, he *can* place his army so that the mass can be formed in line of battle in the required position across the right flank of the Allies' line of battle, about twenty minutes after the Allies' would be enabled to judge his manœuvre.

Accordingly, in the course of the night, he disposes his army in the following position ready for the morning, which will readily be learned from the plan and following description :—

Soult's army in this position is coloured *light yellow* in the plan, and the whole French army in this position will therefore be at once recognised by its colour.

It has been said that Soult determined to place his mass behind the hill between the Albuera and Feria. This mass consisted of thirty of his forty guns, the whole 5th Corps d'Armée about 12,000 men, and of Latour Maubourg's heavy cavalry, in all about 15,000 men. The position of the heavy cavalry on the extreme left of the French line, and of the 5th Corps d'Armée behind the hill, will at once be recognised.

Next to the 5th Corps d'Armée, proceeding towards the right along the French line, the Brigade of Werlé was placed on the opposite bank of the Feria; next to this brigade the light cavalry mass; and next, proceeding to the right, the Brigade of Godinot, to which the remaining ten guns were attached. On the right of Godinot, some squadrons of cavalry formed the extreme right and completed the line. The positions of all these will readily be recognised in the plan.

To see what took place in the Allies' lines during the night :—

May 15th.—At eleven o'clock P.M. Blake's Spaniards began to arrive.

May 16th.—At three o'clock A.M. Blake's rear arrived.

Blake's Spaniards formed in line of battle on the table-land allotted them, on the right of the Allies' line.

May 16th.—Between eight and nine o'clock A.M. Cole arrives.

The Spanish with him joined Blake's Spaniards on the right, and the Spanish, now formed in line of battle on two

rows, are indicated in the plan by the two parallelograms alternately dark and shaded.

Two squadrons of Portuguese cavalry which Cole brought joined the rest of Otway's Portuguese cavalry, and were placed in advance of the extreme left, where they may be seen in plan painted light purple.

The principal mass of the Allies' cavalry which had formed the temporary right wing, having ceded the ground it had occupied to the Spanish, was placed behind the centre and near the Valverde-road ; it is painted light red.

Two Brigades of the 4th Division, the one British, and called the Fusileer Brigade, the other Portuguese, were drawn up in columns in rear of the left flank of the 2d Division on the opposite side of the Aroya, and near the Badajos road ; the British Brigade is painted light red, the Portuguese light purple.

The reader is then in possession of the Allies' line of battle, as formed on the morning of May 16th.

This, then, the first position of the Allies' line given in plan, may therefore be readily picked out, for all bodies painted light red in plan are the British in this position, and all bodies painted light purple are the Portuguese in this position, and the alternately white and shaded parallelograms the Spanish, while the brown are Allen's Germans occupying Albuera.

It becomes necessary to explain the colouring adopted in the plan for the troops of the different nations, because the convention in the table preceding the plates gives sufficient instructions only when each of the two armies is composed of a single nation.

The 1st Position of French given is, as it has been said, painted light yellow.

The 2d Position of French is painted dark yellow.

The 1st Position of British, light red ; 2d, dark red ; 3d, dark lake.

The 1st Position of Portuguese, light purple ; 2d, dark purple. It is only necessary to give a 3d Position to one Portuguese Brigade, viz. the Portuguese Brigade of the 4th Division ; the 3d Position of this Brigade is left white.

The 1st Position of Spaniards, unpainted parallelograms,

alternately white and shaded ; 2d, parallelograms entirely shaded ; 3d, entirely black.

Germans, brown.

The 1st positions of all the Allied nations were contemporaneous, and form one line of battle, and were also contemporaneous with 1st position of the French.

The 2d positions of all the Allied nations may be considered as approximately contemporaneous, and formed a position during the battle, and may be considered as also contemporaneous with the 2d position of the French.

The 3d positions of the British and Spanish were contemporaneous with the 3d position of the Portuguese Brigade above referred to, and with the 2d of the rest of the Portuguese, (for the latter, with the exception of the Brigade, had not moved, while the two former had,) and with the 2d position of the French.

The composition of the Allies' army with which this battle was fought was as follows :—

About 7,000 British Infantry, and 23,000 Infantry, Spanish, Portuguese, and German, in all 30,000 Infantry. From 2,000 to 3,000 Cavalry. Artillery, 38 pieces.

Hence it will be seen, that about 16,000 men had come into line in the course of the night since Soult made his reconnaissance, for it was said there were only 16,000 in line at that time. The total force of the Allies with which the battle was fought was about 34,000 to 35,000.

The Allies' line being, then, thus formed in the 1st position given in plan, between eight and nine o'clock on the morning of May 16th, Soult has to make a new reconnaissance, determine *whether the offensive decisive point he had decided on the evening before is still his offensive decisive point ; whether his army has, during the night, been well placed, and the plan of attack he had conceived still the best which can be devised. He has also to decide whether his offensive decisive point is a sufficiently good one, the Allies being found in as bad a position as he could hope to place them in the time which Strategical Reasons allow him, by manœuvring with his active army, either by his right or left, on either flank of the Allies.*

This then is the place to discuss the determination of the

French offensive decisive point of the field of battle, the Allies being now in their 1st position in line of battle. It has first, however, to be observed, that the Spanish having been placed in position during the night on the Allies' right, their right wing was now still closer to Soult's mass hid behind the hill, which mass was within a quarter of an hour's march of the right flank of the Allies.

Let it be considered that there are three points which have pretensions to being the French offensive decisive point of the field of battle, viz. three equal portions, which may be called the two wings and centre, each in length one mile and a third, and making up the Albuera ridge to the extent of two miles on each side the Valverde road; it is now proposed, by means of the five principal questions given in that Chapter, and their subordinate component questions, to determine between them.

In reply to the Principal Question I., and its subordinate questions, it may be answered,—

That by forming the line of battle across the broadest part of the highest table land, on the right wing of the Albuera position, perpendicular to the Allies' line of battle, and attacking thus with the utmost vigour and rapidity, a much more brilliant application of the Principles of Tactics is made than if the attack be directed on the centre or remaining wing of the position, for Principle III. and Principle III. Case 11 especially, are applied, because the mass of the French will be brought successively into collision with fractions of the enemy; for if an army can by any means form its line of battle perpendicularly to an extremity of the line of battle of the enemy, and attack vigorously, bringing the wings forward, and advancing rapidly along the enemy's line, and rolling it up, it is perfectly clear that the mass of the army is always engaged with a fraction of the enemy, until such time as *the whole of the enemy* shall have executed a change of front, which cannot be effected under such circumstances before a very considerable time has elapsed, if at all, and before which time the enemy will, in all probability, be ruined: in fact, the wing attacked will probably be ruined before the centre and opposite wing have been able to fire a shot, especially

if the line of battle be long, and they in turn, attacked by the advancing mass of the army, discouraged by the defeat and impeded by the remnants of their wing, will probably share its fate.

In reply to the Principal Question II. and its subordinates, it may be replied, answering the four subordinates in order,—

1. There is no tactical defensive line, or tactical obstacles, or tactical pivots, protecting and supporting the point; for though the Albuera, between the hill behind which the mass of the French are hid and the Almendral wing of the position, were considered a natural tactical defensive line, yet it is wholly abandoned by the Allies. Before the centre and remaining third, the Albuera not only forms a larger natural tactical defensive line, because lower down its course, but a line too which is defended.

2. The Almendral third is most inadequately and feebly occupied by the Allies, who have not attached to the point the importance which it deserves, and have directed their dispositions and strength to the defence of another point, viz. the centre of the position occupied by the Allies' line, which it is not to the interest of the French to attack.

3. The selection of the field of battle by the Allies was not in accordance with the relative composition of the two armies..

4. The Allies had mistaken and neglected their defensive decisive point.

Hence the attack on the Almendral third was much easier than that on either of the other two-thirds.

In reply to the Principal Question III. and its subordinates, it may be answered,—

That the Almendral third having been seized by the French, they would, in all probability, be in a position to make a subsequent good application of the principles, certainly a far better application than if they had seized either the central or remaining third, to the defence of which the Allies had directed their dispositions; and, having seized the Almendral third, they would, in all probability, be in a position to apply the Principle III., and especially the Principle III. Case 11, if the seizure of this third were made with

the vigour and rapidity which the Principle XIV. indicates. When an army is so happy as to be able to direct its attack on the flank of its enemy, then the utmost rapidity and vigour are to be employed; then are seconds precious, and the enemy is to be beaten before he can have time to right himself. An army in a line of battle three miles long (this being the length of the Allies' line, from the left of the Portuguese to the right of the Spaniards) does not so readily execute a change of front during the course of a vigorous flank attack, and find a new position on which to form a new line of battle to resist the enemy.

In reply to the Principal Question IV., it may be answered,—

That supposing the Almendral third to have been seized upon, the configuration of ground of the new position is very good, for a slope downwards separates the broadest part of the table land from the table land occupied by the Spaniards. Along the top of this slope French batteries might be placed, and as well, the new line of battle which the ground allows the French to form is longer than that which it presents to the Allies, and yet not at all out of proportion to the numbers of the French.

In reply to the Principal Question V., it may be answered,—

That the possession of the Almendral third, owing to the change of direction in the Allies' single line of retreat, the Valverde road, bringing it in rear of the Almendral third, operates more on the Allies' line of retreat than that of either of the two remaining thirds.

Soult, having made his brief reconnaissance, determined that his offensive decisive point of the field of battle remained unchanged, that it was that part spoken of as the Almendral third, that his army had been well placed during the night, and that no better opportunity could be expected to be obtained by manœuvring on the right or left of the Allies with his active army. He therefore determines to attack at once, persisting in the plan of attack, for the execution of which plan he had disposed his men during the night in the way already given, and which plan was as follows:—

Godinot with his Brigade, preceded by the ten guns attached to it, is to issue from the wood, follow the dotted tactical line indicated in plan, force the passage of the Albuera, take the village of Albuera, and hinder the Allies, as far as may be, from executing a change of front, or moving reinforcements from their left to their right. And another, and perhaps the most important, object to be obtained by this movement of Godinot's Brigade, was to make the Allies think that the French attack was to be directed on their centre, and thus hinder them from looking after their right flank where the real attack was to develop itself.

Soult at the same time, with the 5th Corps d'Armée, Latour Maubourg's heavy cavalry, and the remaining thirty guns, is to follow the tactical lines drawn in plan, and assume the new position painted dark yellow. Latour Maubourg's heavy cavalry, as will be seen in plan, is to move on the left flank of the 5th corps on the outside portion of a circle, and form on the reverse slope of the Albuera ridge, and in the valley of the Aroya.

Werlé, with his Brigade, is to follow the tactical line dotted in plan, at first following Godinot, to give the Allies the idea that the main attack was to be made on their centre, and that they might expect the whole French army to issue from their concealment in échelons, the right in advance; then, as soon as Godinot should have engaged the Allies about the bridge and village, to leave a single battalion as a reserve to Godinot, and returning along the dotted tactical line in figure, drawn from the 1st position of his Brigade, mount the hill in rear of the 5th Corps d'Armée to which he was to be a reserve.

The light cavalry mass was to follow the dotted tactical line drawn from its first position in figure, and, sweeping round the rear of the 5th Corps d'Armée, unite with Latour Maubourg's heavy horsemen. It was to leave some squadrons to watch the Allies' cavalry, and connect the attacks.

The squadrons of cavalry, which were on the extreme right of the 1st French Position, were to proceed down the river below the bridge, following the tactical line

drawn from their first position, and observe the position of the Allies' cavalry in advance of the left of the Portuguese. It now remains to describe the course of the battle.

May 16th.—At 9 o'clock, A. M., Godinot emerged from the wood in one heavy column, preceded by his ten guns, and acted in accordance with the plan of battle. He made for the bridge, and attempted, by a sharp cannonade and fire of musketry, to force the passage of the bridge. He was flanked on the left by the light cavalry. General Briché led the two hussar regiments, which formed the extreme right of the French, according to the plan of battle, down the river below the bridge, to flank his right, observe the Portuguese cavalry which were under Otway, and may be seen in plan on the opposite bank. The French Lancers, forming part of the Light Cavalry mass at present in advance, and flanking Godinot's right, crossed the river above the bridge. The 3d dragoon guards drove the lancers to their own side. Dickson's Portuguese guns, opening from a rising ground above the village, ploughed Godinot's column, which, with extreme absurdity, crowded to the bridge, though the river was, as it has been said, fordable above and below. Werlé follows Godinot. Beresford, observing that Werlé does not follow Godinot closely, judges that the chief effort would be on the right.

Beresford makes, in consequence, the following dispositions:—He sends orders to Blake to form his Spaniards at right angles to his present front, across the broadest part of the table land, on the Almendral wing of the position.

He brings the Portuguese from the left to the centre, sends one brigade to support Alten at the bridge, and places the rest in columns of battalions as a general reserve. The Portuguese in their new position, in consequence of these orders, *i. e.* their second position, are painted dark purple, and will readily be recognised in plan. He sent the two Brigades of the 4th Division, the one British, the other Portuguese, along the tactical line, drawn from their first position in figure to the new position in figure, where the British Brigade (which was called the Fusileer Brigade) is, according to what has been

agreed upon, painted dark red, and the Portuguese Brigade dark purple.

He sends the three Brigades (Colborne's, Houghton's, and Abercrombie's) of the 2d Division along the tactical lines drawn from them in plan, to the support of Blake. These three brigades of the 2d Division are represented on their march in the plan; and this being the second position in which they are represented, they are coloured dark red. He posts the 13th Dragoon Guards near the river above the bridge, where they may be seen in plan dark red.

He sends the Cavalry mass under Lumley, and the horse artillery along the tactical line, drawn from their first position in plan to their second position on the left bank of the Aroya, where they may be seen in plan coloured dark red.

Blake refused to execute Beresford's orders, conveyed to him by Colonel Hardinge, stating, with great heat, that the real attack was at the village and the bridge; he was a second time entreated to obey, but remained obstinate, till Beresford arrived in person, and then only assented because the columns of the 5th Corps d'Armée, which had followed the tactical line assigned to them in Soult's plan, had mounted the hill, and were actively menacing his flank. Blake, however, yielding to this evidence, began changing his front with such pedantic slowness that Beresford, impatient of his folly, took the command in person.

Great was the confusion and delay thus occasioned, and ere the troops were completely formed, the French were among them; for, ere half-an-hour had elapsed from the commencement of Godinot's movement, the French had assumed the position indicated by the *dark yellow* bodies in the plan, and two-thirds of the whole French army—in number 15,000 men—were in a compact line of battle on the right flank of the Allies, while they, composed of different nations, were executing a disorderly change of front, and Werlé, with his Brigade, was already beginning to mount the hill in the rear of the 5th Corps d'Armée, the thirty guns, and Latour Maubourg's heavy

cavalry, to form the reserve,—for Werlé had acted in accordance with Soult's plan of battle; and as soon as Godinot had engaged the Allies at the bridge and village, leaving a single battalion as a reserve for Godinot, countermarched with the rest of his brigade to mount the hill, in rear of the 5th Corps d'Armée. The light cavalry mass, too, leaving, in accordance with Soult's plan of battle, some squadrons to connect the attacks, and keep the 13th Dragoons in check, and sweeping round the rear of the 5th Corps d'Armée, joined Latour Maubourg's horsemen in the plain of the Aroya. By the time the French were among them, the Spanish were, in a disorderly manner, changing their front, and occupying their second position given in the plan, and which it was agreed to represent by parallelograms entirely shaded.

Vainly Beresford tried to get the Spanish line farther advanced, to make room on the broad table land for the 2d Division, now advancing to support it: "the French guns opened, their infantry threw out a heavy musketry fire, and their cavalry outflanking the front, and menacing different points, put the Spaniards into disorder; they fell fast, and went back. Soult thought the whole army was yielding; he pushed forward his columns, his reserves mounted the hill behind him, and Rutty placed all the French batteries in position."

It is here to be observed, that the French batteries never advanced during the whole battle farther than the position of the front row of the nine dark yellow parallelograms which indicate the 5th Corps d'Armée.

By this time General Stewart, with the brigade of the 2d Division under Colborne, arrived at the foot of the slope, which has been already said to separate the table land, now occupied by the French line of battle, from that occupied by the Spanish in their first position. Colborne, seeing the confusion above, desired Stewart to form in line of battle previous to mounting the slope; but Stewart "led up in columns of companies, passed the Spanish right, and endeavoured to open a line by succession of battalions, as they arrived. The enemy's fire was found too destructive to be borne passively, and the foremost

troops charged; but then heavy rain obscured the view, four regiments of French hussars and lancers galloped in from the right at the moment of advancing, and two-thirds of the brigade went down; the 31st Regiment alone, being on the left," had time to form square and resist; this they did, "while the French horsemen, riding furiously about, trampled the others, and captured six guns. The tumult was great; a lancer fell upon Beresford, who, being a man of great strength, put aside the lance, and cast him from his saddle; and then a shift of wind blowing aside the smoke and mist, Lumley perceived the mischief from the plain below, and, sending four squadrons up against the straggling lancers, cut many of them off. Penne Villemur's Spanish cavalry were also directed to charge the French horsemen in the plain, and they galloped forwards till within a few yards of their foes, but then shamefully fled. During this first unhappy effort of the 2d Division, so great was the disorder that the Spaniards in one part fired without cessation, though the British troops were before them in another part, and flying before the lancers; they would have broken through the 29th, then advancing to succour Colborne, but with a stern resolution that regiment smote friends and foes, without distinction, in its onward progress. Meanwhile Beresford, finding the main body of the Spaniards would not advance, seized an ensign by the breast, and bore him and his colours by main force to the front; yet the troops did not follow, and the coward ran back when released from the marshal's iron grasp. In this crisis the weather, which had ruined Colborne's brigade, saved the day. Soult could not see the whole field of battle, and kept his heavy columns inactive when the decisive blow might have been struck."*

* Up to the time that Colborne's brigade was ruined, the French had by far the best of it, and at this time they had by far the best position; their line of battle, too, was far more orderly and compact, for, from the time that two-thirds of Colborne's brigade went down till, after great doubt, confusion, and loss of time, the British, in the way which will be stated, got into their 3d position, in which they are painted dark lake, and the Portuguese brigade of the 4th division, into their 3d position, where they are seen in plan left white, and thus formed a line of battle, which will be recognised in plan, the Allies' line of battle was so discontinuous and unconnected that it could hardly be called a line of battle at all. It was

Soult's "cavalry, indeed, began to hem in that of the Allies, yet the fire of the horse artillery enabled Lumley, covered as he was by the bed of the Aroya, and supported by the 4th Division, to check them on the plain; Colborne still remained on the height with the 31st Regiment," (which, it will be remembered, had formed square, and resisted the lancers,) "the British artillery, under Julius Hartman, was fast coming into action, and William Stewart, who had escaped the charge of the lancers, was again mounting the hill with Houghton's Brigade" (2d Division), "which he brought on with equal vehemence, but in a juster order of battle. The day then cleared, and a dreadful fire poured into the thickest of the French columns, convinced Soult that the fight was yet to be won. Houghton's regiments reached the height under a heavy cannonade, and the 29th, after breaking through the fugitive Spaniards, was charged in flank by the French lancers; but two companies wheeling to the right foiled this attack with a sharp fire, and then the 3d Brigade of the 2d Division" (Abercrombie's) "came up on the left, and the Spanish troops, under Zayas and Ballesteros, at last moved forward. Hartman's artillery was now in full play, and the enemy's infantry recoiled, but, soon recovering, renewed the fight with greater violence than before. The cannon on both sides discharged showers of grape at half range, the peals of musketry were incessant, often within pistol shot, yet the close formation of the French embarrassed their battle, and the British line would not yield them an inch of ground or a moment of time to open their ranks. Their fighting was, however, fierce and dangerous. Stewart was twice wounded, Colonel Duckworth was slain, and the

during this period that Soult, availing himself of the compactness and order of his line of battle, and the total want of connexion, and presence of confusion in the Allies' line, ought to have made a determined, rapid, vigorous, and connected advance along the whole of his tactical front, advancing his artillery to the top of the slope. To do this it would have perhaps been best if he had formed the first row of his line of battle of battalions deployed in lines, and kept the second row in semi-profound columns of attack. The powerful musketry fire of his front line, with the thirty guns placed in it, would have to almost a certainty secured him the power of rapidly advancing, placing his guns on the top of ridge, and, by again advancing, the victory.

intrepid Houghton, having received many wounds without shrinking, fell, and died in the very act of cheering on his men. Still the struggle continued with unabated fury. Colonel Inglis, 22 officers, and more than 400 men, out of 570 who had mounted the hill, fell in the 57th alone; the other regiments were scarcely better off, not one-third were standing in any, and as the English fire slackened, a French column was established in advance on the right flank. The play of the guns checked them for a moment, but in this dreadful crisis Beresford wavered! Destruction stared him in the face, his personal resources were exhausted, and the unhappy thought of a retreat arose in his agitated mind. He had before," as it has been said, "brought Hamilton's Portuguese into a situation to cover a retrograde movement; he now sent Alten orders to abandon the bridge and village of Albuera, and to take with his Germans and the Portuguese artillery, a position to cover the retreat by the Valverde road. But while the commander was thus preparing to resign the contest, Colonel Hardinge had urged Cole to advance with the 4th Division, and then riding to the 3d Brigade of the 2d Division" (Abercrombie's), which had hitherto only been slightly engaged, directed him also to push forward into the fight. The die was thus cast; Beresford acquiesced, Alten received orders to retake the village, and this terrible battle was continued. "The 4th Division," it has been already said, "was composed of two Brigades,* one of Portuguese, under General Harvey, the other under Sir William Myers, consisting of the 7th and 23d regiments, was called the Fuzileer Brigade: Harvey's Portuguese were immediately pushed on between Lumley's Dragoons and the hill," (they are in plan not painted, but left white,) "where they were charged by some French cavalry whom they beat off, and meantime Cole led his Fuzileers up the contested height. At this time six guns were in the enemy's possession; the whole of Werlé's reserves were coming forward to reinforce the front column of the French; the remnant of Houghton's Brigade could no

* It had a 3d Brigade, which was on march by Jerumenha, and was not present at the battle.

longer maintain its ground; the field was heaped with carcasses; the lancers were riding furiously about the captured artillery on the upper parts of the hill; and behind all, Hamilton's Portuguese and Alten's Germans, now withdrawing from the bridge, seemed to be in full retreat. Soon, however, Cole's Fuzileers, flanked by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion, under Colonel Hawkshawe, mounted the hill, drove off the lancers, recovered five of the captured guns and one colour, and appeared on the right of Houghton's brigade precisely as Abercrombie passed it on the left."

The position of the British at this moment is given in the plan, coloured dark lake; Houghton's remnants, and Colborne's 31st regiment in the centre; Cole's brigade, whose tactical line is drawn in plan, is on the right, and Abercrombie's brigade is on the left; Lumley, with the cavalry and horse-artillery, had advanced somewhat; the Portuguese brigade of the fourth division is left white.

"Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke and rapidly separating itself from the confused and broken multitude, startled the enemy's masses, which were increasing and pressing onwards as to an assured victory; they wavered, hesitated, and then vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their front, while a fearful discharge of grape from all their artillery whistled through the British ranks. Myers was killed, Cole and the three colonels, Ellis, Blakeney, and Hawkshawe, fell wounded, and the fuzileer battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled and staggered like sinking ships; but suddenly and sternly recovering they closed on their terrible enemies, and then was seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldier fights. In vain did Soult with voice and gesture animate his Frenchmen, in vain did the hardest veterans break from the crowded columns, and sacrifice their lives to gain time for the mass to open out on such a fair field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and, fiercely striving, fire indiscriminately upon friends and foes, while the horsemen hovering on the flank threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined

valour, no nervous enthusiasm weakened the stability of their order; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front, their measured tread shook the ground, their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation, their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as slowly and with a horrid carnage it was pushed by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserves mix with the struggling multitude to sustain the fight; their efforts only increased the irremediable confusion, and the mighty mass, breaking off like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the steep; the rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood, and eighteen hundred unwounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill!

“While the fuzileers were striving on the height, the cavalry and Harvey’s brigade continually advanced, and Latour Maubourg’s dragoons, being also battered by Lefebvre’s guns, retired before them; yet still they threatened the fuzileers with their right, and with their left prevented Lumley’s horsemen from falling on the defeated infantry. Alten’s Germans had now retaken the village with some loss, and Blake’s first line, which had not been engaged, was directed to support them; Hamilton’s and Collins’s Portuguese, forming a mass of ten thousand fresh men, were brought up to support the fuzileers and Abercrombie’s brigade, and at the same time Zayas, Ballesteros, and España advanced. Nevertheless, so rapid was the execution of the fuzileers that the enemy’s infantry were never attained by these reserves, which yet suffered severely; for Rutty got the French guns altogether, and worked them with prodigious activity while the fifth corps still made head; and when the day was irrevocably lost, he regained the other side of the Albuera, and protected the passage of the broken infantry.

“Beresford was too hardly handled to pursue. He formed a fresh line with his Portuguese, parallel to the hill from whence Soult had advanced, and where the French were now rallying with their usual celerity; the action still

continued at the bridge, but Godinot's division and the connecting battalion of grenadiers were soon afterwards withdrawn, and all firing ceased before three o'clock. The serious fighting had endured four hours, and in that time nearly seven thousand of the allies and above eight thousand of their adversaries were struck down. Three French generals were wounded, two slain, and eight hundred soldiers so badly hurt as to be left on the field. On Beresford's side only two thousand Spaniards and six hundred Germans and Portuguese were killed or wounded; hence it is plain with what a resolution the pure British fought, for they had but eighteen hundred men left standing! The laurel is nobly won when the exhausted victor reels as he places it on his bleeding front.

"The trophies of the French were five hundred unwounded prisoners, a howitzer, and several stand of colours. The British had nothing of that kind to boast of, but the horrid piles of carcasses within their lines told with dreadful eloquence who were the conquerors; and all that night the rain poured down, and the river and the hills and the woods resounded with the dismal clamour and groans of dying men. Beresford, compelled to place his Portuguese in the front line, was oppressed with the number of his wounded; they far exceeded the sound amongst the British soldiers, and when the piquets were posted few men remained to help the sufferers. In this cruel situation he sent Hardinge to demand assistance from Blake; but with him wrath and mortified pride were predominant, and he refused, saying, it was customary with allied armies for each to take care of his own men. Morning came, and both armies kept their respective positions, the wounded still covering the field of battle, the hostile lines still menacing and dangerous. The greater number had fallen on the French side, the best soldiers on that of the allies; and the dark masses of Soult's powerful cavalry and artillery, covering all his front, seemed alone able to contend again for the victory. The right of the French also appeared to threaten the Badajoz road, and Beresford in gloom and doubt awaited another attack; but on the 17th, the third brigade of the fourth division came up by a forced

march from Jerumenha, which enabled the second division to retake their former ground between the Valverde and the Badajos roads, and on the 18th Soult retreated.

"He left to English generosity several hundred men, too deeply wounded to be removed; all that could travel he had, in the night of the 17th, sent by the royal road, through Santa Marta, Los Santos, and Monasterio to Seville. Now protecting his movements with his horsemen and six battalions of infantry, he filed the army in the morning to its right, and so gained the road to Solano; when this flank march was completed, Latour Maubourg covered the rear with the heavy dragoons, and Briché protected the march of the wounded men by the royal road. Soult, however, halted the 19th at Solano, designing to hold on in Estremadura, and draw reinforcements from Andalusia; for he knew well, though Beresford was no longer in a condition to hurt Badajos, Wellington would soon come down, and fresh combats would be necessary to save that fortress. He had as early as the 14th commenced repairing the castle of Villalba, a large structure between Almendralejos and Santa Marta, and now he continued the work, with a view to form a head of cantonments, which the allies should be unable to take before the French army could be reinforced."—*Napier's Peninsular War*, vol. iii. pp. 170—173.

The faults of Marshal Beresford appear, then, to have been,—

1. A disregard of Principle XXIV. or a not knowing how to apply it in the circumstances and in the field of battle on which he found himself.

2. An entire mistake of his defensive decisive point, clearly indicated by his dispositions for defending the left and centre.

3. A want of faith in Maxim 1, which led him to give orders for retreating from a field which he yet could win, as the result showed, and which orders if executed would probably have entailed the destruction of his army.

These were doubtless exceedingly grave faults, but there was found in him, in exchange, great intrepidity and valour—properties which he however doubtless shares with

the majority of British soldiers, as this battle of Albuera and the last siege of Badajoz amply testify. He showed as well that if he were not competent to direct the operations of an army, he would, under a leader like Napoleon, have been capable of directing with extreme credit and renown the movements of a Corps d'Armée; a great talent indeed, and one he shared with many of Napoleon's Marshals, perhaps especially with Ney, to whom he may not unaptly be compared. Though on the morning of the 17th, he greatly feared a fresh attack on the part of Soult, and awaited it in doubt and gloom, he notwithstanding made a fine application of Principle XXIX.; and though weak, by finely forming his front line, apparently menacing and dangerous, he deterred Soult (or at least, in all probability, greatly influenced his determination) from an attack, which, there being only 1,800 unwounded British Infantry in the army, would in all probability have been successful.

With regard to the French Marshal, his determination of his offensive decisive point, the disposition of his army during the night, and his plan of battle, were excellently conceived. He, however, appears to have failed in applying the Principle XIV., when, if he had fully carried it out, it would have given him the victory in all probability. He seems to have forgotten Principle XLV., and in consequence Latour Maubourg, vastly superior to Lumley in cavalry, but without artillery, was held in check by the latter, owing to his having a battery of horse artillery attached to him. Its horse artillery is the fire of cavalry. There can be no question, too, that Soult committed a great error, in what may be called minor tactics, in keeping his men in such deep columns. If a general will expose his men in deep columns, in which they cannot fire or fight, to artillery and infantry in line, who can fire and fight, and will fire and fight, he must, under similar circumstances, expect to meet the fate of Soult, who by so doing lost the fairest field ever open to French arms in the Peninsula, and which his enemy's mistakes and the excellence of his own combinations appeared to have given him to a certainty. Soult's conduct in this has, however,

the palliation that heavy French columns had often frightened and put to flight Austrian armies; but British Infantry in lines do not run from, nor are they frightened at, heavy French columns, and would be very silly if they were; for they can and have poured into them a tremendous fire, which heavy columns cannot, *of necessity*, at all equally return, and then, if necessary, have closed with the heavy masses, whose close formation is a serious hindrance to their fighting.

The following account of the battle of Austerlitz is given in illustration and exemplification of the Principle I. Cases 4, 6, 7; Principle II. Case 5; Principle III.; Principle III. Case 11; and Principles IV. V. XXIV. XXIX. and LI.

A. D. 1805.

The contending parties in the battle of Austerlitz were the French on the one side, and the Russians and Austrians united on the other. An account of the campaign preceding this battle is given in the Author's "Elementary Treatise on Strategy."

Nov. 22d to 28th.—The Corps d'Armée of Soult, Lannes, and Murat, were in cantonments along the road from Brunn to Wischau, and in the villages around Brunn and adjacent to the roads from Brunn to Wischau, which latter was the advanced post protecting the cantonments, being on that side of the circumference of the area of cantonments most directly towards the Russo-Austrian army, and lying on the road from Brunn to Olmutz. Brunn was an excellent and important fortress; and though from its position, in the very centre of the Tactical theatre of war, it was a most important decisive strategical point, it had been most unaccountably abandoned to Napoleon, though there was no difficulty either in garrisoning it or provisioning it. Napoleon employed it as the principal pivot of manœuvres, on which the operations which concluded with the battle of Austerlitz depended.

During the same time, *i. e.* from Nov. 22d to 28th, Davoust, with his Corps d'Armée, was *en échelons* on the

road from Brunn to Presbourg, which latter place he was occupying as an advanced strategical post, for the purpose of damping the courage of the War party in Hungary, and reconnoitering,* in application of the Principles XXIX. and XXIV.

Bernadotte was with his Corps d'Armée *en échelons* on the road from Brunn to Iglau, which latter place he was occupying as a strategical advanced post, for the purpose of operating upon the mental and psychical properties of the Moravians, and reconnoitering in application of the Principles XXIX. and XXIV.

Mortier, with his Corps d'Armée, was stationed at Vienna, to operate on the mental and psychical properties of the metropolitans, and through them on the people in provinces, to reconnoitre, and protect the splendid bridge over the Danube, in application of the Principles XXIX. XXIV. and II.

Marmont, with his Corps d'Armée, is at Léoben, Bruck, and Neustadt, to induce the Archduke Charles, now retreating from Italy, to take the longer road through Hungary, and thus retard the time of his junction with the Russo-Austrian army, now at Olmutz, that the Russo-Austrian army might be beaten separately, and that the Principle III., which is also a principle of strategy, might be applied.

The Russo-Austrian army was during the same time in and around Olmutz, and on the road from Olmutz to Brunn, having its advanced post about eight miles from Wischau, the French head of cantonments.

Nov. 25th.—The Russian Guards and Reserves arrived at Olmutz.

Nov. 28th.—The Russo-Austrian army attacks and carries the advanced post of Wischau, which protected the French cantonments.

Soult, Lannes, and Murat, are ordered to raise their cantonments, fall back, and occupy a position close to Brunn, covering that fortress.

Davoust, already *en échelons* along the road from Presbourg to Brunn, that he might have less distance to

* There is a Chapter on several different ways of reconnoitering.

march, and perform the march more easily, is ordered to hasten to Brunn by the road through Nicholsberg.

Bernadotte already *en échelons* along the road from Iglau to Brunn, that he might have less distance to march, and perform the march more easily, is ordered to hasten by forced marches to Brunn.

Mortier receives orders to leave the occupation of Vienna to the single division Dumonceau, and hasten to Brunn with the rest of his Corps d'Armée.

Marmont is ordered to approach nearer Vienna.

Hence Brunn was the strategical point of concentration of the French army.

Nov. 29th.—The Russo-Austrian army made a short march of seven miles from Wischau to the heights of Kutchreau. This march by its direction indicated a desire to gain the French right before giving battle.

Nov. 30th.—The Russo-Austrians again make a march, and bivouac at Hogieditz; a tendency to gain the French right is apparent.

Dec. 1st.—The Russo-Austrians debouching from Austerlitz find the French line in the position it occupies on plan 4, painted light red, and place themselves opposite the French in the line indicated by the light yellow bodies in the plan.

It is here to be noticed: 1. That Olmutz is about 37 miles from Austerlitz, and 44 from Brunn. 3. That the Russo-Austrian army received the Guards and Reserves, the last large fraction which joined it, Nov. 25th. 3. It was 23 miles from Olmutz to Wischau, and consequently, since it has been said that it was 37 miles from Olmutz to Austerlitz, it was 13 miles from Wischau to Austerlitz. 4. On Dec. 25th, there was an army of nearly 70,000 men between Olmutz and Wischau, while Napoleon had not more than 45,000 men near Brunn till the morning of the 1st, when Bernadotte arrived.

It is then to be considered whether it would not, under the circumstances, have been perfectly practicable for the Russo-Austrian army to have gained a day by taking the post of Wischau on the 27th instead of the 28th.

And whether, admitting that it was impossible, or inex-

pedient rather, for it must have been possible, to have taken Wischau the 27th, and it having been taken the 28th, as it actually was, it was not possible to march the 13 miles from Wischau to Austerlitz the 29th, instead of devoting that day to a little march of 7 miles, and attack on the 30th, with 70,000 men about in line, whereas Napoleon had not more than 45,000 till the morning of Dec. 1st.

Or if Wischau had been taken the 27th instead of the 28th, and the 28th had been devoted to marching the 13 miles between Wischau and Austerlitz, might not a good application of Principle III., which is also a principle of Strategy, have been made by attacking with 70,000 men in line the 45,000 men Napoleon had, for until the morning of the 1st he had not more than 45,000?

It may be replied that Napoleon, availing himself of the possession of the fortress of Brunn, would have taken up the strong position there was around it, and there awaited the arrival of Bernadotte, Davoust, and Mortier. Had he done so, the Russo-Austrian Chiefs would have had no one but themselves and their generous magnanimity to have thanked for it, as there was no tangible reason why Brunn should have been abandoned to him. Whether he would have taken up a strong position around Brunn can not be known; but at all events, it is not often that anything is lost in war by using the utmost rapidity, gaining time, and being in readiness at the earliest moment, in accordance with Principle LI., and if they had failed in applying the Principle III., they would certainly have applied the Principle LI. In war all that can be done, is, under the circumstances which present, to make the best application of the recognised principles of the art, which are the collated results of experience, and this having been done, the rest must be left to Fortune,* with a manly and unyielding heart.

* Fortune is defined by Sir W. Napier, in his "History of the War in the Peninsula," to be the name "for the unknown combinations of infinite power." Napoleon is said to have believed that the consecution of events is bound by an inexorable fatality. To invest Napoleon with atheistic tendencies was a dodge of his enemies; and it is far more probable that that splendid and comprehensive genius attributed the inevitable consecution of circumstances not to Fate, but to an intelligent and wonderful Supreme.

Dec. 1st.—In the morning, Bernadotte arrives from Iglau, and enters into line.

In the evening Davoust, coming from Presbourg by the road through Nicolsberg, reaches Raigern with 2 of his divisions; the remaining division is at Nicolsberg, about 27 miles distant from Austerlitz; Raigern was about 5½ miles distant from the French line, measuring along the tactical line Davoust followed in coming into line at Telnitz and Sokolnitz.

The line which Napoleon occupied on the morning of Dec. 1st, (the day on which the Russo-Austrians debouched from Austerlitz, and took up the position in front of him which is painted *light yellow* in the Plan 4,) is painted *light red* in the Plan, and extended northward from Telnitz (*i.e.* towards the top of the Plan) to the distance of seven miles.

The following verbal description and the plan will give the leading particulars of the formation of the French line on Dec. 1st, the day the Allies debouched from Austerlitz, and placed themselves in the *light yellow* position in front of it.

The six parallelograms, in the centre of which the figure 1 is placed, represent the Corps d'Armée of Lannes, (20 battalions, 16 squadrons.) The five parallelograms, in the centre of which the figure 2 is placed, represent the Corps d'Armée of Bernadotte, (18 battalions, 16 squadrons.) The six parallelograms placed in a single row, and with the diagonals indicating them to be cavalry, in the centre of which the figure 3 is placed, represent the Cavalry Corps under Murat, (76 squadrons.) The six parallelograms, in the centre of which the figure 4 is placed, represent the Guards and Reserves under Oudinot, (20 battalions, 14 squadrons.) The remaining parallelograms to which no number is attached, represent the Corps d'Armée of Soult, (31 battalions, 12 squadrons.) The three parallelograms close to Raigern, to which the figure 5 is affixed, represent the two divisions of Davoust, (12 battalions, 18 squadrons.)

It is clear then from what has been said, and the plan, that the whole of the French line south of the northern-

most of the two ponds at Kobelnitz, and extending to Telnitz, was occupied by a portion of Soult's Corps d'Armée, no numbers being affixed in plan.

The portion of the line spoken of, about 3 miles in length, was occupied by a division and a half of Soult's Corps d'Armée, in number about 10,000. This would give on an average, for this portion of the line, about 3,300 to a mile. These were, however, supported and connected by a division of light cavalry under Margeron.

The remaining 4 miles of the line were occupied by 50,000, or about 12,500 to a mile on the average.

Davoust's two divisions were in number about 10,000.

Hence the total number of the French amounted to about 70,000.

And the number of the Allies was nearly the same.

To consider the French line so formed, and coloured light red in plan,

From what has been said, and the plan, it becomes evident:

1. That the 3 miles of the French line from Telnitz to Kobelnitz is very weak in numbers compared with the remaining 4 miles north of Kobelnitz, and if considered solely with regard to the numbers of men occupying the two portions, is to the remaining four miles, in point of strength, nearly in the ratio of 1 to 4.

2. That the bodies forming the weak portion of the line from Telnitz to Kobelnitz, are conspicuously placed on the tops of the hills on the French side of the large brook which divides the two armies, except those on the extreme right, which are also conspicuously placed on an eminence in advance of Telnitz, on the Allies' side of the large brook.

3. That the heavy masses forming the strong part of the line, extending northward from Kobelnitz for 4 miles along the side of the large brook, are on the contrary concealed to such an extent that the French line might appear to the Allies to be formed about equably.

4. That though the line of the large brook for the 3 miles northwards of Telnitz, extending to about the northernmost of the two ponds of Kobelnitz, is weakly occupied

in point of numbers, viz. by about 9,000 men in all, and that the troops occupying it are conspicuously displayed, yet they are designedly so placed, that there are bodies close at hand ready to occupy the four tactical pivots, Telnitz, Sokolnitz, the wood of Sokolnitz, and Kobelnitz (see *Def.*), and the two tactical points (see *Def.*) whose possession closes the only two roads which cross the large brook which divides the two armies in this portion of the line, with the exception of those which are closed by the occupation of Telnitz and Sokolnitz. The large brook from Telnitz to Kobelnitz, with its four tactical pivots, Telnitz, Sokolnitz, the wood of Sokolnitz, and Kobelnitz, and the ridge of hills along the French side, with the good tactical points on them, whose possession closes the only two roads which cross this portion of the large brook and the two ponds of Kobelnitz, one nearly a mile long, may be said to be a tactical base of manœuvres.

5. That Davoust with two divisions (10,000 men) would before night arrive in his light-red position near Raigern, and be able to be with them in line on the morrow at day-break, before which time it was quite clear the Russo-Austrians would not be ready to attack; and that Davoust had received orders to march to Rosenberg at daybreak, a place from which three roads lead like radii from a centre, (see plan,) to Ghirkowitz, to Kobelnitz, and to Sokolnitz and Telnitz; and remain at this central point till he should receive orders to direct himself on Ghirkowitz, Kobelnitz, or on Sokolnitz and Telnitz, according as the enemy's operations in developing themselves should render expedient.

From this formation of the French line, what is to be inferred of Napoleon's motives in making this disposition, and what was his plan of battle?

1. By displaying his troops conspicuously on the weak three miles on the right of his line, and concealing them to the extent mentioned on the remaining four miles on the left of his line, it appears clear that he had in view to lead the Allies to believe that his line, equably formed, extended to Telnitz, and that consequently if they wished

to turn his right flank, as it appeared manifest they did, (and which if they did at all they must now, since they had approached so near to the French, do tactically,) they must, in order to do so, direct their left wing, which was to turn his right, on and beyond Telnitz.

2. That he hoped that the Allies, continuing in the same intention, which their movements ever since their march from Wischau to Kutchereau clearly manifested, of turning the French right, would for that purpose direct a large portion of their army on Sokolnitz, Telnitz, and beyond Telnitz, which large fraction he hoped, in accordance with and application of Principle V., to contain with a much smaller fraction of his own, profiting by the base of manœuvres already described *for a sufficient time, i. e. till such time as he had executed one or other of the two following plans of battle, according as the enemy followed one or other of the two following courses.*

These two courses, which Napoleon *hoped* the Allies might pursue, and according as they pursued the one or other of which he would pursue the corresponding one of the two plans he had formed, and which will be hereafter given, were—

1. That the Allies having determined to direct their attack on and turn his right wing, and consequently, acting on the false supposition that his line of battle extended equably to Telnitz, direct a very large fraction of their forces on Sokolnitz, Telnitz, and beyond Telnitz, will *not* act in opposition to Principle I. Cases 4, 6, 7, *by neglecting to follow the large left wing, consequently directed on Sokolnitz, Telnitz, and beyond Telnitz, with the centre and right wing*, so that their line of battle should not have a large gap or weak interval towards the centre, nor from its too great length should be weak everywhere on the centre and right; but that, on the other hand, having determined on attacking and turning his left wing, would, according to the Principles, at least, neither leave a large weak gap or interval about the centre, nor allow the line, with the exception of the attacking left wing, to be weak everywhere on the centre and left in consequence of its too great length.

2. That the Allies having determined to direct their attack on and turn his right wing, and consequently acting on the false supposition that his line of battle extended equably to Telnitz, direct a very large fraction of their forces on Sokolnitz, Telnitz, and beyond Telnitz, will act in opposition to Principle I. Cases 4, 6, 7 ; and neglecting to follow their large left wing with their centre and right, leave a large weak gap or interval towards the centre, or else leave the whole of the rest of the line weak by its too great extent.

Before stating Napoleon's two plans of battle, according as the Allies adopted the first or second of these two courses, it appears best, by means of the following description and the plan, to put the reader in possession of the line of battle which the Russo-Austrian army formed after debouching from Austerlitz, on December 1st, that he may see how far the line formed by the Allies on this day, and which is coloured in the plan *light yellow*, gave Napoleon reason to believe that his hopes that the Allies would direct a very large left wing on Sokolnitz, Telnitz, and beyond Telnitz, in the design of turning his right, were well and surely founded. In the description of the line of battle, the names of the different large fractions of the enemy, necessary to be given in order to the narration of the course of the battle, will be stated. Beginning from the left of the Allies' line,—

The 2 parallelograms on the extreme left, south of Aujesd, between which the letter *a* is placed, are commanded by Kienmayer, (5 battalions, 20 squadrons, and 3 regiments of Cossacks.)

The 3 parallelograms on the hill immediately south of Pratzen, to the centre of which the letter *b* is affixed, are the Cavalry Mass, commanded by the Prince Lichtenstein, (35 Russian squadrons and 24 Austrian, in all 59 squadrons.)

The 3 parallelograms immediately in rear of the three former, to the centre one of which the letter *c* is affixed, are commanded by Doctoroff, (23 battalions.)

The 2 parallelograms between which the letter *d* is placed, are under Langeron, (19 battalions.)

The single parallelogram to which *e* is affixed, is commanded by Przebyschew, (17 battalions.)

The 4 parallelograms, in the centre of which *f* is placed, are 12 Russian battalions and 15 Austrian battalions, in all 27, under Kolowrath. These were designed but not destined to be a reserve.

The 5 parallelograms, in the centre of which the letter *g* is placed, are 7 battalions and 17 squadrons, under the Archduke Constantine, designed but not destined to be in reserve.

The 10 parallelograms forming a cluster, isolated on the extreme right, to which the letter *h* is affixed, are 14 battalions, 30 squadrons, and 2 regiments of Cossacks, under Bagration. Hence the total of the Russo-Austrian army was 112 battalions, and 126 squadrons, and 5 regiments of Cossacks. They had 330 pieces of artillery. Total number about 70,000 men.

The Allies' line so formed was ten and a half miles in length, measuring along it. It is clear, then, that the left of Kienmayer, resting on the Lake of Satcham, and the presence of 47 battalions, 79 squadrons, and 3 regiments of Cossacks south of Pratzen, distributed in the way stated, *i.e.* of more than half the squadrons, more than half the Cossacks, and nearly half the battalions, together with the manifest tendency the Allies had displayed of wishing to gain his right, left Napoleon little reason to doubt but that his hopes that the Allies meditated attacking and turning his right, in the way before stated, with a very large left wing, were well and surely founded, and that it was, at all events, highly expedient to arrange plans of battle ready in the case they did so. The two courses which were open to the Allies, having determined to attack with a very large left wing in the way described, have been given, and it was, as it has been said, necessary for Napoleon to have two separate plans of battle ready, the one to be put in execution if the Allies should follow the first course, the other if the second course.

The two plans of battle were,—

Plan 1.—If the Allies adopted the first of the two courses open to them,

Napoleon would, *by means of his tactical base of manœuvres*, extending from Telnitz to the northernmost of the two ponds of Kobelnitz, *contain*, with the 9,000 men forming part of Soult's Corps d'Armée, already occupying the base, assisted, if necessary, by Davoust's 2 divisions, in number 10,000, who were, as it has been said, to leave Raigern at daybreak, directing themselves on Rosenberg as a central point, from which there were roads leading to Telnitz and Sokolnitz, Kobelnitz and Ghirkowitz, by which they might march to any part of the line where they were required, or with the smallest sufficient part of Soult's 9,000 and Davoust's 10,000, *a very much larger fraction of the Allies for a sufficient time*, and with the mass of his army, in number 51,000 at least, (supposing the whole 19,000 were required to contain, which was not likely,) which were in line along the large brook, extending, as in plan, four miles northward from Kobelnitz, would, having previously formed his line of battle in the valley of the large brook in columns of attack on the Ghirkowitz side of the brook, direct his mass and attack on the right wing of the enemy, which he had, supposing the enemy to have adopted the first course, that is, of following up his large attacking left wing with his centre and right, a certainty of being able to far outflank, and attack both in front and flank, perhaps in reverse, (for the base of manœuvres allowed Napoleon to extend his line in length far more than would be safe without the existence of the base, and therefore to a much greater length than the Allies could do theirs with safety, having no such base, and themselves outflanking the French right, and attacking it in great force, and having only an equal number,) attacking at the same time on the centre, so as to hold it engaged till the ruin of the Allies' right wing was consummated, when the centre would in turn be taken in front and flank, overwhelmed in turn by the superiority of numbers as well as by the mode of attack, and after this, his centre pivoting on its right, would take the large left wing of the Allies in reverse and rear, while the containing portion of his line, strengthened by Davoust, if necessary, would contain and attack it in front.

tion of the ground to contain a much greater fraction of the enemy, with a much less fraction of his own, along the portion of his tactical front, formed by his base of manœuvres from Telnitz to Kobelnitz, and thus be able to obtain the requisite numerical superiority on the decisive point; and thus that he would apply the Principle III. by bringing the mass of his forces successively into collision with fractions of the enemy, viz. the left wing, the centre, and finally the right wing; and the Principle III. Case 11, by directing his attack, as far as possible, on the flank, and even the reverse and rear of the enemy.

Plan 2.—If the Allies adopted the second of the two courses open to them,

Napoleon would make precisely the same dispositions, as far as the containing portion of his line and the two divisions of Davoust are concerned, and also as far as forming the rest of his line in columns of attack on the Ghirkowitz side of the valley of the large brook between Kobelnitz and the smaller brook, which enters the large brook a short distance above the high road from Brunn to Austerlitz. The difference would be that the enemy having either left a large gap or weak interval on his centre, or having with his centre and right formed a line everywhere too weak, on account of its too great length, he would direct his main attack with the mass of his army on the portion of the enemy's line, extending from about Blasowitz to about a mile south of Pratzen, *i.e.* to about a sufficient distance beyond Pratzen, coming from Blasowitz, and measuring along a straight line drawn through those places, to obtain possession of the hill immediately south of Pratzen, and thus obtain possession of it and of the hill north of Pratzen at the same time (see plan), contenting himself meanwhile with maintaining an equal contest on his left wing, and with containing the enemy by his base of manœuvres on his right; then when those two hills on the centre, feebly occupied, and assailed by the mass of his army, should have been taken possession of,

and the centre of the Allies broken and in full retreat, leaving a sufficient part of his centre to turn the left flank of the enemy's right wing, and impose on and pursue the remains of the broken centre, with the rest and main body of the centre executing a change of front by pivoting on the right of the centre, push whatever remains of the enemy's centre came in the way into the low grounds near Hostiradek, and taking the large left wing of the enemy in flank and reverse, for which purpose the configuration of the ground is—the hill south of Pratzen having been previously gained possession of—exceedingly favourable, drive it into the lakes of Satchan and Telnitz, and into the marshes about them, while the containing part of the right wing of his own army, assisted by whatever part of Davoust's two divisions might have been found necessary, attacked it in front.

It would be thus that Napoleon would apply the Principle V. as in the former case; the Principle I., of interior tactical lines, having manifestly interior lines in the first instance, and attacking so as to drive the enemy on to still more exterior lines; the Principle IV., which indicates that the centre is the decisive point of a field of battle, when the enemy is on a too extended tactical front, and the configuration of the ground is propitious; the Principle III., Case 11, by attacking the separated right wing of the Allies in front and flank, and the left wing of the Allies in front, flank, and reverse; lastly, the Principle II., Case 5, by driving the left of the enemy on to the lakes of Satchan and Telnitz, and the marshes round them.

It appears best to state here at once that the bodies painted dark red in plan represent the French line of battle, and the bodies painted dark yellow represent the Russo-Austrian line of battle, *at the time the decisive shock took place on the centre, from Blasowitz to about a mile south of Pratzen.* The first shock between the two armies did not take place along the whole line simultaneously: the shock between the lines north of a point about a mile south of Pratzen, that is, between the French centre and left and the Allies' centre and right, took place approximately simultaneously; but the shock between the French

of Pratzen, took place about three-quarters of an hour before the shock on the rest of the line.

To trace the course of events and of the battle till the lines of battle of the two armies got into these two positions, the one coloured dark red, the other dark yellow :— It has been already said that the line of battle of the Allies on Dec. 1st, coloured light yellow, seemed to indicate manifestly that Napoleon's hopes that the Allies would endeavour to turn his right flank by directing a very large left wing on Sokolnitz, Telnitz, and beyond Telnitz, were about to be realized. The Allies' line, too, with its very large left wing only connected with the right by the Grand Duke Constantine (*g*), more than a mile and a half distant from either, seemed to indicate as well for certain that the Allies intended to outflank the left wing of the French also, and direct a minor and secondary attack on it, thus attacking on the two flanks at the same time, a proceeding which, with an approximate equality of forces, is manifestly contrary to the Principle III., and Principle III. Cases 4, 6, 7, unless, indeed, in the case that the centre is supported on a very strong tactical base of manœuvres, as on a fortress or entrenched camp, for example; for it is to adopt exterior lines, and leave a large weak gap or interval in the centre. It was then already apparently certain that the Allies would pursue the second of the two courses, and that Napoleon would have to put the second plan of battle into execution, and his dispositions were therefore made to do so. The accounts which he had received from all sides as to the movements of the enemy's columns, all tended to confirm him in this conviction. At nine o'clock in the evening (of Dec. 1st) Napoleon rode along the line, having previously, in application of Principle XXIX., caused a remarkable proclamation to be read to the soldiers, in which he sketched the enemy's errors, and his own plan of battle, confidently promising the victory. Suddenly the soldiers hoisted up large bundles of lighted straw at the end of long poles, and a wild, strange, but savagely majestic illumination lit dimly up the warlike scene along the French line, that winter's evening, on the field of Auster-

litz, for it was the first anniversary of the Emperor's coronation, and rolling backward the tide of war with more than gigantic might, he had already driven invading tyrants from the polluted soil sacred to the heroes he commanded. Cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* neither heartless nor wavering, resounded from all sides, for there was a sympathy wondrously strong and binding between the soldiers and their chief. The majestic display of unanimity and enthusiasm increased the confidence and courage of every man in the army, while the ominous sounds were borne into the enemy's lines. The Emperor bivouacked that night. The Marshals were assembled around him before four o'clock in the morning, to receive his last orders. At four in the morning he mounted on horseback. The moon had gone down, and the atmosphere, cold and obscure, was still. He directed his inquiries to know if the enemy had made any movement during the night which would derange his plan. All the reports of the grand-gardes agreed that all the noise in the Allies' line had gone from their right to their left, and therefore indicated movement toward their left. The enemy's fires, too, appeared as if their line had been strengthened towards Aujesd. It appeared certain that the second plan was to be adopted.

Napoleon makes the following arrangements for the execution of the plan:—

Since it appeared certain that the enemy will direct a very powerful attack on the extreme right of the French with a very large left wing, orders are at once sent to Davoust to direct himself immediately on Sokolnitz and Telnitz. As it is certain that Davoust will arrive in time, the defence of Telnitz and Sokolnitz is, in the meanwhile, committed to a strong brigade under General Merlé and the light cavalry of Margeron. Soult's Corps d'Armée, with the exception of the Brigade Merlé, viz. the Divisions Vandamme and St. Hillaire, and the Brigade Legrand, 26 battalions, 12 squadrons, in number about 15,000 men, are formed in line in columns of attack, from Kobelnitz to within a quarter of a mile of Ghirkowitz, in the valley of the large brook on the Ghirkowitz side; its

coloured.

Lannes' Corps d'Armée is similarly formed from the pond of Ghirkowitz to the brook which branches eastward, above the high road of Brunn, and is represented in the same way in the plan.

Murat is in columns on the French side of the large brook ready to march, and behind the right of Lannes.

Bernadotte is in columns ready to march on the French side of the large brook, and behind the left of Soult.

Oudinot with the Guards and the Reserves is also in columns ready to march.

When the right moment has come Soult is to turn to the right, pivoting at the same time somewhat on his right, and advance, so that the centre of the line formed by his Corps d'Armée shall be directed on Pratzen, about equal parts being directed on each side of that village. Lannes is to pivot slightly on his left, and direct himself somewhat to his left as he advances.

Murat is to pass Ghirkowitz in columns on the north side of it, while Bernadotte is also to pass Ghirkowitz in columns on the south side, and as Soult turning to the right, and Lannes in a lesser degree to the left, is to leave an interval from about the summit of the large hill north of Pratzen, to about half a mile beyond Blasowitz, this interval, of about two miles, is to be filled by Bernadotte's Corps d'Armée in line, the right of it joining Soult's left, and by Murat, who is to connect Bernadotte's left with Lannes' right.

The Guards and Reserves under Oudinot with Napoleon are, first, to second Bernadotte till such time as the enemy's centre is completely broken and in retreat, then, leaving Bernadotte with whatever portion of his Corps d'Armée may be necessary to impose on and pursue the broken centre of the enemy, and assist Lannes and Murat in turning the left flank of the enemy's right wing, are, with any part of Bernadotte which can be spared to join them, to go to the assistance of Soult, pivoting on their extreme right, and clearing away and driving any portions of the broken centre of the enemy whose proximity might

not be wanted, into the marshy ground about Hostiradek; in their course take in conjunction with Soult the left of the Allies in reverse and rear, and drive it into the Lake of Satchan, while Davoust attacks it at the same time in front by Telnitz and Sokolnitz.

At day-break a light fog obscured the view, especially on the low grounds; suddenly the fog disappears from the hill-tops, and the sun begins to gild them with his rays. Napoleon and his Marshals discover very distinctly the two hills, lying north and south of Pratzen, abandoned by the left of the enemy; on that of the two south of Pratzen, where lately there were 41 battalions and 59 squadrons, not a man is to be seen. At the same time they discover a heavy column marching from the centre to the right, in the direction towards an imaginary point, situated one mile east of Kroug. From this moment it was perfectly certain that the Allies had left a large weak interval of more than four miles on their centre, exposed to all the blows which might be dealt on it; that the enemy had followed the second course—was about to attack at Sokolnitz, Telnitz, and beyond Telnitz, with an immense left wing to turn the French right; that he was about to direct a minor attack on the left wing of the French also, was in fact attacking with his two wings. Hence it became clear that the second plan of battle, to execute which all the preparations had been made, was to be adopted.

Hence also the two hills north and south of Pratzen became the French offensive decisive point of the field of battle, and that these formed an offensive decisive point of very great excellence is clear from a consideration of Chapter IV. to which the reader is referred.

It was now eight o'clock of the morning of Dec. 2d. Napoleon asks Soult how long it will take him to gain the table lands on the tops of the two hills north and south of Pratzen, directing himself in the manner already explained. Soult replies, "Twenty minutes." "Wait awhile," observes Napoleon; "when the enemy occupies himself in making a false movement he must not be stopped."

Soon a violent musketry fire is heard from Sokolnitz and Telnitz, and an aide-de-camp galloping up informs

Napoleon that an immense mass of the enemy is approaching those places in three columns, and that the heads of the columns are deploying as they arrive, and attacking with all vigour. The moment had now arrived which Napoleon was waiting for, and he gives the signal. Immediately Soult, Lannes, Murat and Bernadotte start at full gallop; doubtless they were not men to make themselves be waited for at such a crisis. Napoleon rides to the centre, and as he passes along the line raises the enthusiasm of the men still more by the following words, "*L'ennemi vient se livrer imprudemment à vos coups, terminez la campagne par un coup de tonnerre.*"

It has been already said that the black lines in the valley of the large brook represent Soult and Lannes in line of columns of attack.

In less than half an hour after the time the Marshals left Napoleon, Soult, Lannes, Bernadotte and Murat had advanced without opposition, and formed the line of battle in the position in which it is painted dark red, and in which position the first shock took place along the centre and left of the French. It has been already said that the position of the whole French line at the time the first shock took place along the centre and left of the French is given in plan, and coloured dark red; while the Allies' line at this same moment is coloured dark yellow. It will be seen that the heads of the columns on the Allies' left had already begun to debouch from Telnitz and Sokolnitz, and that Davoust was about to give them a reception; for the first shock on the French right preceded by about three quarters of an hour the first shock on the French centre and left.

Before continuing the course of the battle it is necessary to state how the Allies came into their new dark yellow position.

Beginning with the left of the Allies' line:—

The tactical line (dotted) by which Kienmayer moved from his first position *a* to his second position is given in plan.

The tactical line by which Doctoroff moved from his first position *b*, to form the southernmost of the three dark yellow columns, is also given in plan.

The tactical line by which Langeron moved from his first position *d*, to form the middle of the three dark yellow columns, is given in plan.

The tactical line by which Przibychew moved from his first position *e*, to form the northernmost of three dark yellow columns, is given in plan.

The three columns of Doctoroff, Langeron, and Przibychew, and Kienmayer's corps contained one-half of the whole army, in number 35,000 men.

It has to be remarked that the columns of Langeron and Przibychew crossed and hindered one another somewhat about Sokolnitz; for Langeron, who ought to have directed himself between the two villages of Sokolnitz and Telnitz, directed himself on the Chateau of Sokolnitz.

The tactical line by which Prince Lichtenstein with the cavalry mass moved from his first position *c* to his second position is given in the plan. In the Allies' dispositions for the battle, it was arranged that he was to pass behind the centre, and assist Bagration on the right.

The tactical line by which Kolowrath moved from his first position *f* to his dark yellow position is given in plan. He is represented in plan in part formed in line and in part still in a column of march; for Soult, on arriving at the tops of the two hills, came unexpectedly on Kolowrath while he was marching in a column by pelotons towards the left wing, to which he was to have been a reserve according to the Allies' dispositions. Kolowrath's column was, on the apparition of Soult's Corps d'Armée in line of battle, formed immediately in great haste, or rather the attempt was made to form it.

A similar crossing and hindrance to that which happened to the columns of Langeron and Przibychew happened also to the column of Kolowrath and the column of Lichtenstein; for the advanced guard of Kolowrath, formed by a Brigade under Kamenski, was obliged to stop on the top of the hill south of Pratzen till Lichtenstein's column had passed by. This advanced guard is represented on the plan in the position in which it was obliged to stop for Lichtenstein to pass by, and is represented in the plan by black lines not painted; from that position it

had to form in haste on Soult's appearance on Kolowrath's left, in which position it is painted dark yellow.

The tactical line by which the Grand Duke Constantine moved from his first position *g* to his second position is given in the plan.

The tactical lines by which Bagration, with the right of the Allies, moved from the first position *h* to the second position, are given in the plan. It will be seen by the plan that Bagration's position was such that it was clear he intended to turn the left flank of the French.

Having, then, seen how the two armies arrived in the dark yellow and dark red positions, in which positions they were when the decisive moment had arrived, and the decisive shock took place on the French offensive decisive point of the field of battle, viz. the two hills north and south of Pratzen, it now remains to see the effect of the shock, and follow the two armies to the close of the battle.

With respect to Soult's Corps d'Armée. Scarcely had Soult's line, in columns of attack, climbed the hills of Pratzen, when he fell upon the column of Kolowrath, which, considering itself in reserve, and thinking itself guaranteed by the three columns which preceded it, was advancing in a column of march by pelotons. The Emperor Alexander, Kutusof, and his état-major were with it. Miloradowich, who was marching at the head of the column, scarcely found time to lead his battalions to the attack: as they form they are overthrown, and the Austrians who followed him experienced the same fate. The advanced guard of this column, viz. the Brigade Kamensk, attacked on its right flank as it was marching in haste, formed the left of Kolowrath, as from its position it naturally was obliged to do. The column, as might be expected, thus surprised and ill formed, could not resist Soult, with the divisions St. Hillaire, Vandamme, and the Brigade Levasseur, is driven rapidly back on Hostiradek, and thence, menaced with being driven into the marshy valley, retreats to Wischau, and has no more to do with the battle. As soon as Kolowrath retreated on Wischau, there was a clear gap of three miles in the centre of the Allies' line.

With regard to Bernadotte.

The Grand Duke Constantine, instead of contenting himself with defending the hill on which he is in his dark-yellow position in an orthodox manner, thought it necessary to descend into the valley, to meet Bernadotte on equal terms. Bernadotte, assisted by the Reserves and the Cavalry of the Guard under Bessières, whom Napoleon sent to his assistance, defeats and drives back the Archduke, who was very inferior in numbers to his opponent. The Archduke falls back behind the brook before Austerlitz. (See plan.)

With regard to Lichtenstein's cavalry.

Lichtenstein, applied to for assistance by Kolowrath and the Grand-Duke, and his original destination being the right, where he was to assist Bagration, and being also sent for by this latter, scarcely knows what to do. At last, however, thirty of his squadrons, under Ouwarof, are placed, after a very long promenade, between the right of the Arch-Duke and the left of Bagration, and a portion sent to the assistance of Kolowrath arrive in time to see and share the defeat of his column.

With regard to Lannes and Murat. These two together succeed in beating Bagration and Ouwarof, and, according to the plan of battle, turning the left flank of the Allies' right, and driving it back into marshy ground into the position in which it is painted dark orange in the plan.

With regard to Davoust. He, in the meantime, forming his men into crescents, places them on the hills behind Telnitz and Sokolnitz, with the concavities of the crescents turned towards the outlets, and hinders the Austro-Russian columns from debouching by a concentric fire and by charging their flanks.

As soon as the Grand-Duke was broken and in retreat, Bernadotte is left to look after him, and Napoleon with the Guards and Reserves now executes a change of front, pivoting on his right and advancing, and proceeds to second Soult, who, as soon as Kolowrath was broken and retreated on Wischau, had pivoted on his right and executed a change of front advancing. In this way Soult and Napoleon took the three columns of Przibychew, Langeron, and Doctroff, and Kienmayer's corps, containing one-half the Allies'

army, in flank, reverse, and rear, and drove them ultimately into a position with their backs to the Lake of Satchan, and following the curve of the shore, in which position they are painted dark orange. Napoleon placed a large battery on the slope of a hill at Aujesd, to sweep the ground between it and the Lake of Satchan, thus interdicting retreat by the north shore of the lake. The results were that the Division Przibychew, surrounded in Sokolnitz,—for Davoust was now advancing, and changing his defensive for the offensive,—lays down its arms. Langeron is only able to save one-half his column, which was cut in two by Soult's division Vandamme. Doctoroff and the other half of Langeron, in all twenty-eight battalions, placed along the shore of the Lake of Satchan, following the curve of the shore and between the lake on the south, and Soult and Napoleon, with the Reserves, forming a parallel line of battle along the heights on the north, with Davoust menacing its left flank, and retreat interdicted between Aujesd and the Lake of Satchan, had nothing else to do but march under the French fire along the bank of the lake as they best could, and, crossing the narrow slip of ground between the two lakes, gain Satchan. This they did, experiencing an immense loss. The artillery endeavoured to escape by crossing the frozen edge of the lake; but the ice, injured by the French cannon balls, broke under the weight of the mass, and 2,000 men were drowned. The remains of the enemy's left took the road to Czertsch over the mountains, hotly pursued.

The loss of the Allies was 25,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, and 180 pieces of artillery. The loss of the French was 7,900 killed and wounded, and 763 prisoners, so that the loss of the Allies was to that of the French in the ratio of 3 to 1, about.¹

The position of the Allies' line, driven back in all directions, and the left, which contained half the army, entirely separated from the centre and right, at the time when Doctoroff and the half of Langeron were so nicely enclosed with their backs to the Lake of Satchan, is painted dark orange. The corresponding position of the French is not given, because it is not wished to confuse the plan too

much. As the right and centre of the Allies retreated to their orange position, Lannes, Murat, and Bernadotte had made a corresponding advance, and the positions of Davoust, Soult, and the Reserves, may be inferred from what has been already said. Langeron and Doctoroff escaped along the tactical line of retreat drawn in plan, through the narrow slip of ground between the lakes and passing through Satchan, with all the men they could save.

As an example of a flagrant violation of Principle I. and its consequences, the account of the battle of Stockach, in 1799, may be read.

The history of the three days of Abensberg, Eckmuhl, and Ratisbonne, furnishes an example of operations with scarcely any, if any, parallel in the military history of the world. Owing to a strange fault on the part of Berthier in miscomprehending the Emperor's orders, Napoleon's army was on very exterior lines, the army of the Archduke Charles on very interior, and the destruction of the French army seemed certain, but Napoleon, *advertized at Paris in less than forty hours, by the Telegraph which he had caused to be constructed, of the passage of the Inn by the Austrian army*, started instantly, changed the exterior lines his army was on for very interior lines, and broke the Austrian army in the battles of Abensberg, Eckmuhl, and Ratisbonne, and the combats of Thann and Landschut, by throwing the mass of his army on fractions of the enemy successively.

As another example, the account of Blucher's operations on the Marne, in 1814, may be read. That Marshal divided an army of 60,000 into four fractions of 5,000, 15,000, 19,000, and 21,000, and separated these by large intervals. The result was, that Napoleon, with a very inferior army, overwhelmed these fractions successively, in the combats of Champ-Aubert, Montmirail, Chateau-Thierry, Vau-champs and Etoges, which cost Blucher 20,000 killed and prisoners.

The following extract from the history of the Wars between Charles the First of England and his Parliament, is

Case 8, especially, and of Principles I. II. and Principle II.
Case 5:—

Essex and Waller had orders to march their combined armies towards Oxford, and if the King retired into that town lay siege to it, and thus by one enterprise put an end to the War. But the King, judging rightly that it is the part of an inferior army to manœuvre, in order either to induce the enemy to commit faults or catch the enemy in them, and thus, though inferior numerically, have always a majority on the points of collision, left a very large garrison in Oxford, the place requiring a very large garrison, and retired on Worcester. The armies under Essex and Waller then separated, and thus the King had already diminished the force he would have to contend with on the point of collision by one-half. Essex went towards Cornwall, took Taunton and Weymouth, and caused Prince Maurice to raise the siege of Lyme. Waller with his army marched in pursuit of the King towards Worcester, and actually came within three miles of the King's camp near that place, which camp was, however, on the opposite side of the Severn, without knowing that the King was there. Waller is then deceived by false intelligence which the King had set about, that he (the King) had marched on Bewdley and was directing his army on Shrewsbury, and Waller, in order to anticipate the King at Shrewsbury, hastens by forced marches to that place. The King's strategical position near Worcester was wisely taken, for he hoped to deceive Waller as to his intentions, and make him believe he was gone to Shrewsbury, and consequently induce him to direct his army on that place. If this hope were realized, then the King intended returning back again along the strategical line he had followed from Oxford to Worcester, to Oxford, unite himself with the large garrison of that place, and thus apply Principles I. and III., by going with his army so reinforced in pursuit of Waller, thus turning the tables on the Parliamentarian, and then, having overthrown Waller, go after Essex and defeat him in succession. It is clear that by this manœuvre the King would assume interior lines between Essex, marching into Cornwall, and

Waller hastening to Shrewsbury, and that he had as well cut both from their base of operations, which was *London and the Eastern Counties*, in application of Principle I. to say nothing of the mental and psychical effect of it on the Parliament and London. On the other hand, if the hope of thus deceiving Waller were not realized, a large river was placed between him and Waller, more than capable of compensating for his inferiority if Waller attempted to attack, and would besides afford him an opportunity of showing Waller the same trick he afterwards did, as will be seen, at Cropredy Bridge.

Waller, then, as it has been said, was deceived by the false intelligence, and hastened by forced marches to Shrewsbury. The King returned from Worcester to Oxford by the same strategical line he had pursued in going thence to Worcester, united himself with the garrison of Oxford, and now marched toward Banbury in search of Waller. The two armies came in sight of one another at Cropredy Bridge, near Banbury, the river Carwell running between them. The King arrived first on the Carwell, but he neither attempted to cross the river, or destroy Cropredy Bridge. Waller arrived in the afternoon. The next morning the King pretended to retire on Daventry, and Waller thought him in full retreat, but he was, in fact, only applying the Principle III. ~~Case 8.~~ Waller began to cross the bridge in pursuit, but as soon as that fraction of his army which the King thought it would be most expedient to engage had passed the bridge, the King returned and attacked it vigorously with his whole army, and drove it into the Carwell. In this attack the King as well applied Principle II. ~~Case 5.~~ Waller's army, stunned and disheartened by this blow, and *by want of confidence in the general, without which the finest army in the world can never do anything great*, dissolved by desertion, and the King, finding he might leave Waller to go back to the Parliament without his army, reinforced his army with all the men available from his garrisons, and marched after Essex. That General had directed his army towards Cornwall, at the instigation of one of his subordinates, a Lord Roberts, who had estates in Cornwall, and wished to get some rents

out of them *—so wise and great a general was Essex, and on such paltry intrigues do the destinies of armies and nations hang, when not presided over, under God, by honest men of the right stamp. The King followed Essex into Cornwall, and that general, finding himself completely cut from his base of operations by a superior army, and his provisions growing scarcer and scarcer every day,—in fact, that position which the ablest generals of all times have agreed to be a preface to the destruction of any army,—and with the sea behind his army, escaped with a few of his principal officers to Plymouth, leaving his army to fare as it might. The Cavalry under Balfour, favoured by a dense mist, escaped, but *the whole of the baggage, artillery, and ammunition, fell into the hands of the King.* The Infantry under Skippon obtained a convention, under which *they were to lay down their arms*, and go home quietly. There was, however, no stipulation that they were not to serve again in the course of the war. Yet these infantry, thus *compelled to lay down their arms before an enemy*, were indeed brave and true soldiers, for many of them, when under Cromwell they gloriously retook the artillery they had lost in Cornwall, recognising their pieces, embraced and wept over them,—so greatly did these men feel the disgrace, the ignorance cowardice and imbecility of their generals had brought on them, and such was ~~the~~ affection which, with the instinct of true soldiers, they bore to their arms.

The surrender of Essex's army took place two months after Cromwell and his Independents had obtained the decisive victory of Marston Moor in the North, and thus did the King, by these wise and able strategical and tactical operations, realize in the West the worst fears of the Parliament, and of one who, judged by his acts, was the most extraordinary, powerful, and self-reliant man that ever trod on British soil.

Obs.—Charles was doubtless an able strategist and tactician, and a brave soldier, equal, perhaps, to his gigantic subject as a strategist and tactician, as well as in courage, as far as that quality is purely physical. But Napoleon has said that the mental and psychical qualities of armies

* Clarendon.

are to the physical in the ratio of three to one in point of importance, and that general who, however able in other respects, is incapable of exciting the enthusiasm and confidence of his soldiers, is only an ignorant officer; (see Principle XXIX. and Maxim 7,) and the extraordinary courage, indefatigability, and resolution of the mighty Englishman, with that enthusiasm unmatched in the annals of the world, and that confidence he knew how to communicate to his soldiers, *attest and perhaps taught these truths, for the life of the English Lord Protector was a favourite study with the democratic Emperor of France.* The courage, endurance, and indefatigability of Cromwell were, from his own account, derived from mental and psychical sources, and these so derived are always *most intense, as they are necessarily most equable.*

The three following examples of Principle III. Case 8 may also be mentioned, that the student may know where to find other examples than the preceding, if he wish to refer to any.

In the first Italian campaign of General Buonaparte, when he descended the right bank of the Po to Plaisance, and crossed that river, he was compelled to pass his army in boats and barges, not having the means of constructing a bridge. The process was, therefore, long and tedious, and an opportunity was afforded to the Austrian General Beaulieu to have attacked that part of the French army which had crossed which might appear to him most expedient; but Beaulieu, with the temporizing spirit ordinary to extreme age, (for he was already an octogenarian,) only took half measures, and lost his opportunity.

In 1809 the Archduke Charles succeeded in separating the French army in two by destroying the bridge over the Danube by which it was passing, a portion only of the army having as yet passed. This was done by letting loose and giving to the current some of the floating mills which are found on the Danube. Then the Archduke, forming a concave line of battle, attacked with his whole army, and with the concentric fire of three hundred pieces of artillery, the portion of the French army which had crossed before

Lobeau.

Before leaving the Principle III. Case 8, it remains to be said that when the enemy is crossing a bridge, not only is the whole of the army to be thrown on the portion of the enemy which has passed, and which is of that size which it is thought most convenient to attack, assuming naturally for the purpose a concave line of battle, which will have the advantage of a concentric fire, but all efforts have at the same time to be made to destroy the bridge, by giving to the current large barges heavily laden with stones, great rafts made of large trunks of trees, &c. some of which, if not all, will, if the stream be strong, strike against the bridge, and it is hoped will break it.

The following sketch of the battle of Friedland may be given in illustration of Principle I. Case 2, Principle III. Case 8, Principle V., and Principle II. Cases 2, 5.

In this battle the Russian line of battle was of the convex order, about $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles in length, and formed before a reentering angle of the river Alle, so that the line of battle and the reentering angle of the Alle formed approximately a sector of a circle. About the vertex of the projecting angle of land which fits into the reentering angle of the river, the town of Friedland is situated, between the vertex of the angle of land and a large pond or lake of which mention will be made, and on either side of this lake, to about one quarter of the length of it, measured from that end of the lake towards the vertex of the angle. The Alle was not fordable, and there was a bridge about one-fifth of the whole length of one of the sides of the projecting angle of ground from the vertex, and this was the only communication by which the Russians could retreat over the Alle in case of defeat. The bridge may then be said to be situated at a distance of approximately one-fifth of the length of one of the bounding radii of the sector of a circle from the centre of the circle.

The projecting angle of ground which fits into the reentering angle of the river was nearly bisected by a large brook with its ravine, and by a long large pond or lake $1\frac{1}{2}$

mile in length, and about 300 yards wide, through which the brook flowed into the Alle. This large pond or lake, then, bisecting the angle of ground, and the large brook, formed a serious natural obstacle, intersecting at right angles the Russian tactical front. Draw a line bisecting the angle of the sector of a circle, then this line gives the approximate position of the large long pond, and of the large brook and its ravine.

The Russian line, of a convex order as it has been said, was formed along a ridge of hills, which of course did, as well as the Russian line itself, form out with the reentering angle of the Alle and bound an approximate sector of a circle, but the sectorial area of ground behind these hills, and in which the town of Friedland was situated, was low, and commanded by the hills.

Then, taking what has been said into consideration, and the reader having, if he pleases, made a diagram, it is clear:—

1. That the Russians have violated Principle I. Case 2, by assuming a tactical front intersected by a large brook with its ravine, a large pond $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile in length and 300 to 400 yards wide.

2. That in order to apply the Principle III. Case 3, and Principle V., in attacking the Russians, the mass of the French army must be thrown on the fraction of the Russian line (approximately one half) on one side of the large brook and pond, while the other half must be contained by as small a portion of the French as possible, profiting by the accidents of the ground, tactical pivots, &c., and by large and well-placed batteries.

3. That Principle II. Cases 2 and 5, must be applied by directing the mass on that half of the Russian line which lies *on the same side of the large brook and lake as the Bridge.*

4. That some portion of the circular arc of hills on the Bridge side of the pond is the decisive point of the field of battle.

5. That the decisive point gained, the position of the Russians is desperate, and that the more they are driven back the more crowded will they be together,—the less

the length and greater the depth of their line, and the greater the ravages of the concentric fire of the French artillery.

Hence we find that Napoleon contained the one-half of the Russian line on the side of the lake opposite to the bridge, and even suffered the Russians to obtain a trifling advantage, directed the mass of his forces on the other half, drove its fragments over the bridge, seized the bridge and town, and then, turning the mass of his forces on the other half, whose only line of retreat was seized, drove it into the Alle, with total loss of its artillery.

The Russians had 30,000 killed and wounded.

Here follows the Peace of Tilsit.

The relation of that portion of the battle of Wagram which took place on the afternoon and evening of July 5th, 1809, furnishes an excellent example of Principle I. Case 3, and Principle III. Case 5. It must be remembered that the day the French gained the victory at Wagram was the 6th; on the evening of the 5th the French were repulsed with loss.

July 5th.—The Archduke Charles occupied the excellent position of the Russbach, with 120,000 men, his line of battle extending from Gerasdorf to Neusiedel, and being in length about ten miles.

On the afternoon of the 5th Napoleon gave the order to force possession of the position of the Russbach.

Massena is directed on Breitenlee.

Bernadotte on Wagram.

Eugene between Wagram and Baumersdorf.

Oudinot on Baumersdorf.

Davoust on Neusiedel.

Bernadotte, Eugene, and Oudinot, attack the portions of the Austrian line on which they are directed, *before* Davoust is ready to attack at Neusiedel, and the columns of the three former do not arrive simultaneously in face of the enemy's line. Hence the Archduke Charles, whose field of battle possessed that of the requisite properties of a good field of battle among others which requires that the field should be such that, while it covers the move-

ments of the army, shall expose as much as possible those of the enemy, holding the half of his forces disposable, throws them first on Eugene, next on Bernadotte, then on Oudinot, who was unable to maintain himself at Baumersdorf. Eugene was driven back, then Bernadotte, then Oudinot.

Here, then, was Carnot's celebrated *strategical* operation imitated *tactically* by the Archduke.

The following account of the Pultowa campaign is given in illustration of Principle II. Cases 3, 5, Principles XXIV. XXXII. XXXIII. XLIX. L. and Maxim III.

The great fault which led to the overthrow of Charles XII. at Pultowa, the destruction of his vast military power, and shameful termination of his career, was a contemptuous disregard and abandonment of his line of operations without having previously established a new one, and that too at a time when one of the most valuable convoys of which history furnishes an example, consisting of the immense number of 8,000 wagons, containing ammunition, provisions, and money, escorted by 15,000 men, was moving along the abandoned line of operations to join him. Charles's line of operations was the great road leading from Grodno by Leda, Minsk, Borisow, Orscha, Smolensk, and Wiasma, to Moscow, with its subsidiary side roads.

Charles crossed the Niemen, six miles from Grodno.

June 25th, 1708.—Charles forced the passage of the Beresina at Borisow, the Beresina being the next great river east of the Niemen.

Marching along the great road towards the Dneiper, Charles defeated 20,000 Muscovites, intrenched behind a vast marsh, protected by a river, at a place called Hollosin.

Peter the Great left the above-mentioned great road, which has been said to be Charles's line of operations, at Kochanow, and took the great road which leads southwards, and passes the Dneiper at Mohilew. Charles pursued by the same road, and passed the Dneiper after the Russians at

Mohilew. Peter turned northwards from Mohilew, and retreated on Smolensk.

Sept. 22d, 1708.—Charles attacked and defeated a body of 20,000 Russians at Smolensk.

At Smolensk, Charles was again on the great road which was his line of operations, and after the Victory of Smolensk, the line was perfectly safe. Levenhaupt was on the line of operations, advancing as rapidly as he was able with his immense convoy,—8,000 wagons of ammunition, provisions, and money, and 15,000 men for its protection. The Swedish Generals used the utmost exertions and entreaties they dared with the King to induce him to remain at Smolensk and await the arrival of Levenhaupt with the convoy, for Levenhaupt was to arrive in about six or seven days, and the gigantic convoy would put the army in a position to face all its necessities and reasonable contingencies. But Charles, abruptly quitting his line of operations, turned suddenly southwards, and marched towards the Desna, to a place which Mazeppa, Prince of the Cossacks, and hero of the celebrated equestrian ramble, had appointed as the point of junction for their two armies. The King sent orders to Levenhaupt to hasten to him with the convoy to the point of junction on the banks of the Desna. The difficulties the Swedes had experienced on the great road were nothing in comparison with what presented themselves as soon as the army commenced its southward march;—a marshy forest, to the distance of 150 miles, had to be passed, trees had to be cut down, and the army wandered 90 miles from the road it was to have taken before the error was discovered. The small time Charles would have had to wait for Levenhaupt and the convoy is manifest from the facts that he did not leave Smolensk till Sept. 26th, and that Levenhaupt having received his orders to turn southward, and march to the point of junction, leaving the great route of Moscow at Kochanow, and passing the Dneiper at Mohilew, was on Oct. 5th at a place called Lesno, having left Mohilew 60 miles behind him. Since Charles, then, on marching southward, found such immense obstacles to his march,

It is only fair to conclude that Levenhaupt, with his 8,000 wagons, found considerable obstacles, and hence that the march of Levenhaupt, after turning south, was slower than if he had kept in the direct road to Smolensk, which was the largest road in the Russian Empire; and, therefore, it appears certain that Levenhaupt being, on Oct. 5th, 60 miles past Mohilew, on his march southward, the King, had he waited at Smolensk and allowed Levenhaupt to proceed on the direct road to join him there, would not have had more than six days, at most, to wait, and these days were bringing no advantages worth mentioning to the Russians. Had Mohilew been named as the point of concentration for the convoy with its escort and the army of the King, the delay might very probably have been decreased to four or five days.

Peter, seeing that Charles had abandoned his line of operations, and knowing of the existence of the gigantic convoy, determined to throw the mass of his forces on the important fraction of the Swedes under Levenhaupt, thus exposed to all the blows his whole army could deal it, and this the more that, (as will be seen from measures which he will in the course of the narration be found to have taken,) he had the strongest reason to believe that if he could prevent the provisions and ammunition in the convoy reaching Charles, the ruin of the latter, now employed in losing his way and burying himself and army in an unknown and most desolate country, would be consummated. Accordingly, when Levenhaupt was near Lesno, the Czar appeared at the head of 40,000 men, having left orders to General Beyer to follow as soon as possible with 20,000 more. The Czar, who never encountered any danger from which he could not perceive a reasonably remunerating advantage, and remained as firm as any man before any danger whatever when he could, knew that if with 40,000 Russians well armed he could not maintain his ground against 15,000 Swedes, embarrassed by an immense convoy, the sciences and arts, particularly the mechanical manufactures and improvements which the labours of his whole life had produced, were lost to his vast barbaric empire. The yielding man seemed to feel that a moment was at hand

when all the iron firmness and cool determined valour of his powerful nature were to be called forth, to seize the opportunity which his genius, foresight, and painstaking labours had prepared. Peter was fully aware of the truth of the Principles XXXII. and XXXIII., and whereas at the final battle of Pultowa 72 pieces of artillery—an immense number in those days—swept the Swedes from the field, so in the series of engagements which terminated in the capture of the convoy he owed much of his success to that *most* important arm. So great was the prestige of the Swedish arms that the Czar felt the only way of overcoming the fears his men entertained of the Swedes was to make it more dangerous for them to retreat than to hold their ground, and accordingly placed a reserve behind his line of battle, with a powerful, well-placed battery in a commanding position, whose mission it was to fire on any one who should attempt to fly; he also decreed that any one found plundering should be punished with death, and at the same time, willing to profit by the whole power of fears, punishments and rewards, like a crafty politician as he was, promised rewards to all as soon as the victory should be obtained. Levenhaupt, without hesitating, marched to the attack, and 1,500 Russians went down at the first onset. Confusion began to introduce itself into the Russian army, but the Czar, repeating his injunctions to the reserve to fire even on himself, if he retreated, rallied his troops in person. Levenhaupt did not think proper to attack the line which the Czar in person had formed, and hoping that he had done enough to prevent the Russians from desiring to follow, continued his march to join Charles.

The next day at eleven o'clock the Czar attacked Levenhaupt, when he and the convoy were on the border of a marsh, thus applying Principle II. Case 5. The Czar extended his line so as to envelope the Swedes with his fire—a proceeding sanctioned by the marshy irregular nature of the ground, and the necessity Levenhaupt was in to protect the convoy,—thus seizing the greatest front of fire possible, and that concentric, *as well with double the numbers of the enemy to attack the enemy on both wings*

simultaneously is in accordance with the principles of Tactics. The battle lasted two hours : the Russians fell fastest, but no one fled, and the prestige of Swedish invincibility was beginning to pass to the things that were.

At four o'clock Beyer arrived with his detachment, and the battle recommenced with greater determination than ever on the part of the Russians, and the Swedes, broken and in disorder, were driven on the convoy. Night put an end to the battle, and the Swedish General, having rallied only 9,000 of his 15,000, retired, during the night, to a strong position, *having previously set fire to the gigantic convoy.* The Czar succeeded in saving 6,000 of the 8,000 wagons, which, with their contents, he of course appropriated to his own purposes. The next morning the Czar ordered the *fifth* attack, and 4,000 Swedes were killed, wounded, or prisoners ; the remainder, in number 5,000, however, crossed the Lossa, a river that flows into the Dneiper, and escaped. In these five battles the Swedes lost as many as the Russians, and the immense convoy ; and they lost, too, the prestige of invincibility, and we know that mental and psychical force, which is generally, though obscurely and improperly perhaps, called moral force, constitutes three-fourths of the strength of armies. Instead of Mazeppa, the Prince of the Cossacks, bringing to Charles at the point of junction on the banks of the Desna 30,000 men and immense stores of ammunition, provisions, and gold, as he had promised, he brought next to nothing ; for the Czar, having penetrated his alliance with Charles, not having neglected the Principle XXIV., had destroyed his army, burned his towns, pillaged his treasures, and executed his chief friends. Charles's plan had been to base himself on the Ukraine, the country of the Cossacks of which Mazeppa was Prince, and the next summer march to Moscow, thus changing his line of operations ; but the Czar had learned his plan and taken his measures, and it was only a fugitive that he had been hastening to meet at the rendezvous of the Desna : no new base or line of operations existed ; and the needless abandonment of his first line before his junction with the convoy, which was only a question of five or seven days at

most, (and time was no object, as his plan was not to go to Moscow till the next summer,) left him without ammunition, provisions, or money, and indeed hardly any artillery, for he had managed to get most of it lost in different bogs. The battle of Pultowa, though it gave proof of the military genius of Peter, was but a result, for the fate of the King of Sweden was decided, and he learned too late that no man, however brave and chivalrous, can, with impunity, violate the Principles and Maxims of War. It is to be remarked, that throughout the whole of the campaign Peter acted as far as possible up to the Principle XLIX., and profited by every opportunity of engaging in insignificant combats, which, while they decided nothing at all, rendered by degrees his troops experienced and warlike, and always cost the enemy more in proportion than a great battle. As well, Peter made good use of field fortifications, and profited by natural obstacles, in accordance with Principle L. Charles's vanity induced him utterly to disregard the Maxim III.; and whereas Napoleon operated in the presence of an army of peasants with the same caution as if Hannibal were before him, Charles, inflated by a mad and presumptuous vanity, committed, with the utmost heedlessness, fault upon fault, and folly on folly, in the presence of a man to whom Nature had been eminently lavish of every quality which constitutes the character and bent of a great general.

The disasters of Charles were brought to an end by the celebrated battle of Pultowa, a brief sketch of which is given in the chapter on Fortification; it was obtained by brilliant applications of Principles XXXII. XXXIII. L., and of the Principles of Fortification, a correct knowledge and application of which enabled the Czar to occupy a tactical front impregnable for the defensive, and which did not at all hinder offensive action when the decisive moment arrived. Indeed, Peter seems to have taught the Russians to believe in the Principles XXXII. XXXIII., and they have always been attentive since his day to the number of their pieces of artillery. The Russians showed Napoleon the necessity of augmenting his artillery if he would save his infantry and cavalry, and win battles

against them. Principle XXXIII. states, on the authority of Napoleon, that the better the infantry, the more numerous should the artillery be. Hence the British artillery should be more numerous than any other. Guns do not appear to be expensive, and neither eat, drink, or require pay or clothing. It is hardly likely the British infantry will allow their batteries to be taken. The batteries should be made to do the work as far as possible, and the infantry will protect the batteries. Perhaps six guns to every 1,000 men would not be at all too much for the British army.

It has been already said that there are three ways of containing one portion of the enemy, while the mass of the army is thrown on the remaining portion, and that one of these is by distance or time. When the enemy violates Principle I. Case 4, then it is clear an opportunity is afforded of containing the enemy by time.

It was in consequence of Marmont's violation of Principle I. Case 4, dictated by a wish to cut the British army from its line of retreat, that the Duke of Wellington was enabled to win the battle of Salamanca (the best battle he ever won) by throwing the mass of his army, or at least a much greater fraction of his army, on the left of the French, which was separated from the centre and right by a large gap of more than a mile, and by so doing to overwhelm this isolated left. The isolated left of the French was attacked in flank as well as in front, in accordance with Principle III. Case 11. A most able, accurate, yet poetical account of the battle of Salamanca, is to be found in Sir W. Napier's History of the War in the Peninsula.

As a further example to Principle I. Case 4.

In the campaign of 1757 the Austrian army, under the Prince of Lorraine, was covering Prague. The Prince perceiving that the Prussians, under Frederick, were endeavouring to overlap his right wing, ordered the infantry of that wing to execute a change of front and form a *crochet*, the angle of the *crochet* being at the right extremity of the centre, and being nearly a right angle, and the angle being towards the enemy—that is, the *crochet* was formed towards the rear. The requisite

movement in the presence of the enemy was not executed without some disorder. The heads of the columns marched too rapidly, the distances became too long, and the columns surpassed their proper length. The columns formed on the right, and the proper distances being again assumed in forming the line of battle on the right, a gap of about 1,000 yards was consequently left at the angle of the crochet. Frederick ordered a Corps d'Armée to enter by the interval, and the right of the Austrians, thus divided from the centre and left, was overwhelmed and destroyed. This manœuvre decided the success of the battle, and the Austrians retreated into Prague with loss of 16,000 men and 200 pieces of artillery.

As further examples of Principle I. Case 5, and Principle III. Case 7 :—

In 1799 Championnet commanded the French army in Italy. He sought to cut the Austrians under Melas from their communications by placing his army between them and Turin. To do this he had recourse to the odd expedient of dividing his army into several columns, which he sent to turn the Austrian army and unite in its rear. Melas, who found out the project, fell back quickly, and Championnet supposed him to be in full retreat, but his real object was *to seize the point of concentration of the isolated columns*, and defeat them separately by his great numerical superiority in each combat, which he did. This manœuvre gave Melas the possession of Piedmont.

An excellent opportunity of applying Principle III. Case 7, occurred in the campaign of 1757, but was neglected by the Prince of Lorraine, who, with an Austrian army of 70,000 men, was covering Prague. Frederick marched on Prague in two columns, of which each had its separate line of operations. The Prince of Lorraine remained inactive, and made no endeavour to anticipate the columns at the point of concentration, which there is every reason to suppose he might have done, and so have defeated them separately.

Again, before the Archduke Charles got so completely out-manœuvred and beaten in the three glorious days of

Abensberg, Eckmuhl, and Ratisbonne, he had an excellent opportunity of anticipating the French columns at their point of concentration, getting among them and defeating them separately, but he failed.

The following examples are given in illustration of Principle I. Case 8, which seems important, as it is a caution against a fault which has often been committed, and into which it does appear easy to fall :—

As the same deviations from the Principles and Maxims of War produce the same disasters in all times, an example will be taken from a somewhat early period in history. At the battle of Raphia, Antiochus having beaten and broken the opposing wing of the enemy, pursued it to a great distance, and only returned to find that Echecrates, one of Ptolemy's Lieutenants, who commanded the other wing of the Egyptians, victorious over the wing of Antiochus opposed to him, had with the Egyptian centre entirely defeated the remainder of his army. Antiochus perceiving the defeat of the rest of his forces, and finding himself unable to engage the victorious centre and remaining wing of the Egyptians, was very happy to retire to Raphia.

The great actor in the second example is none other than the great Englishman "who taught a Pope to preach moderation and humanity to Popish Princes,"—formed and disciplined an army which "came to regard the day of battle as a day of certain triumph, and marched against the most renowned battalions of Europe with disdainful confidence," (an army which *never was beaten*, and to which victory was, humanly speaking, entailed as a prescriptive right,)—crushed the united navies of the Great Maritime Republic and France—compelled, from pole to pole, a forced obeisance to the British flag, and determined that the deep should be navigable only at his will—restrained the bad practices of piratical Mahomedan Beys, and crushed the pretensions of the superstition-eaten Papistical Duke—divided the Gordian knot of Irish affairs by summarily casting out the Priests—raised his native country to a higher rank among the nations than she had ever before attained, or ever since possessed—restrained by his single life that native country

from falling into the abject French province she was under woman-ridden Charles II.,—and, finally, having, in conjunction with Blake, crippled the commerce, and captured or burned the Fleets of Spain, fully persuaded the Pope that during the lifetime of him (Oliver Cromwell), if he did not desist from his heartless cruelties to unfortunate Protestants, a very antipapistical British army would try conclusions at Rome—and during a long and troublous life having uniformly preached and practised, in a dark and bigoted age, the principles of Civil and Religious Liberty in their utmost purity, was buried among the Kings of England with a splendour surpassed at the obsequies of no one of the Plantagenets, while his vast power passed as of right to his son.

On the 14th of June, 1645, Charles I. attacked the army of the Parliament, now remodelled by Oliver, who, two days previously, had arrived from the Eastern Associated Counties, amid the enthusiastic shouts of the whole army. The line of battle of the army of the Parliament was formed along the heights near Naseby Village. On the side of the King, Rupert commanded the right wing, the King in person the centre, and Sir Marmaduke Langdale the left, the Earl of Lindsey the right hand reserve, and Lord Bord the left hand reserve. On the side of the Parliament Oliver commanded the right, composed of cavalry, Fairfax and Skippon the centre, Ireton the left, the reserves were commanded by Rainsborough, Hammond, and Pride. Rupert's wing was composed of cavalry, and it will be seen was not (as was the case at Marston, when Oliver's Ironsides rode him down) opposed to Oliver. It being premised that in those days, before flint-locks had come into use, and armour capable of turning the feeble bullets of those days was retained, cavalry was an immeasurably superior arm to what, owing to percussion-locks, and immeasurably better barrels, it is at present. Rupert's right wing, mainly composed of cavalry, charged Ireton's left wing, also mainly composed of cavalry, and finally broke it, though that brave man and his men made very stubborn resistance, Ireton himself being run through the *thigh with a pike*, cut in the face with a halberd, shot in

the side with a pistol, and in the calf of the leg with a musket, his horse, too, being shot under him, and himself finally taken prisoner fainting. Rupert pursued Ireton's wing too far, went as far as the village of Naseby, and then attacked the baggage park of the Parliamentary army which was about a mile and a half in the rear, and made into a fortification, defended by infantry, several times. He, however, failed in producing any effect; for the infantry, protected by the wagons, and firing from behind them, resisted stoutly. At length Rupert desisted, and when he got back after his too lengthened stay, found that Cromwell had in the meantime succeeded in destroying (it appears by the first charge) the wing opposed to him, then detaching a sufficiency to hold the fragments in check and pursue, returned and charged the King's infantry which were on the centre in the flank and rear at the same time that Fairfax, apprised of the manœuvre, engaged them warmly in front, and that, in fact, the King's army was, generally speaking, a perfect wreck, which he was happy to join in a very precipitate flight of twelve miles to Leicester, hotly followed. In this battle the number of the Royalists is represented in an official letter to the Speaker of the House of Commons as 12,000, the number of Parliamentarians about the same, so that neither side had half the number it put in line at Marston Moor. The trophies of this battle, fought, according to several works, on the highest table land in England, and certainly almost the exact point which a geometrician might select as the central point of England, and which decided the fate of Charles I., and apparently that of civil and religious liberty throughout Europe, were 5,000 wounded and prisoners, 1,000 killed, the whole of the King's baggage and artillery, and the Royal standard, and what was still of more importance than artillery, baggage, and standard, a cabinet of the King's autograph documents, copies of letters, &c., which, when printed by order of the Parliament, made a sad impression against him, gave in fact a most melancholy view of the Veracity of His Majesty, notwithstanding his often used and favourite expression, "On the Word of a King." The Pursuit was a model of what a pursuit ought

to be, and in full accordance with Principle XLI. it went from three miles short of Harborough to nine miles beyond, even to the sight of Leicester. Harborough Church was on the evening of the day crammed full of prisoners. The loss on the side of the Parliament was under 500 killed and wounded.

The following is an example of Principle I., Principle I. Case 7, Principle VII., Principle I. Case 8, and Principle III. Case 4.

In the campaign of 1760 the Austrians under Marshal Daun occupied an excellent position before the battle of Torgau. The left of the Austrians was at Torgau, the right on the table land of Stipitz, and the centre protected by a large pond, a natural obstacle to intersect the tactical front of the enemy, in accordance with Principle III. Case 4. Frederick divided his army into two parts, one of which he placed under the orders of Marshal Ziethen, and commanded the other in person. Frederick's plan was to make Ziethen attack the centre, while he himself turned the Austrian right, and took it in reverse. But the movement for effecting this being too extended, and there being no connexion between the two parts of his army, the plan of battle was contrary to the Principle I., the Principle I. Case 7, and Principle VII., and he was not long in discovering his error; for Daun, prepared for the manœuvre, placed his army in a favourable position, so as to defeat Frederick's attack, which he did, and forced him to retreat. Daun, having been victorious through the aid of the Principles, now, in opposition to Principle I. Case 8, pursued too far, and by separating himself, with his centre and right, from his left, allowed Ziethen, who, hearing the cannonade become more and more distant, concluded that Frederick's attack had failed and himself in retreat, followed by Daun, to take the offensive. In this way Ziethen brought a superior fraction of the Prussians to bear against the isolated left of the Austrians, defeated it, took possession, first, of the table lands of Stipitz, and then of the whole field of battle. It was after sunset when the King heard of the success of his lieutenant, returned in all haste,

profited by the night to reorganize his army, and on the morrow occupied Torgau. Marshal Daun was receiving compliments on his victory when he learned the success of Ziethen. He gave immediate orders for a retreat, and the next morning, at day-break, the Austrians repassed the Elbe, with loss of 16,000 men and 50 pieces of artillery.

ON PRINCIPLE V.

The three principal ways in which the principle can be applied, viz. 1. By employing lines of natural obstacles forming tactical bases of manœuvres and tactical pivots, and assisting these by field fortifications constructed after the correct principles of fortification. 2. By distance or time. 3. By an augmented fire of powerful batteries.

It seems as well expedient to notice two orders of battle, by the adoption of which on favourable ground the principle may be well applied, and because they are very good orders of battle in themselves. It being premised that a line of battle is always formed along any part of its length of one row of troops, two rows of troops, or two rows of troops and the reserves behind, and the reader being referred to the definition of a line of battle and an order of battle, then the two lines of battle, *a, b*, Plan 6, fig. 3, being supposed to represent an enemy to be attacked or fought with, the lines of battle, *c, d*, represent the two orders of battle spoken of; the number of lines in the fig. along any part of either of the lines of battle showing that the line is to have more or less strength at that part, as the number of the lines is greater or less. It is clear, then, that it is the right of each of the lines of battle *a, b*, which is contained by the left of each of the lines of battle *c, d* respectively, for these lefts are held back, so as to keep the weak portions of the lines *c, d* as little engaged as possible, and prevent them being attacked in flank, while the strong parts of *c, d* are engaged as hotly as possible and outflank the enemy. It is clear that the lefts of *c* and *d* must retire if necessary to keep the lines in the same relative positions with respect to *a* and *b*. A powerful battery must in general play from the left of the strong parts on the centres of *c* and *d*,

before the lefts, which are to contain the enemy only, and thus protect them.

The order *d* is approximately the order of battle adopted by Napoleon at Wagram and at Ligny, and the order he wished to adopt at Borodino and Bautzen.

ON PRINCIPLE II. CASE 3.

The following quotation from the celebrated Montecuculli may be given in proof of this Principle II. Case 3. The opinion expressed in it is the opinion of all great commanders of all times. Montecuculli says :—

“ It is *necessary* that the line of operations of an army be safe and well formed ; for every army which leaves its line of operations, and has not care to keep this means of correspondence open and secure, marches on the brink of a precipice. The army seeks its ruin, as is proved by an infinity of examples. In fact, if the road or roads by which supplies of food and ammunition, materials of all kinds, and reinforcements come to the army, be not secure from danger, and the magazines, hospitals, and stations fixed and conveniently situated, not only will the army fall away of its own accord, but is exposed to the greatest misfortunes from the enterprises of the enemy.”

As examples to Principle XVIII.

In 1644 the Prince of Condé failed in all his attacks on the entrenched position of the Bavarian army. Condé's losses were severe, and recognising the impossibility of dislodging the enemy from his fortified position, he *manœuvred to menace the communications, and the enemy fell back at once*. Hence it is clear, that had not Condé violated the Principle, he would have saved a great number of his best soldiers, and might have selected his own field of battle, or at least attacked on far more advantageous terms.

Again, Massena having failed in his attack on the position of Busaco, turned that position, and Wellington was compelled to fall back. Had Massena turned the position at once, he would have saved 4,000 brave soldiers.

Again, Talavera ought never to have been fought by Victor and the King, for Wellington's entrenched and powerful position was *already turned strategically* by Soult, and the position of Talavera was therefore already untenable. As well the position of Talavera might have been turned tactically in the way Jourdan stated. At Talavera time was bringing great disadvantages to the British; for Soult was descending on their rear, and Victor knew it; while time was bringing great advantages to the French; and if a general will, under such circumstances, or when his enemy is, without his being obliged to strike a blow, obliged already to evacuate his fortified position, attack that fortified position in front, instead of waiting till necessity obliges his enemy to quit this powerful position, and then when his enemy has been obliged to do this, manœuvre on his flanks till a brilliant opportunity presents, or at worst unite the two armies together (Soult's and Victor's), then he deserves, like Victor, to regret the loss of the brave men his incompetence destroys, to see his hopes baffled, and his detestable vanity scattered to the winds.

Marshal Villeroi, on taking the command of the army of Italy in 1701, with extraordinary presumption and incapacity, sacrificed the lives of brave men by attacking the entrenched position of Chiavi on the Oglio, and that impelled *by no show of necessity, and furnished with no justifying reasons*. The whole of the French Generals considered the position inattackable. The result was the loss of the best battalions of the French army.

As an example to Principle XXII. Marshal Turenne lost the battle of Marienthal from having violated this principle, for if, instead of naming Ebshausen as the point of concentration on raising his cantonments, he had named Mergentheim behind the Tauber, his army would have been united much sooner, and as well, instead of the enemy having to do with 3,000 men at Ebshausen, whom he beat easily, he would have had to do with the whole French army, in a position covered by a river.

As an example to Principle XXII. Case 5, the King of Prussia lost in 1758 the battle of Hohenkirch, because he

... till he was attacked in it, when he lost 10,000 men and nearly all his artillery.

The following sketch of the battle of Dunbar, is given in exemplification of Principle V., Principle II. Case 5, Principle III. Case 11, Principle XVII., Principle X., and Maxim V.

On Monday, Sept. 2d, 1650, Cromwell's army, ranged in line of battle, followed the base line of the Dunbar Peninsula, which base line, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile in length, extends from Belhaven Bay to Brocks mouth House. The left of Oliver's army was towards Brocks mouth House, which was occupied as a tactical pivot on the extreme left, and the right towards Belhaven Bay. Along the base line of the Peninsula, Oliver's army, in number about 12,000, occupied a tactical front of about a mile and a quarter in length. Before Oliver's tactical front, bounding his position, ran what in the old pamphlets is described as a large deep ditch, 40 feet deep, and 40 feet wide. Along the bottom of this ditch ran a water-course, called the Brock, whose mouth was on Oliver's left towards Brocks mouth House. This ditch, with its steep and muddy sides, formed a base of manœuvres before Oliver's centre and right, impassable to cavalry, and with great difficulty to infantry, in face of an enemy. But before his left, for the space of some 200 yards, the Brock was passable for cavalry, the steep slopes of the rest of the ditch being here exchanged for more gradual, so that cavalry could operate. The Brock and marshy ground then formed a tactical base of manœuvres before Oliver's centre and right, and it appeared clear that the attack, which ever side made it, must be made on the left of Oliver's tactical front. Behind Oliver's line of battle was the little Dunbar Peninsula, its base line, as it has been said, only about $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile in length from sea to sea, "a place of plashes and rough bent grass," according to Yorkshire Hodgson, and formed of very uneven ground, and in this stood the tents by battalions forming the camp, and this was all the ground in Scotland of which Oliver was master. The peninsula contained the town of

Dunbar and a solitary farm-house. Oliver's ships were in the offing, with a supply of biscuit and means of transport, if the winds and sea permitted, a matter by no means certain.

On the further side of the Brock from Dunbar, or on the Scotch side, was a narrow strip of ground, capable of admitting the operations of all arms, running parallel to the Brock, but beyond this narrow slip hills rose abruptly, and such that they were only passable with extreme difficulty except by certain passes.

On the morning of the same day, Sept. 2d, the Covenanters under Lesley were occupying all the passes on the tops of the hills, particularly an important pass, that of Cockburnspath, on Oliver's left, which they had made impassable, and were so placed as to be inattackable for an army one-half their number, and whose great strength lay in its cavalry. The number of the Scotch was about 24,000.

This 2d of September was a day of storms and winds, fit to sweep the tents from off the long dank grass on the Dunbar Peninsula, and the Scotch lying on the hills guarding the passes were not likely to be pleasantly affected by those storms and winds. Oliver's position appeared critical: the sea was behind him, from which he might, or might not be able at that season to obtain supplies, and on which he might, or might not be able to embark, and before him an army double as numerous as his own, and occupying the passes of wild, savage, boggy hills, so as completely to enclose him in, and being in a position from which it was very doubtful if it could be dislodged, especially by an army whose great strength lay in its cavalry. Doubtless, Oliver had partially violated the Principle II. Case 5, which seemed, however, justified by the strategical circumstances of the campaign, and no doubt he was in a critical position; but says Charles Harvey, who knew him, "He was a strong man in the dark perils of war, in the high places of the field hope shone in him like a pillar of fire when it had gone out in all the others." Here then there was a man capable of exciting and sustaining the confidence of his army.

In the morning of this Monday, however, Lesley sends

down his cavalry from the hill tops to occupy the narrow strip of ground on his side the Brock, in the afternoon his batteries come down, and indeed his whole army, and he forms his line of battle on the opposite side of the Brock to Oliver, amid wild showers and winds.

Between four and five of the afternoon, Oliver, walking with Lambert in the garden of Brocks mouth House, watches Lesley's movements, sees him descend and take up his position on the other side of the Brock, by a kind of flank march from Lesley's left to his right, and reinforce the cavalry on his right wing with the cavalry on his left.

It was an ill hour for Lesley when he determined to descend from his position, and attack in violation of the Principles XVII. and X., and Principle II. Case 5.

When Oliver saw the Scots come down, he told those near him "that the Lord had delivered them into their hands." This was a good application of Principle XXIX., and no man ever knew how to explore Maxim VII. better than Oliver; it was even better than the "*L'ennemi vient se livrer imprudemment a vos coups*" of Napoleon before Austerlitz.

Oliver's plan of battle was as follows:--He will attack by his left, forcing the passage of the Brock with his cavalry and some battalions of infantry, along that 200 yards of it before his left where this was practicable, if need be; and with his powerful cavalry attack the right flank of the enemy, in application of Principle III. Case 11, and drive the enemy's cavalry on his right wing over his infantry, and the rest of his line of battle encumbered in the narrow ground between the Brock and the Hills, and will contain him along his own (Oliver's) centre and right, by means of the Brock, across which his artillery and that part of the infantry not destined to the attack on his left will maintain as rapid a fire as possible, in application of Principle V. Oliver determines that the execution of the plan of battle should not have place till the morrow at day-break. It must be remembered that Sept. 2d by the Calendar of those days, is our Sept. 12. The night was wild and wet.

Accordingly in the morning, Oliver's cavalry being placed

wholly on his left, and the left of his line strengthened, Lambert conducts the attack to be made on the Scots' right. The Ironside Cavalry cross the Brock, and immediately the centre and right of Oliver's line open as sharp a fire as possible across the Brock; the artillery opens along his whole line. The first squadrons of the Ironside Cavalry met some resistance from the Scotch Lancers, but the contest was hardly an instant doubtful. Oliver's own regiment of foot too, on the left, likewise charged across the Brock, and a Scotch regiment went down. This charge made by Oliver's regiment of foot is said to have had a great effect in depressing the spirits of the Scotch infantry; however this may be, the Scotch cavalry fled, mostly along the narrow strip of ground between the Brock and the Hills, and over their own foot, while the Ironside Cavalry rode onwards in uncontrolled might. A general charge of horse and foot seems to have been made, as soon as the Scots were evidently wavering and beaten, and Rushworth and others write that they never saw such a charge of horse and foot. The Scotch infantry, enclosed in the narrow strip of ground, was trampled by its own flying cavalry, and by the pursuing Ironsides. The loss of the Scots was 3,000 slain, 10,000 prisoners, 30 pieces of artillery, 15,000 muskets, 200 colours, and all the baggage, and a great deal of ammunition of all kinds.

One further fact deserves to be recorded as an example of Maxim VII. Just as the decisive attack on the right flank of the Scots succeeded, and the wavering squadrons and battalions began to break and fly, the first beams of the level Sun broke over the German Ocean and St. Abb's Head. The rising of the majestic, fructifying, light-giving orb,—that great emblem of the Deity to his creatures on this earth, which rises every day alike on the slave-cultivated lands of Russia and Carolina and the free and sacred British soil, on the superstition and idolatry-darkened lands of Popery and the comparatively enlightened countries of Protestantism,—on the scene of strife at the very moment of victory, seemed to speak to and confirm the faith of Oliver in his God, to teach him afresh what he ever seemed to know so well, and so often acknowledged, "That

of this planet, arises every day upon his whole physical and moral Universe, on the evil and the good, the oppressor and the oppressed, the tyrant and the slave. "Let God arise," exclaimed the Parliamentary General, as the first beams of the rising Sun broke on the decisive moment of his victory; "Let God arise, and let his enemies be scattered."

The following is given in illustration of Principles LII. XXVIII. XI. :—

Hannibal found that there were two ways open to him by which to advance on Rome, one by the defiles of the Apennines, easy in itself, but occupied by the Roman armies; the other across the great marshes of Clusium, deemed impracticable, and therefore neglected by the Romans. Hannibal caused the marshes to be sounded, and assured himself that the physical difficulties, although very great, were not insurmountable. The road by the defiles of the Apennines was the longer, that by the marshes the shorter. Hannibal decided for the marshes, and thus furnishes the example of Principle LII. By taking this way, too, he avoided the defiles, where his cavalry, superior to that of the Romans, would have been useless, and thus applied Principle XXVIII. He had also room to hope, that as soon as he had operated his passage, the imprudent Flaminius would offer battle before being joined by his colleague, and that he would thus apply Principle XI.

To determine, supposing the enemy to attempt to turn one wing of the army by one of his wings, in what cases it may be expedient to oppose this manœuvre on his part, by turning his other wing. Clearly only when the tactical base of manœuvres, or difficulties of ground which can be opposed to the enemy, and made use of defensively before the wing of the army which the enemy is attempting to turn, is greater, better, and stronger, than the tactical

base of manœuvres or difficulties of ground before the wing of the enemy which it is attempted to turn.

It is clearly advantageous to retreat for a short distance along the edge of a marsh, of whose existence the enemy is ignorant, and across which a portion of the army with artillery may, by its fire, check, or stop the pursuit.

The following are three remarks of the Marshal Saxe, the Marshal Villars, and Prince Eugene on the Principle XXIV., the Principle XXIX., and the Maxim XI. respectively:—

“War,” says the Marshal de Saxe, “ought to be waged without leaving anything to conjecture, chance, or accident; and in this the ability of a great general is more shown than in anything else.”

Marshal Villars used to say, “that in war everything depends on frightening the enemy, and as soon as that point is gained, in giving him no time to recover himself.” Villars joined his example to his precepts in this.

Prince Eugene said, “Councils of War are of no good, except when an excuse is wanted for doing nothing.”

Under perilous and difficult circumstances, a general-in-chief ought not to assemble a council of war, but confine himself to consulting separately the most experienced officers, that he may enlighten himself by their counsels, but *decide* afterwards according to his own views. The general-in-chief will thus have the advantage of acting according to his own conviction, and the secrets of his plans will not be divulged; whereas, after a council of war, what ought to be secret is frequently divulged: besides, the Principle XXXVIII. is thus preserved from violation.

As an example to Principle XXIII.—It was by violating this Principle that Frederick lost the battle of Kollin, in the first campaign of 1757. In spite of a great display of valour, the Prussians lost 15,000 men, and a great part of their artillery; the loss of the Austrians was only 500. These numbers will suffice to show that this Principle awards a fearful punishment to its violation.

should and ought to be read in conjunction with the Part 3 of the Chapter on Fortification, in the relation of that subject to Strategy and Tactics.

Some of the Principles and Maxims have been explained, illustrated, and exemplified more than others; but this Chapter is already long, and the reader of military history will be able to explain, illustrate, and exemplify those to which he thinks this has not been here sufficiently done for himself. This chapter will now be concluded with the following article on Marches, considered in their connexion with the Principles of Strategy and Tactics.

Def. The Strategical Power of an army may be defined to be the *Capability it possesses for Strategical Operations*; in other words, the capability it possesses for war during the time which Strategy presides over war, as defined in the definition of Strategy at the commencement of the treatise.

Rapidity is then so important in war, that the Strategical Power of an army—and this is, of course, none other than the actual power which makes itself felt—is in proportion to the rapidity in marching of which it is capable. When the expression “in proportion to the rapidity in marching” is used, the words, “in proportion,” are used familiarly, and are not to have their exact mathematical signification attached to them; for, in fact, these words, taken in their exact signification, are not adequate to the case; since, by increasing the rapidity of an army in any ratio, the Strategical Power of an army is increased in a far higher ratio. Double, for example, the rapidity of an army, and the Strategical Power is manifestly not doubled, but increased many times more. By increasing in a small degree the rapidity of an army, how many plans, impossible before, become practicable! how many doubtful, certain! and how much is the decisiveness of the results which are to follow from a safe plan increased! It is by rapidity that the broken army is to withdraw itself from danger; not without rapidity can the vigour and audacity of pursuit

which are always to be extreme, banish the appearance of order from the pursued, and change retreat to headlong flight. It is by rapidity that the mass of the army presents itself unexpectedly in the midst of the enemy's columns or of his cantonments, and defeats successively the separated columns, overwhelmed *by the fire and power* of numbers, and crushed in consequence by a vastly superior artillery, against which it is impossible to undertake anything, in rapid detail. As the solidity, too, of either of the most advantageous bases of operation explained in the writer's elementary treatise on strategy, and called respectively parallel and perpendicular, and projecting angular bases, becomes diminished, even the success to be obtained from operating from the extremity of such base towards the enemy, being affected, becomes dependent more and more on the rapidity of the columns; for we know, on the authority of Napoleon, that "without a head quick to take the offensive, one would vainly for any length of time oppose to the efforts of a great captain a river wide as the Vistula, and rapid as the Danube at its mouth." The importance of rapidity is briefly discussed in the writer's treatise on strategy. This importance is, however, self-evident, and every one will see this more and more as his knowledge of military history increases. Increase the rapidity of which an army is capable, and the impossible becomes possible, imprudence changes to wisdom, doubt to certainty, and *a new sphere of operations, containing plans before absurd, lies open.*

The Power of an army is Strategic and Tactical. The Strategic power of an army has been defined, and the Tactical power of an army will be hereafter, in its proper place. The Strategic Power of an army is dependent on two elements; the one Rapidity, which rapidity is in its turn dependent *on the enlightened, anti-prejudiced, well-directed pains taken to acquire it*, and on the excellence of the Engineers and their Parks. The remaining element is, the army's power of carrying or carriage. The power of carriage—a term that perhaps explains itself—means the whole power exerted by all the men in the army, each man in carrying arms, ammunition, provisions, and neces-

saries for himself, and in the special corps of wagons organised for the purposes of carriage. Rapidity, then, and Power of Carriage are the two elements of the Strategical Power of an army; and their relative importance varies with the fertility and resources of the theatre of war, because the more provisions and resources are found in the country, the less important the power of carriage becomes. Rapidity appears to enter in general in point of importance with respect to power of carriage in the ratio of about four to one. It may be remarked that the power of carriage is not absolute, but varies with the habits and wants of the army. Thus an army which, on the supposition that each infantry soldier should carry any given number of pounds, each cavalry soldier another given number of pounds, &c. &c., and should by so doing have ammunition, *provisions*, and necessaries for ten days, would have greater power of carriage than one in which every foot soldier and every horse soldier should carry double these same given numbers of pounds, and yet be only provided for nine days. The writer has heard that the Black King of Hayti pays great attention to the speed and distance of which his soldiers are capable, and is in this as much in advance of certain White Governments and Potentates as his Royal Blacks would be at the end of a race with certain white battalions. Mrs. Beecher Stowe might in fact be quite proud of his Black Majesty in this particular, and show from his proceedings the natural *quickness* of the African Races generally. It has been said that the power of carriage depends on the habits and requirements of the army. An anecdote is related of the Duke of Wellington, to the effect that, very shortly after entering the army, he weighed one of his men in his arms, &c., and afterwards out of them. In this, then, he was experimenting on the power of carriage of the army, in order to determine that, and from that its strategical power, and thus obtain a measure of the magnitude of the strategical operations of which it was capable. The young officer did, as the anecdote goes, attach a serious importance to the weighing proceeding, a result of superior knowledge and investigation, at which the bystanders expressed astonishment and ridicule.

Def. The Tactical Power of an army may similarly be defined to be, the capability the army possesses for tactical operations; in other words, its capability for war during the time which Tactics presides over war, as defined in the definitions of Strategy and Tactics.

The Tactical Power of an army is dependent on—

1. Its Physical force for combat.
2. Its Psychical and Mental force for combat.
3. The intrinsic excellence of its evolutions of minor tactics.
4. The rapidity with which it is capable of performing its evolutions.
5. The excellence of its armament.

Having now premised the important influence which the pace at which an army can move exercises on the plans which it is possible or expedient for the general to form, the discussion of the leading problem of marches, in its relation to the Principles of Strategy and Tactics, will now be proceeded with in as general a way as appears possible.

In order to the consideration of this leading problem, let there be supposed to be *a general*, who, of course, must be *at a certain place*, and who has received information on which he has decided to act, either of his own accord, or because he is obliged to do so, and who may or may not know *the position the enemy's army occupied at a certain time, and the rate at which the enemy is accustomed to march*. In fact, it is necessary to the purpose in hand to suppose nothing more or less than a general who is at a certain place, and has received such information respecting the enemy that he has decided to act, either of his own accord, or because he is obliged. Let it be supposed, too, that the Corps d'Armée and Divisions of the army which this general commands are scattered,—a Corps d'Armée, perhaps, on one part of the frontier, another on another part, a third in and about some large fortress, such as Strasbourg, a Division or two at another fortress, &c. &c. In fact, to give the leading problem of marches, in its relation to the Principles of Strategy and Tactics, in all its generality, the general's army must be supposed to be scattered. The general now takes the best map he can

get, and with pins having heads of different colours, or stuck through little pieces of different coloured cards, to indicate the different bodies of his own and the enemy's armies, indicates the positions of the opposing armies, as his information makes him believe them to be, by sticking the pins in the map. The general, of course, knows the position which the whole of his own army occupies, or which it occupied at any time; he may, perhaps, know where each of the principal bodies of the enemy were at different times. It is not, however, here a question of the amount of information the general may possess, or its kind; or the way he puts the pins into the map; though it may be concluded that he will think good to put in such pins *in some way or another*, i. e. *according to some rule*: he might, for instance, mark all the enemy's bodies in the positions he believed them to occupy *at one and the same time*; he might find it better to mark the places they occupied at different times, according to his information; or he might find one or other of these two ways given as examples impossible, or both, or partially so. That which is the subject of consideration here is the general way in which marches, with their rapidity, and the circumstances which influence that rapidity, enter a general's combinations. To state, then, the general way in which marches and their rapidity, with the circumstances which influence that rapidity, enter a combination:—

The general having considered his information as to the positions of the two armies, and the configuration of the theatre of war, and the probable plans of the enemy, &c., and being, as it has been supposed, decided on acting, voluntarily or under necessity, *will decide on a certain position, or on certain positions, which he would like his army, either entire or in two, three, or more bodies, to occupy at a given fixed time*,—thus according to his calculations ensuring a favourable strategical position relatively to the position which the enemy will at that time occupy. In fact, the execution of a general's plan will always turn on *the having his army in a certain strategical position or positions,—the army being in a single mass or divided at a certain fixed time*. It is clear that it is on this that the

combination will and does in all cases turn ; whether, for example, it be proposed to take up a certain strategical position at a certain fixed time, in order to intercept the union of the enemy's columns at their point of concentration, and defeat them in detail ; or to be on the enemy's communications, one's own remaining covered ; or at one extremity of the enemy's strategical front, along which it is proposed to pass the mass of the army ; or in any case whatever. It being decided, then, that the combination will always turn on this, the general is now to be supposed to have decided that, *if at a certain fixed time he can be in a certain strategical position*, he will be in a position, relatively to the enemy, such that he will be either already reaping or in train to reap great advantages. The consideration of the rapidity of marches, and the circumstances affecting their rapidity, has already entered the combination before the strategical position and the fixed time are decided on as being the right thing, *if attainable* ; because the general, before suggesting to himself a certain strategical position, at a certain fixed time, must at least have promenade his compass open at a distance of say twenty miles, (which, supposing him to measure in straight lines along the general direction of the roads, would in general for every twenty miles of the straight line give twenty-four of road, taking turns and twists into account,) and become pretty well acquainted with the prominent distances on the map, the size of the theatre of war generally, and uniting this roughly with the strategical power of his army, and the estimated strategical power of the enemy, have roughly ascertained whether it is possible to attain *the* certain strategical position at the certain fixed time, and whether the enemy can be, and is likely to be, in the corresponding position he has attributed to him. The consideration of marches having, then, thus far entered the combination before the strategical position at the fixed time is suggested, the position at the fixed time being suggested, the consideration of the rapidity, and circumstances affecting the rapidity, of marches, again enters into the mental discussion of the combination by the general, and he has to decide—

1. (1) By a consideration of distances, configuration and nature of the theatre of war, and strategical power of his army, as to the actual amount of probability that he can at the fixed time be in the fixed position ; (2) *and at what time each of his bodies must start in order that the different bodies may arrive simultaneously, each in its allotted position.*

2. By a consideration of distances, configuration and nature of the theatre of war, and estimated Strategical Power of the enemy ; whether it is possible or impossible for the enemy to execute any decisive manœuvre which will overthrow the combination, and turn the strategical advantages of position in his favour.

This, then, is the general problem of marches ; and having thus introduced and stated it, the discussion of the solution may be proceeded with.

The Problem has been divided into two parts. The discussion of the second part is no other than the discussion from more imperfect and less reliable data of the first of the two divisions of part 1 ; for the general has, in order to solve the second part, only *to make the same calculation with respect to* the supposed position of the enemy, the distances on the map, the configuration and nature of the theatre of war, and the strategical power of the enemy, and any position into which he sees that if the enemy could place himself it would interfere with the success of his plan, which he makes in solving the first division of part 1, with his own known position, the distances on the map, the nature and configuration of the theatre of war, and the strategical power of his army, in order to see if he is able to be in the fixed position he wishes his army to be in at the fixed time. Hence the discussion of part 1 will alone be entered on ; more would be recapitulatory.

The first thing, then, manifestly to be done in the solution of the problem, is to determine the time which each of the separate bodies—the army being supposed disseminated, to give all possible generality—will require to march from the position it occupies, to the strategical position it is to have *at the fixed time*. To show how this is to be done for one corps, is to show how it is to be done for all.

First, then, to state the different things which have to be taken into consideration in determining the time which an army, or column of an army, will require to move from one given point to another given point.

1. The distance between the two points, or the distance between the points estimated in *marches*.
2. The ordinary general rate at which the army marches ; or, to explain better, the *marching power of the army* ; because marches may be forced, and so the expression, " ordinary general rate," becomes inadequate.
3. The size and character of the road, or roads, which are chosen for the strategical line of the column ; the nature of the country, more or less difficult ; the resources of the country.
4. The Parks, more or less considerable, which are to accompany the column.
5. The greater or less importance that the march of the column should be concealed, and the consequent necessity of precautions which occasion delay.
6. The information received as to the obstacles which the enemy has thrown or is likely to throw in the way of the march of the column.

Then, *by an exercise of judgment*, the general determines the shortest time in which the march can be done. If he be able to give the column more time than the shortest possible, he gives it, if he pleases, by starting the column sooner.

It is to be remarked that, when time presses, and a march has to be performed in the shortest possible time, or thereabouts, the *security the general has that he will have the column at the end of its march, in the place fixed, at the hour fixed, lies in a general knowledge and conviction throughout the whole army, and which ought to be most sedulously inculcated into all ranks, that the Safety and Honour of the whole army, and of every column of it, depend on the exact execution of every march which may be ordered, more than on anything else*. If unexpected difficulties arise, so must unexpected efforts : brave men are made to surmount difficulties, not to be beaten by them. Let that of

the Principles, too, be remembered which states, "That an army passes everywhere, and at all seasons, where two men can stand abreast;" nor should Hannibal's passage of the Marshes of Clusium, deemed impracticable by the Romans,—Napoleon's passage of the Alps, with its difficulties augmented by the Fort of Bard,—the retreat of the 10,000,—the passage of the Beresina,—or Charles the Twelfth's march into Russia,—be forgotten.

As a matter of course, the security the general has for an exact execution of a march,—however unexampled, and whatever its unexpected difficulties,—depends on everything on which the success of every one of the operations of an army depends; but *the inculcation of the knowledge and conviction spoken of above, in all ranks*, seems to deserve especial attention, for many weighty reasons. It is, then, the military excellence of every kind—of the soldiers forming a column, and of the officer commanding it, and the general determination of all ranks to be at the appointed place at the appointed time, if it even involve apparent impossibilities—that can alone ensure the exact execution of the general's strategical plans, and with them the Safety and Honour of the army.

We have, then, now arrived at the part of the discussion where we suppose the general to have determined the shortest length of time required for each of the columns to march from its present position to the appointed one.

To illustrate the question thus far, let the day on which the general is making his combination be supposed to be Sept. 1st; let the army be divided into four bodies—A, B, C, D; stationed at four different places—*p, q, r, s*: let the fixed time at which they are to have their new strategical position be Sept. 12th; and let P, Q, R, S, be the new positions of the four bodies, respectively.

Let the general have decided that the least time in which A can march from *p* to P is 8 days; B from *q* to Q, 7 days; and similarly for C and D, 6 days and 3 days, respectively.

Then the combination is possible if an order can be carried from the place at which the general is, to *p* in 3 days, to *q* in 4 days, to *r* in 5 days, and to *s* in 8 days.

The combination being found possible, the general gives each of the columns as much time as he thinks fit, compatibly with time allowed to each of the columns to accomplish its march. Then the general, having decided at what time any one of the columns is to march, sends an order to the officer commanding it, stating the time of starting, the place he is to go to, and the time he is to be there. The order is accompanied by a document containing in general,—

1. A condensation of the most important information of all kinds respecting the strategical line which the column is to take.

2. Positive orders for the particular emergencies which it is possible may arrive.

3. Instructions as to the conduct of the march, to be observed at discretion.

4. Bodies on the right and left with which he may have to cooperate, and as much of the general plan as it is necessary for the officer to know.

5. Anything important respecting the enemy which is known. Instructions, *to be followed at discretion*, and information are *alone* sent to the officer charged with the march of a column. Orders which require positive execution may be found inexecutable and absurd, and will only embarrass. The column must be at the appointed place at the appointed time; this is the only absolute order given, and the officer in command must give a very good reason indeed for failure in its execution,—his military reputation is embodied with the success of the march. The officer then ought to be left free and unembarrassed in his movements: assist him all that is possible by the best information which can be obtained, lucidly and clearly given, and by instructions as to the conduct of the march, all of which he may find it highly expedient to follow, and be very grateful for; but by none of which should he be bound for a moment as if it were an order.

CHAPTER VI.

ON THE PASSAGE OF A GREAT RIVER, THE PASSAGE OF WHICH THE ENEMY WISHES TO DISPUTE.

It was said by Napoleon that the greatest obstacle which could present itself to the march of any army is a Desert, the second a Chain of Mountains, and the third a Great River. It is certain that the passage of a great river whose bridges are broken, and which is not fordable, in face of an enemy wishing to oppose it, is among the most difficult operations in war. A small river may be passed by means of the pontoons, and other machines and materials for the construction of bridges carried by the engineers accompanying the army or column. In the passage of a great river it is necessary to have recourse to the system of requisitions, and seize the barges, boats, wood, &c., necessary to the construction of the bridge, as near as possible to the point which is determined on to be the point of passage. The passage of a great river, the passage of which an enemy wishes to dispute, may be effected—

1. By Stratagem.

2. By Force.

3. By Stratagem and Force combined.

The last method is the most frequent, because, if the enemy be moderately watchful, he is nearly certain to have some troops in the neighbourhood of the point of passage ready to oppose the passage before it can be completed. The more successful the stratagem the less troops the enemy will have to oppose at the point of passage.

It is the Principles of Strategy which indicate the *neighbourhood* of the point of passage; thus, when a great river forms a *parallel and perpendicular base of operations*, (i. e. approximately parallel to the enemy's communications, and perpendicular to those of the army,) the *neighbourhood* of the point of passage would be in general towards

that extremity of this base which lies towards the enemy, in consequence of the Principle of Strategy which says—“Operate as far as possible on the communications of the enemy without exposing your own;” or, taking a more simple case referring to the Principle IV. that principle indicates in what cases the point of attack on the enemy’s strategic front lies on the centre, and when on one extremity.

The *neighbourhood* of the point of passage being then determined by Strategy, the particular point is then to be chosen and determined upon from the six following conditions. The Conditions, which the point of passage of a river must satisfy, in order that it may be as favourable as possible for the army passing the river, are—

1. The bank passed from must be higher than, and therefore command the bank passed to.

2. The river must form a curve, the curvature must be considerable, and convexity towards the side passed from, so as to permit the establishment of batteries crossing their fire, and thus cutting off, separating apart, as it were, and taking possession of, a piece of ground on the opposite bank, and protecting the establishment of troops thereon.

3. An Affluent should enter the main river on the side passed from, near the point of passage, to facilitate the collection of barges, boats, &c., and the carriage of materials to the point of passage, (for in war water-carriage is in general very vastly easier and more rapid than land,) and up which Affluent the troops may embark in the barges or boats protected from the enemy’s fire.

4. There should be small woods, villages, &c., on the side passed to, provided the artillery can, from the side passed from, flank them and cross behind them, and sweep the plain in which they stand between and around them, so as to prevent succour arriving to any of the enemy’s troops which may occupy them, and they are inadequately occupied, for if these can be taken possession of, they form tactical pivots for the army, and greatly strengthen the *tête-de-pont*, which the infantry, flanked by the artillery, (the heavier the better,) firing from the opposite bank, must form and be till the bridge is finished. It is clear that the more tactical pivots there are on the side passed

to—as a part of a town, a large stone building, woods, &c., provided they are unoccupied or quite inadequately occupied—the better.

5. The bank passed from should be well furnished with bushes, small woods, brushwood, &c., to conceal materials and men, and this bank should afford good cover for riflemen, who will probably be wanted to line it in great numbers.

6. The slope of the banks of the river should be gentle, especially on the side towards the enemy, and the point of passage should be in the neighbourhood of good roads on both sides of the river.

7. There should be an Isle at the point of passage, in which materials, &c. may be hidden, and behind which barges, boats, &c. collected; as well the Isle, by dividing the stream into two parts, and protecting one part from the enemy's fire, diminishes the breadth of water to be crossed under the enemy's fire, and the length of the bridge to be constructed, to one-half, or about.

The point of passage being thus fixed on, *its Neighbourhood by Strategic reasons, and its exact Situation by the six preceding considerations*, the great object now becomes to make the enemy think the real point of passage is some other point than that decided on; which false point shall be at as great a distance as possible under the circumstances from the true one. It is said “under the circumstances,” because one has only the choice between those points which offer some ostensible advantages, at least generally speaking. The enemy would not believe in a pretended point of passage if it appeared an absurd or very disadvantageous one.

Before describing in general terms the operation of effecting the passage of a great river, it may be stated that it cannot be effected in the actual presence of an enemy at all equal in force to the army, and ready to dispute the passage.

It being supposed, then, that the detachments of the enemy opposite the real point of passage, and in the neighbourhood, are not too numerous, the enemy being deceived as to the real point, and that the pontoons, machines, barges, boats, wood, &c., are ready in the Affluent, if there be one, behind or in the protecting Isle, if there be one, and no Affluent, or if there be neither,

as near as possible to the bank, hidden behind woods, in villages, &c., then everything being ready for the operation at break of day, batteries are placed in commanding positions on the right and left, so as to cross their fires on the other side—thus, as it were, taking possession of a quadrilateral piece of land on the other bank—sweep the opposite bank, and drive away the detachments of the enemy, or compel them to hide themselves, and silence any artillery which the enemy may bring to oppose the passage of the boats, or injure the bridge while in course of construction. In order to be able to silence any guns the enemy may be able to bring up, it is highly expedient to be provided with siege artillery. As well the breadth of the river is to a certain extent against the artillery of the army wishing to pass, and in favour of the defending enemy, and this difference requires to be made up by weight of metal, and consequent extent of range. Riflemen lining and distributed along the edge of the bank on the side passed from, as thick as possible in reason, and behind as far as may be any shelter which may be available, will assist the artillery very powerfully indeed. At the same time the barges and boats are brought from their hiding-places, they either descend the Affluent, come from behind the Isle, or are lowered from the bank into the water when there is neither Affluent nor Isle. The barges and boats are immediately filled with infantry, and pass over as rapidly as possible. The first battalions that arrive on the opposite bank seek to establish themselves as well as possible, profiting by the tactical pivots which may present, or, in default of any, by the undulations of the ground, hedges, enclosures, &c., while the artillery—the heavier the better—by crossing its fire before them, puts them in a position to resist very superior numbers. Two advantages to the mental and psychical properties of the soldiers accompany these successive passages in boats. The courage of the soldiers is increased, both by seeing themselves cut off for the moment from all hopes of retreat, and by the certainty of speedy succour, while every moment their position betters.

The object of the battalions which cross in the barges and boats, is to drive the enemy from, and obtain possession

of, all the obstacles, villages, buildings, little woods, &c., in fact, tactical pivots, greater or less, which are in the proximity of the point of passage; in fact, to avail themselves artistically of all the advantages and accidents the ground may present, to make themselves as soon as possible into a *tête-de-pont* flanked by the artillery, to protect the establishment of the bridge.

As soon as by the successive transports of infantry the force on the other side, aided by the artillery, has obtained undisputed possession of the other bank, the barges, pontoons, machines, &c. for the construction of the bridge, are brought forth from out the Affluent, from behind the Isle, or from their hiding-places wherever they may be, and the bridge is constructed with, of course, the greatest despatch. It may be stated that the artillery ceases its fire and changes its position, so soon as the increased numbers of the infantry on the opposite bank render the fire dangerous to them. It then seeks new positions whence to sweep the opposite bank, flanking the infantry as much as possible.

During the construction of the bridge some engineer officers are occupied in tracing the fortifications for a *tête-de-pont* to protect the bridge and ensure a means of retreat, in case of disaster to the army in its future operations. Such a precaution is never to be despised, no matter how great the apparent superiority of force which one possesses.

The bridge being completed, the Artillery, Cavalry, and the rest of the Infantry cross it, and take up their position on the opposite side. It is best to construct the bridge above the place of passage of the boats, because the shock of the boats which continue to cross during the construction of the bridge, and which any accident, as the loss of their conductors, might allow the stream to drive against the bridge, might be injurious to the operation of constructing the bridge, or to the bridge itself. This is, however, liable to exception when the stream is not rapid, and other conveniences outweigh this danger.

Not only the Strategical artifices for deceiving the enemy by collecting men and materials on some distant probable point or points of passage as already mentioned, but all kinds of artifices are to be employed, in order to divert the attention of the enemy from the true point, on

the day of passage itself. Thus a large battery may keep up a heavy fire at a distant point, the heads of pretended columns may be shown in different places, &c. In war a good Dodge or Artifice is never to be despised, according to the Maxim XV.

In illustration of the preceding, the instructive history of the passage of the Limmat under Massena in 1799 will be now given ; it must be read with a map of Switzerland : any good map will suffice. Without a map, this narrative, as, indeed, all military history, is best left alone.

Passage of the Limmat under Massena in 1799.

Massena occupied the left bank of the Aar from Klignau to the junction of the Aar and Limmat, the left bank of the Limmat, and the western shore of the Lake of Zurich. The general Knochemmoff, at the head of a Russian army, had a no less extended strategical front, occupying the right bank of the Aar from Klignau to the junction of the Aar and Limmat, the right bank of the Limmat, and the eastern shore of the Lake of Zurich. A second Russian army, under Souwarrow, was descending from the Alps to join Knochemmoff. According to the Principle of Strategy which states that one of the great objects to be uniformly looked after in all military operations, is "To bring the mass of one's forces successively into collision with fractions of the enemy," Massena determined to effect the passage of the Limmat, and, if possible, engage and defeat Knochemmoff, before his junction with Souwarrow, and afterwards in turn engage the latter, thus engaging the two successively in application of the Principle. Massena having decided on this, the Principle IV., *q.v.*, next indicates, that the point of attack of Knochemmoff's strategical front is towards the centre, and hence that the point of passage of the Limmat should be *in the neighbourhood* of Schlieren, or on the centre of the Russian strategical front. Then the conditions which the point of passage of a river must satisfy in order that it may be as favourable as possible, determine *the particular point* out of the neighbourhood already assigned.

On looking at the map it will be seen that the river, forming a considerable bend at a point in the neighbourhood of Schlieren, with its convexity the right way, *i. e.*

towards Massena, (which point is near the village of Dietikon,) that point satisfies the condition 2.

This point also satisfies condition 1, for the left bank does command the right.

And the condition 5.

And the condition 6 as well as any other point does.

And the condition 7.

Hence the conditions 3 and 4 remain alone unsatisfied, there being no Affluent or protecting Isle. But it is very important that one of these unsatisfied conditions should be satisfied. It will be seen how that of these two which requires an Affluent to serve for the collection of barges, boats, machines, materials, &c., by furnishing water carriage, &c., was supplied as far as possible under the circumstances. And here, at the risk of discursiveness, as the subject has incidentally arisen, the great advantages which water carriage frequently possesses in war over land carriage may be remarked. In a despatch from Napoleon to his brother Joseph, the following words occur,—“From Saragossa to Tudela the land carriage is 3 days” (i.e. 72 hours); “the water carriage is only 14 hours, wherefore to have the besieging artillery and stores at Tudela is the same as to have them at Saragossa.” Nor does it appear at all likely that Railroads will affect the question, for, admitting they will serve for the strategical concentration of armies entirely out of the sphere of the enemy’s activity, yet their operation appears so easily deranged by pulling up very short pieces of the rail, or putting pieces of iron across, &c. &c., especially if done on the tops of bridges, viaducts, &c., or by mines, that it does not appear probable they will be of any use in or near the sphere of the enemy’s activity. The effect of a battery opening on a railway train remains to be seen.

To continue the narrative. On looking at the map, it will be seen that the town of Bremgarten on the Reuss is distant about 5 miles from the point decided on for the point of passage, and that there is a road, though not a very good one, nearly the whole way. The river Reuss, then, must supply the purposes of the Affluent for the supply and collection of barges, boats, and the collection of machines and materials by water, and these all must be

carried across to the Limmat by land from Bremgarten, a distance which, it has been said, is 5 miles.

There is, it will be seen from the map, a point also *in the neighbourhood* of the centre of the Russian strategical front which has an Affluent, but this point of confluence satisfies no other of the required conditions, and the Affluent is very small and unimportant compared with the Reuss for the purpose of collecting barges and boats, &c., by means of which latter it will be seen barges, &c., could be collected from *even the Lake of Neuchatel 90 miles distant*.

Though the Reuss could neither answer the purpose of an Affluent in conveying the barges, boats, materials, &c., quite to the very point of passage, nor shelter the embarkation of the Infantry destined to cross in boats, yet it had the advantage of awakening less the suspicions of the enemy.

The false strategical point, at as great a distance as possible from the true one, decided on in this case for the purpose of turning on it the attention of the enemy, was Brugg, on the Aar. At that place ostensible preparations were made; two of the largest barges from the Lake of Lucerne were formed into a moveable bridge, rafts were constructed, requisitions of tackling, oars, &c. made, and in fact the attention of the enemy was directed successfully towards this point, *12 miles distant from the true one*. The real preparations were made by collecting barges and boats on the Reuss itself, and by it from the Lake of Zug, and even from that of Neuchatel, 90 miles distant by water from the true point of passage. The barges and boats from the Lake of Neuchatel were brought down the Aar with the current, as will be seen by map, and up the Reuss. In this way twenty-seven barges destined to the transportation of the Infantry were collected one by one at Bremgarten, and carried to the point, where they were hidden behind and in a little wood. The barges destined to the construction of the bridge were taken from the bridge of boats at Rottenshwyl on the Reuss, where, to prevent suspicion, they were left till the last moment, viz. till the evening before the day on which the passage was to be effected, when, the bridge being taken to pieces, the barges were brought down to Bremgarten.

One thing is to be remarked;—the great distance of river and lake over which boats and barges were collected for the passage.

During the night before the passage, the barges and boats destined to the transport of the Infantry were carried silently to the bank of the river, and the artillery placed so as to cross the fire and protect effectually the disembarkation of the Infantry.

There was, in particular, a body of 2,000 Russian Grenadiers in the immediate proximity of the point, and a portion of the artillery was so placed as to cut these as far as possible from the point of passage, and throw howitzer shells into their encampment. A battery was also placed opposite the village of Otwill, to play across and intercept the communication by the road from Wurenlos to Zurich on the other side of the river, and prevent assistance coming to the 2,000 grenadiers. A strong Division was placed in position across the road from Dietikon to Schlieren, to oppose any offensive movement the garrison of Zurich might attempt during the operation of the passage. The artillery made its disposition during the night with extraordinary order and silence. The infantry destined for the passage was arranged in order at fifty paces distance from the bank. As early dawn began to break, notwithstanding the height of the bank above the water, the barges and boats were launched into the stream, and the Infantry, to the number of 600 men, mounting readily the opposite bank, chased away 200 Cossacks, who formed an advanced post. Now the waters of the Limmat rippled and vibrated beneath the atmosphere shaken by the French Artillery, and howitzer shells searched after the Russians in their encampment.

As soon as the success of the Infantry on the opposite bank was certain, and the battalions having, on finding themselves decidedly superior, charged, and driving back the enemy made good their *tête-de-pont*, the barges, machines, and materials, which had till then remained in the village of Dietikon, advanced at a fast trot. In two hours and a half the bridge, with rampe and road which led down to it, were finished. By this time 8,000 Infantry

were on the opposite bank, because, according to the Rule, the boats continued crossing Infantry during the construction of the bridge. The Artillery, Cavalry, and remains of the Infantry, defiled over the bridge, four hours after the commencement of which the French army was united in the position of Fahr.

Companies of Swimmers are of use in crossing a river. They may draw their arms after them in very small light boats constructed expressly for the purpose, each of which two, or even one man, might readily carry. Where silence is required, such companies might be of great use, and, of course, the more rapidly an army can cross a river, the greater the probability of the success of the undertaking, for the less time the enemy will have to concentrate and oppose the passage, and the more means an army has of crossing, the greater will necessarily be the rapidity with which it will pass. There can be no difficulty in forming companies of swimmers, as it is only to collect together men who can swim. All soldiers ought, of course, to be able to swim well, for if the opportunity or occasion for swimming rarely occurs, the consciousness of the power of doing so in case of need gives confidence where a man has anything to do with the water.

In the passage of a river, as in all the operations of war, according to the Maxim XV. a good dodge, artifice, or trick is an excellent thing; decidedly it is of importance that a soldier should possess a very ready invention, a natural turn for mechanism and mechanics of all kinds, and a great power of adapting himself to all circumstances, and all circumstances to himself.

The two circumstances which form the only points of interest in the passage of the Dwina by Charles XII. will here be mentioned in illustration of the preceding remark, and of the subject of this Chapter generally, which are—

1. That before he ordered his barges to cross he waited for a favourable wind, and lighted great masses of wet straw and underwood, &c. which he had collected, and thus made a great smoke, which the wind drove across the river, by which means he greatly obscured the view of the

river about his point of passage, and the enemy not being able to see well through the very thick smoke which the wind was driving in their faces, their fire was very ineffective, and the boats got over with scarcely any loss.

2. That he had his boats made expressly with very high sides, bullet proof, over which and through loop-holes in which the men could fire as over a parapet, and which high sides, *fixed on hinges*, lowered like little drawbridges, and thus assisted as well the disembarkation of the Infantry from the boats.

Here, then, was a good trick, and a tolerable employment of mechanism, and certainly where invention and ingenuity can economise the lives of brave men they ought always to be exercised, nor ought the fear of being considered an innovator in such a case be allowed to weigh.

It is manifestly out of the scope of this Treatise to enter into all the details of the passage of a great river, for that would fall within the province of a Treatise on Military Engineering. The reader is referred to the accounts of the two passages of the Rhine at Rehl, and that of the Danube at Hæchstädt in 1800, classic accounts of which have been written by General Dedon. The passage of the Danube at Esling by Napoleon, who appears to have himself been one of the best engineer officers, to say the least, in his army, *in face of an army of 120,000 Austrians, with 400 pieces of artillery*, in one of the points where the bed of the river is broadest, is perhaps the most extraordinary on record, with the exception of the passage of the Bérésina on the world-wide retreat from Moscow, which passage, the celebrated Jomini says, was in his opinion miraculous in every respect. A General Pelet has written an account of the Passage of the Danube at Esling. This article will now be concluded with an account of—

The passage of the Douro in the year of our Lord 1809, May 12th.

The Passage of the British army under Sir Arthur Wellesley took place on the above date close to the town of Oporto. The passage was disputed by 10,000 Frenchmen under Soult. The measures which that general had taken were the destruction of the bridge, the bringing over to his side of the river all the barges and boats on the Douro, the

Tamega, and the small affluent which enters the Douro on its right bank above Oporto. Soult was deceived by Franceschi's report, which induced him to believe that the passage would be attempted by means of the vessels which were erroneously supposed to have landed Hill's Corps from the *Ocean* at Ovar. Hence Soult took up his station on the morning of May 12th on a mound, which is inserted in the Plan 5, westward of the city, where he could see the Douro to its mouth, and the guards above the city were few, and placed at wide intervals, while the patrols were not vigilant. It will be seen from the plan that the bank of the Douro, just above Oporto, forms a projecting angle, surmounted by a hill, on which the Serra Convent, to which the letter *a* is affixed in plan, stands. Behind this hill, or height, the British army was concentrated and concealed before eight o'clock of the morning of May 12th. The British army in this position is in plan painted light red. Before the army rolled a deep and rapid river, more than 300 yards wide, and the means and dispositions of passage in face of Soult's 10,000 men remained to be found.

It will be seen from the figure, it being remembered that dark brown represents houses, or collections of houses, by the convention for the plans, that there was a large isolated building, to which the letter *b* is affixed, called the Seminary, on the right bank. This building, easy of access from the river, was surrounded on three sides by a wall, extending down to the water's edge, and the river on the fourth side, and the only entrance into the area so bounded was by an iron gate on the side opposite the river. No French posts were near, and the direct line across the river to the Seminary was hidden from the town by the Serra rock. The Serra rock offered a position on which to place a large battery, flanking the Seminary on the side towards the French, *i. e.* towards Oporto, and compelling them to attack the Seminary, when troops had been placed in it on the side opposite to the river. The fire, or battery, too, so placed, crossed the French line of retreat by the Vallonga road. It happened that a poor barber had come over the preceding night, *i. e.* the night of May 11th, in

a small skiff. Colonel Waters discovered him, and these two, with the Prior of Amarante, who, in despite of his peaceable mission or calling, did not appear to have been a member of the Peace Society, nor to have fasted over much, and who gallantly offered his services, crossed the river, and returned all three of them in half-an-hour each with a large barge. At the time when the gallant trio, to wit, the Priest, the Colonel, and the Barber, started to cross the river, General John Murray was sent with the German Brigade, the 14th Dragoons, and two guns, three miles up the stream, to the Barca di Avintas, with orders to look for boats and pass if possible. During the half hour the trio were absent 18 guns were placed in battery on the convent height. On their return with the three barges, some British troops were sent to support Murray, and others cautiously approached the river, hidden by the Serra rock. As soon as the first boat reached the bank, it being now ten o'clock, an officer and 25 men embarked, and in a quarter of an hour were placed in the Seminary, the French still remaining unsuspecting in Oporto. The point of passage of the boats, hidden by the Serra rock from the French, will be recognised in the plan. A second boat followed, and was unobserved. A third crossed higher up the river, and then "tumultuous noise rolled through Oporto;" but before continuing the quotation from Sir W. Napier's History of the War in the Peninsula, of which this is the commencement, it is necessary to state that the dark red and dark yellow positions of the British and French given in the plan, the British being dark red, were simultaneous positions, and that the time at which they were in these positions, and how they came into them, will appear clearly from the text. A third crossed higher up the river, and then "tumultuous noise rolled through Oporto, the drums beat to arms, shouts arose in all parts, and the people were seen vehemently gesticulating and making signals from their houses, while confused masses of troops, rushing out of the city by the higher streets, and throwing out swarms of skirmishers, came furiously down against the Seminary. The British soldiers instantly crowded the river bank, Paget's and Hill's

divisions at the point of passage, Sherbrooke's where the boat bridge had been cut away; but Paget himself, who had passed in the third boat and mounted the roof of the Seminary, fell there deeply wounded, whereupon Hill took his place. The musketry, sharp and voluble, augmented as the forces accumulated, and the French attack was eager and constant, their fire increased more rapidly, and their guns opened on the building, while the English guns from the Serra commanded the enclosure and swept the ground on the left so as to confine the assault to the iron-gate front; but Murray did not appear, the struggle was violent, the moment critical, and Sir Arthur was only prevented crossing in person by the interference of those about him and the confidence he had in Hill.

"In this state of affairs some citizens came over to Villa Nova with several great boats; and Sherbrooke's men were beginning to cross in large bodies, when a long loud shout in the town, and the waving of handkerchiefs from the windows, gave notice that the French had abandoned the lower city: at the same time Murray was descried coming down the right bank of the river. Three battalions were now in the Seminary, the attack slackened, and Hill advancing to the enclosure wall poured a destructive fire on the French columns, as they passed in haste and confusion along his front on the Vallonga road; five guns then came galloping out of the town, but, appalled by the terrible line of musketry from the enclosure, the drivers pulled up, and while thus hesitating a volley from behind stretched many artillerymen in the dust, and the rest dispersing left their guns on the road. This volley came from Sherbrooke's men, who had come through the town, and thus the passage being won the Allies had the right bank of the Douro. Sherbrooke from the city now pressed the French rear, Hill from the Seminary sent a damaging fire on the flank of the retiring masses, and far on the right Murray menaced the line of retreat; the rear of the army was still passing the river, but the guns on the Serra rock searched the French columns from rear to front as they hurried onwards.

"If Murray had fallen upon the disordered crowds their

discomfiture would have been complete; but he suffered column after column to pass without even a cannon-shot, and seemed fearful lest they should turn and push him into the river. General Charles Stewart and Major Hervey, impatient of his timidity, charged with two squadrons of dragoons, and riding over the enemy's rear-guard, as it was pushing through a narrow road to gain an open space beyond, unhorsed Laborde and wounded Foy, yet on the English side, Hervey lost an arm, and his gallant horsemen, receiving no support from Murray, had to fight their way back with loss. This finished the action, the French continued their retreat, the British remained on the ground they had gained; the latter lost twenty killed, a general and ninety-five men wounded; the former had five hundred men killed and wounded, and five guns were taken. A quantity of ammunition, and fifty guns, the carriages of which had been burnt, were afterwards found in the arsenal, and several hundred men were captured in the hospitals.

"Napoleon's veterans were so experienced, so inured to warfare, that no troops could more readily recover from a surprise. Before they reached Vallonga they were again in order with a rear-guard; and as a small garrison at the mouth of the Douro, guided by some friendly Portuguese, also rejoined the army in the night, Soult, believing Loison was still at Amarante, thought he had happily escaped the danger. Sir Arthur Wellesley now brought over his baggage, stores, and the artillery, which occupied the 12th and 13th; and though Murray's Germans pursued on the morning of the 13th, they did not go more than two leagues on the road of Amarante. This delay has been blamed. It is argued that an enemy once surprised should never be allowed to recover while a single regiment could pursue. The reasons for halting were, that part of the army was still on the left bank of the Douro, and the troops had outmarched provisions, baggage, and ammunition; they had made eighty miles of difficult country in four days, during three of which they were constantly fighting, men and animals required rest, and nothing was known of Beresford."

CHAPTER VII.

ON CERTAIN OF THE PRINCIPLES OF FORTIFICATION, AND ON THE RELATION
OF THAT SUBJECT TO STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

PART I.

THE Principle XXVI., which is equally a principle of Strategy and Tactics, has to be taken into consideration; and is a guide in the construction, both of the largest permanent fortresses of all kinds, the largest permanent *têtes-de-pont*, and all field fortifications.

The following is also a principle of fortification. There is no tactical front or position so good, or so bad, but it may always be considerably improved by field fortifications constructed on some part of it, according to the Principle L.

The Principle V. of Tactics explains how the mass of the forces is to be carried on to the decisive point of the field of battle, by containing the enemy along another part of the tactical front; which is to be done, 1. By natural obstacles; 2. By distance or time; 3. By a very augmented fire of artillery. It is clear, then, that along any part of the line of battle, along which it is wished to contain the enemy, *i.e.* prevent him from driving back and breaking this part of the line in by means of a much less number of men than he attacks it with, and at the same time do him all the harm possible by cannonading him, and in repelling his attacks if he makes any, while the mass of the forces are thrown on another part of his line, the containing part of the line should, whenever time allows, be strengthened by field fortifications, made in accordance with the Principle XXVI.; thus constructing a tactical base of manœuvres.

The following is, then, a principle of fortification:—

Along every part of a line of battle along which it is intended to contain the enemy, remaining on the defensive

for that purpose, whether it be intended to remain on the defensive along the whole line or along a part, the line should be furnished with field fortifications, placed at intervals, constructed so that they will not interfere with the offensive movements which may be necessary even to the defence of a part of the line on which defence is alone decided upon, according to the Principle XXVI., or with any subsequent purely offensive movements which it may be necessary to make on this portion of the line of battle.

The following is another principle of fortification :—

Field fortifications are never to be formed by continued lines; but are always to be formed by detached works, mutually flanking one another, separated by unfortified intervals; and are always to be closed at the gorge, either with palisades, chevaux-de-frise, or a deep ditch, over which cavalry cannot get without the greatest confusion, if at all: this is, of course, only the case when the detached works are not regularly parapeted all round.

The following is another important principle of fortification :—

That of all kinds of fortresses which can be constructed so as to answer any purpose, that kind of fortress is to be chosen which can be defended by the least number of men.

That of all kinds of fortresses which can be adequately defended by the *same number of men*, that kind of fortress is to be chosen which can also be advantageously defended by the greatest number, and from which the greatest number can operate offensively.

That of all fortresses which can be adequately defended with the same number of men, and be advantageously defended by the same greatest number, that is to be chosen which commands the possession of the greatest area of ground and of the adjacent communications.

Or this principle may be otherwise stated, as follows :—

It is an universal principle of fortification, and that too most important to be remarked, that in all fortification, field and permanent, whether it be the strengthening a position of battle, a tactical pivot, a tactical base of manœuvres with field works, in building a fortress of the

largest size, in entrenching a camp, or in fortifying any line of country or any barrier,—that which is to be aimed at is, not to form a continued line or circumference, or part of a circumference, which the enemy cannot pass, and out of which, if the enemy be in front, it is equally impossible for the army to advance, and into which the army cannot retire without difficulty, encumberment, and loss if the enemy is pressing it; nor is it to make the greatest amount of fortification to enclose the smallest possible area of ground; nor to build an immense incubus which requires an army to defend it properly; but on the contrary, what is required is to form a line, or circumference, or part of a circumference, which the enemy cannot pass, but out of which the army can readily and advantageously pass, and into which it can with the greatest readiness retire, however hard pressed, with a certainty the enemy cannot follow; and to make the least possible amount of fortifications to enclose the greatest possible area of ground; and to construct a fortress such that it can alike be held defensively by a few, and be an advantageous field of battle for an army, and that whether the army operates offensively or defensively.

Hence the field fortifications along any portion of the line of battle along which it is intended to take the defensive, in order to apply the Principle V., or along the whole line of battle if it is intended to take the offensive along the whole line, the fortification should consist of detached works, forming tactical pivots, closed at the gorge when of the kind to require it, and mutually flanking one another, which must be placed on two or more rows, so that lines or columns of attack, Cavalry, and Artillery, may easily advance from between the intervals; because, according to Principle XXVI. "offensive movements are the foundation of a good defence," and as the time may come, as it will be remembered it did at Austerlitz, when the offensive has to be taken with rapidity, vigour, and audacity, even along that part of the line of battle along which at the commencement of the battle no more was to be done than to contain the enemy and remain entirely on the defensive.

ject, made by Peter the Great at the decisive battle of Pultowa, accompanied by a just appreciation of the value of artillery on the part of that extraordinary mechanical genius—not by the adjective “mechanical” at all disparaging his genius in other things, for it does appear that the title of “Great” was only justly applied—may be remarked on.

The Czar’s line of battle was slightly convex, the two extremities resting on the river which flows past Pultowa. Having then a large river directly at his back, it might appear that he was grossly violating the Principle II. Case 5; but this was done from calculation and wisdom, though contrary to the principle. The reasons were that the dispositions of the Czar, the fortifications he had erected, and the immense superiority he possessed in artillery, rendered his success so nearly certain that the principle might nearly be neglected on this account only; and that the prestige of the Swedish arms was in those days so great that on a previous occasion the Czar had been obliged to set apart artillery with orders to play on any who fled, and to tell this manœuvre to his army, in order to keep them up to the contest; hence, therefore, there was on this occasion a similar exercise of judgment in placing a river behind his army, having previously given his men 999 chances of success out of 1,000 in their favour, if they stood up like men, which the large river they saw behind them compelled them to do. And here an occasion presents for stating to the reader that though the principles of war hold almost always, yet they do not hold quite always; but this is of little moment as regards their efficacy and value, for the exceptional cases are very rare and will always be readily recognised. There are, to illustrate this, medicines which administered in 999 cases out of the 1,000 are productive of a cure, but in the single case are found to fail: would it not then be absurd to say that great progress in the science of medicine has not been made when a remedy for 999 cases out of 1,000 of any particular disease has been discovered? And so with the principles

and maxims of war. The Czar's line of battle was supplied with tactical pivots, formed by detached redoubts placed at proper intervals. These redoubts were not only furnished with musketry but with artillery, and in all, along the Muscovite line there were the incredible number for those days of 72 pieces of artillery. Between the redoubts, in the intervals, the infantry and cavalry were placed; the latter on the wings, ready to attack the Swedes as soon as they had been thrown into confusion by the fire of the redoubts, which fire does not at all exclude the fire of artillery and of deployed battalions placed in the intervals. Charles XII., with only 4 pieces of artillery, advanced to the attack; and the Swedish cavalry, though very superior to the Muscovite, was completely broken by the latter, aided by the fire of the redoubts; for the Muscovite cavalry was enabled to charge offensively from between the redoubts whenever their fire had disordered the Swedish cavalry, and escape between the redoubts again when hard pressed. The Swedish infantry too, formed in line of battle, attacked the redoubts; but the fire was too hot to be borne even by that infantry, and it was indeed shattered to pieces by the fire before it could arrive at the redoubts. Then the Muscovite infantry, issuing from between the redoubts, and charging, finished the battle.

From the last of the preceding principles it follows,—that the large fortresses of a state ought in general to be formed of detached, completely enclosed, casemated, bastioned forts, mutually flanking one another, and enclosing the greatest possible area of ground consistently with adequate defence by the garrisons of the numbers which can be allowed to them, and commanding as directly as possible all the communications around their sites, and to form the tactical pivots of an extremely advantageous tactical front, which an entire army might occupy defensively as an impregnable position, and from which it might issue offensively without hindrance or encumbrance, having ample space to do so. In fact, large fortresses should be vast entrenched camps, properly constructed in masonry.

When a battery is likely to remain a long time in the

position it occupies in a field of battle, especially if a large battery, and at all exposed to the attacks of cavalry, a ditch cut round it (which will be improved by stakes at the bottom with sharp points) is a powerful means for its safety. The sides should be as steep as the ground will cut. A ditch, which it is little trouble to make, stops the effect of a charge of cavalry. If the entrenched battery at Borodino had had a ditch along the gorge, over which infantry could pass, comparatively speaking, readily, the French Cavalry would never have taken it.

It is incontestable that field fortifications were too much neglected during the wars of Napoleon.

PART II.

ON THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES TO THE CONSTRUCTION, AND ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF TÊTES-DE-PONT.

BASES of operation, both the primary or great initial base, and the subsequent successive base of operation and strategical bases of manœuvres, are *in general* formed by, or at least contain on some part of them, either a great river, or a chain of mountains. *In general* this is the case, but while stating this fact as a necessary introduction to the subject to be treated on, it may be as well to call to the mind of the reader that a line of sea-coast of any extent, may, to a maritime power which shall have, or obtain possession of the fortresses and harbours (which will be naturally coincident) along it, be a very good base of operations, especially since steamers have been brought to their present perfection, and particularly on a favourable coast; vast marshes, swamps, and impassable forests, too, may likewise form the lines of bases of operation; and it may be remarked, that the full definition of a base of operations is as follows:—

Def.—A base of operations is defined to be a piece of ground of any size or shape whatever, from which an army may or does derive its supplies, and towards which it might retreat in case of disaster.

This definition appears perfectly general, and includes the cases in which a single sea-port town may be a base of operations, as Konisberg was for the Russo-Prussian armies in the Friedland campaign; and likewise a portion of the extremity of a promontory, separated from the main land by lines of fortifications, of which a ready example is found in the entrenched camp of Torres Vedras, with its 3 enclosing lines of fortifications. The exterior of these lines, about 29 miles in length, with a portion of the Tagus about 29 miles in length, and the Ocean to the extent of 26 miles, formed an area of ground nearly in the form of an isosceles triangle.

Having introduced this apparent digression for the sake of clearing up matters as progress is made, and preventing erroneous conclusions as far as may be, it will be repeated in order to introduce the subject of this second part of the chapter—

That Bases of Operation, both the primary or great initial base, and the subsequent successive bases of operation and strategical bases of manœuvres, are in general formed by, or at least contain along some part of them, either a great river or a chain of mountains. And of these two, rivers and mountains, rivers are the more general.

A small knowledge of military history will suffice to show how very large a portion of strategy is occupied by manœuvres involving, and indeed based on the offensive and defensive use of a great river as a base of operations, or as a strategical base of manœuvres. By the offensive use of a river—as, for example, when the river forms a base of operations of either of the most favourable kinds spoken of and explained in the writer's elementary treatise on Strategy, as, for example, a projecting angular base, or a parallel and perpendicular base. By the defensive use—as, for example, where a river forms the frontier of a state. Not to neglect examples, take the Danube, forming the parallel and perpendicular base used by Napoleon in the Austerlitz campaign, and bounding his line of operations on the north; the Mayn, a parallel and perpendicular base for Napoleon in the Jena campaign; the projecting angular base formed by the Warthe and Oder; the double

parallel and perpendicular base formed with the sea-coast of the Adriatic when in possession of a maritime power, by the Po and the Adige, two great rivers, protecting either flank of the line of operations which runs between them, and which, with Venice, made impregnable from the land side, a matter of the greatest ease, appears to afford the strategical key to the conquest of Austrian Italy by a maritime power. And, lastly, the following quotation with respect to another double parallel and perpendicular base on a far larger scale, viz. the Elbe and the Oder, including the lines of operation between them and protecting them, in the same way as the Po and Adige, on either flank, from Sir W. Napier's History of the War in the Peninsula, may finish the examples, and strengthen them with the weight it is calculated to impose.

“ Nevertheless Napoleon's genius triumphed at Dresden over the unskilful operations of the Allies directed by Schwartzberg, whose incapacity as a commander was made manifest in this campaign. Nor would the after misfortunes of Vandamme and Macdonald, or the defeat of Oudinot and Ney, have prevented final success, but for the continuation of a treachery which seemed at the time to be considered a virtue by sovereigns who were unceasingly accusing their more noble adversary of the very baseness they were practising so unblushingly. He had conceived a project so vast, so original, so hardy, so far above the imaginations of his contemporary generals, that even Wellington's sagacity failed to pierce it, and he censured Napoleon's long stay on the Elbe as an obstinacy unwarranted by the rules of art. Yet he urged as a reason for not invading France the emperor's tenacity in holding Dresden; thus showing how widely the moral influence of that position was felt. Napoleon had more profoundly judged his own situation. The large forces he left at Dresden, at Torgau, and Wittemberg, blamed by shallow military critics, were essential parts of his gigantic plan. He quitted Dresden, apparently in retreat, to deceive his enemies; but with the intention of marching down the Elbe, recrossing that river, and throwing his opponents into a false position. Then he would have seized Berlin,

and re-opening his communications with his garrisons both on the Elbe and the Oder have operated between those rivers; and with an army much augmented in power, because he would have recovered many thousand old soldiers cooped up in the garrisons—an army more compact and firmly established also; because he would have been in direct communication with the Danes and with Davoust's force at Hamburg, and both his flanks would have been secured by his chains of fortresses on the two rivers. Already had Blucher and the Swedes felt his first stroke; the next would have taught the Allies that the lion was still abroad in his strength, if at the very moment of execution his marshals had not opposed his views, and the Bavarians, on whom he depended to check the Austrians in the valley of the Danube, had not made common cause with their opponents, and marched together towards the Rhine. The battle of Leipsic followed; the well-known treason of the Saxon troops led to the victory gained there by the Allies; and Napoleon, now the prey of misfortune, reached France with only one-third of his army; having on the way however trampled in the dust the Bavarian Wrede, who attempted to stop his passage at Hannau."

As examples of the defensive employment of a great river which forms the frontier of a state, the operations of the French armies on the Rhine, in the wars after the Revolution, may be adduced.

Because there the operations based on, proceeding from, and completely involved with the offensive manœuvres by means of rivers, the offensive defensive manœuvres by means of rivers (remembering the Principle XXVI.), and the defensive manœuvres by means of rivers (always a *pisaller*), form so large a part of strategy, and that these all depend greatly for success on the effective and efficient strategical employment of a river, which in its turn depends in all cases most essentially on the excellence of the *Têtes-de-pont* of the rivers, it has been thought expedient to treat of the guiding principles to the construction and of the ways of constructing *Têtes-de-pont*. And while speaking of the number of the offensive and defensive strategical operations depending on rivers, it may not be thought

useless to insert the following quotation from the Archduke Charles. It may be stated that the quotation is a commentary on the Principle XXVI.

“There is no better defensive attitude than when positions are occupied which continually menace the enemy with an attack, and oblige him to think of his own safety. Nothing is better calculated to effect this object than *têtes-de-pont*, behind which the troops are cantoned. All other positions may be turned; but a *tête-de-pont*, properly constructed, placed out of the power of a *coup-de-main*, and perfectly covering the passage it defends, is subject to no one of the disadvantages so formidable to other positions, because it can never want either a sufficient garrison, or provisions, or ammunition; and the enemy is obliged to observe incessantly an outlet, from which superior numbers may be thrown upon him.”

It may be not unworthy of remark that in the cases in which a base of operations is formed by a chain of mountains, possessing as a consequence *defiles*, and when a base is formed by a great river, unfordable, possessing bridges, and when a base is formed for a maritime power by a line of coast possessing seaport fortresses, harbours towards the sea and fortresses towards the land, the defile of the mountains, the bridges of the river, and the seaport fortresses of the coast line, are analogous points; they are the decisive strategical points of the bases; and it is from them equally that offensive and defensive operations are based and proceed. Having then alleged and explained the great importance of *têtes-de-pont* in so large a class of strategical operations, and the consequent importance of excellence in their construction, as the reason of the introduction of this part of the chapter on fortification into the treatise, the subject may be proceeded with.

The *têtes-de-pont* of which it is proposed to treat are those destined to *protect the retreat and facilitate the offensive egress of an army or great detachment, and to render the approach to, and therefore the passage of, the bridges covered impossible for the enemy*. They are the *têtes-de-pont* to be placed on great rivers, when any very important strategical line passes a great river.

The purposes of these *têtes-de-pont* then are,—

1. To protect the passage of a great river by an army, or great detachment in retreat.

2. To protect and facilitate the offensive passage of a river by an army, and its egress on the opposite bank.

3. To render the approach to, and therefore the passage of, the bridge it covers impossible for the enemy.

When the fortifications lie almost wholly on one side of the river, there being only a few works, and those for the purpose of supporting the former on the other side, and the fortifications being only constructed to answer the three great purposes mentioned as those which *têtes-de-pont* are to serve,—viz., the purpose 1, provided the army is retreating towards one of the banks of the river only (or towards the right bank or the left bank only), intending to pass to the other; the purpose 2, provided the army is passing offensively *to that same bank*; and the purpose 3, provided the army is endeavouring to pass *from that same bank*. The *tête-de-pont* formed by such fortifications is called a *Single Tête-de-pont*. And when, on the contrary, the fortifications lie about equally on both sides of the river, and are constructed so as to answer the 3 purposes equally on whichever of the 2 sides the army is retreating, to whichever of the 2 sides the army wishes to pass offensively, and from whichever of the 2 sides the enemy wishes to penetrate to the other, they form a *Double Tête-de-pont*. And it is proposed to treat on the Single and Double *Têtes-de-pont* successively, and to treat on the former first is the most natural and convenient order.

And first on Single *Têtes-de-pont*.

The Principles 3 and 5, which are principles both of Strategy and Tactics, require that the *têtes-de-pont* should be so constructed as to be capable of being efficiently defended by the fewest men possible; in other words, that the purpose 3 may be efficiently executed with as few men as possible.

And the purposes 1 and 2 require that they should be so constructed as to form both a most advantageous defensive and offensive field of battle for the greatest number possible.

Moreover the purposes 1 and 2 require that the fortifications to be erected should by their bodies, which they must for this purpose interpose, protect the bridge and the area of ground before it from the enemy's fire, or shall by their fire remove and keep the enemy at such a distance, that he shall not be able to turn his fire on the bridge, or said area of ground before it; or partly protect the bridge by the interposition of their bodies, and partly by removing the enemy by their fire from the neighbourhood of the bridge.

That, then, which is to be done in constructing a *tête-de-pont*, is to form by permanent fortifications, assisted or not by fieldworks, a tactical front on the ground before the bridge, or, in other words, to furnish with one or more great tactical pivots which are to be in permanent fortification, assisted or not by field works, a tactical front on the ground before the bridge, which tactical front shall, with its fortifications, be capable of being held against the enemy by the fewest men possible, and of being no less capable of being occupied offensively or defensively by an entire army.

It is hoped, then, that the problem to be solved has now been distinctly enunciated,—a great point towards the solution of many problems.

It will be seen that since the fortifications *are to be capable of being held by the fewest men possible* for the longest possible time, and that these few will have to dispute the passage against an entire army, the following principle is arrived at.

PRINCIPLE.—If a single large enclosed bastioned fort can be placed so as to serve as well the purposes of a *tête-de-pont* as any other system of fortifications, it is to be preferred to all others.

Now it will be afterwards shown that a single large fort *can almost always, if not quite always*, be so placed as to answer all the purposes of a *tête-de-pont* better than any other system whatever. This will, it is hoped, appear at once to the reader as he proceeds. The dictum of Napoleon to this effect naturally deserves remark. Again, since the *tête-de-pont* is to protect the bridge head and the area of ground immediately before it by its body or by its fire,

remove the enemy to such a distance that he shall not be able to fire on the bridge or area of ground before it, and that it is to form both a most advantageous offensive and defensive field of battle for an entire army, to protect a retreat or facilitate an offensive movement, the next principle is obtained at once.

PRINCIPLE.—The single large enclosed bastioned fort is to be placed as nearly as possible exactly opposite the bridge, and at as great a distance as possible from the river consistently with its fire entirely and completely interdicting to the enemy an approach to the bridge.

As a proof, then, of the truth of these two principles, let us proceed to see how a hexagon with sides in length 500 yards each, directly in front of a bridge, and placed at the distance of 500 yards from the river, operates and answers the purpose of a *tête-de-pont*. Let the river be supposed to run in a straight line, and let the bastioned fort constructed on the hexagon be so placed that the capital of one of the bastions, which will be coincident with one of the three diagonals of the hexagon, is perpendicular to the line of the river, and in the same straight line with the bridge, (see the Plan VI. fig. 2,) and the angle of the bastion 500 yards distant from the river.

It is not stated, it must be remembered, that the hexagon is more advantageously placed when in this position, that is, when the capital of one of the bastions constructed on its sides is perpendicular to the river, than if the hexagon had a side parallel to the river, or were in any other position; nor is it at all meant to say that the advantages of a hexagon over a heptagon or pentagon are considerable. The only reason why a hexagon is taken and placed in this particular way is that *the explanation is shorter*, and the effect of the fortress *more easily described and readily seen* in this case, owing to an accident of geometry. Also the front of fortification being taken at 500 yards seems as well to require observation. This is certainly larger than ordinary, but perfectly justified by the increased range of musketry. It is the length of *the line of defence* considered with respect to *the range of musketry*, from the flanks of the bastions which kept the front of fortification to the

limits Vauban assigned, but the length of the line of defence in a front of 500 yards is much less compared with the present effective range of musketry, than the line of defence in any of Vauban's or in the Modern System, compared with the effective ranges of musketry for which they were calculated. But whether the front be taken at 500 yards the explanation is not changed at all, and the effects are scarcely at all altered.

The following construction will explain the figure which will be found Plan VI. fig. 2.

The river is painted light green, according to the convention for plans, and the bridge over it dark burnt sienna.

A perpendicular to the river is drawn from the centre of the extremity of the bridge, and a distance of 500 yards is measured off along this from the bank of the river.

Measure off the same distance again, and with its extremity furthest from the river as centre, describe a circle and place a regular hexagon in it, having two of its angular points in the perpendicular by Euclid's construction for that purpose. The circle is dotted in the figure.

The sides of the hexagon so constructed are manifestly each 500 yards, and it is, therefore, the one spoken of, and placed in the right position, and on its sides the bastioned fronts of the fort are to be constructed; they are not inserted in figure because that is not found to be necessary.

It will be seen at once that two of the sides of the hexagon are perpendicular to the river.

Let the two angular points of the hexagon *not* in the perpendicular and furthest from the river be joined, and this straight line, which is manifestly parallel to the river, produced both ways. The line is dotted in figure. Let also the two angular points not in the perpendicular and nearest to the river be joined, and the straight line, which is manifestly also parallel to the river, produced both ways like the other. The line is dotted in figure.

Then the fire of the fronts of the fortress constructed on the sides of the hexagon perpendicular to the river may be approximately considered as sweeping the ground included between the two dotted straight lines thus drawn parallel to the river to the extent of 1,000 yards on each side of

the fortress. And the length of the portion of each of these two straight lines included *within* the fortress is found from the formula (the side of the hexagon being 500 yards) :—

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Log.}_{10} (\text{length of portion included}) \\ &= \log. 500 + \log. \cos. 30^\circ - 10 \\ &= 433 \text{ yards nearly.}\end{aligned}$$

Hence the fortress and the fire of its sides perpendicular to the river may be considered as *interdicting* the enemy from a portion of ground 500 yards in width, and 2,433 yards, or about $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile in length, having its centre opposite the bridge, and having its furthest bounding (dotted) straight line at the distance of about 1,220 yards, or about $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile from the river.

In this approximation to the effect of the fire of fronts of the fortress perpendicular to the river, the approximation falls short of the truth, for the fire of the curtain and of the bastions can manifestly not only sweep this area between the dotted lines, but a good deal of ground on each side of it.

Again: the fire of the two sides next the river do manifestly most effectually prevent the enemy from crossing the bridge, being near enough to use grape if they please at its most effective range. There is, then, no fear of the enemy passing the bridge, so long as this *tête-de-pont* remains untaken, and, in case of retreat, pursuit by the bridges is perfectly stopped till the fortress is taken; in other words, pursuit is baffled completely.

The effect of the two remaining sides compels the enemy to a circuit, and makes him keep a respectful distance, but this effect need not be spoken of in explaining the capabilities of the fort as a *tête-de-pont*. Their effect is felt on their completing the enceinte of the fortress, and enabling a small garrison to hold the *tête-de-pont* against an army which has nothing else to do except open the trenches and besiege the fortress, which will give time for the arrival of the army and the termination of any decisive strategical operation it is engaged in.

The fortress being a single *tête-de-pont* supposes that the

holders of it are masters of the opposite bank. Then heavy batteries, placed at 1,500 yards or at a greater distance on either side of the perpendicular line on the opposite side of the river to the fortress, and firing across the river, complete the enclosure of an area of ground interdicted to the enemy, whose length they may augment to 2, $2\frac{1}{2}$, or even 3 miles, and whose breadth, referring to the figure, is more than 1,200 yards, or about $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile. Hence it is clear that it may be safely said the hexagon, assisted by the two batteries (for which small casemated forts may if thought necessary be built) on the other side, renders inattackable an area of ground in length $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and in breadth $\frac{3}{4}$ of a mile, perfectly capable of receiving an army in retreat, and protecting it while the army defiles across the bridge, however long in reason that process may require. Also the army finds no difficulty in entering this protected area in retreat, for it might clearly if it pleased form itself in line of battle, and march into it in that state, so large is the entrance. And, again, every facility is presented to an army which is about to cross the bridge offensively, for it finds a sufficient space for forming its line of battle before advancing to the enemy, in which space it is perfectly safe from an offensive movement on the enemy's part. A red strip represents a line of battle which an army, after crossing the bridge to take the offensive, might form under cover of the hexagon and batteries on opposite bank in perfect safety, before proceeding to drive the enemy from the neighbourhood of the *tête-de-pont*, supposing him to be there. And lastly, calling attention to the fact that whereas other single *têtes-de-pont* only prevent the enemy crossing the bridge from one side to the other, viz. from the side on which the *tête-de-pont* is, the single large fort, which is equally *only a single tête-de-pont*, interdicts equally the passage of the bridge to the enemy both ways. The works of other *têtes-de-pont* are taken in rear and reverse by an enemy coming to the bridge from the other side. In this, however, *têtes-de-pont* formed of two or three scattered detached enclosed forts which the nature of the ground may require, to replace the single one, of which it is about to be treated as forming the next best

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tête-de-pont, are to be excepted. It may be remarked, that there is no reason why a large parapet of earth should not be raised up round the bridge-head when a single fortress is used as a *tête-de-pont*. It may be useful, and is good as a precaution, and it costs no more than the labour, for it need only be of earth, and need be of no particular profile. The two lines, *aa* in figure, represent what might be the ground plan of it, and other traverses, *bb*, so placed that the artillery from the fort may fire in the direction of the length, so that an enemy may not be able to use them for shelter, may also be placed for the protection of the bridge. These traverses will be solely for the purpose of receiving any shot the enemy might send at a bridge from a long range, and compelling him, if he is determined to fire at a long range on the bridge, to come close down to the water's edge to do so, when the batteries from the other side will open on him.

A consideration of the conditions which a *tête-de-pont* must satisfy in order to its excellence and effectiveness, indicates the second best kind of *tête-de-pont* is formed by a system of detached enclosed forts, and the fewer and larger they are the better; situated on an approximate arc of a circle, having the extremity of the bridge on the centre of its chord, and the chord in length approximately 2,000 yards, and its perpendicular sagitta 500 to 1,000 yards. It is to be remarked that the extremity of the bridge is in the centre of the *chord* of the arc of a circle, not in the centre of the circle itself, and that the area of ground included by the system of two or more detached enclosed forts is *not* approximately a *sector*, but a *segment* of a circle.

It is clear from what has been said, that the conditions which the system of forts is to be constructed so as to satisfy, are—

1. That the system be such as to be capable of the longest defence by the fewest men.

2. That it shall be equally capable of interdicting the passage of the bridge to the enemy from whichever side he may wish to come.

3. That the system shall be such that some work or

approached, or by which the bridge might be issued from.

4. That the system shall form the pivots of a tactical front large enough and very advantageous for an army, whether the army may wish to advance offensively from out the area enclosed by the system, or may wish to retire into the area enclosed by the system.

From these conditions the following conclusions are drawn :—

That it would be better if the number of the detached forts exceeds two (perhaps it would be better if it exceeds one), to have the forts casemates. The condition 2 indicates that it is much better to have the forts bastioned or parapeted all round, instead of being only palisaded, &c. at the gorges. That the less the number of the forts and the larger, the better, because the difficulty of taking a fort is not directly proportional to the increase of the magnitude of the fort, but the difficulty of taking increases much more rapidly than the size and number of the garrison. The subject of this second best kind of *têtes-de-pont* will be concluded with a description of the *tête-de-pont* of Aarberg, whose name will sufficiently indicate to the reader that it belongs to a bridge over the Aar in Switzerland. This *appears* to be a bad *tête-de-pont* of the worst of the two kinds, and bad of its kind, because, first, there appears to be too many separate works, and secondly, because the works are not parapeted or bastioned all round. The *tête-de-pont* is not yet finished, but when it is, the exterior enceinte is to be composed of 10 detached works of different forms and sizes. The arc of a circle to which this enceinte approximates in shape has its chord of from 1,500 to 1,600 yards, and its perpendicular sagitta of from 600 to 700 yards. Three only of the 10 works have been constructed; they are the 3 principal ones, and have the ordinary relief of large fortresses of the modern system. These 3 works are situated on the heights, and command, as directly as possible, the principal approaches; the remaining seven are not to be made till there is a good chance of the *tête-de-pont* being wanted, because the Confederation entertain a laudable

regard for the interest of money. In considering the *tête-de-pont*, it must not be forgotten that the 7 works remain to be made, and the 3 principal ones have to be palisaded at the gorges. The *tête-de-pont* has likewise a *réduit* constructed before the bridge, and which is a great *redan-à-ailerons*.

As an example to the *têtes-de-pont* of the best kind. Turenne, in the campaign of 1645, was driven on to Philipsberg by a very superior force, and there was no bridge over the Rhine, but he encamped *between the fortress and the bridge, under the protection of the guns of the fortress in the area, analogous to that which has been shown in the case of the hexagon to be protected.*

As an example of the fact that the construction of a *tête-de-pont* is the construction of the tactical pivots of a tactical front before the bridge, &c. &c.

In the campaign of 1741, the Marshal Saxe, having crossed the Moldaw to attack a detachment of 14,000 men, which had just been thrown into Prague, left 1,000 infantry on the Moldaw, with orders to entrench themselves on a height which was directly opposite the bridge. The Marshal ensured his retreat by the power he thus obtained of ranging his army between the entrenched height and the bridge. The Marshal did, in fact, *only construct a tête-de-pont* (though not a permanent one) *of the best kind.*

With regard to the *Double Têtes-de-pont*.

As to their construction, all that appears necessary to say is, that the construction of a double *tête-de-pont* is nothing more than the construction of two single *têtes-de-pont* exactly opposite one to another. As to the great strategical advantages of a double *tête-de-pont* constructed after most correct principles, they are so many, so great, and so manifest, that it would be absurd to be diffuse on so ample a subject. They are among the richest jewels in the strategical theatre. Any one who has read the writer's treatise on Strategy, and this treatise thus far, will, it is hoped, be convinced of the vast value of double *têtes-de-pont* and appreciate somewhat the vast field for decisive strategical manœuvres which they open.

It would of course be best always to have double *têtes-de-pont*, and no single. This expense prohibits, and the general principle for placing the single and double remains to be enunciated.

PRINCIPLE.—The more or less parallel a river is to a line of operations, the more or less important is it that the *têtes-de-pont* should be double.

Hence, the more perpendicular a river is to a line of operations, the less important it is to have double *têtes-de-pont*.

Hence, too, it is clear that the rivers forming bases of operations of the best kinds, as the parallel and perpendicular bases, and projecting angular bases, are to have double têtes-de-pont.

It is explained in the writer's elementary treatise on Strategy, how a system of fortresses for the defence of a country is determined. Among the most decisive strategical points of a country which are to be chosen as the sites for fortresses, those which demand *têtes-de-pont* will be very prominent. And it also follows from the principle, *that in fortifying a country it is more or less necessary that a tête-de-pont at a decisive strategical point over a river, should be double according as the river to which it belongs leads more or less directly from the centre of the country to the frontier.*

Thus, for example, taking the map of France, the *têtes-de-pont* on the Garonne and Rhine may be single, while those on the Rhone, the Loire, the Seine, the Marne, should be double, as well as those on the Meuse, supposing the Rhine to be the boundary of France.

Def. The fortifications about the point of junction of a river with a monster affluent, and lying equally on the three angles of ground around the point, so as to answer the purposes of a *tête-de-pont* from whichever of the 3 ways the enemy may come, and on whichever of the 3 ways the army may go, is called a *Triple tête-de-pont*.

On Triple Têtes-de-pont.

The principles of fortification indicate that the best way to build a fortress at the junction of two great rivers, or,

in other words, at the junction of a great river with a monster affluent, since one of the rivers is always the affluent, is to build 3 closed bastioned forts, one in each of the 3 angles of ground around the point of junction, placing them as nearly as possible on the straight lines drawn from the point of junction, bisecting the angles of ground, and at the greatest distance from the point, so as to include between them the largest possible area of ground consistently with their being able to cross their fire, so as to prevent the enemy penetrating between them.

The second-best way, in the case it is too expensive to have the forts perfectly enclosed by a bastioned enceinte in masonry, is, that the forts be palisaded, &c. at the gorge, but must flank one another mutually, so that the enemy may be kept outside the circle through the faces of the forts. These forts will of course include the greatest area possible, consistently with the safety of the circular line to be defended.

Fortresses situated *à cheval* (that is, part on one side, part on the other, borrowing a metaphor) on a great river, or at the junction of two great rivers, *i.e.* at the junction of a river with a monster affluent,—for one of the two is always the affluent,—when formed *of a continued enceinte*, constructed on a hexagon, a heptagon, an octagon, or any polygon having the point of junction at its centre, form in the former case a double, and in the latter case a triple *tête-de-pont*; but *têtes-de-pont* so formed are not good ones; and unless the enceinte be very large indeed, and furnished with far more inlets (and consequently outlets) than is at all ordinary, an army retreating before an enemy pursuing in accordance with Principle III. Case 10, and Principle XLI., would be ruined; nor do the scanty outlets from the fortified continuous enceinte permit the army to advance readily and advantageously if it wishes to cross the river offensively. Such *têtes-de-pont* are not constructed in accordance with the principles, nor do they at all adequately answer the requisitions of a *tête-de-pont* as these have been enumerated.

PART III.

ON THE CHEAPEST SYSTEM OF FORTRESSES, AND THE BEST, CONSIDERED WITH RESPECT TO MILITARY, NAVAL, AND COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGES, FOR THE DEFENCE OF AN ISLAND POSSESSING A DECIDED MARITIME ASCENDENCY; AND ON THE STRATEGICAL ADVANTAGES OF THIS SYSTEM.

A DECIDED maritime superiority in war is always accompanied by the best commercial marine by far, and the largest commerce by sea. Hence such an Island naturally possesses gigantic sea-ports; some more especially devoted to war, others to commercial purposes; and these gigantic sea-ports, containing immense arsenals, docks, dock-yards, magazines, storehouses, and fleets, require imperatively to be among the fortresses which are to form the system, both because of the intrinsic nature of the arsenals, docks, dock-yards, magazines, &c. contained in them, and because they are manifestly, apart from their immense intrinsic value, and their value in order to the maintenance of the decided maritime ascendancy, decisive strategical points of a very high order, both because they close to the enemy the most important communications, by shutting to him the largest and most important harbours and places of landing, and keep those open to the army which strategical reasons may require to be embarked from any one of the gigantic sea-ports, to be landed at any other by means of the fleet, every vessel in which, being a more or less powerful Steamer, the operation can be effected readily.

Besides, as these sea-ports are naturally centres of commerce and marine manufactures and industry, and as such centres inevitably attract to themselves the large roads of the Island, which are the great communications, and become, therefore, centres of communications also, and decisive strategical points of a very high order—

Hence the gigantic sea-ports of an Island manifestly enter into the system of fortresses for its defence ; and no less are they manifestly the best points which could be chosen as fortresses, with a view to the offensive against a foreign power.

But since—

1. The system is to be the cheapest compatibly with efficiency.

2. That all systems of fortresses for the defence of countries lie regularly on the boundaries of one or more concentric areas, having their common centre about the centre of the country, the largest of which areas is the country itself, and the others each successively smaller than the other ; but all the areas like to the exterior area in shape, *i.e.* like to the shape of the country itself ; this rule receiving more or less modification in consequence of the necessity of choosing the most important decisive strategical points which have a good tactical configuration for the sites of fortresses.*

3. That some, or all the gigantic sea-ports along the coast must be fortresses in the system.

Hence it follows from these 3 premises, that there is only to be one area, which is the exterior area, and therefore the whole Island, along the boundary of which the fortresses are to be placed as regularly as possible. But the defensive system, and defence of the Island, would be so much improved by having in addition a single large fortress on that point, towards the centre of it, which commands the most and most important communications, because this central fortress connects the other fortresses, and increases greatly the number of directions in which the army of the Island can retreat, and is in full accordance with the Principle II., which should here be referred to and read, and so greatly diminishes the distance to which, at most, the army can be driven to retreat, in accordance with Principle XLI., that such single fortress must be allowed, notwithstanding its cost. Of course, the more of the concentric areas bounded by fortresses placed

* This is explained in the writer's elementary treatise on Strategy.

regularly at intervals along the boundaries, the better, provided the fortresses be well placed on decisive strategical points of a high order, and with good tactical configuration, provided the number of fortresses, and, consequently, the total number of the men composing the garrisons, be not out of proportion to the whole army. However, the defence of the fortresses might be committed, in great part, to the militia; and the difference between a good militia-man and a well-trained and thorough soldier is not nearly so great when both are engaged in the defence of a fortress, as when both are employed in field operations. But the system is to be the cheapest compatibly with efficiency, and hence will only be composed of the fortresses made by fortifying some or all the gigantic sea-ports, and the single large fortress towards the centre of the country, which must from its strategical advantage be taken at its cost.

When the shape of the Island is so unsymmetrical that a single fortress, place it where you will, is so unsymmetrically placed that it fails in its object of connecting all, or even a great part of the fortresses round the coast, and increasing largely the number of directions in which the army can retreat on a fortress from any point whatever in the Island where it may have experienced a disaster, and diminishing the distance which it will have to retreat, in the case that the tactical theatre of war lies in many parts of the Island, then this single fortress must be replaced by 2 or even 3 fortresses; cheapness must submit, for the thing is necessary. Thus, for example, taking the unsymmetrically shaped Island formed by England, Scotland, and Wales, the position of a single fortress towards the approximate centre of the whole would be in the north-west of Yorkshire, a position manifestly unsymmetrical with respect to the fortresses round the coasts of England, Scotland, and Wales, and far too distant from the fortresses of the South coast of England, and of the North of Scotland. In this case, then, the approximate form of the whole Island being considered a bad figure of 8, with the top loop smaller than the bottom, and contact of the two loops of the 8 formed by a line drawn from Longtown, on the Solway Firth, to

Alnwick, or by the line of the Picts' Wall, the single fortress must, to answer the purposes of its design, be replaced by 2, one towards the centre of each loop; the one towards Derby, the other towards Aberfield, near Loch Taye.

Having then decided—

PRINCIPLE I.—That the system of fortresses is to be formed of fortresses constructed by fortifying some or all the gigantic sea-ports round the coast, and by 1, 2, 3, or even more fortresses, in case the unsymmetrical formation of the Island renders this imperatively necessary, in order that the purposes which the one fortress in the case of symmetrical formation fulfils may be answered, viz. that the number of directions in which the army may from any point whatever in the Island retreat on a fortress be much augmented, and the distance it has to retreat much diminished, and its lines of operation always shorter, while the enemy is everywhere hemmed in in a much smaller area, bounded by fortresses.

II.—That the fortresses are to be, as far as possible, equally distributed round the coast, at equal distances from one another.

III.—That each of the fortresses shall, as a matter of course, be constructed in accordance with the principles for the construction of fortresses already given in Part I. of this Chapter, viz. that the fortresses of a country ought in general to be formed of detached, completely enclosed, casemated forts, and of the largest and fewest possible of these necessary for the purpose, flanking one another mutually, and enclosing the largest possible area of ground consistently with its adequate defence by a garrison of the number which is to be allowed, and to command as directly as possible all the communications which lead to and from their sites, and to form the tactical pivots of an extremely advantageous tactical front, which an entire army might occupy defensively without encumberment as an impregnable position of battle, and from which it might operate offensively without hindrance or encumberment, having ample room for doing so, protected by the heavy guns of the forts. In fact, large fortresses should, wherever it is

possible, and they are not designed for a special and very exceptional purpose, be large entrenched camps, presenting on all sides tactical fronts, whose tactical pivots are the detached forts in masonry forming the fortresses, and which form an impregnable position when occupied by an entire army as a field of battle, while the separate detached forts, mutually flanking one another, and casemated, shall be capable of being defended by a garrison.

IV.—That the fortresses shall be good and safe harbours, and all capable of admitting large steamers; for it is not necessary that all should admit men-of-war, though it would of course be much better that all should.

The last Principle which remains to be stated to fix finally the required system, and which is a deduction from the principles of Strategy, applied to the circumstances of an Island possessing a decided maritime superiority, as will be seen when the advantages and properties of the system come to be explained, is—

V.—That the fortresses along the coast of the Island shall be placed on the great rivers and entering arms of the sea, and as far as possible up these rivers and arms towards the centre of the Island, or rather towards that of the central fortresses already spoken of, if there be more than one, the Island being unsymmetrical in shape, to which they belong, consistently with the rivers and arms of the sea being at the sites of the fortresses so broad, or have such a configuration, that so long as the fortresses remain untaken steamers bringing supplies of any kind, detachments, or even an army in, or taking them out, can go out and come into the harbour with safety from the attacks (which can of course be only made by constructing batteries on the river side or coast) of the enemy on land, if he is besieging or investing the fortress. Before proceeding to explain the advantages of the system of fortresses now fixed by these five Principles, the principles and the subject may be exemplified by picking out on the map of England and Wales the approximate sites which the Principles appear to decide on as those for the fortresses in the lower and larger loop of the figure 8, spoken of as approximately representing the whole Island of England, Wales,

and Scotland. It must be remembered that the writer in applying the principles to England and Wales has only a small map to look at, and is not answerable for anything which is rendered impossible or absurd by local accidents, such as the great exceptional difficulty of navigation in some rivers, the extreme exceptional shallowness of some arms of the sea; what the writer proposes to do is, to point out the places where, having a common map of England and Wales only as data, with nothing else, the principles indicate that fortresses should be placed; all that it is pretended to give is a very rough first approximation, the accuracy of which is to be afterwards verified by means of maps of the particular localities involved, on a much larger scale, and by a survey of localities, consideration of soundings, currents, tides, winds, &c.

1. To begin with the Thames. It appears from the map, at first sight, that the fortress in the Thames should be situated somewhere on the long tongue of land which has Rochester at its base, and is contained between the Thames and arm of the sea which receives the Medway. It appears, too, that the fortress might be on either side of the tongue, for both the Thames and arm of the sea appear on measurement on the scale at least $1\frac{1}{4}$ mile wide. As well it appears that the base of this tongue of land, formed by the shortest straight line drawn across the tongue from the mouth of the Medway, is not more than 3 miles in length, and is flanked on the left by the Medway, and right by the Thames. A question then arises,—Would it be expedient to form a large fortress by fortifying this line of 3 miles by means of large detached bastioned forts, or could any fraction of this tongue of land be formed into the required fortress? However this may be, Rochester must, from the incomplete data taken, be considered as the approximate site of the fortress of the Thames.

2. Proceeding along the coast round Kent and Sussex we come to the 3 small entering arms of the sea, the centre of which forms the harbour of Portsmouth, which place is a fortress.

3. Continuing the circuit, we arrive at the bay in which Axmouth and Bridport lie; the neighbourhood of one of

these places would appear a proper site, or, these being eminently deficient in characteristics not to be learned from the map, and Exmouth not, then Exmouth.

4. The large entering arm of the sea forming the Bristol Channel and the Severn, requires the fixing the next fortress approximately at Bristol.

5. The next fortress on Cardigan bay, at the mouth of the Dovey.

6. The next near Liverpool, or further up the Mersey or Dee, if the arms of the sea permit.

7. The next towards Burton, on Morecambe bay.

8. The next towards Longtown, on Solway Firth.

9. Berwick-on-Tweed.

10. The mouth of the Tyne, or the mouth of the Tees.

11. The mouth of the Humber, towards Hull.

12. The Wash towards Lyme Regis.

13. It has been said that the centre of the lower loop of the bad figure of 8 formed by England, Scotland, and Wales, would be approximately Derby; but were Derby chosen, it is clear that the fortresses of the north of this lower loop, viz. England and Wales, would, from the shape of the Island, be nearer together, and consequently the objects which it is desired to gain equally for all points of England and Wales, by means of a central fortress, would be far better obtained for the fortresses of the North of this lower loop than for those of the South, and besides the fortresses of the South appear the most important from their situation. In fact, as a nearer approximation to shape, England, Scotland, and Wales, instead of being taken as the approximate bad 8, is more nearly like 3 loops, the central one of which is formed by the 6 northern counties of England, being smaller than the other 2. The fortresses round the boundary of this central loop, it being far smaller than the southern loop, are therefore much nearer together than those round the southern loop; and therefore the fortresses of the southern loop have to be most consulted in fixing the site of the central fortress for England and Wales.

Hence the site of the central fortress may be taken at Warwick on the Avon, or Northampton, or Leicester.

The hamlet of Naseby is a still more central point, but cannot be taken, as it commands no communication at all; however, distances may be measured from it, as it is just about the centre of a circle through Warwick, Northampton, and Leicester.

To see the distances between these fortresses for England and Wales so placed. Measuring in a straight line—

From Rochester to Portsmouth, 80 miles.

From Portsmouth to Bridport, 70.

Bridport to Bristol, 70.

Bristol to mouth of Dovey, 90.

Mouth of Dovey to Liverpool, 70.

Liverpool to Burton, 60.

Burton to Longtown, 60.

Longtown to Berwick, 70.

Berwick to Stockton-on-Tees, 70.

Stockton to Hull, 65.

Hull to Spalding, 60.

The Wash to Rochester, 85.

And the distances from Naseby to Rochester, Portsmouth, Bridport, Bristol, mouth of the Dovey, Liverpool, Hull, and Lyme Regis, are respectively 100, 105, 130, 85, 110, 90, 100, 60, for the fortresses which belong to the 6 northern counties of England may be omitted from the enumeration.

It now remains to consider the strategical advantages and properties of such a system for the defence of an Island.

Before proceeding to do this, in order that the subject may be presented as definitely as may be, *let an Island be supposed to have such a system of fortresses for its protection, and let an invading fleet be supposed by some means to have eluded the vigilance of the fleet, and to have landed an invading army*; as, for example, the invasion being unexpected, and the enemy's ships not concentrating in one or two of their ports, but having sailed out of different ports, and concentrated at some point of concentration on the ocean, given by its latitude and longitude, having previously embarked the troops destined to the invasion, on pretence of taking them to some colony or for action and

conquest in some country other than the Island. It is then supposed that the invading fleet has succeeded in bringing from the point of concentration and disembarking successfully the invading army in the Island, and that the Island is furnished with the system of fortresses already determined on by the principles ready for its defence. Then the news of the landing of the invading army being communicated instantly through the Island by Electric Telegraph, all arms, ammunition, and military stores of all kinds will be removed with all despatch to the nearest of the fortresses, as well as all the provisions in the neighbourhood, as far as may be, till the magazines which each fortress possesses are full, and all that can be received on shipboard in the harbours embarked. The remainder will move towards the opposite part of the Island to that at which the hostile army has landed. Magazines will be formed ready *en échelons* on the great roads from all the distant fortresses, to form the *étapes*, or provision stations, in case the army is compelled to retire on any one of them, or in case it is determined that any of those distant fortresses is to be for a time the base of the army's operations. Particular attention would be paid to the carrying into the fortresses all the saltpetre and ingredients of gunpowder, and all powder-mills out of the fortresses will, on the enemy's approach, be destroyed. Not to digress, by entering on details which are out of place here, the decided maritime superiority of the Island, which forms a part of the hypothesis, warrants the assertion in consequence, that as soon as the invading army has landed it can no longer hope for anything approaching to regular supplies of ammunition, food, reinforcements, &c. from home; in fact, the fleet of the Island, informed from the land of the position of the invading army, will pay particular attention to those places on the coast at which, in consequence of the position of the invading army, it would be expedient to land supplies for it. The line of operations, then, of the invading army is clearly broken, and its communications lost as soon as it is landed; already the most powerful Principle II. is dead against it, and it is in a state which the ablest generals of all times have agreed to consider

as almost inevitably preceding the total destruction of *any* army.

The Principle II. Case 5, is certain of being applied in the case the enemy suffers a defeat; for deprived of a single fortress, he is every way surrounded by the sea, into which he must be driven. It is quite certain that the invader will not be able to land sufficient provisions on which to subsist an army adequate in numbers for any length of time.

It is, then, now time to proceed to the consideration of the strategical advantages and properties of the system of fortresses fixed on.

These advantages and properties are:—

1. Since an invading army must by want of supplies be speedily driven into the interior of the Island in order to seek supplies, the rivers and arms of the sea running up into the interior of the Island become parallel and perpendicular bases for the Island army; and therefore the higher up the rivers and arms of the sea the fortresses are towards the centre of the country, or the central fortresses in case the unsymmetrical conformation of the Island requires more than one central fortress, provided they are in accordance with the condition stated in the Principle V. of the principles given for the formation of the system, the better. This fact is a manifest deduction from Principle II. which is a principle both of Strategy and Tactics, and by the Principle II. of Strategy and Tactics the Principle V. for the formation of the required system of fortresses is therefore justified.

2. In consequence of the invention and present perfection of Steamers, which under anything like ordinary circumstances can make head against and are independent of wind and tide, and the *power of water carriage* for the conveyance of heavy materials of all kinds from any one of the fortresses to any other, excepting of course the central fortress or fortresses, this system of fortresses gives the Island army the power of changing its line of operations instantly, at any moment, with the certainty of having a new base and new line of operations perfectly ready.

The system then of fortresses determined on, confers the power of perpetually making brilliant applications of the Principle II. Case 3, in which the following words will be found :—" To change the line of operations one possesses for a new one when this is practicable, in order to operate as far as possible on the communications of the enemy without exposing one's own, is among the ablest and most decisive manœuvres in war : " for any one of the fortresses round the coast may be taken as a new base of operations at any moment, the army may at once begin to operate from it as such new base, with a new line of operations ready to its hand, from whence all the necessities for an army—as ammunition, artillery, provisions, reinforcements, &c.—can be drawn to any extent; for by means of the Steam fleet all and every necessary for the army may from the moment the army has decided on any particular one of the fortresses as a new base, begin to be concentrated from the other fortresses into this particular fortress; and, indeed, if the maritime superiority of the Island be undoubted over the enemy, may begin to be concentrated from all parts of the world with which the Island is not at war, and from the numerous colonies which so maritime an Island will naturally possess. Thus, referring to the system spoken of for England and Wales, supposing a British army based on a great fortress near Hull, one near Liverpool, and on the fortresses of the six northern counties; and it became very advantageous to change the base of operations for a new one formed by the large fortress of Portsmouth (that fortress being properly constructed for the purpose), the contents of the fortresses of Rochester and Bridport might if necessary be emptied into Portsmouth in less than four days, while the contents of Hull and Liverpool might be at Portsmouth in great part in less than a week.

3. The invading army would never be able to know even approximately where the Island army really was, so that it could never attempt a military occupation of the Island; for it would be necessary for it to keep together, because if it left a detachment the army of the Island or a sufficient fraction of it might be embarked from the fortress

nearest to the position it was in when the information was received that the invading army had left this detachment in a certain place for a certain purpose, and disembarked at the fortress nearest to the detachment, whence it might be on the detachment before the enemy had any idea of the operation. Hence the system, undoubtedly, by concealing and expediting manœuvres, confers the power of making advantageous applications of the Principle III. In fact, recurring to the hypothetical system spoken of for England and Wales, a British army of 50,000 men at Hull is a British army of 50,000 men at Rochester, a British army at Portsmouth, at Bristol, &c.

4. The most important advantages of which the Principle II. Case 1 speaks, are at the disposition of an army which can retreat in every direction on good bases of operations formed by vast, impregnable, entrenched camps, in permanent fortification, furnished with unlimited supplies. Thus, recurring to England and Wales, a British army at Aylesbury might retreat on Rochester, Portsmouth, Bridport, Bristol, Warwick or Northampton or Leicester, (whichever of the three is chosen as the central fortress,) Hull and the fortress on the Wash; and the Island army might therefore operate at pleasure with safety on the flanks and rear of the invading army. It is quite true, however, that the Island army has not this Principle II. Case 1 so fully in its favour as if the invader was obliged to retreat in one direction only, for as he has no base it matters little to him where he goes; still, were it not for the fortresses, the army instead of being on equal terms with the invader in this respect, and at the same time possessing in addition the immense advantage of a regular base and line of operations, would be obliged either to forego the immense advantage of being able to operate at pleasure with safety on the flanks and rear of the enemy, or the immense advantage of having an excellent base and line of operations. The fact is, that without the system of fortresses the army would have its lines of retreat restricted, while all directions would be equal for the invader.

5. The fortresses being all, with the exception of 1,

2, or 3 at most, by the sea-side, the rise and fall of the tide would, by the power it gives of inundating at pleasure, render the construction of the fortresses much cheaper, and their power vastly greater; as well the fortresses might on this account, and because the sea itself would form a part of their enceinte, be much larger at the same cost.

6. The fortresses would, in the case that the Island did not at first possess an army equal to the invading army, hold possession of the country and protect the organization of an adequate army; and in case the army of the Island received a defeat, they would always protect its re-organization and reinforcement; as well the enemy would, in consequence of the existence of these fortresses affording prepared lines of retreat in all directions, lose almost all the fruits of his Victory or Victories, without which a victory would be only a positive loss in his position.

7. If the invading enemy wanted to besiege one of the fortresses on the coast, he would be obliged to have and keep before the fortress a portion of his army larger than the Island army, for he knows not how soon the whole Island army may disembark from the sea at the fortress; in which case, if he had not a larger or as large a force there, the Island army would issue out offensively and seize everything, destroying the works. And if the invading army remain entire before one of the fortresses, in order to besiege it, the Island army may occupy the fortress as an impregnable entrenched camp, fully supplied with provisions and ready to issue out offensively as soon as the enemy attempts to separate, which he must do in order to get provisions. If the invader please, he may under vastly greater disadvantages emulate Schwartzenberg's glorious and scientific attack on Dresden.

8. Other great advantages of such a system of fortresses would be, that it would be hardly possible to find an enemy so foolish as to invade at all with the certainty before him of the ultimate ruin and destruction of his army, and the immense additional confidence Victory—(certain to come as soon as an army equal in numbers to the invading army, supposing an equality in troops can be organized, which

organization has been protected and provided for)—surely and certainly would inspire, both in the army and the population; the dispiriting influence which his position must have on the enemy, if he know anything whatever of war, for his destruction must surely appear to him certain; and not least, the power of saying to the invading army, “If you commit any outrages which pass the limits of legitimate civilized war,—if, for example, you recklessly burn anything, &c.—you are to expect no quarter, which quarter you are certain to want.”

To glance briefly at the probable way events would run after the landing of the invading army :—

The invading army having no base of operations, must come to want provisions, and to get these he must make requisitions, and to make the necessary requisitions he must occupy a large area of ground; in fact, in order to subsist at all, he must ultimately come to be obliged to occupy a very large area of ground. In the mean time, the Island army destined to take the field against the invader is rapidly collecting and being organized in the different fortresses; and is then concentrated in one of the fortresses, or, in case the enemy is distant, the army may be concentrated in several of the fortresses—as many as safe junction at the point of concentration permits—and an intermediate point between those several fortresses named as a point of concentration. The army then having been concentrated, marches towards the invader, having 1, 2, 3, or more of the fortresses for its base of operations, and good lines of operations, with its back well turned to them, along which all sorts of supplies can readily come to it; and places itself in a strong position menacing the enemy. Then the invader is in a dilemma, for he has to deal with an army which having regular supplies can remain concentrated. *If the invader remain concentrated he cannot subsist, for he has no regular supplies; and if he do not remain concentrated he is inevitably fallen on at the right moment, with the utmost vigour and rapidity, and defeated in detail.* Hence the invader's best course—apparently his only one—appears to be to march and attack the Island army, which will manœuvre, by retiring

or otherwise, according to circumstances still maintaining a position so near the enemy that if he separates to obtain provisions he is lost; and thus keeping him concentrated as long as possible and without provisions. If the invader's necessities and impatience at length induce him to commit a very serious blunder, and give the army the power of making a brilliant application of the Principles, and a brilliant offensive decisive point, which it is probable will be the case, the opportunity must be seized, for the mental and psychical qualities of the enemy will be in so bad a state after a defeat of this kind, and the courage and confidence of the army so high, that the invader is ruined. If there be at any time a doubt as to whether the invader's whole army is in front, an armed reconnaissance must be made, and he must be compelled to show himself. He will ultimately become very eager to attack, for if he does not his army will fall to pieces of itself. Since the enemy then is so eager to attack, this should be profited by to induce or compel him to run great dangers and risks, commit a great blunder, or fall on the Island army in a very strong defensive position, in order to attack. It is clearly the interest of the Island army to defer the battle, both because it must be every day increasing by reinforcements which are to put it into a position to be certain of a decisive victory, and because it is supplied and the enemy is not. It may be stated that the chances being that the Island army may have to receive battle defensively at first, passing of course at the fitting moment, *i.e.* the decisive moment, to a vigorous offensive, if the occasion presents, the army should have a very numerous artillery, (*say 6 pieces to every 1,000 men*); for this is, under any circumstances whatever, indicated by Napoleon, to whom the Principles XXXII. and XXXIII. belong, and which principles, particularly the latter, should be referred to and read. Victory appears certain for the Islanders. In the case of Victory for the Islanders, the Invaders must, it would appear, lay down their arms. But should Victory be for the Invaders (a most remote contingency), it is hardly better to them than defeat, for they must have experienced great loss, and have no reinforcements to

expect; how are they to replace the ammunition expended in the battle?—while the Island army retreats on its fortresses, to be reinforced and re-organized. Victory must ultimately, sooner or later, probably very soon indeed, be for the Islanders; and if the enemy have committed great and *reckless* damage, by burning towns, ships, &c., or any other outrages contrary to the usages of civilized warfare, and dictated by a disgraceful spirit of unreasoning vengeance for injuries with which the people of the Island generally had nothing whatever to do, and in which they had no voice whatever, and were for the most part opposed to them,—then a terrible but necessary example must be made.

In conclusion it has to be stated, that if the 12 fortresses round England and Wales were reduced to 6, then all that has been said as to the strategical advantages and properties of the system still holds, though in a minor degree.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON THE MEANS OF OBTAINING INFORMATION, AND OF DISCOVERING THE PROJECTS, PLANS, DISPOSITIONS, AND RESOURCES OF THE ENEMY.

THE vital and absolute importance of correct information on all matters and subjects in War is so manifest, that to pretend to insist on it for a moment is to become ridiculous, the subject speaking for itself. The Principle XXIV. speaks as to the importance of the earliest and correct information in war. Notwithstanding the manifest importance of correct information, it is perfectly astonishing to what an extent the simplest means of obtaining information have been neglected. It does seem wonderful how any man dares to accept the direction of the operations of an army, and at the same time wilfully neglect to employ the best means of obtaining information on which his plans, if they have any base at all, must be based, and without which the success of his movements, should they happen to succeed, must be perfectly fortuitous and accidental,—a contingency not to be relied on. Such folly can only be accounted for on the supposition that the commander capable of it is sufficiently wise to believe that he does not know how to utilize correct information when he has it, and therefore the trouble of getting it is thrown away.

Before stating the principal means of obtaining information, the Principle LIII. may be recopied here at full length. It belongs to Napoleon:—

PRINCIPLE.—“It is a fact that when one is not in a desert, but in a peopled country, if the general is not well instructed it is because he is ignorant of his trade.”—*Napoleon Bonaparte.*

That then which has to be done, viz. to obtain correct

information, is practicable and can be done. To enumerate the chief means of doing it:—

The principal means of obtaining information, and of discovering the projects, plans, dispositions, and resources of the enemy, are—

1. By spies located in the enemy's rear, on his communications, or in his country, and more or less intimately instructed of his movements, dispositions, resources and plans. Among such spies there will be men, and may be women, of all grades in life.

2. By seizing the Letter Bags. Napoleon says,—“Seize *above all* the letter bags,” and manifestly they afford a great source of information.

3. By seizing Notables, as—The civil magistrates and their subordinates, with their documents, letters, papers, &c. The ecclesiastical magistrates, Priests, Bishops, &c. with their documents. The richest and most influential private citizens, principal proprietors, with their documents, &c. The Heads of Convents, Universities, &c. And if there be any persons who are supposed to possess valuable information, let them be seized.

4. By sending out large detachments of *all arms*, which may amount to as many as 4,000, 5,000, or even 6,000 men, which detachments will, in obtaining the information they are sent to seek, *employ force to an extent which will be hereafter explained.*

5. By sending out small detachments composed of cavalry on ordinary ground, and of light infantry in mountains. These do not employ force, but artifice and cunning, in obtaining the information they seek.

6. By means of the prisoners of war, officers and men, deserters, and by seizing travellers.

7. By considering all the best, most probable, and feasible plans which the **enemy** can form in the circumstances in which all your information when most carefully (but at the same time rapidly) weighed leads to the belief that he is, which plans will in general be very restricted in number, say 6 at most.

8. Armed reconnaissances made by an entire Corps d'Armée, or by a whole army, having for object—

1. To determine the number of men in an enemy's detachment or column, or to see whether the whole of the enemy's army or his main army is in front or not, by compelling the body on which the reconnaissance is made to deploy and show itself.
2. To determine the configuration of the position occupied by the enemy, and the way in which the enemy occupies the position.
9. By all kinds of tricks, dodges, and artifices, not classifiable, according to the Maxim XV.

To discuss these 9 principal means of obtaining information seriatim :—

MEANS 1.—It is on this means that an army depends for information as to what is passing in the interior of the enemy's country, and also in general as to what is passing *behind the strategical and tactical fronts of the enemy*. All that can in general be hoped from the means 4 and 5, viz. from sending out respectively large detachments of all arms, who, to an extent to be explained, will use force, and small detachments of light cavalry or light infantry, according as the country is ordinary or mountainous, using cunning and artifice, is an account of the numbers and disposition of the enemy *on his strategical and tactical fronts*; *behind these cordons* it will not in general be possible by these means to obtain information. Notwithstanding this, one must endeavour to do so as far as possible by the means 5, and the officer in command of the small detachment having sent back the information he has obtained as exactly, definitely, and explicitly as he is able, as to what is passing on those cordons, may then, if his instructions permit, penetrate between the enemy's detachments, columns, &c., and try to obtain whatever further information he is able.

The leading information which is expected from a Spy may be collected under the following heads :—

1. The particular places or positions occupied by the enemy's forces in his own country, and on his communications. And on this point the Spy tells what he has himself seen, which is the principal part of the matter, and next what he has learned, stating his authority, as public

report, a traveller well known to him, in whose word confidence can be placed, &c. The exact date of every occurrence is, of course, very important, as dispositions constantly change.

2. The movements of the enemy's troops, whence a certain fraction of the enemy came, where it is directed. And on this point, also, the Spy tells what he has himself seen, which is equally the most trustworthy part of the despatch, and next what he has learned, stating his authority, &c. In this, too, the exact date of everything is, of course, most important.

3. What he has been able to learn of the plans of the enemy's general, stating the various sources of his information.

4. The resources of the enemy; the places he has chosen for his magazines; remarks on his fortresses or camps; remarks on the peculiarities of the enemy's country, and of different salient points in it considered militarily.

5. Character and Antecedents of enemy's general.

6. Information of all kinds, not classifiable.

The subject of Spies as a means to obtain information cannot be quitted, without advertng to the danger. An able Spy who is faithful to his employer is a great advantage, and may be an immense advantage, but, on the other hand, an unfaithful Spy is exceedingly dangerous. Men are pushed on by their fears and pulled on by their hopes, and when a man's fears and hopes are thoroughly with you, he is going in the right direction under all the pressure of which his nature is capable. Hence the best precautions to ensure the fidelity of a Spy appear to be—To let him know that if he is unfaithful no means will be spared, and no industry grudged, towards hunting him down, by any means whatever, till he is dead. To pay largely every good piece of information which is afterwards found to be correct. To fix on a man whose sympathies you know to be strong, and with your cause. *Nothing binds men so strongly together as a similarity of religious and political views*, with the exception of the influence of fear and a community of interests, and it has been already recommended to have the two latter with you as far as possible in the case of a Spy, and the two former ought also to be had as much as

to the government, especially if it be well and secretly organized, and contains men of the true stamp, who fear nothing in reason in carrying out their ends, here is a system of Spies organized and made ready to hand. Money in this case, too, is economised, for you have only to show the Spies the triumph of their party, which is to them money ultimately. If the whole of the population of the enemy's country be more or less intensely disaffected, every one becomes more or less a Spy, and the enemy's army (which by the way can hardly fail to be secretly more or less disaffected, and consequently little inclined to fight and willing to be made prisoners *if they know that the prisoners are treated kindly* and good opportunities are supplied to them for carrying out their wish) is in reality in a far worse position than if it were, under ordinary circumstances, in an enemy's country. In such a case the army, though apparently in an enemy's country, will in reality be among friends, and will have correct and early information, while the enemy, apparently at home, will be among enemies, and have false information. Such a state of things ought naturally to prelude the entire destruction of the enemy's army.

It is clear that in such a case in order to select the Spies you have only to put yourself in communication with the chiefs of the party hostile to the government, and they will for their own sakes indicate the men of the greatest value, intelligence, and trustworthiness. The thing is done to your hands; all the information that can be needed will be supplied, and the enemy's army ought to be, in consequence, rapidly and utterly ruined.

It is clear that the more nearly the position and duties of a spy enable him to penetrate the secrets of the Commander-in-Chief and of the government, the greater his value, and the more largely he will expect to be paid.

MEANS 2.—With regard to this means, the words of Napoleon, "above all," stamp the importance of it. As the information, or at least a very great portion of it, was never intended to fall into the hands of the army seizing it, it is proportionably valuable as containing the real thoughts and opinions of the writers. The chief ways in which, or

rather the chief occasions on which, the letter-bags will be seized, are—

1. When the advanced guard of a column, marching rapidly in the execution of the plan of the campaign, enters a town unexpectedly, then the first thing to be done is to seize the letter bags.

2. While an army is maintaining its offensive positions, *which are to be as many and menacing as possible consistently with Principle I. which is both a principle of Strategy and Tactics*, until the plans of the enemy are sufficiently developed, the letters may suddenly be seized.

3. If there be an unprotected town which can be seized by sending out from one of the army's advanced positions a detachment of 4,000 or 5,000 men (according to the means 4 of obtaining information) such detachment may be sent to seize the letters when information is wanted.

In a magnificent despatch of Napoleon's to his brother Joseph, very ably translated in Sir W. Napier's "Peninsular War," are the following words:—

"When we know how to take measures of vigour and force, it is easy to get intelligence. All the posts, all the letters must be intercepted; the single motive of procuring intelligence will be sufficient to authorize a detachment of 4,000 or 5,000 men, who will go into a great town, take the letters from the post," &c.

On MEANS 3.—The notables will be all the civil magistrates, by whatever name they may be called, as Prefects, Sub-Prefects, Mayors and their Deputies, Sheriffs, Alcaldes, Aldermen, Postmasters, &c., the most influential private citizens and the largest proprietors, and certainly not less the religious functionaries, as Bishops, Priests, Heads of Convents, &c.; for it is a fact greatly to the credit of these latter, they are so extremely anxious to be fully prepared for the kingdom of heaven, that they lose few opportunities of meddling as much as possible with the affairs of the kingdom of this world, merely by way of obtaining experience, and for the purposes of preparation.

These notables when required will be seized either by *a large detachment reconnoitring by force*, by which name a detachment of the kind spoken of in the Means 4 will be

name the detachments spoken of in the Means 5 will be spoken of, or by the advanced guard of a column on march on its entering a town; or when military possession is held of a portion of the enemy's country, sudden seizures of notables may take place from time to time.

When a notable refuses to speak on subjects on which there is good reason to believe he is well informed, from his documents seized at the same time as himself, and which have been looked over, he is put under arrest in solitary confinement, and examined once or twice a-day till he does speak. Notables when seized are to be made to write letters to their friends and relations, (of the excellence of whose style for the purpose you are of course a self-constituted critic,) to send messages and obtain news. In cases of contumacy, either in a non-willingness to write in a good style or in sending out messengers, the regimen of solitary confinement, with moderate diet, and one or two examinations a-day, must be persevered in till it has produced its effect. It is clear that the notable must be rendered uncomfortable by the nature of his confinement and diet, and absence of material comforts, particularly those to which he is most attached, in proportion as he is obstinate. The maxim of conduct in treating a notable is, *suaviter in modo, fortiter in re*. If a notable be compliant he need not be placed in solitary confinement, further than the necessity of his not being allowed to communicate with any one till his letters and messages are answered requires, and he should be treated as respectfully and kindly as possible. As soon as an obstinate notable becomes compliant he must be treated kindly, and a cruel necessity and the recognised usages of war presented him as an apology, by way of soothing any irritation of feeling which may exist: actual necessity compelled, and no choice remained, however repugnant it might be to the feelings, for it is impossible to neglect means which the enemy is on his part certain to use, and by which he will certainly profit. It is a wise maxim, under all circumstances, that the good will and affection of every man must

be sought and gained, and his ill-will conciliated and disarmed as far as possible, consistently with the course of conduct which it is on due deliberation firmly determined to pursue towards him. How many men have by roughness or exclusiveness sent away or neglected the very persons who were the best qualified to serve them in their objects!

On MEANS 4.—These large detachments of all arms, which may amount to 5,000 or 6,000 men, have been said to reconnoitre “to an extent by force;” it remains to explain this extent. In the first place, when one of these detachments is sent out it is made sufficiently numerous, that, according to the information received by, and the conviction of the general sending it, it is capable of overthrowing every hostile body so placed as to compromise its safety while executing its reconnaissance. This fact at once follows from Principle III., which is equally a principle of Strategy and Tactics, for it would be to go in exact opposition to this principle to send a smaller body to obtain information, or do anything else which involves a necessary collision with a larger.

Hence, the detachment is never to compromise itself with a more powerful body, and if this should be necessary to the attainment of the required information the reconnaissance has failed.

Hence it is clear that if a larger body bar the road the reconnaissance has failed.

If the detachment on its march discover a body on either flank, which it is dangerous to leave in its rear unattacked, and which it is necessary to the safety of the detachment to beat back before proceeding, and which however it is able to beat pretty easily; then, if the time required for the action with, and pursuit of, such body be not so long as to cause the object to be obtained by the reconnaissance to be lost, the body is to be beaten and broken; if, on the other hand, by the loss of time the object of the reconnaissance is lost, the reconnaissance has failed, and the detachment has only to retire on the main body.

If on the road the detachment falls in with a body of the enemy smaller than itself, and which it can readily over-

ity of applying principle III., the detachment overthrows it, makes prisoners, takes or spoils the cannon, and proceeds on its mission.

If the detachment discover on either flank a smaller body, which it may pass by unnoticed with impunity, then, according as the instructions of the officer commanding the detachment do or do not indicate the time required for beating this smaller body to be of importance in its effect on the object of the reconnaissance, the body is pursued and attacked, or not.

Every person who is met with, or come up with, on the road, and who wishes to go faster than the column, is arrested.

The detachment must never neglect the precaution of having an advanced guard, *éclaireurs* and flankers, according to the rules for the march of every column, great or small; and this must be observed however great the necessity for the column arriving quickly at its place of destination. When the detachment marches by night the advanced guard, *éclaireurs* (explorers) and flankers are withdrawn entirely, or at least are brought so near to the main body that they can either see or hear it.

And generally, the detachment, being a column, observes all the rules for the conduct of the march of a column.

On the duties of the commander of the detachment:—The commander will make himself acquainted with the object of the reconnaissance, and the circumstances under which it is to be made, and to this end ask all questions which may appear to him necessary after receiving his instructions. Before starting, he will assure himself of the good state of his detachment, as to arms and ammunition. It is perhaps needless to say he will furnish himself with the best map he can get, a good telescope, and materials for sketching and writing. He will take two or three of the inhabitants of the country, who will be selected by their knowledge of the road and country, to serve him as guides; to these he will address the necessary questions, which will have reference to the names and size of the villages, the state of the roads, the character of the water-courses, nature

of the ground, the places to which the side roads lead, &c. He will take with him an interpreter, if he be unable to speak the language. He will, when he passes through a village, stop some little time to ask questions on the position of the enemy, and if he suspects deceit will take hostages, whom he will not release till he finds that the people have not tried to deceive him. He will study the country through which he passes, and determine the points at which he can make a stand if necessary, should he be obliged to retreat before a larger body of the enemy; will frequently look behind him, that he may learn the country, and be able to recognise it in its different aspects; and will verify his map, and correct it when found to be erroneous. When the detachment halts, he determines the place of halt from the conditions: 1. That it shall conceal the detachment from the view of the surrounding country. 2. That it shall be so near a good position, that the position can be immediately occupied (in accordance with Principle XXXVII.) in case of surprise, because by that principle the choice of an encampment or a halt is none other than the choice of a position of battle.

When he halts his detachment near a village, he halts it on the side towards the enemy, that it may have the advantages conferred by the possession of the village in case of an attack, that the enemy may not seize the village suddenly, and that all communication between the village and the enemy may be as far as possible interdicted.

On MEANS 5.—The subjects on which information is sought by means of these small detachments are very numerous. For example:—

To discover the number of a column known to have passed through a certain town by a certain road.

To see if a defile is occupied.

To see whether a bridge, over which it is wished to pass, has been broken.

To observe a point as far as possible in advance on a certain road, ascertain the number and watch the movements of an enemy's column which may present itself by that road, and forward the information with all despatch.

The characteristics of the movements and operation of

ning, and Artifice. The following is a sketch of the conduct which such detachments must pursue.

It is manifest that the commander of the detachment, having great need of good guides to lead him through the intricacies which it may be necessary for him to thread, must leave no means untried to get the best guides possible. Each of the guides is watched most closely by two soldiers appointed for that purpose, and he is by no means to be permitted to escape. The guides are not allowed to speak to one another, lest they should concoct some rascality between them. So long as there are sufficient men, the fewer men there are in one of these detachments the better, because the enemy is less likely to remark their manœuvres, the vigilance and observation of the enemy is more likely to be eluded, and a retreat can be made with greater rapidity. Secrecy being a characteristic of its manœuvres, the little detachment travels as much as possible by night, moves along ravines, follows hollow roads, and makes great rounds when necessary to the avoidance of the enemy. The detachment is so small that it cannot have an advanced guard; it sends forward, however, a group of *éclaireurs*, because it is certain that if the *éclaireurs* are discovered the whole detachment marching together would be, and it is better the *éclaireurs* alone fall into mischief than the whole troop. The *éclaireurs* send forward two men. Two or three flankers move on each side of the little column, in accordance with the rules for the march of all columns. It is by advanced guards, and the advanced guards of advanced guards, and the *éclaireurs* which precede them, and the flankers and the rear-guards, that columns in modern warfare avoid the ambuscades and insidiæ so common in ancient times. When the *éclaireurs* announce an enemy, the detachment endeavours to hide itself in a wood, a hollow behind a hedge, or by means of some accident of ground. If the detachment cannot succeed in hiding itself it fights, if the enemy be not too numerous, and if the enemy be too numerous saves itself by a rapid flight. If the detachment succeeds in hiding itself, the commander endeavours to see all he can of the

hostile body, and if it be a considerable body sends all the information he has been able to obtain, as to its number and composition, &c., to the main body. It is essentially necessary that the detachment be composed of soldiers on whom reliance can be placed, and of excellent officers; in fact, it should be composed of tried and known men. Two or more of the officers ought to speak the language of the country, and the more officers and soldiers the better. When there is fear of discovery, the leading roads are forsaken for the bye and side-roads, or for cross-country. Villages and houses are avoided as much as possible, especially on approaching the destination, for obvious reasons. If it be necessary to pass through or enter a village, the opportunity of getting information is not to be neglected; recourse is to be had to the rural notabilities, and false reports as to the destination of the detachment must be cleverly spread to put the enemy on a wrong scent. Provisions may be bought from the villagers, but not taken without paying for; the weaker a man is, the more he stands in need of the good-will of his neighbours. The little detachment should pay well, and promise equally liberal patronage on its return, and the villagers will be to a certain extent interested in its safety. The detachment scarcely ever returns by the way it went, to avoid ambuscades which might be set for it. It is best, when possible, that the detachment should start provided with all the provisions, &c., that it will require; but when this is not possible the sooner they are laid in after starting the better, because they are found so much the further from the enemy, whose ignorance will be the greater. No unnecessary noise is of course allowed, nor is smoking permitted by night.

It has been said that secrecy is a characteristic of the manœuvres of these little detachments; and so it is of *every manœuvre of an army on the field of battle, or elsewhere*, except those manœuvres which are made expressly for the purpose of deceiving the enemy. This tempts a brief animadversion here to a subject far too universally neglected, with what most certainly appears the utmost contempt for common sense. If secrecy be an object, why

dress armies in the colours most easily distinguishable? It cannot be because it is wished that the enemy's reconnoissances be facilitated, and that, on the field of battle, he may be better able to ascertain the number, learn the dispositions, and see the movements of the army; and that the fire of his artillery and musketry, being directed on more distinct and definite objects, may be more deadly.

Two questions, then, have to be asked. Is it a principle that an army should be dressed in those colours which best conceal it from the view of an enemy? or, on the other head, Is it a principle that an army should be dressed in those colours which most expose it to the view of an enemy, or in order that it may please the eye, look pretty, or for any other weighty reason? If the first of the two questions be answered in the affirmative for the whole army, or for a great part of an army, then it becomes a question, which is the colour most conducive to concealment. Whenever the analogy of nature, or the instructions of nature, the infinitely wonderful and mysterious structure of the Infinite Artificer, can be consulted on any question, it seems to be wisdom to consult such analogy and instructions. What, then, are the colours of those animals and birds whose nature most requires concealment, either for their protection from others, or that concealment may enable them to gain their sustenance? The matter is, however, perfectly capable of being decided by experiment. To be brief, the colours which most conduce to concealment are manifestly indefinite colours, and are not the marked and prominent colours of the spectrum. They are clearly neither red, blue, yellow, green, black, crimson, white, nor purple; yet these are the colours in which soldiers are dressed. If this assertion be objected to with respect to black, it is answered, that invisible green is equally visible with black.

The best colour for concealment appears to be a mixture of dull yellow and dull brown, approaching the colour of a lark, or a hare's back, a partridge, or a woodcock. The degrees in which the dull yellow and dull brown enter into the composition is a matter of experiment. The exact proportions in which these two colours ought to enter in

order to make the concealment greatest, manifestly depends on the general colour of the soil of the country in which the army is called to operate; but any mixture of them appears good for all soils. Is it to enter too curiously into the question to say that, *cæteris paribus*, that of two fields of battle should be chosen to whose general colour the colour of the uniform of the soldiers is best adapted for their concealment?

On MEANS 6.—As a first rule in employing this means, prisoners of war, deserters, and travellers, are to be questioned apart one from another, in order to discover, by comparing their statements, whether they are attempting to deceive by false information.

Though it will be sometimes difficult to find a direct contradiction between the statements of two of such persons, or between the statements of two of such persons separately interrogated, a man who possesses natural tact, and has had some experience, will almost always be able to decide, by various indications, whether the witness is telling what he believes to be the truth. In examining prisoners, whether officers or privates, it is not right to expect from them what it is unreasonable to suppose they can know, and this must be taken into consideration; for example, a private infantry soldier cannot be expected to know anything beyond the movements of his battalion.

On MEANS 7.—*That is, on the consideration of all the best and most probable plans which the enemy can form in the circumstances in which all the knowledge of him, and information received about him, when most carefully weighed, leads to the belief he is placed, as a means to acquire information.*

In order, then, to consider and discuss this means of obtaining information, it is to be supposed, as data, that the enemy is known to be occupying, or that all the information which can be obtained leads, when most carefully weighed, to the belief that the enemy is occupying a certain strategical position, at a certain time, with certain numbers and resources, and under certain circumstances—How then, from this data, is information as to the enemy's future projects and plans to be obtained? As a matter

of course, what are the good or probable courses open to the enemy in the position and circumstances in which he is believed to be,—in fact, all the plans which oneself would think of undertaking, and pass in review as good or feasible, in order to decide between them, supposing oneself to be in the enemy's place?

On the authority of Jomini, the number of the plans which are open to an army, under any circumstances, is very limited (say 6 at most), hence there cannot be many plans which the enemy can adopt, and consequently few for one to pass in review in order to divine which is the enemy's plan. To give an illustration of this, the following translated quotation from Jomini's "*Précis de l'Art de la Guerre*" will be given :—

"In 1806, when it was as yet doubtful in France whether a war would take place with Prussia or not, I made a note on the chances of a war, and the operations which, in the case of a war, would take place. I laid down the 3 following hypotheses as to the conduct the Prussians would pursue :—

"1. The Prussians will await Napoleon behind the Elbe, and operate defensively between the Elbe and the Oder, to gain time for the cooperation of Russia and Austria.

"2. Or they will advance to the Saale, supporting their left on the frontier of Bohemia, and defending the outlets of the mountains of Franconia.

"3. Or, awaiting the French by the great road of Mayence, *they will advance imprudently to Erfurt.*

"I do not think there were any other possible hypotheses to be made, unless one supposed the Prussians sufficiently ignorant to divide their forces, already inferior in number, in the two directions of Wesel and Mayence—a useless fault, since by the former of these two routes no single French soldier had appeared since the Seven Years' War.

"Supposing, then, they advanced on Erfurt, by directing themselves on *Hof* and *Gera*, they were cut from their line of retreat and thrown back on the Lower Elbe and North Sea. Did they occupy the line of the Saale, by attacking their left by *Hof* and *Gera* they would be partially over-

whelmed, and might be intercepted at Berlin by the Leipsig road. Did they remain behind the Elbe it was equally by directing themselves on *Hof* and *Gera* that they were to be found. What was the importance, then, of knowing the details of their movements, since one's course was in all cases the same. So, well convinced of these truths, I did not hesitate to announce, a month before the war, that that would be what Napoleon would undertake, and that if the Prussians passed the Saale, it would be at Jena and Naumbourg that the battle would be fought."

It is not generally possible for the most able spy to penetrate the secrets of the enemy's general, and discover his plans, nor will any of the other 8 means of obtaining information effect this. All that can be learned by any of the other 8 means, is where a body of the enemy of a certain number was at a certain time, the direction from which it came, and the direction in which it was going; in fact, the dispositions, strategical and tactical, of the enemy as they exist at a certain time; but from these the enemy's project and plan does not appear, but still remains to be found out. Hence the great value of considering what are the good and feasible plans for the enemy to undertake in the position and circumstances in which he is; in fact, all the plans which oneself ought to think of undertaking as good and feasible as a means of obtaining information. But, in order to determine what these good and feasible plans are, it is necessary to know *how* to determine. Hence the great value of a knowledge of the correct principles and maxims of war, and a good knowledge of military history, for *it is only by means of these that it is possible to determine and know* what are the good and feasible plans to pursue in any position and circumstances. And it is clear of how great assistance well-made hypotheses containing the several good and feasible plans an enemy can undertake in a given position, under given circumstances, are, not only directly towards ascertaining what his real plan is, by finding out and indicating several definite plans, one of which the enemy must, to a very high probability, indeed take, and of which the information, as it arrives, has only to indicate the actual one the

enemy is pursuing, but pieces of information, and information generally, which, without these hypotheses, based on and constructed from a knowledge of the Principles and Maxims of Strategy and Tactics, and an acquaintance with military history, which embodies the experience and instructions of the Past, would be not comprehended and understood, or misunderstood, and therefore unprofitable, now become explained and comprehended in their proper bearings, acquire peculiar significance, and indicate which is the enemy's real plan. Hence it follows, that not only are the Principles and Maxims of War, and a Knowledge of Military History, of the greatest use in forming able plans, based on the best knowledge which can be acquired of the position and circumstances of the two armies, but also as a most important means of verifying, interpreting, comprehending, and obtaining information, and consequently, that best knowledge of the positions and dispositions of the two armies.

To make a summary of this Means 7, it is—

From the enemy's position and circumstances, according to all that can be learned, well weighed, to determine, by means of the Principles and Maxims of Strategy and Tactics, and a Knowledge of Military History applied to the enemy's position and circumstances, *and the configuration of the theatre of war*, what are the good or probable plans for the enemy to pursue. Having determined these plans, view every new piece of information which may be received by any of the other 8 means, or by any other means not categorized here, (all of which should be kept rapidly and incessantly at work,) as it comes to hand in conjunction with them; comprehend, understand, verify, and interpret it by means of them and by a knowledge of the Principles and Maxims of War and Military History, and determine therefrom, if possible, between the hypothetical plans which is the enemy's real one, or see at least if the number of hypothetical plans is diminished, the new piece of information just come to hand having rendered one or more of them now unwarrantable.

It may be here stated, it is hoped *à propos*, that a plan for a campaign ought at any time during the campaign to

contain within itself, in addition to an offensive part, the means of defeating all the good or probable plans which at that time remain open to the enemy. Thus, if 2 good plans remain open to the enemy at any time during a campaign, the plan of the campaign should contain within itself, as its defensive part, the means of defeating both these, and in addition a purely offensive part; but when new information arrives, and the enemy's plan is so far developed as not to be mistaken, then the plan of the campaign must contain the means of defeating the enemy's plan by striking him offensively so as to parry his blow.

The value of a Knowledge of the Principles and Maxims of War and of Military History, as a means to obtain information, understand it, and deduce therefrom, may be illustrated by the game of Chess. An enemy's move which may to one player indicate a beautiful plan of attack, and the necessary defensive and offensive operations, will to another ignorant of the art have no significance whatever. The following translation of a despatch of Napoleon's to his brother Joseph, the King of Spain, copied here from Sir W. Napier's "History of the War in the Peninsula," is of so striking a character that its value seems to require its insertion in a treatise on war. It is placed here because the latter part of it refers to the subject of reconnaissances, and as well, the writer of this treatise, in placing it here, offers it to the kind consideration of the reader as a test to the extent it goes of the principles, maxims, and views of war advanced by the writer in his "Elementary Treatise on Strategy," and this "Elementary Treatise on Tactics." "This despatch of Napoleon's," says Sir W. Napier, "evinces his absolute mastery of the art of war." As the translation of the despatch in the "History of the Peninsular War" is accompanied with a valuable observation, it is copied verbatim from the text of that most valuable work.

" 'It was too late,' he said, 'to discuss the question, whether Madrid should have been retained or abandoned; idle to consider if a position covering the siege of Zaragoza might not have been formed; useless to examine if the line of the Duero was not better than that of the Ebro for the

French army. The line of the Ebro was taken and must be kept; to advance from that river without a fixed object would create indecision; this would bring the troops back again, and produce an injurious moral effect. But why abandon Tudela? why relinquish Burgos? Those towns were of note and reputation. They gave moral influence, and moral force constituted two-thirds of the strength of armies. Tudela and Burgos had also a relative importance; the first, possessing a stone bridge, was on the communication of Pampeluna and Madrid, commanded the canal of Zaragoza, was the capital of a province. When the army resumed offensive operations, the first enterprise would be the siege of Zaragoza; from that town to Tudela the land-carriage was three days, the water carriage was only fourteen hours; wherefore to have the besieging artillery and stores at Tudela, was the same as to have them at Zaragoza. If the Spaniards got possession of the former, all Navarre would be in a state of insurrection and Pampeluna exposed. Tudela then was of vast importance, Milagro of none; it was an obscure place, without a bridge, commanded no communication, was without interest, defended nothing! led to nothing! A river,' said this great commander, 'as large as the Vistula and as rapid as the Danube at its mouth, is nothing unless there are good points of passage and a head quick to take the offensive; the Ebro is less than nothing, a mere line; Milagro is useless,—the enemy might neglect it, be at Estella, and gain Tolosa before any preparation could be made to receive him: he might come from Soria, from Logrono, or from Zaragoza.

" 'Burgos is the capital of a province, the centre of many communications, a town of great fame, and of relative value to the French army; to occupy it in force and offensively, would threaten Palencia, Valladolid, Aranda, and even Madrid. It is necessary to have made war a long time to conceive this; it is necessary to have made a number of offensive enterprises, to know how much the smallest event or even indication, encourages, or discourages, and decides the adoption of one enterprise instead of another.'—'In short, if the enemy occupies Burgos,

Logroño, and Tudela, the French army will be in a pitiful position. It is not known if he has left Madrid; it is not known what has become of the Gallician army, there is reason to suspect it may have been directed upon Portugal; in such a state, to take up, instead of a bold menacing and honourable position like Burgos, a confined shameful one like Trevino, is to say to the enemy, you have nothing to fear, go elsewhere, we have made our dispositions to go further back; or we have chosen our ground to fight, come there without fear of being disturbed on your march. But what will the French general do if the enemy marches the next day upon Burgos? Will he let the citadel of that town be taken by six thousand insurgents? if the French have left a garrison in the castle, how can four or five hundred men retire in such a vast plain? From that time all is gone; if the enemy masters the citadel, it cannot be retaken. If, on the contrary, we should guard the citadel, we must give battle, because it cannot hold out more than three days; and if we are to fight, why should Bessières abandon the ground where we wish to fight.

“These dispositions appear badly considered: when the enemy shall march, our troops will meet with such an insult as will demoralize them, if there are only insurgents or light troops advancing against them. If fifteen thousand insurgents enter Burgos, retrench themselves in the town and occupy the castle, it will be necessary to calculate a march of several days to enable us to post ourselves there and retake the town, which cannot be done without some inconvenience; if, during this time, the real attack is upon Logroño or Pampeluna, we shall have made countermarches without use, and fatigued the army. If we hold it with cavalry only, is it not to say, we do not intend stopping, and invite the enemy to come there? It is the first time an army has quitted all its offensive positions to take up a bad defensive line, and affect to choose its field of battle, when the thousand and one combinations which might take place and the distance of the enemy did not leave a probability of being able to foresee if the battle would take place at Tudela, between Tudela and Pampeluna, between Soria and the Ebro, or between Burgos and Miranda del Ebro.’

“Then followed an observation which may be studied with advantage by those authors who, unacquainted with the simplest rudiments of military science, and in profound ignorance of numbers, positions and resources, point out the accurate mode of executing the most delicate and difficult operations of war. The rebuke of Turenne, who frankly acknowledged to Louvois that he could pass the Rhine at a particular spot, if the latter's finger were a bridge, has been lost upon such men, and the more recent opinion of Napoleon may be disregarded. ‘But it is not permitted,’ says that consummate general, ‘it is not permitted, at the distance of three hundred leagues, and without even a state of the situation of the army, to direct what should be done!’

“Having thus avoided the charge of presumption, the emperor recommended certain dispositions for defending the Ebro, and giving a short analysis of Dupont's campaigns, declared that ‘twenty-five thousand French, in a good position, would suffice to beat all the Spanish armies united.’—‘Let Tudela,’ he said, ‘be retrenched if possible; at all events occupied in force, and offensively towards Zaragoza. Let the general commanding there collect provisions on all sides, secure the boats, with a view to future operations when the reinforcements shall arrive, and maintain his communication with Logroño by the right bank if he can, but certainly by the left; let his corps be considered one of observation. If a body of insurgents only approach, he may fight them, or keep them constantly on the defensive by his movements against their line or against Zaragoza; if regular troops attack him and he is forced across the Ebro, let him dispute the ground to Pampeluna until the general-in-chief has made his dispositions for the main body: in this manner no prompt movement upon Estella and Tolosa can take place, and the corps of observation will have amply fulfilled its task.

“‘Let Marshal Bessières, with his whole corps reinforced by the light cavalry of the army, encamp in the wood near Burgos; let the citadel be well occupied, the hospital, the dépôts, and all encumbrances sent over the Ebro; let him keep in a condition to act, be under arms

every day at three o'clock in the morning, and remain until the return of his patrols; he should also send parties to a great extent, as far as two days' march. Let the corps of the centre be placed at Miranda del Ebro and Briviesca, and the encumbrances likewise sent across the Ebro behind Vitoria; this corps should be under arms every morning, and send patrols by the road of Soria, and wherever the enemy may be expected: it must not be lost sight of, that these two corps, being to be united, should be connected as little as possible with Logroño, and consider the left wing as a corps detached, having a line of operations upon Pampeluna and a separate part to act: Tudela is preserved as a post contiguous to the line. Be well on the defensive, in short, make war! that is to say, get information from the alcaldes, the curates, the posts, the chiefs of convents, and the principal proprietors, you will then be perfectly informed. The patrols should always be directed upon the side of Soria, and of Burgos, upon Palencia, and upon the side of Aranda; they could thus form three posts of interception, and send three reports of men arrested, who should however be treated well and dismissed after they had given the information desired of them. Let the enemy then come: we can unite all our forces, hide our marches from him, and fall upon his flank at the moment he is meditating an offensive movement.'

"With regard to the minor details, the emperor thus wrote:—

"Soria is only two short marches from the position of the army, and it has constantly acted against us; an expedition sent there to disarm it, to take thirty of the principal people as hostages, and to obtain provisions would have a good effect. It would be useful to occupy Santander; it will be of advantage to move by the direct road of Bilbao to Santander. It will be necessary to occupy and disarm Biscay and Navarre, and every Spaniard taken in arms there should be shot. The manufactories of arms at Placencia should be watched, to hinder them from working for the rebels. The port of Pancorbo should be armed and fortified with great activity; ovens and magazines of provisions and ammunition should be placed there, because,

situated nearly half way between Madrid and Bayonne, an intermediate post for the army, and a point of support for troops operating towards Galicia. The interest of the enemy is to mask his forces; by hiding the true point of attack, he operates so, that the blow he means to strike is never indicated in a positive way, and the opposing general can only guess it by a well-matured knowledge of his own position, and of the mode in which he makes his offensive system act to protect his defensive system.

“ ‘ We have no accounts of what the enemy is about, it is said no news can be obtained, as if this case was extraordinary in an army, as if spies were common; they must do in Spain as they do in other places. Send parties out. Let them carry off, sometimes the priest, sometimes the alcalde, the chief of a convent, the master of the post or his deputy, and above all the letters. Put these persons under arrest until they speak; question them twice each day, or keep them as hostages; charge them to send foot messengers and to get news. When we know how to take measures of vigour and force it is easy to get intelligence. All the posts, all the letters must be intercepted; the single motive of procuring intelligence will be sufficient to authorize a detachment of four or five thousand men, who will go into a great town, take the letters from the post, seize the richest citizens, their letters, papers, gazettes, &c. It is beyond doubt, that even in the French lines, the inhabitants are all informed of what passes, of course out of that line they know more; what then should prevent you from seizing the principal men? Let them be sent back again without being ill-treated. It is a fact, that when we are not in a desert but in a peopled country, if the general is not well-instructed it is because he is ignorant of his trade. The services which the inhabitants render to an enemy's general are never given from affection, nor even to get money; the truest method to obtain them is by safeguards and protections to preserve their lives, their goods, their towns, or their monasteries ! ’ ”

EXPLANATION OF THE PLANS.

IN all the Plans, the base plane of the piece or area of ground represented is left White.

All Slopes are painted light Brown, or, more properly speaking, light Burnt-Sienna. All Table-Lands (*i. e.* all those portions of ground which may be approximately considered as being horizontal, and situated out of the base plane, around the tops of the hills or mountains, or half or any portion of the way up them) are painted light Blue.

Woods are painted dark Green.

Lakes, Ponds, and Rivers light Green.

Towns, Villages, Houses, Masonry, dark Brown, or, more properly speaking, dark Burnt-Sienna.

Roads are indicated by one or two black lines, according to their magnitude, and are not painted at all.

When the armies represented in either of the Plans are each composed of men of a single nation, or when one of them or both are composed of different nations, but it is not found necessary or expedient to indicate this by giving different colours to the different nations of which either army is composed, then—

For the one army:—

1st Position, will be painted light Yellow.

2d Position, dark Yellow.

3d Position, Orange.

For the other army:—

1st Position, light Red.

2d Position, dark Red.

3d Position, dark Lake.

The Tactical Lines by which the different bodies of either army move from one position to another are indicated by dotted lines.

When a diagonal is drawn across any one of the little parallelograms representing corps, that corps is of cavalry.

The reasons for choosing the way of representing the configuration of a piece or area of ground adopted, viz. leaving the base plane of the piece of ground white, painting all slopes light brown, or light burnt-sienna, and all table-lands, *i. e.* all pieces of ground, whether at the tops of hills or mountains, or any part of the distance up them, which may approximately be considered as horizontal planes, light blue, are—

1. The facility and rapidity with which an area of ground is in this way represented.

2. The distinctness with which the configuration of the area of ground represented stands out to the eye.

3. The slopes being merely painted, and not covered with a multiplicity of black lines (which are no small trouble in making), numbers can be written in, indicating the rapidity of the slopes and the height of the hills to which they belong; as well, remarks can be written in when required.

